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Forbearance as Redistribution: 
Enforcement Politics in Urban Latin America 
 
 
Abstract 
Why do governments tolerate the violation of their own laws and regulations, and when 
do they enforce them? Conventional wisdom is that state weakness erodes enforcement, 
particularly in the developing world.  In contrast, I highlight the understudied political costs of 
enforcement.  Governments choose not to enforce state laws and regulations that the poor tend 
to violate, a behavior that I call forbearance, when it is in their electoral interest.  
I argue that two central factors shape enforcement decisions: first, the economic 
progressivity of welfare expenditures affects incentives for local politicians to enforce. When 
social policies are truncated or absent, forbearance emerges as a credible way for politicians to 
boost welfare informally and signal their distributive priorities.  Second, political decentralization 
determines the electoral weight of poor voters. When elections occur at a local level and poor 
voters constitute a plurality, politicians are more likely to forbear in line with district preferences.  
I develop the argument through a set of comparative case studies of enforcement against 
two legal violations—squatting and unlicensed street vending—in three Latin American capital 
cities since 1990.  I draw on an original public opinion survey and experiment, in-depth 
interviews, administrative records, newspaper archives, and campaign platforms.  Several 
empirical observations distinguish my theory from dominant alternatives centered on state 
weakness: 1) the poor support forbearance and candidates who advocate it, 2) politicians block 
enforcement on electoral grounds even after bureaucrats perform their roles, 3) enforcement 
choices vary with politicians’ core constituencies, and 4) electoral rules generate predictable 
enforcement patterns.  
 iv 
The contribution is to show how forbearance can function as an informal welfare policy, 
and how its use in turn alters the politics of tax-based redistribution in low and middle-income 
democracies.  Scholars often assume that political divisions form between the Left that favors 
tax-based redistribution and the Right that resists it.  My research instead suggests that electoral 
competition can center on informal welfare policies, particularly in contexts where formal 
benefits accrue to the middle class. 
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Chapter 1 
An Electoral Theory of Forbearance 
 
The Law, in its majestic equality, forbids, the rich, as well as the poor,  
to sleep under the bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread.  
—Anatole France, The Red Lily (1894) 
 
María Luz has a newspaper article plastered to her precarious house in a squatter settlement 
in Bogotá, Colombia.  The article title reads, “Social Interest Housing: A False Promise?”  It chides 
the Colombian government for excluding the poor from its housing program through onerous 
savings requirements.  As María Luz reasons, the absence of state housing options “protects” her 
house built in the city’s slums without land title: “If the government will not provide a decent home 
and living conditions for my family, then it has no right to take me off this land.”1 
Indeed, just ten miles from María Luz’s neighborhood, the Colombian Congress debated 
legislation to build a million houses for the poor.  The Housing Ministry pitched the bill as a way to 
undercut squatting.  Two-thirds of housing construction in Colombia in the past thirty years has 
occurred informally because, as the government itself acknowledges, it does not provide accessible 
alternatives for poor families.2  María Luz is similar to millions of Latin Americans who have 
violated state laws and regulations to secure basic social goods.  The poor’s access to housing, 
electricity, and employment hinges on how property laws are implemented.  Yet rarely are 
enforcement decisions incorporated into analyses of social policy or electoral politics.   
Conventional wisdom is that limited enforcement reflects a weak state unable to implement 
its laws due to resource constraints or inept bureaucracies.  In light of standard expectations, 
widespread violations of property laws are perhaps unsurprising in low and middle-income countries 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Author interview, Bogotá, Colombia, September 5, 2012. 
2 “Viviendas aplazan candidatura de Vargas en 2014,” El Colombiano, 29 April 2012.   
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where institutions are weak and ineffective.  Governments cannot act otherwise.  Far more puzzling, 
then, are instances when governments do enforce their laws.  Politicians evict street vendors, 
bulldoze squatter settlements, raze informal mining rigs, and disconnect illegal electricity lines.  After 
a century of encroachment, for example, the Peruvian government removed more than 30,000 street 
vendors to recover Lima’s historic center in the late-1990s.  Equally nettlesome questions arise as to 
why governments with otherwise effective institutions do not enforce their laws.  The Chilean 
government can compel citizens to wear seat belts, and yet looks the other way when thousands of 
street vendors sell everything from car parts to feather dusters on major avenues.   
These scattered examples raise broad questions about enforcement politics:  Why do 
governments tolerate the violation of their laws and regulations?  And when do they enforce them, 
or change the letter of the law to match lived experience?  These broad questions give rise to more 
micro-level questions about how ordinary citizens, bureaucrats, and politicians view enforcement.  
Do citizens want enforcement?  Does income or political ideology impact enforcement demands? 
And what do enforcement attitudes and decisions say about how citizens and state officials view the 
poor and their social responsibilities?  Do bureaucrats subvert politicians’ enforcement orders, and 
for what reasons?  
This project uses the lens of distributive politics to study enforcement of property laws that 
the poor tend to violate in low and middle-income democracies. The core argument is that 
governments choose not to enforce laws, a behavior that I call forbearance, when it is in their electoral 
interest.  I argue that two key factors help to shape enforcement patterns: First, the social policy 
context, and particularly, the targeting of government social expenditures; and second, the electoral 
geography, by which I mean the ways that class groups segregate across political districts and 
aggregate into national politics. 
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The first factor—the social policy context—shapes the weight that politicians place on the 
functional benefits of forbearance.  While less tangible than the provision of homes or water pipes, 
governments provide a form of informal welfare when they forgo enforcement of laws that the poor 
tend to violate.  The provision of informal welfare makes the poor more likely to support and 
organize around enforcement as a way to resolve their social demands.  Public support and 
mobilization encourages politicians to forbear to boost local public welfare and signal their 
distributive commitments.  State welfare provision that reaches the poor, in contrast, encourages 
politicians to enforce because it directly shifts voters’ demands to government programs and 
indirectly reduces the reputational costs of enforcement.   
The second factor—electoral geography—sheds light on enforcement patterns in the 
absence of adequate state welfare provision.  Where politicians cannot or will not provide for social 
demands through formal channels, enforcement choices turn on the poor’s electoral power.  The 
way that electoral decentralization has occurred affects the concentration of poor voters and thus 
gives rise to predictable patterns of enforcement.  Politicians who require the support of the poor to 
win office, such as those in homogeneous low-income districts, are more likely to forbear.  In 
contrast, politicians who run for office in upper class or heterogeneous districts can exclude the 
poor from their winning coalition and are more likely to enforce.  Voter demographics are very 
important in predicting where enforcement will occur, although politicians’ links to political parties, 
ideological beliefs, and competitive pressures also can affect whether they bow to their geographic 
constituents’ preferences.     
Together, these propositions suggest that enforcement is malleable and contingent on 
political incentives, rather than a reflection of underlying levels of institutional capacity.  State 
capacity still matters, but not in the way typically discussed. The state’s ability to resolve social 
welfare claims, or distributive capacity, constrains enforcement under democracy more forcefully than 
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budgets, police or bureaucrats.  The contribution of this project is to demonstrate how distributive 
concerns limit enforcement, and how weak enforcement in turn reshapes redistributive politics.  
This chapter proceeds in four parts.  The first lays out the main questions.  The second 
introduces the concept of forbearance.  The third presents the theory.  The fourth discusses the 
research design.  The fifth provides the chapter overview and summarizes the contributions.   
1 Dual Puzzles 
This project juxtaposes a puzzle about redistribution and a puzzle about enforcement.  First, 
one of the great promises of democracy is a more egalitarian distribution of wealth.  When the poor 
are given the franchise in unequal societies, they should “soak” the rich (Acemoglu and Robinson 
2005; Lenski 1984; Lipset 1981).  Yet even after two decades of stable democracy, Latin America 
remains one of the most unequal regions in the world and evidence that the poor want and are able 
to boost social spending is limited (Kaufman 2009).   
Compared to advanced democracies, Latin American states spend less on social expenditures 
and, critically, less on the poor.  Social expenditures average 13 percent of GDP in Latin America 
compared to 20 percent in OECD countries. On average, taxes and transfers reduce the Gini 
coefficient by 36 percent in Europe, but only by 10 percent in Latin America (Leiden Budget 
Incidence Fiscal Redistribution Database 2011).  The extent to which social expenditures prioritize 
the poor in the region also varies widely.  Government spending still leaves inequality basically 
unchanged in Colombia, Guatemala, and Peru, while it improves the income distribution by more 
than a fifth in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay (Lustig, Pessino, and Scott 2013). 
The combination of high levels of inequality and low levels of redistribution in Latin 
America cuts against expectations.  Workhorse political economy models predict that increases in 
pre-tax inequality lead the median voter to support more redistribution (Meltzer and Richard 1981; 
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Romer 1975).  Scholars extend this intuition cross-nationally and expect higher levels of 
redistribution in unequal democracies.  Empirically, however, redistribution seems least present in 
the unequal societies where it is most needed (Bénabou 1997; Iversen and Soskice 2009; Lindert 
2004; Perotti 1996).  Figure 1.1 highlights that higher levels of inequality in Latin America, 
operationalized by the Gini coefficient, are associated with lower levels of government social 
expenditures compared to the OECD.  Moreover, there is little relationship between inequality and 
the extent of redistribution within Latin America.       
 
FIGURE 1.1. Inequality and Redistribution in the OECD and Latin America 
SOURCE: OECD Database and ECLAC (2012). 
A focus on the urban informal sector sharpens the redistributive puzzle.  Arguably one of 
the most important demographic trends in twentieth century Latin America has been the emergence 
of the urban informal sector, meaning workers who engage in licit activities without formal labor 
contracts or benefits.  The transition from import-substitution industrialization (ISI) to open 
economies, combined with the debt crisis of the 1980s, led to an explosion of urban informality.  By 
some estimates, the urban informal sector encompassed 45.9 percent of the region’s workforce by 
the 1990s, and union density plummeted to around 10 percent in most countries (Portes and 
Hoffman 2003).  Social policy, however, has been truncated because it often only covers those with 
steady formal sector employment (DeFerranti, Perry, and Ferreira 2004; Díaz-Cayeros and Magaloni 
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2009; Haggard and Kaufman 2008).  Governments have made substantial progress in recent years to 
target transfers to the poor and extend major benefit programs.  Nonetheless, progress has been 
uneven across country and policy area (Garay 2010; Gasparini and Lustig 2011; Pribble 2010, 
2013a).  
A large literature attempts to explain why welfare spending lags in unequal societies.  
Political economists point to several factors, from political competition in multi-dimensional policy 
space (De La O and Rodden 2008; Roemer 1998) to lobbying and campaign finance (Grossman and 
Helpman 2002; Karabarbounis 2011) and electoral rules (Iversen and Soskice 2006) that may limit 
the extent to which democracies actually redistribute resources.  In the context of Latin America, the 
prevailing explanation ties low levels of redistribution to the political distortions caused by vast 
inequalities (Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Karl 2004; Robinson 2010) and fragmented workplaces 
that weaken labor power (Huber and Stephens 2011; Roberts 2002; Weyland 1996a).  While 
inequality undoubtedly has political ramifications, explanations that focus on distortions in the 
political process assume that the poor would lobby for expansions in social spending if they had 
greater clout.  Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), for instance, take income-based preferences over 
redistribution, which they then weight by each income group’s influence, to model the political 
process.  But the poor in Latin America do not necessarily demand or organize in favor of more 
state redistribution.  They have offered erratic support for leftist candidates (Handlin 2007; Levitsky 
and Roberts 2011), and uneven support for state actions to reduce inequality (Blofield and Luna 
2011; Kaufman 2009).    
These facts raise a series of questions.  How did Latin American states sustain 
“redistributive” policies that offered almost nothing to half the workforce for decades?  How can 
they continue these practices under democracy?  Why don’t poor voters hold elected officials 
accountable, replacing them with new legislators and executives who will shift policy toward their 
! 7 
interests?  Even if unable to secure better representation at the ballot box, why haven’t urban 
informal sector workers used their proximity to seats of political power to mobilize and pressure for 
more inclusive social policy?   
This project proposes a novel answer to these questions by highlighting the distinctive 
nature of Latin American welfare regimes.3  My argument is that Latin American states distribute 
resources through forbearance, or more broadly through what I call informal welfare policies, to secure 
the support of poor voters.  Reliance on forbearance creates feedback effects on attitudes, interest 
associations, and electoral competition that perpetuate the poor’s exclusion from formal welfare 
policies.  The poor lack incentives to lobby for formal legislative change in social policies when 
adjustments in the substantive effects of laws and the distribution of resources can be made 
informally.  Forbearance also allows politicians to link to voters through the manipulation of laws, 
rather than the provision of public goods or the pursuit of policy reforms.  By theorizing how 
informal welfare policies can “crowd out” formal substitutes and complement absent or truncated 
social expenditures, this project helps understand the limited progressivity of Latin America’s 
welfare states.  It also explains why class is a weak predictor of demands for redistribution, despite 
yawning income inequality. 
A second core puzzle concerns the weak rule of law.  Numerous scholars have noted the gap 
between written law and lived norms in Latin America (Fischer 2008; García Villegas 2009; Helmke 
and Levitsky 2006; Holston 2008; Weyland 2002).  Guillermo O’Donnell (1999)’s pioneering work 
pointed out the vast “brown areas” in Latin America where the law is functionally and territorially 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 I follow Hacker (2002) in using the term “welfare regime” for the broad constellation of state 
actions that affect income shares and risks, while limiting a “welfare state” to government tax and 
transfer policies.  “Social policy” and “welfare policy” refer to any government action that 
reallocates income or risks, and can include informal versions that provide functionally equivalent 
benefits outside of formal channels.     
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absent.  However, O’Donnell offered little more than state weakness in the wake of debt crisis by 
way of explanation.  
At the most basic level, the legal-security apparatus, or coercive capacity, of the state constrains 
enforcement.  Theoretically, a state can deter and penalize all offenses with sufficient resources for 
police, judges, and bureaucrats.  Yet few states have this fiscal luxury, particularly in low and middle-
income countries.  Centeno and Portes (2006), for instance, describe the relationship between those 
in violation of the law and the state as one of constant conflict; the state attempts to assert its 
authority, but cannot sufficiently deter citizens due to resource limitations. As Levitsky and Murillo 
(2009: 121) write, “A major cause of weak enforcement is limited state capacity to monitor and 
sanction.”  This vision of enforcement bound by budget and personnel constraints also undergirds 
much of the classic work in economics on optimal enforcement levels (Becker 1968; Stigler 1970). 
Beyond coercive capacity constraints, scholars point to the training and control of the 
bureaucracy, or administrative capacity, to explain weak enforcement.  The fact that rules have to be 
applied and enforced, often by actors other than the designers, opens up space for change to occur 
in a rule’s enactment. In particular, principal agent problems complicate enforcement. North (1990: 
59), for instance, emphasizes: “Enforcement in Third World economies is uncertain not only 
because of ambiguity of legal doctrine (a measurement cost), but because of uncertainty with respect 
to the behavior of the [government] agent.”  Bribes corrupt police and bureaucrats.  Implementation 
thus lags because politicians cannot control the behavior of “street-level” bureaucrats (e.g. Cross 
1998; Dimitrov 2009; Geddes 1994; Lipsky 1980; O'Brien and Li 1999). In this view, politicians 
prefer to enforce the law and bureaucrats undercut implementation.4   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Combined, coercive and administrative capacity can be thought to constitute what Mann (1984) 
coined as the “infrastructural” power of the state, a concept that Soifer and vom Hau (2008) call to 
revive.  Throughout, I use the term “state weakness” in the standard sense of deficits in coercive and 
administrative capacities that affect what the state possibly can do to enforce its laws.  
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Enforcement outcomes, however, do not coincide neatly with state strength.  Consider, for 
instance, some of Latin America’s variation in two common urban offenses, informal commerce and 
squatting.  Figure 1.2 visualizes the puzzle.  It plots a loose measure of administrative capacity, 
“government effectiveness,” which is a composite measure of the quality of bureaucracy, 
infrastructure, and administrative training compiled by the World Bank’s Governance Indicators, 
against urban informal employment and squatting.  It is clear that Latin American governments vary 
widely in effectiveness, ranging from the bottom to top quintile of global rankings.  As discussed 
further below, this study purposely focuses on three cases (shown in red) with maximum variation in 
administrative capacity: Peru, Colombia, and Chile.  While more effective states do have lower levels 
of both offenses, government effectiveness explains less than 10 percent of the variation in offense 
levels.  Other common proxies for state capacity—income tax collection, national income (GDP per 
capita), infrastructure coverage, and so on—show similarly broad variation and weak explanatory 
power.  For example, despite similar levels of per capita income and poverty rates, roughly two-
thirds of Peru’s urban population live in squatter settlements, while less than one-third do in 
Colombia.  Wealthy cities like Montevideo, Uruguay have tolerated important land invasions 
(Alvarez Rivadulla 2012), while far poorer capitals like Quito, Ecuador have prevented and expulsed 
squatters (Dosh 2010).   
More broadly, both state capacity approaches assume that governments attempt to enforce 
their regulations and fail, which begs the question of why laws go unenforced in otherwise effective 
states.  Governments—and even military regimes (Bayat 1998; Collier 1976; Dorman 2007; Gilbert 
2002; Kusnetzoff 1987)—allow legal violations to unfold even when resources and hierarchical 
administrative control exist.  Santiago, Chile best illustrates the point.  Despite a highly respected 
police force and ample resources, the city streets are peppered with more than 50,000 unlicensed 
street vendors.   
! 10 
 
FIGURE 1.2.  State Capacity as a Partial Explanation of Informal Commerce and Squatting   
SOURCE: Government effectiveness indicator from the World Bank (2009); Urban Informal Commerce from ECLAC 
(2007); Urban Squatter Populations from UN-Habitat (2005). 
Rapid shifts in enforcement by administration similarly hint at the fact that state capacity, 
which often changes slowly, is a partial explanation of behavior at best.  For instance, mayors in a 
number of capitals in the developing world evicted street vendors from city streets in the 1990s after 
decades of tolerance. Some cities then let the vendors return or expand, such as Caracas, Venezuela, 
Kampala, Uganda, Lusaka, Zambia, and Mexico City, Mexico, while others remained firm, such as 
Lima, Peru and Kigali, Rwanda.  
Why do some governments tolerate the violation of the law, while others enforce it?  Why 
do governments enforce against some offenses, but not others?  By connecting the redistributive 
and enforcement puzzles, this study seeks to show their mutual resolution.  Enforcement often has 
distributive consequences.  Squatters gain rent-free housing if their takings succeed.  Street vendors 
secure a way to earn a living when the government ignores their unlicensed stands.  These 
distributive consequences can be powerful constraints on the behavior of elected officials, 
particularly under democracy and decentralized metropolitan governance.  Attention to the ability of 
governments to resolve distributive demands and to the electoral dynamics, I argue, provides greater 
leverage to explain variation in enforcement across space, time, and sector than explanations rooted 
in coercive or administrative capacity alone. 
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2 The Concept 
This project introduces a new concept, forbearance, to distinguish deliberate choices not to 
enforce state laws from garden-variety state weakness.  In common parlance, forbearance describes a 
broad set of situations.  It can imply a decision not to enforce a contract, debt, law or regulation.  
Here, I define forbearance as intentional and revocable government leniency toward violations of the law.  There 
are three components to this definition—capacity, intention, and revocability—that I walk though in 
this section and use to distinguish related concepts in Figure 1.3.   
First, institutional capacity distinguishes forbearance from forms of weak enforcement in 
which actors cannot enforce the law.  In states with scant personnel or budgets, the enforcement 
outcome is uniform. Forbearance only can occur when states plausibly muster the infrastructure to 
sanction offences.5   
Second, and most critically, forbearance occurs when a political actor chooses not to enforce a 
law.  In cases of forbearance, the capacity to enforce exists, but the intent to do so is absent.  
Enforcement preferences diverge between the actors who design and those who implement a law or 
policy.  A contemporary example helps clarify the point.  In 2012, President Barack Obama 
suspended the deportation of young illegal immigrants.  Although immigration authorities have the 
budget and agents to deport youths, and the law unambiguously orders authorities to do so, the 
President has decided not to follow the letter of the law.  The choice evidences a political preference 
to alter the law’s impact at the implementation stage or what critics decry as “backdoor legal reform” 
that circumvents the legislature.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 As an empirical matter, the identification of state capacity is tricky because governments can 
withdraw state resources as a strategy not to implement a regulation, and can work with societal 
actors or businesses to bolster their internal capacity as well (Amengual 2013).  I tackle this issue of 
how to separate capacity constraints in the empirical chapters. 
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A third core definitional element is that forbearance is revocable.  The state reserves the 
right to enforce the law and offenders believe that the rules can carry a credible sanction.  This 
insecurity differentiates forbearance from cases of amnesty, pardon or legalization.  There, the state 
formally surrenders its enforcement rights.  Revocable decisions, on the other hand, are open to 
revision and are more likely to be negotiated informally.  Revocability is important because it permits 
a form of dependent exchange in which those who violate the law require a politician’s continued 
benevolence.  Amnesty or legalization can foment political gratitude, but benefits are not contingent 
on continued loyalty.  Revocability also differentiates forbearance from alternative concepts of 
“benign neglect” or “standoffish” state behavior (Dorman 2007; Slater and Kim 2013), where states 
intentionally eschew administration of an area.  Prolonged neglect means that states cannot easily 
reverse course and enforce at whim.  In cases of forbearance, politicians gain leverage through the 
maintenance of information and procedures to change their enforcement decisions.   
 
FIGURE 1.3.  Identifying Forbearance 
Forbearance also can be divided into subtypes based on its distributive effects.6  I define the 
progressivity of forbearance as in the economic analysis of the effects of taxes and transfers.  
Progressive forbearance occurs when lower tranches of the income distribution receive greater absolute 
or relative benefits through the tolerance of law breaking than upper tranches.  Regressive !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Some types of forbearance do not have clear distributive consequences, such as choices about the 
enforcement of moral and religious regulations (laws against sodomy, burial restrictions, and so on), 
but they are not the focus of this project. 
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forbearance implies that upper tranches capture greater benefits.  A benefit is defined as the net 
value of the offense to most individuals.7  Some offenses, like copyright infringement, generate 
important economic gains and limited moral disutility.  Other crimes, like allowing individuals to kill 
bankers or sell their organs, generate risks and ethical quandaries that dissipate the income gains for 
most individuals.  Progressivity is clearest when property and regulatory violations are at stake, 
rather than “hard” crimes.  This project focuses exclusively on cases of progressive forbearance due 
to their importance for the lives of the poor and relationship with welfare politics; here, I use the 
term forbearance as shorthand to refer exclusively to its progressive subtype.   
There are two ways that a government impacts progressivity through its enforcement 
decisions.  First, choices about which laws and regulations to enforce, or selective enforcement, have 
distributive consequences.8  In this case, progressivity is measured by how the marginal utility of an 
offense changes with income.  Forbearance must be directed toward laws that the poor tend to 
violate to progressively distribute resources.  The criminalization of homelessness clarifies the point.  
Although facially neutral, vagrancy laws have a discriminatory impact on the poor, given that few 
wealthy individuals choose to sleep under bridges when they have a home at their disposal.  
Enforcement of laws that the wealthy tend to violate (“white collar” crime), like those against pure 
cocaine use, foreign tax shelters or insider trading, has the opposite distributive consequences.    
Other laws can benefit all income groups if ignored.  In these cases, progressivity depends 
on which groups are targeted for enforcement, or segmented enforcement.  Consider the case of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 While I focus on the benefits derived by the person violating the law, there can be ancillary 
distributive effects that benefit other class groups.  For example, in the cases of domestic service or 
illegal immigration, the benefits to the worker who violates the law may be trumped by the 
economic benefits to employers who gain a cheaper workforce.  In classifying types of forbearance, 
I follow the conventions in the analysis of social policies and consider the policy incidence.  But in 
understanding the politics of forbearance, I do allow other class groups to benefit and separately 
consider the social welfare effects of the policy as a whole.   
8 O’Brien and Li (1999) use the term selective implementation for a similar concept. 
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enforcement against electricity theft.  If a government does nothing to prevent electricity theft, then 
industries with high usage absorb the greatest absolute benefit.  However, poor users may receive 
the maximum relative benefit given that they spend a greater share of their income on services and 
they are potentially judgment proof in the case of prosecution.  Weak enforcement thus has mixed 
distributive effects: it is likely regressive in absolute terms, and progressive in relative terms.  
However, if regulators prosecute industrial users and ignore illegal users in poor neighborhoods, the 
result is solidly progressive.9  The incidence depends not on the type of law, as with street vending 
prohibitions discussed in Chapter 4, but rather on how governments use their discretion in 
enforcement of a law, as with land use regulations examined in Chapter 3. 
Forbearance can be extended to individuals or groups.  This project focuses exclusively on 
forms of forbearance that cover a class or group. Collective forbearance raises the stakes in 
conceptually important ways.  Enforcement decisions are more likely to be publicly observed when a 
group is affected.  The reputational effects of enforcement thus ripple beyond those who violate the 
law.  Collective violations of the law also shift the power dynamic.  Groups raise the electoral costs 
of enforcement, as they represent a bloc of votes and can threaten collective action.  As one mayor 
sums up, “If one squatter invades a piece of land, I call the police, but if one thousand squatters 
invade, I give a call to the president.”10  
The mode through which forbearance is distributed can differ.  Clientelism is often defined 
by individual-level quid pro quo protocol (Stokes et al. 2013).  Consistent with this definition, 
forbearance can be provided in specific cases as a reward contingent on political loyalty (Chubb 
1982).  The quote ascribed to Brazilian President Gétulio Vargas captures the sentiment: “For my 
friends, everything; for my enemies, the law.” When forbearance implicates groups of citizens, it !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 The inverse also can occur, as Golden and Min (2013) document in Uttar Pradesh, where 
authorities allow powerful farmers to use excess electricity prior to elections.  
10 Author interview with John Barrera, Mayor, District of Ancón, Lima, Peru, December 1, 2011.   
! 15 
becomes a club good.  It also can be exchanged for a group’s turnout or votes in which case the 
relationship still may be clientelistic.11  Direct political exchange, cemented through personal or 
group reciprocity, can drive forbearance in some cases.   
Crucially, however, forbearance is not a subtype of clientelism.  Forbearance also can be 
extended in a programmatic manner.   Minimalist definitions of programmatic policy center on the 
idea that disbursements are 1) made based on transparent criteria, regardless of whether a particular 
individual supported or opposed the politician or party that designed the policy, and 2) that the 
criteria of distribution are formalized (Kitschelt 2000: 850; Stokes et al. 2013: 7).  Much like a 
programmatic policy, forbearance can be provided in a transparent way and independent of political 
loyalty.  To continue with the immigration example, Obama instructed prosecutors to exercise their 
discretion to exempt all young immigrants, not to reward select followers in the Democratic Party.  
As we will see in the empirical chapters that follow, politicians often are open in their beliefs that 
certain laws should not be enforced when offenders are poor and direct their subordinates to follow 
these distributive criteria.  While this position can be motivated by an instrumental desire to secure 
votes, it is a generalized position that applies to an entire class of individuals.  Indeed, as I will 
discuss below, one of the main drivers of progressive forbearance is the need to signal broad 
distributive commitments.  Despite public positions, forbearance is uniformly an informal policy in 
that it is unwritten and communicated outside of formal political channels.  In this sense, it falls 
short of standard definitions of programmatic policy.  As such, progressive forbearance constitutes 
an informal welfare policy. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 How to treat group-based contingent exchanges is the matter of some disagreement in the 
literature.  Some definitions of clientelism permit the distribution of club goods when the dyad is 
conceptualized as the groups exchanging their vote for benefits from a politician (e.g. Abente Brun 
and Diamond 2014; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007), while others require individual-level exchanges 
given a requirement to monitor vote choice (e.g. Stokes et al. 2013). 
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Progressive forbearance provides three functional benefits to state authorities that come in 
its level, timing, and targeting.  First, forbearance can raise the level of social good provision.  
Because forbearance can be provided immediately by withholding state capacity, it can be a more 
credible social policy promise and result in immediate distributive improvements compared to the 
expansion of state welfare programs.  Second, governments can manipulate the timing of 
forbearance as a form of social insurance.  Developing countries struggle to execute counter-cyclical 
social policy because they have limited access to capital markets during tough times and popular 
demands limit the ability to save during booms (Wibbels 2006).  Governments cut social 
expenditures when they are most needed in economic downturns.  In contrast, forbearance operates 
off government ledgers and can be manipulated to counteract the business cycle.  Similar dynamics 
can be observed at the local level: subnational politicians can turn to forbearance to absorb shocks 
to local economies or smooth citizens’ income during national administrations that cut targeted 
social policies.  Third, forbearance can target the poorest segments of the income distribution, while 
many social programs in Latin America favor middle-income formal sector workers.  Penalties for 
law breaking often are proportional to income, which discourages the nonpoor from breaking the 
law.   
Nonetheless, forbearance is an inefficient form of redistribution that results in material and 
abstract costs.  Law breaking imposes public harms such as the deterioration or appropriation of 
public goods, insecure property rights, unfair competition, and so on.  Widespread noncompliance 
can jeopardize a state’s legitimacy and indicate an ineffective state.  Forbearance also has negative 
consequences for citizenship regimes.  As T.H. Marshall (2006[1949]) argues, social citizenship 
constitutes the core idea of a modern welfare state.  Allowing the poor to enter into relationships of 
legal insecurity and criminality to secure basic goods is the opposite of a commitment to social 
solidarity embodied in state welfare policies.  The manipulation of laws and regulations, while often 
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producing material benefits for the poor, segregates the poor from state institutions leading to what 
has been called a “poverty of rights” (Fischer 2008), the “unrule of law” (Holston 2008; O’Donnell 
1999), and “legal apartheid” (De Soto and Ghersi 1989).  The next section considers why 
forbearance arises and persists as an informal welfare policy, despite the fact that it imposes costs on 
both the state and society.   
3 The Argument  
My core argument is that politicians choose not to enforce the law when it is in their 
electoral interest.  I argue that the interaction of two variables—the social policy context and the 
urban electoral geography—accounts for the incidence of enforcement of laws that the poor violate.  
Forbearance is most likely to occur in the context of absent or truncated social policies that fail to 
meet the poor’s distributive demands.  Where the poor are unable to compete for formal social 
policies whose supply is relatively fixed and targeted on more organized groups in the short term, 
forbearance emerges as an important policy complement to formal welfare provision. National 
decisions about formal welfare policies thus can leave subnational politicians with a distributive 
dilemma, meaning a situation when citizens’ demands for basic social goods far outpace their 
political supply.  The structure of social policies also produces different heuristics for politicians to 
signal their distributive commitments to voters.  When promises of formal forms of welfare 
provision are viewed as non-credible, forbearance can be a powerful signal of a politician’s 
commitment to the poor.  The development of social policies that substitute for the poor’s demands 
allows politicians greater latitude to enforce because it shifts popular demands away from informal 
benefit provision and softens the association between enforcement and a politician’s distributive 
priorities.   
Differences in the poor’s electoral clout in turn explain variation in where we observe 
forbearance.  When the poor can back up their claims for basic goods with pivotal votes, local 
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politicians will forgo enforcement for this constituency.  Conversely, in the absence of political 
leverage, the poor are left with few resources to prevent enforcement, particularly when the costs of 
their activities are visible or tied to other ills that concern middle-class groups.  Electoral rules within 
cities produce different levels of political power for the poor, and thus variation in enforcement 
outcomes.  Forbearance is most likely and systematic in politically decentralized cities where local 
districts concentrate lower class residents.   
This electoral argument applies best to low and middle-income democracies with 
intermediate levels of institutional capacity. Although forbearance also occurs in authoritarian 
regimes, it is motivated by a quite different set of distributive pressures relating to regime stability 
and the need to maintain support among a smaller ruling faction.  In democratic contexts of high 
institutional capacity, distributive politics is more likely to center on formal welfare policies.  
Moreover, manipulations of enforcement are harder, but not impossible, as bureaucracies become 
more professionalized.  Forbearance also can occur in countries with limited institutional capacity, 
but its use is circumscribed to laws that are easy to enforce where politicians plausibly have real 
choices.  The concluding chapter considers more thoroughly how the argument could be extended 
to other settings.  I now walk through the two key pieces of the argument—social policy context and 
electoral geography—and derive several theoretical predictions that will guide the empirical chapters.          
3.1 National Welfare Regimes  
To begin, I briefly outline the origins of truncated welfare states and the reasons why 
forbearance offered an attractive alternative for governments to incorporate the urban poor into 
politics.  While multiple origin paths exist to give rise to widespread violations of the law by the 
poor, I argue that forbearance emerged in Latin America as a compromise strategy to distribute 
resources to the urban poor and complement truncated or underdeveloped welfare states.  I then 
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argue that the distinct pattern of welfare state development has legacies for the poor’s political 
behavior that persist and shape enforcement politics in the contemporary period.   
In broad strokes, Latin American governments faced a social policy challenge in the post-
World War II period.  On the one hand, rapid urbanization increased social demands for housing, 
employment, and basic services in urban areas.  On the other hand, coverage for “big ticket” social 
items like housing, pensions, and employment insurance requires upper class cooperation to raise 
taxes and expand redistribution.  The wealthy wielded sufficient political power to block tax 
increases or collection, and prevented the proposal of universalistic welfare policies to meet growing 
social demands.  States were constrained in their distributive capacity.   
Many Latin American governments resolved this tension by developing truncated welfare 
states that offered generous benefits to a limited segment of the workforce. Social benefits to 
industrial workers, or truncated social policies, were used to secure labor cooperation as 
governments attempted to accelerate growth through ISI (Collier and Collier 1979, 2002; Haggard 
and Kaufman 2008; Wibbels 2013).  The urban informal sector and rural sector received little from 
welfare programs, and paid for benefits through general taxes and inflation.  Other countries, such 
as Peru, did not advance as far with ISI.  With a smaller industrial labor force, they developed only 
skeletal welfare policies that spent little on citizens.  
Forbearance helped sustain truncated and skeletal welfare policies because it offered parties a 
way to avoid distributional conflict and expand their political coalitions.  To clarify, consider a 
stylized version of the interests of the Left and Right.  The Left is defined as pursuing pro-poor 
policies through state channels.  As Levitsky and Roberts (2011: 5) propose, “the Left refers to 
political actors who seek, as a central programmatic objective, to reduce social and economic inequalities.”  
Yet historically, the Left was thwarted to reduce inequalities through expansions of state tax and 
transfers.  It also drew its core constituency from organized labor that opposed reallocations of 
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benefits to the informal sector poor.  Therefore, the best way for the Left to assist the informal 
sector poor was through “hidden” forms of redistributive politics.  Left-wing politicians expanded 
their political coalitions through the tolerance, and even explicit promotion, of law breaking.  For 
example, Chile’s Socialist President Salvador Allende allowed land invasions to balloon because the 
government could not raise taxes or build sufficient social interest housing to meet popular demands 
(Portes and Walton 1976). Venezuela’s Democratic Alliance encouraged construction in the urban 
periphery after the restoration of democracy in 1958 with the explicit aim of building its political 
base among the urban poor at a time when expansions in formal welfare spending could have 
destabilized the fragile regime (Ray 1969). 
Forbearance also garnered the support of the Right.  The Right prioritizes the maintenance 
of existing distributions of income and a minimal state role in the redistribution of income (Luna 
and Kaltwasser Rovira 2013).  For right-leaning politicians, forbearance offers a way to contain the 
social demands of the poor without expansions of the state bureaucracy or tax increases on the 
wealthy.  The fact that forbearance is revocable makes it attractive to conservative politicians who 
may prefer to retract support when social demands ease.  Historically, forbearance allowed the Right 
to expand its political coalition beyond the upper class.  While the Left defended organized labor, 
the Right competed for the votes of the informal sector poor.  Vote buying was one way to gain the 
poor’s support, but the provision of access to basic goods through forbearance offered another 
important route to secure the support of urban masses.  Forbearance was most likely when the Right 
controlled the extent of forbearance and conservative politicians required the support of the urban 
informal sector to counter the Left’s political base among organized labor.  Peru’s dictator, General 
Manuel Odría, for instance, embraced forbearance as a type of “self-help” aid to the poor that 
would expand his support in Lima’s burgeoning shantytowns (Collier 1976).  Colombia’s dictator, 
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Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, almost displaced Colombia’s traditional political parties from power by 
supporting the claims of informal sector workers (Dix 1979). 
Admittedly, forbearance by right-leaning governments has been more erratic than support by 
the political Left.  Enforcement occurs when the Right enjoys sufficient legitimacy among middle-
class groups to ignore popular demands or when legal violations directly threaten elite interests.  For 
example, General Augusto Pinochet enforced firmly against squatters and street vendors due to the 
association of these activities with revolutionary activism and his strong support among the middle 
class.    
Figure 1.4 pictures the way that informal welfare appeals both to the political Left and Right 
and emerges as a complement to truncated welfare provision.  While the Left ideal type prefers pro-
poor spending through state channels, the constrained Left embraces forbearance for its pro-poor 
effects.  The Right ideal type favors limited spending and state interference.  However, the Right can 
support forbearance due to the low level of government involvement required to achieve stabilizing 
distributive outcomes. Unable or unwilling to incorporate the urban poor in state welfare programs, 
politicians across the aisle implicitly supported forbearance as the best response to demands for 
basic goods and services.     
This brief historical account differs from most recent work on the growth of the informal 
sector in that it views political actors as taking deliberate enforcement stances to build their political 
coalitions and complement formal welfare state structures.  Particularly after the debt crises of the 
1980s, scholars have noted that “family based aid” plays a key role in Latin American welfare states 
(Barrientos 2004; Franzoni 2008).  More broadly, it has been argued that informality cushions 
economic crisis and allows enterprising poor to improve their lot (Berger and Piore 1980; Centeno 
and Portes 2006; Loayza and Rigolini 2011; Perry 2007; De Soto and Ghersi 1989).  However, the 
common view is that these social safety nets expanded either through the state’s contraction and 
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decreased ability to regulate behavior, or through byzantine bureaucracies that prevented the poor 
from using formal property law systems.  This study emphasizes that governments take deliberate 
choices to permit informal forms of redistribution.  In doing so, I build on an older literature 
focused on squatter settlements that took seriously the political incentives of governments to 
encourage and tolerate their formation (Castells 1971; Collier 1976; Cornelius 1975; Dietz 1977, 
1985; Leeds 1974; Perlman 1974; Ray 1969).  But this literature largely viewed squatter settlements as 
a temporary phenomenon that surged with rapid urbanization in the post-World War II period, and 
focused on the clientelistic exploitation of squatter settlements.  While clientelism remains important 
in some cases, this study shows how forbearance increasingly forms part of an informal welfare 
debate about what the state owes the poor in contexts where formal policies fail to guarantee basic 
social rights.    
 
FIGURE 1.4.  Political Support for Informal Welfare Provision 
Forbearance has continued even as the pace of urban growth has slowed because social 
policies remain unable to meet the poor’s distributive claims.  Even with market reforms and 
democratization in the 1980s and 1990s, formal sector workers largely managed to protect their job 
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security and benefits due to their organization and alliances with labor-based political parties 
(Murillo and Schrank 2005; Wibbels 2013).  Workers with protected, formal sector jobs also became 
a smaller segment of the labor force as temporary, subcontracted, and other precarious labor 
contracts have expanded.  Recent reforms to include the urban poor in social policies in Latin 
America have occurred through welfare state expansions, not the redirection of spending away from 
unionized workers, and have proceeded unevenly across space and sector (Garay 2010; Huber and 
Stephens 2012; Pribble 2010; 2013a).  In many cases, changes to the structure of social benefits have 
not encompassed extensions in major expenditures like housing or employment insurance. 
The combination of forbearance for the poor and truncated (or minimal) welfare benefits 
for the middle class has long-term consequences for the structure of popular demands.  My micro-
level claim is that the poor prefer less enforcement against progressive offenses than the nonpoor.  
They poor also are more likely to support politicians who forbear.  In part, attitudes vary by income 
because the poor are the expected material beneficiaries.  Some poor individuals benefit directly if 
they engage in an offense.  Others gain an indirect benefit of insurance against an income shock, or 
consumption benefits from cheaper goods.  In contrast, the middle class suffers negative 
externalities from forbearance.  They can experience direct losses, such as higher electricity prices or 
outages when politicians tolerate illegal electricity connections.  They also lose access to public 
goods like sidewalks and conservation land that the poor appropriate for private use.  Although the 
poor may share the loss of public goods, they also receive countervailing benefits that can outweigh 
the diffuse costs.     
Material interests do not always lead the poor to favor forbearance and the nonpoor to 
oppose it.  Prospects for mobility and differences in economic investments may lead to divergent 
material interests within the informal sector poor (Widner 1991).  Or, a consumer-based perspective 
(Baker 2010) may suggest that individuals across the income spectrum benefit from lower prices on 
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goods produced informally.  Unlike other distributive goods, given a budget constraint, forbearance 
also might actually increase the pool of resources available for spending on public goods that might 
gain middle-class support.  For instance, the poor bear the costs of additional squatters who strain 
public resources and land.  The middle class receives benefits, although often opaque, as 
governments maintain social stability and truncated housing programs by permitting the poor to 
build informally.  Even in cases where material interests flip, however, my claim is that class 
preferences can emerge on group-based grounds. 
Individuals tend to be more supportive of policies as the share of recipients from their own 
group rises because of instrumental expectations or social affinity.  The poor are more likely to 
perceive politicians who forbear as more broadly representative of their interests.  In other words, 
forbearance serves as a distributive signal of a politician’s broader class commitments.  This distributive 
signal also can stem from greater sympathy with those affected by enforcement.  Preferences toward 
law enforcement in the abstract may differ little by class, but reactions to concrete situations within a 
community may depend on an individual’s identification with the individuals affected.  For example, 
Gibson (2008: 707) finds that South African blacks are more than twice as likely as whites to view 
the treatment of a specific squatter as unfair, even though beliefs about the rule of law in general 
differ little.   
Flipping the logic, the middle class are more likely to interpret forbearance as a negative 
indication about the quality of government as a whole, and are less likely to identify with the poor’s 
distributive claims.  The middle class is likely to perceive politicians who enforce as more likely to 
serve their class interests.  In this spirit, Weitz-Shapiro (2012) argues that middle class groups are 
more likely to punish politicians who use their discretion to manipulate policy.  Hence, on average, 
poor voters should reward, and nonpoor voters should punish, politicians who rely on forbearance. 
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Proposition 1.  Preferences toward informal welfare provision divide along class lines.  The poor 
are more supportive of forbearance than the nonpoor, and expect politicians who forbear to support 
their distributive interests more generally. 
 
This proposition diverges from findings about preferences toward formal redistribution in 
Latin America.  The materialist model of redistributive preferences, as formalized by Romer (1975) 
and Meltzer and Richard (1981), assumes that the gap between the median voter’s income and mean 
income determines individual support for redistribution.  However, the relationship between income 
and redistributive preferences is fragile in Latin America.  While some scholars find that demand for 
redistribution is higher among poor individuals (Gaviria 2008; Haggard, Kaufman, and Long 2013; 
Morgan and Kelly 2010), others find no correlation (Cramer and Kaufman 2011; Dion and 
Birchfield 2010; Kaufman 2009).  Why, then, would material interests drive preferences toward 
enforcement and only unevenly toward redistribution?   
This gap reflects differences in the economic progressivity of benefits provided through 
welfare state programs and forbearance. Truncated welfare states invert a central assumption of the 
comparative political economy literature—the “nonregressivity assumption” that the rich always lose 
from welfare policies, whereas the middle class does less well than the poor but better than the rich 
(Iversen and Soskice 2006).  Even with social insurance expenditures, nonregressivity holds because 
lower income households face greater risk and pay less in taxes (Moene and Wallerstein 2001, 2003; 
Rehm, Hacker, and Schlesinger 2012). Indeed, advanced democracies substantially favor the poor in 
their tax and transfer polices (Mahler 2010; Milanovic 2000).  The nonregressivity assumption is 
more tenuous in Latin America given that many countries continue to channel benefits to formal 
sector workers and middle-class groups.  The urban poor face variable—and sometimes very weak 
material incentives—to support formal welfare expenditures. Thus, using a simple material interest 
model, the relationship between income and support for formal redistribution should be weak in 
Latin America, and particularly for social welfare policies like housing or employment insurance that 
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exclude the poor.   In contrast, the urban poor can access the benefits of forbearance regardless of 
their labor market status.  As defined above, forbearance offers progressive benefits because the 
middle class is unwilling to stomach the legal risks associated.  It follows that the relationship 
between income and support for forbearance should be stronger and more uniform across country 
than that between income and social expenditures.  
My second proposition is that the structure of formal welfare policies shapes demands for 
forbearance.  I distinguish types of social policy by their relationship to forbearance.  A social policy 
substitute decreases demand for forbearance toward a type of law breaking.  For example, free state 
electricity provision to the poor reduces the need to tap electricity lines.  Hence, it suppresses 
demand for forbearance toward electricity theft.  Social policy complements have the opposite effect.  
The decision to provide electricity to the poor, for instance, may improve the quality of life in 
squatter settlements, attract more residents, and thus increase the demand for forbearance toward 
land invasions.  Properties of substitution and complementarity therefore are defined with respect to 
the legal violation in question. 
Minimal or truncated social policies are complementary to forbearance because they leave 
the poor’s basic material demands unresolved.  They “crowd in” forbearance by raising the value of 
the material goods provided.  In addition, limited formal policies lead the poor to expect little from 
national authorities.  Soifer (2013) documents, for instance, how the lack of state intervention in 
housing policy leads the poor to ignore national housing ministries and rely on their own means to 
build housing.  My contention, however, is that the poor do not withdraw from the state writ large 
when social policies are ineffective.  Instead, low expectations of national provision lead to a process 
of demand displacement in which local politicians who control enforcement receive strong pressure 
to meet social needs through informal means.  
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In contrast, the introduction of substitutive social policy can erode popular support for 
forbearance. Social policy investments can “crowd out” forbearance by directly resolving the poor’s 
material claims.  They also change expectations about state provision. Formal welfare expenditures 
concentrate popular demands on state authorities, which reinforce the state’s role and incentives to 
expand formal provision. Individuals who believe that the state provides distributive options for the 
poor should be less supportive of forbearance toward those who violate the law.  
The structure of interest associations shifts in a parallel fashion with the social policy 
context. The informal sector poor are often portrayed as politically disorganized.  Characteristics of 
informality itself—heterogeneity of employment, geographic separation, and precarious income—
are used to explain the informal sector’s limited class consciousness, fluid political allegiances, and 
inability to influence redistributive policy (Roberts 2002; Weyland 1996a).  When the informal sector 
poor do organize, they mobilize around particularistic demands, or “segmented collectivism,” and 
fail to aggregate their claims into broad movements (Roberts 2002).  Associations dissolve once local 
demands are fulfilled or clientelism co-opts members (R. B. Collier and Handlin 2009; Oxhorn 1995; 
Stokes 1995).  The informal sector poor have failed to form broad political movements to change 
social policy with few exceptions (for instance, see Garay 2007, 2010). 
Accounts that emphasize the informal sector’s lack of organization, however, overlook the 
ways in which the poor do act collectively.  The poor often change policy at the enforcement stage. 
As Scott (1969: 1142) recognizes, “A large portion of individual demands, and even group demands, 
in developing national reach the political system, not before laws are passed, but rather at the 
enforcement stage.” Informal organizations of squatters, street vendors, and neighbors form to 
secure forbearance and formalize their concrete advantages.  Because important welfare benefits are 
secured through the manipulation of enforcement, these informal benefits, rather than state social 
programs, galvanize action. While these demands are particularistic in the sense that they are 
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embedded in local contexts, they can cumulatively result in large-scale change in the distribution of 
goods and benefits and prompt policy reforms.  With the increased constitutional recognition of 
social rights, collective action around forbearance even can be framed in terms of rights to basic 
welfare.   
In contrast, substitutive policies shift social pressures and organizations in poor districts to 
expand spending, and in nonpoor districts to cut expenditures.  The spectrum of political 
competition thus shifts away from enforcement toward classic redistributive politics.  In other 
words, where social policies target the poor, citizens are more likely to demand and organize around 
formal goods provision.! 
Proposition 2.  The absence or truncation of social policies displaces popular demands and 
organizing to forbearance from local politicians.  Conversely, social policy substitution leads popular 
pressure and organizing to center on state welfare authorities. 
 
Substitutive social policies directly reduce demands for informal welfare provision, but they 
also shift the political supply by changing how voters judge politicians who enforce.  In the absence 
of substitutive social policies, forbearance can serve as a distributive signal about a politician’s 
commitments to provide for the poor.  A common fear of politicians was that they would be seen as 
“anti-poor” or “insensitive to the social costs” if they enforced without providing welfare 
alternatives.  But, when politicians have both formal and informal distributive tools at their disposal, 
enforcement says less about a politician’s class commitments.  Rather, enforcement in the context of 
substitutive social policies demonstrates a commitment to formal solutions to improve the lives of 
the poor, or what I label a legalism signal.  Consider, for instance, the reasoning of a mayor in Chile, 
where the state operates a massive housing program for the poor.  He explained that it was not hard 
to evict squatters because they “were just trying to cut the queue” and that he would have been seen 
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as “uncommitted to the State’s solutions” if he allowed the poor to take land.12  Through the 
reduction in material needs, displacement of popular demands, and attenuation of the signal 
conveyed about a politician’s distributive priorities, I expect:       
Proposition 3.  Politicians are more likely to enforce when in-kind social policy substitutes are 
available for the poor.   
 
Of course, social policies have varying abilities to displace forbearance as a form of 
redistribution.  In-kind transfers, such as the direct provision of housing or jobs, are the most 
effective policies because they reduce demand for forbearance, dissolve or reorient informal interest 
associations, and allow politicians to point to a direct alternative to illegal appropriations of the same 
good.  Without housing or high-quality employment to offer constituents, enforcement against 
squatters or street vendors still signals a politician who is insensitive to the poor’s social demands. 
The most widely adopted social policy to assist the poor in recent years has been means-tested 
conditional cash transfers.  Through a pure income effect, cash transfers can reduce demand for 
forbearance.  For example, some low-income individuals may choose to rely on government 
subsidies, rather than work as street vendors, or to rent an apartment, rather than build a home in a 
squatter settlement.  But cash transfers do not eliminate demand for the goods that can be accessed 
through forbearance, and may even make forbearance more valuable.  Street vendors may use cash 
transfers as capital to buy a cart with which to sell products, or the poor may gain the income to buy 
materials to build homes in an informal settlements.  Income-support also does not provide the 
means for local politicians to fulfill the poor’s specific social demands so they maintain strong 
incentives for forbearance.  
Against this backdrop, are policies to legalize informal benefits effective at promoting 
enforcement?  In large part inspired by the recommendations of Hernando De Soto (1989, 2000), !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Author interview with Pedro Isla Farías, Mayor, Municipality of San Ramón, Santiago, Chile, June 
21, 2012.   
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governments in the developing world have promoted programs to provide land title to squatters and 
licenses to informal street vendors, transport, and businesses.  On the one hand, formalization 
policies, particularly the provision of land title, can be political boons, as they increase legal security 
and allow politicians to proclaim their desire to fully recognize and incorporate the poor (Feierherd 
2013; Gilbert 2002; King 2003).  To the extent that informal interest associations form to protect 
their benefits, legalization policies fulfill their collective demands and demobilize informal 
associations.  The reduction in interest group pressure confers on local governments greater latitude 
to enforce.   
But on the other, the flaw is that legalization policies are retrospective solutions.  The 
provision of property titles, formalization projects, and subsidies to improve informal housing or 
markets are reactive social policies.  The poor only access these goods once they have violated the law. 
Reactive policies incentivize legal violations by showing that informal activities ultimately end with 
the official transfer or subsidization of a good.  Legalization and licensing policies increase the long-
term payoff of legal violations. They thus promote vicious cycles in which periods of forbearance 
end with legalization, which in turn encourages a new generation of law breaking on the expectation 
of eventual legalization when sufficient social demands accumulate.  As I turn to next, in the absence 
of social policy substitutes, how forbearance occurs across space and time will depend on how 
electoral districts alter the poor’s ability to influence the enforcement process.   
3.2 Urban Electoral Geography 
Assuming different class preferences, enforcement incentives will depend on the local 
electoral geography.  Electoral geography refers jointly to the distribution of the population across 
space and the rules that divide the population into electoral districts. In the 1980s and 1990s, many 
developing countries implemented reforms to decentralize political power and reorganize 
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metropolitan governance. In the context of urban politics, political centralization refers to reforms 
that invest power in a single elected mayor.  In large capital cities, these mayors may rival the 
president in popularity and name recognition.  Political decentralization entails the creation of sub-
city electoral districts and the division of power among local mayors, who tend to be less 
recognizable political figures.    
I assume that a politician sets enforcement policy for her district and, as in classic 
distributive models, disregards any negative externalities imposed on other districts.  The way that 
decentralization has occurred shapes the poor’s electoral weight in a district and thus predicts 
systematic variation in enforcement. 
My argument is that politicians are more likely to forbear in electoral districts dominated by 
poor voters via two distinct causal mechanisms.  First, forbearance is an informal form of welfare 
provision that the poor value.  Much literature on distributive politics focuses on how politicians 
allocate expenditures to improve their electoral prospects.  However, decentralization often leaves 
subnational politicians with implementation authority, but little influence over the design of 
parchment law and limited resources to tailor social policies to local needs.  Under such constraints, 
a mayor can expand the set of distributive goods that she can provide and use to target the poor by 
forgoing regulatory enforcement.  The reverse also holds: the withdrawal of these benefits through 
enforcement carries a direct social cost, particularly when government programs offer no alternative 
means to address constituency needs.  For instance, a mayor of a poor district in Santiago, Chile 
makes his electoral calculation in light of weak social alternatives clear: 
“The police don’t obey me, they are autonomous. But they also don’t go do operations against 
the unlicensed vendors unless I ask them…The police know that the street markets are a way for 
the poor to make a living in Chile, and all the fallout of operations hits the mayor because the poor will have 
no way to make a living and the [municipal] government can’t provide it.  We can’t do those types of 
repressive operations in a municipality with such high rates of unemployment.”13  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Author interview with Pedro Isla Farías, Mayor, Municipality of San Ramón, Santiago, Chile, June 
21, 2012.   
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Second, as argued above, forbearance can signal a politician’s broader class commitments in 
the absence of formal welfare policies. Voters must decide on candidates based on observable 
characteristics, but they often lack informational cues like those provided by party labels in advanced 
democracies or ethnicity in some developing democracies (e.g. Bates 1982; Chandra 2004; Posner 
2005).  In local elections worldwide, partisan issues take the backseat to the personal problems of 
constituents and local management issues.  In many local races in Latin America, candidates are 
differentiated by their class commitments, which can entail different stances toward legal norms.  
Ostiguy (2009), for instance, argues that the main candidate “types” in Latin American politics are 
distinguished by manners, dress, accent, and legal attitudes.  “Low” types dispense with the 
“formalities” of law to achieve their objectives, while “high” types value the rule of law.  Politicians 
in low-income districts risk their reputation for solidarity with the poor when they enforce.  
Conversely, as district income increases, politicians can emphasize their willingness to enforce and 
privilege the interests of middle class groups. Thus politicians may choose to signal enforcement or 
forbearance.  The signal is clearer for enforcement, given that it requires the use of coercive force, 
and for incumbents who control actions.  Forbearance is a subtler cue, but it can be conveyed 
through public statements and alliances with groups in violation of the law. To give a flavor for this 
signaling mechanism, consider the logic of a councilor in a poor district in Lima: 
“Democracy creates more demands on the local governments because we are closer to the people 
and absorb the social problems. My support comes from the poor, so when there is a land 
invasion, I visit to show my sympathy.  If you bring in the police, then it’s clear to everyone that the 
mayor does not really fight for the social needs of people and isn’t really looking for ways to help.”14 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Author interview with Erasmo Segundo Cardenas Obregon, Local Councilor, Municiaplity of Ate, 
Lima, Peru, November 23, 2011. 
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Consequently, politicians can form reasonable expectations about the electoral repercussions 
of enforcement from voter demographics.  Incentives to boost local welfare and signal class 
commitments vary with the concentration of poor voters in a district.  Political decentralization 
changes the distribution of class groups within electoral districts, and means that most variation in 
enforcement comes with district composition.  In a largely middle or upper class district, the most 
viable electoral strategy is to enforce in line with nonpoor preferences, displacing offenses to poor 
districts.  A political challenger gains little from deviating from this policy because there is no 
electoral constituency of poor voters to counterbalance middle-income interests.  In districts that are 
overwhelmingly poor, politicians forbear and attract more offenders due to their lax enforcement 
policies.     
Proposition 4.  Enforcement decreases with the fraction of poor voters in an electoral district.   
Even in majority poor districts, enforcement still can occur for two reasons.  First, 
politicians can enforce as a way to raise the value of forbearance.  A defining feature of forbearance 
is that it is revocable.  Occasional crackdowns, threats, or fines can guarantee that the beneficiaries 
of forbearance remain aware of their precarious position.  Second, past periods of forbearance can 
reduce social sympathy among poor voters for those who violate the law and reduce the political 
costs of enforcement.  This can occur because weak enforcement encourages more individuals to 
engage in the illegal activity and thus grows the associated nuisances, which can reduce support even 
among poor residents that often are sympathetic to forbearance.  Additionally, forbearance allows 
those who violate the law to accumulate wealth.  Past beneficiaries can become “parasitic actors” 
(Onoma 2009) who exploit newcomers who hope to engage in the informal activity, and thus reduce 
the insurance benefits of forbearance to poor voters.  Politicians are less likely to be perceived as 
anti-poor if they credibly can claim that offenders do not need to violate the law due to their 
income, and that forbearance actually leads to the exploitation of the most vulnerable.  Thus, my 
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basic claim is that enforcement will be less common in districts with larger concentrations of poor 
voters.  But past forbearance can reduce the electoral costs of enforcement even in poor districts 
and lead to enforcement. 
Of course, authorities have significant leeway in which policies to pursue.  Elections, and 
particularly competitive ones, can be a powerful inducement to implement policies in line with 
voters’ preferences.  A long tradition of research views elected leaders as more responsive to the 
needs of citizens than autocratic leaders or appointed officials who do not face direct competitive 
pressures.  Similarly, local politicians should be more responsive to divergent enforcement 
preferences across districts compared to appointed officials.   
In addition, the extent of local competition may matter.  V.O. Key (1949) famously argues 
that more intense political competition within democracies induces parties to cater to the needs of 
the poor.  However, evidence that higher levels of competition promote pro-poor policies or 
electoral accountability is mixed.  Weitz-Shapiro (2012) suggests that the effect of competition is 
contingent on voter demographics when preferences over a political behavior vary by class.  
Drawing on this intuition, the votes at risk because of enforcement in poor districts should be less 
determinative of behavior when politicians enjoy greater office security.  In the words of a local 
mayor, “If you stay in politics long enough, you can become bold because you don’t need the 
vendors anymore, you don’t have to count each vote, and you don’t fear using force to accomplish 
something big.”15  I therefore predict: 
Proposition 5. District demographics are less relevant for enforcement in cities that do not elect 
district mayors or districts with low levels of competition.   
 
Politicians also can have ideological or strategic interests that lead policies to diverge from 
the median voter’s preference.  Much as social democratic parties expand the welfare state, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Author interview with Alberto Sánchez Aizcorbe, Mayor, District of La Victoria, Lima, Peru, June 
15, 2011. 
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politicians who represent poor core constituencies are more likely to promote forbearance to lift 
local welfare informally and signal their class commitments to the poor. Even without firm 
ideological beliefs, there is a debate over how much weight politicians place on the interests of their 
core electorate versus swing voters (Cox and McCubbins 1986; Dixit and Londregan 1996; Lindbeck 
and Weibull 1987).  As Cox (2009) argues, the core voter hypothesis is strengthened where 
politicians must mobilize voters.  Low turnout is common in subnational elections so politicians 
induce their strongest supporters to go to the polls.  Even in the case of compulsory voting, 
politicians may focus on core constituencies to rally turnout for campaign events or to guarantee 
that past supporters do not become swing voters in the next period (Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni 
2013).  Because enforcement by politicians with poor constituents risks having poor voters stay 
home or swing to an opponent, I expect:  
Proposition 6. Politicians with poor core constituents enforce less than those who draw their 
support from the nonpoor, all else equal. 
 
I emphasize a politician’s core constituency, rather than political ideology, for empirical and 
theoretical reasons.  For one, while the representation of class groups is taken as synonymous with 
political ideology in advanced democracies, these are not equivalent in much of the developing 
world.  Labor-based leftist parties long drew their core support from middle class voters.  Popular 
Right parties have pursued segmented strategies to build coalitions of poor and wealthy voters (Luna 
2010) or “neopopulist” appeals to the informal sector by railing against organized labor (Roberts 
1995; Weyland 1996b).  Moreover, particularly in subnational politics, partisan labels can be 
orthogonal to any recognizable ideological spectrum (Luna 2006; Oliver, Ha, and Callen 2012). 
Forbearance also fits uncomfortably with traditional Left-Right ideological distinctions.  
Even if we assume a Left united to help the poorest in society, disagreement exists on how to 
distribute resources.  Two main strands of thought emerge.  A materialist Left considers the 
economic rights claims of the poor to trump other concerns.  Forbearance is justified because it 
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allows the poor to fulfill their basic needs where the state fails.  A post-materialist Left seeks to 
advance a broader conception of social equality.  In this light, it sees forbearance as a threat to social 
citizenship.  Forbearance creates a dual structure in which the poor access basic goods through 
illegal means that stigmatize them and harm collective rights.  While a post-materialist Left defends 
the poor’s long-term interests, it often alienates poor voters, particularly through its enforcement 
activities.  Materialist claims resonate among the poor; post-materialist platforms attract the middle 
class.  A broad label betrays different visions about how to help the poor that are captured in the 
class composition of their constituencies. 
On the Right, tensions also arise between a libertarian and a liberal Right.  The libertarian 
position, best articulated by De Soto, underlines the corrosive impact of state regulations on 
development.  Forbearance allows the poor economic freedom to advance where political insiders 
capture policymaking.  In contrast, the liberal position emphasizes the rule of law as the cornerstone 
of economic growth and promotes even enforcement.  The libertarian approach resonates among 
the poor, particularly when it has involved the provision of land titles and tolerance of informal 
activities.  In contrast, the liberal position, when enforcement is directed at progressive offenses 
(rather than hard crime) gains stronger support among the middle class.  Hence, an electoral account 
based on a politician’s class constituency allows for vote-maximizing politicians with vapid 
ideological positions and provides shorthand for these more nuanced ideological views, which I 
explore in greater detail in the empirical cases.  
At a more general level, this study assumes that politicians formulate enforcement policies to 
win the local elections at hand.  Electoral victory is paramount, and other motives like ideology and 
competing career ambitions are taken as secondary.  But politicians also seek office in order to 
implement policies that they believe to be in the public interest.  In particular, many city politicians 
have ambitions to rise to national offices (and often the presidency) that require different electoral 
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strategies.  On average, politicians likely hew to the preferences of the district where they run for 
office.  But, when ideological beliefs or national office-seeking ambitions lead politicians to deviate 
from their constituents’ preferences, enforcement still results in electoral consequences.  My 
empirical expectation is that politicians will lose votes among the urban poor if they enforce in the 
absence of social policy substitutes.  
Synthesizing, this project’s main interest lies in explaining why some local governments 
enforce against legal violations, and others continue to tolerate these activities.  I propose that 
national social policy regimes bear on these outcomes by influencing the local electoral costs of 
enforcement.  Substitutive social policies like housing and employment programs increase the 
probability that politicians will enforce the law.  Social policies directly “crowd out” the poor’s 
distributive demand, but just as importantly, they reinforce the state as the authority responsible for 
social provision and allow politicians to present themselves as defending the poor’s interests by 
supporting formal welfare programs even when they enforce.  Conversely, the absence or truncation 
of social policy leaves local politicians with a distributive dilemma: they have no way to meet the 
poor’s basic material demands.  Popular pressure and organizing to offer informal welfare benefits 
encourage politicians to forbear, while the strong association between enforcement and anti-poor 
distributive positions elevates the electoral risks of enforcement.   
The second piece of the argument is attuned to the local dynamics of enforcement.  The way 
that urban decentralization has occurred impacts the poor’s electoral clout at the local level.  Political 
decentralization makes local mayors disregard the negative externalities of their enforcement choices 
on other districts.  It also increases the electoral incentives to forbear in districts where the poor are 
geographically concentrated and thus pivotal votes.  Meanwhile, urban political centralization means 
that mayors internalize all the negative externalities of their enforcement choices.  Mayors will be 
! 38 
more likely to forbear when they represent poor constituents for ideological or strategic reasons.  
Figure 1.5 presents a visual summary of the argument.   
 
FIGURE 1.5.  The Argument Summarized 
4 Research Design 
The strength of this project’s research design lies in its integration.  The theoretical 
predictions intentionally implicate multiple levels of government and actors, including the attitudes 
and organizations of citizens, national welfare agencies, subnational politicians, and bureaucrats.  
The triangulation between diverse forms of evidence increases my confidence in the theory.   
While I briefly have discussed the origins of national welfare states, this study revolves 
around a comparative analysis of enforcement politics in three Latin American capital cities—
Santiago, Chile, Bogotá, Colombia, and Lima, Peru—and two types of legal violations—unlicensed 
street vending and illegal land occupations.  I begin the study with the reintroduction of direct 
mayoral elections in each city and continue through the contemporary period (roughly 1990-2010).  
This section justifies the focus on city politics, and then explains the case selection and data sources. 
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4.1 Comparative Urban Politics 
This research speaks to broad debates on social policy and welfare state development, but 
focuses on comparative urban politics.  A focus on cities and their districts harnesses the advantages 
of subnational analysis, namely the ability to expand the number of observations by “scaling down” 
to lower level units of government and to code cases more accurately through attention to local 
dynamics (Snyder 2001).  However, it also exploits the advantage of cross-national case studies, 
primarily the ability to vary features of the electoral and policy context that differ only at the national 
level.  Subnational studies that look only within a nation have a greater challenge in distinguishing 
how national structures impact subnational political behavior.  Rather than hold the national context 
constant, this study uses a cross-capital city design to understand how similarly situated actors 
behave given different electoral rules and welfare regimes. 
I focus on capital cities for purposes of comparability and institutional strength.  The 
primate structure of many countries means that capital cities are often far more similar to each other 
than to secondary city counterparts.  Another reason to study cities, and particularly political capitals, 
is precisely for the “urban bias” in politics and state strength.  Capital cities tend to absorb 
disproportionate resources, access to government, and media attention.  State power fades outside 
the capital in many low and middle-income countries.  Cities therefore allow us to consider why 
non-enforcement occurs even in places that are most prone to have the money, bureaucracy, and 
media markets to make law effective.  Capacity constraints grow, and make it harder to disentangle 
forbearance from inept institutions, outside the capital.  Cities also merit special attention due to 
their practical importance.  Latin America is 75 percent urban, and set to grow to 85 percent by 2030 
(UN-Habitat 2005).  The governance of metropolitan areas has a huge impact on the quality of 
democracy and life for the vast majority of citizens.   
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The primary period of study begins with the introduction of direct elections for city 
government.  Prior to the 1990s, Latin American mayors tended to be appointees of civilian and 
military rulers. Elections for city mayors create a new set of actors with specifically urban interests 
and electorates.  More so than appointed predecessors, elected capital city mayors broker demands 
between those who reside in the capital city, as well as national leaders, political parties, and interest 
groups (Dietz and Myers 2002). Of the cases studied here, Colombia introduced direct election of 
mayors in 1988 for the first time in over a century. Peru and Chile reintroduced local government 
elections in 1981 and 1992, respectively.  In focusing on the democratic period, I do not deny that 
forbearance occurred under authoritarian regimes.  But enforcement in authoritarian contexts and 
prior to urban electoral politics may have distinct dynamics: broadly put, enforcement politics is 
more likely to reflect national concerns, such as social stability, internal security threats, urban-rural 
migration patterns, and regime legitimacy.  The determinants of enforcement and social policy shift 
under electoral democracy, and differences in the structure of elections allow for a probe of the 
connections between popular demands, electoral politics, and enforcement.  
Cities provide an ideal laboratory to understand electoral geography, meaning the joint 
geographic distribution of voters and electoral rules.  Latin America is one of the most unequal 
regions in the world and vast income inequality translates into spatial segregation.  Most sub-city 
districts group together a single class group.  Lower-class groups occupy peripheral areas, and upper-
class groups cluster in one area of the city, generally with an apex in the historical center that 
expands outward to some suburban developments.  Poorer neighborhoods tend to be more 
uniformly poor than high-income areas (Sabatini 2003).  From a theoretical perspective, spatial 
segregation provides useful variation in constituency composition and thus demands on local 
governments.   
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4.2 City Case Selection 
Primarily, the theory is illustrated through an analysis of three capital cities and two sectors.  
The design permits three types of comparisons: 1) within city comparisons of variation across space 
and time, 2) across city comparisons within sector, and 3) across sector comparisons within city.   
I selected city cases with two purposes.  First, given a dominant alternative explanation of 
enforcement patterns focused on institutional strength, I looked for “critical” cases (Bennett and 
Elman 2006; Eckstein 1975; Gerring 2007) for qualitative analysis.  I strategically chose the case with 
the highest state capacity in the region (the “least likely” case), Chile.  From a folk Bayesian 
perspective, the intuition is that evidence from a case unlikely to be consistent with a theory’s 
predictions—namely, non-enforcement in a strong state—provides greater confidence in the validity 
of the theory.  I then chose two cases with weak institutions, Colombia and Peru.  Despite similar 
income levels, Peru has a much less effective bureaucracy than Colombia.  In particular, Peru is 
known for high levels of local government corruption (AmericasBarometer 2010).  Citizens share 
these perceptions: Chileans and Colombians tend to believe that the state can enforce all laws, while 
Peruvians doubt the state’s ability to enforce any laws.16  Observations of enforcement in Lima, in 
particular, thus also cut against theories based on institutional strength.  
Second, these cities are chosen to provide variation on the principal independent variables, 
namely electoral structure and social policy context.  Table 1.1 highlights some of the relevant 
features of the city cases.  Many cities struggle to manage legal violations by the poor; I selected 
these three cities in part because they have different electoral structures for exogenous reasons.  The 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Latinobarometer 2005, Question P76ST asks citizens “On a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 means the 
state is unable to enforce any laws, and 10 means that the state is able to enforce all laws, where do 
you locate the state?” Peru has a mean of 4.2, among the lowest in the region (along with Paraguay 
and Ecuador), while Colombia and Chile have a mean of 5.8 and 6.2, respectively, which falls among 
the highest in the region (along with Uruguay and Costa Rica). 
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return of democracy led to a push for local participatory institutions across Latin America.  Each city 
selected consists of sub-units, which I uniformly call districts.  But, the cities vary in whether they 
hold elections at the district level.  The degree of urban decentralization pursued depended in part 
on political calculations about the desirability of strong city mayors (Dietz and Myers 2002). 
TABLE 1.1.  City Case Selection 
!
SOURCES: Housing expenditure data come from national housing reports.  Social expenditure, population, and poverty 
data from ECLAC.  Government expenditures are calculated as the average from 1990-2010.  Government effectiveness 
from the World Bank.  Citizens' reports of paying bribes come from AmericasBarometer2010 and are calculated per 
bureaucratic transaction. 
 
Santiago is a highly politically decentralized city.  The military regime initiated 
decentralization as an antidote to party politics and devolved financial and administrative powers to 
the district level (Siavelis, Valenzuela Van Trek, and Martelli 2002).  Each of 34 districts (comunas) 
elects a local mayor, but no mayor exists for the whole city. Many institutions remain centralized at 
the national level, including, most importantly for this project, the National Police (Carabineros), 
which is under the command of the Interior Ministry.  Although the police have autonomy to 
Bogota´ Lima Santiago
Principal Independent Variables
Social policy context truncated skeletal substitutive
Electoral structure centralized hybrid decentralized
Housing expenditures as % GDP 0.25 0.04 0.7
Social expenditures per capita $277 $162 $604
Social expenditures as % GDP 10.8 7.8 13.4
Number of electoral districts 1 43 36
Competing Independent Variables
State capacity medium low high
Police structure centralized decentralized centralized
Government effectiveness 62.6 20.9 83.9
% citizens who pay bribes 6.3 18.2 4.8
Controls
Population (millions) 8.8 9.4 7.2
Urban population as % total 76.0 75.9 86.6
Poverty rate (⇡1990) 37.6 33.6 32.1
Poverty rate (2010) 13.2 19.1 8.1
Source: Housing expenditure data come from national h usi g reports. Social xpenditure, population, and poverty dat from
the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). Government expenditures are calculated as the average
from 1990-2010. Government effectiveness from the World Bank. Citizens’ reports of paying bribes come from AmericasBarom-
eter2010 and are calculated per bureaucratic transaction.
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conduct enforcement operations on their own initiative, they rarely do so.  The informal norm is 
that police act on the request of the local mayor.  
Bogotá, in contrast, is a politically centralized city.  Citizens elect a city mayor who appoints 
local administrators in each of 20 districts (localidades). Metropolitan centralization has extended the 
country’s tradition of strong (although previously appointed) mayors. The country introduced 
popular election of mayors in 1988 as a way to bolster armed actors’ allegiances to the state (Eaton 
2004) and appease conservative and regional politicians who expected to gain mayoral seats (Falleti 
2010; O’Neill 2005).  As in Santiago, the National Police controls enforcement operations.  
However, unlike Santiago, the city mayor controls the police force by law.   
Finally, Lima has a hybrid political structure.  All 43 districts (distritos) elect local mayors, but 
residents also elect a city mayor.  While a prominent figure, the city mayor has far weaker formal 
powers than in Bogotá.  Fujimori, in particular, strengthened district governments to undercut 
political rivals among Lima’s city mayors (Dickovick 2006). Among their many functions, district 
mayors manage their own police forces that can control many regulatory infractions. These cities 
thus make it possible to examine both the role of political decentralization and administrative 
decentralization in enforcement.   
To make more concrete the role that electoral structure plays in spatially segregated cities, 
Figure 1.6 caricatures the distinctions referred to in the argument, urban political decentralization 
and urban political centralization.  The underlying maps show the class stratifications at the block 
level, using the city of Bogotá as an example.  Colombia uses a standardized census to measure 
socioeconomic class and divides the population into six strata ranging from “1,” the lowest, to “6,” 
the highest.  Strata 1 and 2 can be thought of as the lower class.17  The lower class earns below the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Class groups in many Latin American cities, including Lima and Santiago, are ranked alphabetically 
with a similar logic, where “A” is the highest class and “E” is the lowest class.  Classes “D” and “E” 
can be thought of as the urban poor or lower class. 
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country’s established monthly minimum wage; it makes up roughly 40 percent of the population in 
most Latin American cities.  More than 70 percent of the lower class works in the informal sector 
and an even higher fraction rotate in and out of informal employment (Perry 2007).  Given this high 
correlation, I refer interchangeably to the urban poor, the informal sector poor, and the lower class 
in this study.  
The map on the left depicts how political decentralization cordons off homogeneous class 
districts.  The city is divided into many electoral districts, as would have been the case in a 
counterfactual scenario in which Bogotá pursued electoral decentralization.  I marked one 
hypothetical poor district at the bottom of the map in which 95 percent of residents belong to 
lower-class groups.  Throughout this study, “poor districts” refer to sub-city units composed of 
more than 50 percent lower-class residents.  At the top of the map, I depicted a nonpoor district in 
which residents belong primarily to the upper class (defined as strata 4 and above).  There are small 
pockets of poverty, but the lower class makes up less than 5 percent of the district.  What should be 
clear is that the median voter in these two sub-city districts will be different.  For a district mayor to 
win office in a poor district, like the hypothetical one pictured, she must win the support of the 
lower class; the converse holds in a nonpoor district. 
The map on the right, in contrast, shows a politically centralized city.  The entire city 
constitutes a single electoral district, as is the case in reality in Bogotá.  The dominant color is light 
blue, which corresponds to the lower-middle class (strata 3).  Mayors can win office with a poor core 
constituency, uniting lower and lower-middle class groups, or a nonpoor core constituency, uniting 
the lower-middle and middle class.  Valence appeals to all citizens also are possible. 
The virtue of this map exercise is that it shows how electoral rules shape the votes at stake 
from enforcement, and therefore lead to very different predicted levels of enforcement under my 
theory.  Selecting cities that vary in their electoral rules for exogenous reasons affects the poor’s 
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political power in a given electoral race and allows me to test my predictions about spatial and 
temporal patterns of enforcement.    
!
FIGURE 1.6.  The Impact of Electoral Structure on District Composition       
SOURCE: Bogotá District Planning Secretary (Secretaría Distrital de Planeación, SDP), 2013. 
In all cities, I focus on the role of mayors, given that they determine enforcement.  Each city 
also elects local councilors and, in the case of Bogotá and Lima, city councilors (which are variably 
called ediles or concejales).  Councilors formally “oversee” government actions, and sometimes pass 
local ordinances and regulations.  Informally, councilors play a key role aggregating vote blocs for 
higher-level politicians and channeling complaints to politicians.  Councilors serve as a conduit for 
popular pressures to reach executives, but they do not make enforcement decisions.   
These capitals also are situated in countries with divergent welfare policies, but roughly 
similar challenges at the beginning of the period analyzed.  Peru continues to have one of the 
smallest and least progressive welfare states in the region.  Social expenditures have been under 10 
percent of GDP for the past two decades.  Housing expenditures are low, and even lower when it is 
taken into account that the majority of the housing budget goes to land titling and registration 
programs.  Chile has a more targeted welfare state that spends heavily on housing and on poverty 
Urban Political Decentralization          Urban Political Centralization !
!!
poor 
district 
nonpoor 
 district 
mixed 
district 
Strata 1 (poorest) 
Strata 2 
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relief.18 Colombia falls in between.  Historically, it has dedicated substantial resources to housing 
policy, although it has been less effective at targeting housing resources to the poor than Chile.  
While the inclusion of Santiago may raise alarms about case comparability due to Chile’s 
higher level of development, it is important to note that the city faced similar challenges at the start 
of the period examined.  The urban poverty rate in Santiago was 32.1 percent at the democratic 
transition, which was similar to the urban poverty rate for Bogotá in the mid-1990s (when uniform 
data come available).  Plus, Chile has among the highest levels of income inequality in the region, 
which makes its treatment of the poor a relevant political question.   
The cities also all constitute medium-sized capitals of fewer than ten million inhabitants in 
unitary political systems.  Roughly similar populations alleviate concerns of different governance 
challenges that may arise in megacities or provincial capitals.  I also chose all unitary political systems 
to minimize variation in state capacity across space due to federalism.  
4.3 Sectoral Case Selection 
Within each city, I analyze two types of violations: illegal land occupations and unlicensed 
street vending.  I use the terms “squatting,” “illegal land occupation,” and “informal settlements” 
interchangeably to refer both to physical takings, where the poor occupy land with no property 
rights claim, and regulatory takings (illegal or informal subdivisions), where the poor pay reduced 
prices for an incomplete property right to land owned by others or inappropriate for housing 
development.19  While lumping these categories together glosses over some important distinctions, I 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Official housing statistics sharply underestimate Chile’s expenditures because many housing 
subsidies technically count as social security assistance (Bouillon 2012). 
19 For brevity’s sake, I refer to the people who occupy land illegally as “squatters,” and collectively 
refer to the neighborhoods created as “informal” or “squatter settlements.”  Many individuals who 
purchase illegal land recoil at the idea that they have deliberately taken something that belongs to 
another person as often conveyed by the term squatting.  In this sense, the more technical 
distinction is that they are not “invaders” (invasores) or, in the legal terminology, they are not engaged 
in land “usurpation” (usupadores del terreno).  However, it is clear that the poor understand that they 
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coincide with other scholars (e.g. Caldeira 2000; Camargo and Hurtado 2011; Gilbert and Ward 1985; 
Gilbert 1981; Holston 2008)—as well as state officials—in thinking of both activities as a single 
category of property law violations.  Most important to this project, both types of property law 
violations allow the poor to access land at far below market prices but leave them vulnerable to 
eviction.   
Street vendors form part of the broader concept of the informal economy.  The most 
common definition of the informal economy is as a process of income generation that “is 
unregulated by the institutions of society, in a legal and social environment in which similar activities 
are regulated” (Portes, Castells, and Benton 1989: 12).  Street vending involves commercial activities 
that otherwise are subject to health, safety, tax, and property regulations and therefore forms part of 
the informal economy.  Street vending differs from other forms of informal economic activity in 
that it involves a property law violation, much like squatting. Rather than appropriate land for 
housing purposes, vendors monopolize public space for private commercial use. 
I selected these violations because they allow for variation on my principal independent 
variables, as summarized in Table 1.2.  Illegal land occupations have a clear social policy substitute, 
housing policy, but the nature of housing policy varies by country case.  Street vending has less clear 
social policy substitutes because job prospects are shaped by a host of macroeconomic and labor 
market policy choices.  Unemployment insurance and job creation programs are the most direct 
substitutes; both are uniformly minimal in my cases.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !
lack full property rights over land. For instance, the poor who purchase land through intermediaries 
almost always have their physical possession of the land validated by the police (constancia de posesión).  
A purchaser would be unlikely to call the police to validate possession if she believed that she had 
valid, notorized title to the land. Terms to refer to the neighborhoods that illegal land occupants 
form have varied widely across time period and country, and therefore I just use informal 
settlements as a shorthand.   
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These violations also are selected because they vary in their geography.  Land is immobile 
and illegal land occupations occur in the urban periphery of cities, out of sight of middle-class 
constituencies.  This fact means that enforcement occurs in the same areas where politicians get 
elected, and that residents cannot easily relocate depending on enforcement policies.  Moreover, 
most land occupations occur in poor or unoccupied districts on the urban periphery, which means 
that there is little variation in the type of district that faces enforcement policy questions.   
TABLE 1.2.  Sector Case Selection 
 
To make this point about geography more concrete, I return to the example of Bogotá.  The 
map on the left of Figure 1.7 shows the pattern of illegal land occupations since 1950.  What stands 
out is that informal land occupations concentrate on the urban periphery, and they have moved 
further out toward the city limits with time.  This centrifugal pattern is consistent across my city 
cases and the most common pattern of squatting.20  Politically, it means that informal settlements 
form exclusively in low-income districts and largely are not visible to middle-class residents in the 
city.  The electoral structure of a city is not all that salient given that mayors have little to gain or lose 
in terms of middle-class votes due to the low visibility of the issue.  A focus on squatting helps 
isolate the impact of social policy context on enforcement politics.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 An important exception is Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, where squatter settlements (favelas) formed in 
central city areas.  See Fischer (2008) for a history of this inverted settlement pattern. 
Squatting Street Vending
Social policy Variation by country Constant
Housing policy Unemployment insurance
Job creation programs
Geography Constant Variation by city
Only occurs in poor districts Occurs across types of districts
2
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FIGURE 1.7.  Variation in the Geography of Squatting and Street Vending, Bogotá          
SOURCE: Informal settlements from Camargo and Hurtado (2011: 19); street vendor locations from Aliaga Linares 
(2012: 248). 
In contrast, unlicensed street vending can occur throughout city space.  Vendors can move 
locations in response to enforcement policies.  The map shown on the right in Figure 1.7 highlights 
major conglomerations of street vendors in green, as well as some of the key infrastructure in the 
city that attracts vendors (the dots represent bus routes and parks, and informal settlements are 
shaded in gray).  Street vendors clearly spread throughout the city to work.  They prefer areas of 
commercial activity in the downtown.  Because street vendors can work anywhere in the city, and 
actually prefer busy areas that are visible and trafficked by the nonpoor, their location will be highly 
sensitive to the electoral rules of a city and the poor’s ability to set enforcement policy.  Meanwhile, 
the social policy context is largely constant in the case of street vending.  All three city cases struggle 
to generate alternative jobs for the poor.   
These violations also are selected because they are the most consequential for the lives of the 
poor.  It is worth clarifying both how and how much gets distributed to the poor through these two 
offenses.  Some may assume that illegal land occupations constitute redistribution from private 
property owners directly to the poor.  But in most Latin American cities, seizures of private land are 
rare.  The poor take vacant state land in the vast majority of cases, or purchase lots at bargain prices 
Bogota´ Lima Santiago
Principal Independent Variables
Social policy context truncated skeletal substitutive
Electoral structure centralized decentralized decentralized
Housing expenditures as % GDP 0.25 0.04 0.7
Social expenditures per capita $277 $162 $604
Social expenditures as % GDP 10.8 7.8 13.4
Number of electoral districts 1 43 36
Competing Independent Variables
State capacity intermediate low high
Police structure centralized decentralized centralized
Government effectiveness 62.6 20.9 83.9
% citizens who pay bribes 6.3 18.2 4.8
Controls
Population (millions) 8.8 9.4 7.2
Urban population as % total 76.0 75.9 86.6
Poverty rate (⇡1990) 37.6 33.6 32.1
Poverty rate (2010) 13.2 19.1 8.1
Source: Housing expenditure data come from national housing reports. Social expenditure, population, and poverty data from
the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). Government expenditures are calculated as the average
from 1990-2010. Government effectiveness from the World Bank. Citizens’ reports of paying bribes come from AmericasBarom-
eter2010 and are calculated per bureaucratic transaction.
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in areas that have problems with the zoning or belong to private owners.21  Redistribution is not 
zero-sum.  Rather, like most welfare programs, illegal land occupations involve a transfer of state 
resources, financed by taxpayers, to benefit a class of poor individuals.    
Part of the value of illegal land occupations comes in the transfer of land to the poor.  
Squatters on state land in Lima, for instance, report that they could rent their properties for an 
average of $725 per year.  Property improvements likely account for about a third of the rental value 
so the state transfer amounts to about $450.22  If the rental value loosely reflects property values, 
then the government transfers roughly $38 million to Lima’s 86,000 current squatter households each 
year by allowing them to occupy state land.23  To give a sense for the magnitude of these transfers, 
consider the fact that Peru only allocates $3.5 million annually to help lower class families in Lima 
access housing.  Approximately 268,230 households in the Lima metropolitan area—or about one 
seventh of the population—still live on property acquired through land invasions, and more than a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 People buy lots in informal subdivisions that fall into three basic types: irregular, clandestine, and 
fraudulent.  An irregular subdivision appears to be legitimately owned and registered by the 
developer.  It fails to meet in some way the regulatory building requirements, such as the provision 
of basic services, the size of lots, or the allocation of green spaces.  A clandestine subdivision is not 
registered in the real estate registry, but the land itself may be legitimately owned.  The issue is that 
the land is not suitable for residential development, such as rural or environmental conservation 
land.  An owner can transfer a property right to the physical land but not to build on the land.  A 
fraudulent subdivision is sold by a swindler (terrero in Colombia, traficante in Peru) who pretends to 
have legitimate title to the land, but who himself occupies the land illegally.   
22 For formal properties, construction costs (materials, licenses, and labor) account for 62 percent of 
the property value (Bouillon 2012: 112).  Informal properties have far lower investments in 
materials, particularly within their first five years of construction, and no licenses, so I estimate that 
the construction materials only account for roughly a third of rental values.  
23 Peru’s household survey (Encuesta Nacional de Hogares, ENAHO) asks individuals their tenancy 
status.  I count squatters as those who respond that their house is “owned, acquired by invasion” 
and that they lack property title to the land, which likely means that the invasion formed after the 
deadline to title property in 2006.  In 2011, ENAHO shows that 268,230 households in the Lima 
metropolitan area live on property acquired through land invasions. Of those households, 34 percent 
admit that they do not have land title.  ENAHO also asks households how much they think that 
someone would pay in rent for their house.  
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half once have lived on informal property.  Illegal land occupations thus involve consequential 
transfers and large numbers of urban residents.  
The other piece of the distributive transfer in the case of squatting comes in the provision of 
basic services.  When an individual purchases or rents a house, a major part of the cost comes in the 
access to urban infrastructure.  In the case of an illegal land occupation, the poor pay nothing for 
these goods, and the state provides them after the fact.  Extending the water, electrical grid, sewage, 
transportation, and roads to an informal settlement—particularly one on precarious land—is 
enormously expensive.  For instance, it costs the Bogotá city government an average of $1900 per 
lot, and can be assumed to raise the land value at least in equal measure (Maldonado Copello 2009: 
332).  A conservative estimate suggests that an informal lot that the poor may occupy or buy from 
an intermediary for $2000 would cost on the order of $9,900 if sold with the required services and 
legal documents.24  Were land transactions fully legal and services provided at their real cost, the 
poor would be unable to access land markets at all.25  Holston (2008: 206-207) nicely underscores 
the distributive impact of this process: “The very illegality of house lots in the peripheries makes 
land accessible to those who cannot afford the higher sale or rental prices of legal residences.”  
Again, the costs are born by the public at large who pay for the costs of occupied state land, 
inefficient service provision, and urban sprawl. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 The value of this informal transaction could also be calculated by looking at how the price paid 
compares to that for similar lots available on the market with title and services.  But the calculation 
is tricky because these types of lots do not exist in the market.  Instead, I arrive at the figure of 
$9,900 by calculating the increase in property values from a zoning change from land outside the 
urban periphery (on rural or environmental land), as is the common case in Bogotá, plus the 
additional value from public service provision. 
25 What the poor pay to purchase an informal lot is roughly on the same order as what the state 
requires as a down payment to participate in a social interest housing project ($2,000).  This down 
payment is viewed as the maximum that poor families can pay at any one time.  Thus, the “real” 
price of illegal land occupation lot at $9,900 is well beyond the economic means of most poor 
households. 
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Likewise, the distributive transfers provided through tolerance of street vendors are 
important to the lives of the poor. Consider a rough estimate of informal transfers to unlicensed 
street vendors in foregone rent payments.  Street vendors in Lima report that they pay an average of 
$130 in monthly rent when evicted from city sidewalks.  I use rent payments, given that vendors 
often report earning less in formal stands, as a lower bound estimate of the vendors’ willingness to 
pay to sell on city streets.  By this calculation, the government effectively provides an annual subsidy 
of $1560 per street vendor when it permits a vendor to occupy busy streets and to forgo paying rent. 
Or, stated otherwise, the city provides a total subsidy of $182.5 million annually to 117,000 illegal 
vendors.  By contrast, one of the largest social programs in the city, Glass of Milk (Vaso de Leche), 
transfers $115 per poor family each year and covers 287,000 families.26  Together, these calculations 
about squatting and street vending suggest that informal transfers through forbearance often dwarf 
formal transfers by orders of magnitude.  A study of these offenses thus is critical to understanding 
the structure of social policy in the region.     
4.3 Data 
This study is based on fieldwork carried out in Bogotá, Santiago, and Lima over the course 
of thirteen months between 2011 and 2013.  The primary data analyzed include government and 
police records, fiscal and electoral records, congressional and municipal debates, newspaper reports, 
and in-depth interviews with politicians, public officials from the national and subnational level, 
academics, lawyers, and interest group organizations (chambers of commerce, construction lobbies, 
street vending organizations, neighborhood organizations, labor organizations, and so on).  
Public opinion data comes from several sources.  I conducted an original public opinion 
survey of 900 respondents in Bogotá, Colombia in August 2013 to probe the micro-foundations of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 The 2011 annual budget is $33 million for 287,000 families. 
! 53 
my theory. Given that I could only run the survey in a single city, I make use public opinion data 
from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) AmericasBarometer to examine the 
generalizability of the relationship between class and support for legal violations by the poor.27  To 
supplement the survey data, I also conducted focus groups with the leaders of street vending 
associations and neighborhood organizations to understand how citizens and organized groups 
interacted with government agencies.   
Initial field research consisted of qualitative interviews primarily with bureaucrats and 
politicians to develop the theory.  Subsequent research attempted to gather data to test the 
implications by systematically surveying bureaucrats across districts.  I created an original data set, 
on legal violations, enforcement actions, and political dynamics through a survey of local sub-city 
governments. The survey collects systematic data on offenses, enforcement actions, government 
resources, citizen complaints, and decision-making.  When possible, this information was verified 
with administrative records.  In addition to information about government behavior, the survey 
asked bureaucrats a series of attitudinal questions about their perceptions of enforcement politics.  
These data help understand district enforcement operations from the bottom up. They are limited to 
a single moment in time, however, and may overstate enforcement operations if officials distort the 
information provided to portray a more effective administration. The survey covers 89 districts in 
three cities, or 92 percent of all city districts (only rural districts are excluded from the sample), and 
two sectors, thus drawing on interviews with almost two hundred district bureaucrats.   
For information on political motivations, I rely on interviews conducted with politicians, 
state officials, lawyers, police, and local leaders.  In about a third of districts surveyed, I interviewed 
the local mayor and/or councilors.  Since qualitative data were not intended to provide point 
estimates such as the percentage of politicians supportive of forbearance, the main concerns were to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 These data are publicly available at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/. 
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ensure that a variety of perspectives was captured, that these perspectives were not systematically 
biased in any way.  As such, I interviewed local mayors and councilors in all types of districts.  To 
encourage that respondents would be as open and forthcoming as possible, I offered the option of 
anonymity to politicians, but discovered that the vast majority of politicians were happy to discuss 
their enforcement positions openly.  Where available, I also reviewed campaign platforms at the 
district level to get a more systematic sense for the frequency of politicians’ promises.  Peru, in 
particular, has a unique database of district government platforms (Plan de Gobierno) that I 
systematically analyze for the 2010 election.28 
  The local government survey only provides enforcement information at a single moment in 
time so I supplement it with information on enforcement from administrative records and 
newspaper reports.  I followed coverage of housing and street vending enforcement by 
systematically searching through the main national newspaper in each country (El Comercio in Peru, 
El Mercurio in Chile, and El Tiempo in Bogotá) from 1990 to 2010. The public opinion survey, 
complete local government survey, and newspaper methodology are provided in the Appendix. 
5 Overview and Contributions 
The study is organized as follows.  The next chapter turns to the micro-level to examine 
enforcement and redistributive preferences. I use individual-level data from Bogotá and across Latin 
America to show, first, that income predicts preferences for forbearance, and second, that popular 
support for forbearance decreases with social expenditures that substitute for the poor’s distributive 
claims. I also show that poor voters identify politicians who support forbearance as more likely to 
represent their interests, even compared to politicians who promise targeted social expenditures.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 Platforms are available for each district and candidate through the National Electoral Authority’s 
Governance Observatory (Jurado Nacional de Elecciones, Observatorio para la Gobernabilidad, 
http://www.infogob.com.pe). 
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These observations confirm that politicians face different electoral incentives to enforce based on 
the national social policy context and the demographics of the district where they seek office. 
Chapter 3 analyzes how local politicians make enforcement choices in light of nationally 
determined social policies.  I examine the case of squatting because it has a clear social policy 
substitute, targeted housing expenditures.  I show how truncated housing policies in Colombia and 
skeletal housing policies in Peru have created strong incentives for local politicians to forbear.  In 
contrast, I demonstrate how the development of housing policy that reaches the poor alters popular 
demands and prompts politicians to enforce against squatters in Santiago.  Illegal land occupations 
occur on the urban periphery where the electoral costs of enforcement are high.  Even in politically 
centralized cities, the costs are concealed to middle-class constituents. This geographic distribution 
means that enforcement is largely stable over time and dependent on the social policy context.  I 
process-trace responses to illegal land occupations using administrative and newspaper records to 
show that enforcement breaks down at political decision points and that distributive capacity is a 
more powerful explanation of forbearance than institutional weakness. 
Using the class preferences outlined, Chapter 4 examines how a mayor’s core constituency 
drives enforcement policy against street vendors over time in citywide elections.  I show that mayors 
with poor core constituencies enforce less than those with nonpoor core constituencies in Bogotá 
and Lima, and that forbearance appeals are explicitly used to attract and mobilize informal sector 
poor voters.  Chapter 5 then exploits the fact that street vendors work scattered throughout the city 
to probe how enforcement policy varies at the sub-city level.  I show that the combination of voter 
demographics and electoral rules explains enforcement, even in a context of institutional strength 
like Santiago.  Original data on enforcement and offenses, as well as interviews with mayors and 
bureaucrats, provide strong evidence to distinguish my electoral theory’s predictions from capacity-
based alternatives.   
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Chapter 6 concludes with the implications of this study for future research on the electoral 
behavior of the urban poor, state capacity, enforcement politics, and welfare regimes.  
The core theoretical contribution of this project is to bring together the literatures on 
enforcement and redistribution.  On the one hand, I highlight how weak distributive capacity can limit 
the willingness of politicians to enforce state laws and regulations.  I provide empirical evidence to 
support the argument that electoral incentives, structured by the social policy context, provides 
greater leverage to understand why certain laws go unenforced in Latin America than classic 
capacity-based explanations.  On the other hand, I underscore how the limited extent of formal 
redistribution to the informal sector poor may reflect the fact that Latin American countries 
redistribute resources through fundamentally different means, namely forbearance. This study 
provides a novel explanation for this inconsistency by showing how the informal sector poor receive 
important material benefits from forbearance, and therefore organize collectively and vote in favor 
of its extension and the eventual legalization of informal benefits. 
In so doing, this study suggests an alternative path through which the poor were integrated 
into politics in Latin America.  Classic studies of political incorporation, such as Collier and Collier 
(2002), focus on how governments incorporated organized labor through the extension of social 
benefits, and how variation in political coalitions persisted and shaped political outcomes over time.  
The urban poor are largely absent from this classic account of the political incorporation of the 
working class.  This study begins to fill this gap by suggesting that forbearance allows politicians to 
link to the informal sector poor and channels their social demands to informal modes of 
redistribution.  The legacies of this pattern of incorporation are important for how redistribution 
and electoral politics works today. 
In its more micro-level analysis of urban politics, this study also makes contributions to 
literatures on distributive politics.  Work on distributive politics focuses on the choice of 
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government expenditures or employment, while paying little heed to other important policies that 
can be manipulated near elections.  But politicians have discretion over a variety of areas.  Their 
power to withhold enforcement can be just as consequential as their ability to provide goods and 
services.  With a few important exceptions (Chubb 1982; Collier 1976; Ferraz 2007; Golden and Min 
2013; Holston 2008), the politics of enforcement have been much less studied than other forms of 
distributive goods.  As Kramon and Posner (2013) point out, targeting patterns in one area of 
distribution do not necessarily imply the same, and could even suggest inverse, patterns in other 
areas.  Understanding how informal welfare benefits target the poor can help make sense of how 
truncated formal welfare benefits persist even under democracy.  
This study also moves beyond the literature on vote buying in highlighting that the poor’s 
electoral behavior can be strategic and rooted in beliefs about material interests and political 
representation, even though it may be motivated by different sets of goods and policies than 
traditionally studied in advanced democracies.  A theme throughout this work is that both citizens 
and politicians’ attitudes toward forbearance have real programmatic content.  Views on forbearance 
do not align neatly with traditional Left-Right dichotomies, but they often are rooted in 
philosophical views about equality, citizenship rights, and welfare provision.  In ignoring informal 
modes of redistribution, scholars have missed issues that differentiate candidates and help make 
sense of the political spectrum in contexts where formal redistribution fails to create clear class 
cleavages.  
In focusing on local politics, this study also adds to a rather limited literature on the 
consequences of electoral decentralization.  While a number of studies have focused on why central 
authorities opted to share power with local officials (Eaton 2004; Falleti 2010; Mardones 2007; 
O’Neill 2005; Samuels and Montero 2004; Willis, Garman, and Haggard 1999), the question of how 
choices about political decentralization shape urban policies and outcomes has been less explored.  
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For instance, little is known about the consequences for equity and efficiency of direct local 
elections versus appointed administrative structures outside of developed democracies (for a review 
in mature democracies, see Partridge and Sass 2011).  Electoral decentralization also helps 
understand why forbearance can become institutionalized in some settings, leading to consistent 
deviations from formal rules or “informal institutions” (Helmke and Levitsky 2004; 2006) in some 
settings, and why it can become a contested and volatile electoral division in others.         
Lastly, this study adds to a large literature on state capacity in developing democracies.  Many 
scholars view resources and the quality of bureaucracy as central obstacles to effective enforcement 
(e.g. Cross 1998; De Soto and Ghersi 1989; De Soto 2000; Dimitrov 2009; Levitsky and Murillo 
2009; Shleifer and Vishny 1993).  Bureaucratic procedures are slow and cumbersome, state agents 
are corrupt, and politicians are unable to observe and sanction those that neglect their duties.  Major 
international organizations have invested in projects to buttress legal implementation in the 
developing world, primarily by training and funding bureaucracies. Yet this study documents how 
politicians favor given constituencies by influencing the actions taken by bureaucrats in the 
implementation of public policies and laws.  These manipulations can be the sign of healthy electoral 
democracy and weak social policy.  The broad implication is that the design of social policy can be 
an alternative and effective tool to build the rule of law.   
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Chapter 2 
Preferences 
 
“Justice involves treating the equal equally and the unequal unequally in 
proportion to their inequality.”   
—Aristotle  
  
Understanding the electoral dynamics of forbearance requires dissecting how ordinary 
citizens think about enforcement.  This chapter lays the micro-foundations for the subsequent 
examination of politicians’ enforcement choices. I examine three core assumptions about how 
voters view enforcement that underpin my electoral theory: 1) poor individuals prefer less 
enforcement against certain property laws than nonpoor individuals, 2) popular support for 
enforcement increases with social welfare expenditures that substitute for the poor’s distributive 
claims, and 3) voters identify politicians who support enforcement as acting against the poor’s 
broader interests. Together, these observations provide evidence that an important segment of the 
public justifies and prefers forbearance as an informal mode of redistribution.   
 While a large literature exists on preferences toward redistribution, comparatively little work 
analyzes enforcement preferences (c.f. Gibson 2008; Tsai 2013).  This chapter aims to move beyond 
vague generalizations about legal attitudes in Latin America.  On the one hand, it is often argued that 
a cultural disrespect for formal rules accounts for widespread law breaking in the region and hinders 
the state’s ability to enforce the law.  Cultural idioms (“The law is for the peasants”; “Make the law, 
make the way around it”; “I obey, but do not comply”) are taken as evidence of widespread cultural 
norms that reject enforcement.  Scholars who take a socio-cultural approach stress that weak 
enforcement is rooted in Latin America’s familial and clientelistic traditions (DaMatta 1991; García 
Villegas 2009; Mockus, Murrain, and Villa 2012; Mockus 2002).  On the other, another common 
view is that legal violations persist because individuals or groups who violate the law impose their 
preferences on the majority (Cross 1998; Donovan 2002).  This chapter confirms that legal norms 
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are sometimes viewed as flexible and jettisoned by large segments of the population in Latin 
America.  However, support for forbearance is tightly bound to an individual’s class interests and 
the state’s welfare capabilities, much like redistributive preferences.   
This chapter combines original survey and experimental data, as well as a new approach to 
regional survey data, to provide a more complete and nuanced picture of enforcement attitudes than 
any single source could offer on its own.  The first part of the chapter characterizes forbearance 
attitudes and discusses the measurement challenges.  I draw on an original survey that I designed 
and administered to 900 voters in Bogotá, Colombia in August 2013.  Appendix A presents the 
details of the survey design and the translated questionnaire.  The latitude to design my own survey 
allowed me to probe enforcement attitudes in a variety of ways.  Conceptually, I argue that 
enforcement attitudes are two-dimensional—they reflect beliefs about individuals who break the law 
(compliance) and beliefs about state sanctions against those individuals (enforcement).  Attitudes 
about compliance and enforcement do not necessarily go together.  An important finding is that 
most voters oppose law breaking in the abstract, yet they also are rather unenthusiastic about state 
enforcement.  High levels of popular support for forbearance contradict past theories that 
emphasize how special interest groups or rent-seeking politicians distort the enforcement process to 
undercut the public interest.  Forbearance has a constituency, and one that is overwhelmingly poor.   
The thrust of the second part of this chapter is that material interest models developed to 
study redistributive preferences apply, and even more crisply, to forbearance attitudes.  I show that a 
respondent’s class position strongly predicts her forbearance preferences, all else equal.  I find 
suggestive evidence that the relative predictive power of class is weaker for redistributive than 
forbearance attitudes by comparing the model fit and robustness to different question wordings.  I 
estimate a series of statistical models to determine whether other factors like political ideology or 
education account for individual-level variation in forbearance beliefs.  I then demonstrate the 
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generalizability of my findings using an indirect measurement technique on region-wide public 
opinion data from AmericasBarometer.  My findings also support the hypothesized mechanism, 
namely that the comparative progressivity of forbearance helps explain the strong class cleavages in 
attitudes.  Poor respondents do not see themselves as clear beneficiaries of the welfare state as a 
whole.  Yet, in line with my theory, they do support higher taxes on the rich, cash transfers, and 
forms of forbearance that have progressive economic effects. 
Third, I examine my claim that forbearance functions as social policy substitute.  The idea of 
policy substitutes is that the availability of one decreases demand for the other.  Consistent with this 
logic, I show that individuals who believe that state programs meet citizens’ basic needs also are 
keener on enforcement.  Of course, observational analysis raises issues of omitted variables and 
makes identifying causal relationships challenging.  To overcome this challenge, I examine a quasi-
experiment based on the placement of social interest housing projects in Bogotá.  By looking at how 
a geographically localized social policy context alters attitudes toward squatters, I can more plausibly 
claim that social policy availability impacts enforcement attitudes.  The evidence is suggestive that 
social policy investments can reduce support for squatting and displace demands to housing 
authorities.  The fragile individual-level findings will be buttressed by an array of observational data 
in Chapter 3. 
 The final empirical section examines voters’ evaluations and preferences over hypothetical 
mayoral candidates.  I use an experiment embedded within a survey to randomize candidates with 
platforms based on social policy and enforcement proposals.  The survey experiment allows for a 
test of the relative salience of enforcement and social policy cues in shaping candidate placements 
and electoral behavior.  Strong evidence emerges for my claim that citizens use enforcement 
positions as heuristics for politicians’ distributive commitments.  The poor are more likely to believe 
that candidates who promise forbearance will favor them in office, and to say that they will vote for 
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forbearance platforms in hypothetical elections.  In stark contrast, promises of formal social policies 
targeted at unskilled workers do not budge beliefs about political representation or vote choice.  I 
interpret these results as evidence that forbearance is a more credible social policy promise and a 
powerful class signal. 
This chapter pools together tests of this trio of hypotheses—that the poor support less 
enforcement than the nonpoor, that social policy expenditures boost support for enforcement, and 
that politicians who support enforcement are seen as anti-poor—because they collectively challenge 
canonical individual-level models of electoral behavior.  Existing models assume that tax-based 
redistribution divides the electorate, and promises of social expenditures compel the poor to support 
candidates.  The contribution of this chapter is to suggest that, particularly in countries with a 
history of truncated welfare spending, forbearance can be a more economically progressive and 
credible form of aid than formal welfare policies.  Forbearance can generate strong class cleavages, 
provide more credible cues about the political spectrum, and, at least in some contexts, motivate 
vote choice.  Attention to enforcement preferences thus contributes to our understanding of the 
distributive issues at stake in politics, especially for poor voters historically marginalized from the 
formal welfare state.  Before diving into the empirical results, I tackle some of the conceptual and 
measurement challenges in operationalizing support for forbearance. 
1 Measuring Forbearance Preferences  
Legal attitudes can be decomposed into two distinct dimensions.  The first concerns 
reactions to what an individual has done (law breaking/compliance), and the second concerns how 
the state acts in response (law enforcement/forbearance).  This section first develops a typology of 
attitudes based on these two dimensions, presents the indicators for each dimension, and then 
discusses some descriptive statistics regarding the distribution of attitudes in my survey of voters in 
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Bogotá.  The overarching goal of this section is to show that forbearance attitudes can be measured 
through indicators about both law breaking and enforcement, and that combining these questions 
can provide a clearer picture of the basis for legal attitudes.   
The first dimension concerns attitudes toward compliance.  Beliefs about compliance can be 
governed by political and social norms that make certain forms of legal violations socially acceptable, 
regardless of how the state acts in response.  For example, taking the iconic example from Les 
Misérables, the theft of a loaf of bread by a starving man like Jean Valjean may be an accepted action 
in the eyes of most citizens.  Tsai (2013) demonstrates that many forms of non-compliance are seen 
as justified in China when they provide feedback to the government.  Work on tax compliance 
highlights that individuals have a host of reasons to support or reject evasion, such as perceptions of 
the tax code’s fairness, ethical reciprocity, notions of political community, or habit (Levi 1988, 1997; 
Lieberman 2003) For the purposes of this project on progressive forms of forbearance, my main 
interest is when an individual’s economic circumstances are seen to justify law breaking.  Support for 
legal violations with progressive effects likely varies with an individual’s social solidarity with those 
who break the law, and also direct material motives like whether the individual has or expects to 
violate the law. 
The second dimension of legal attitudes concerns ideas about how the government should 
enforce the law.  These attitudes may overlap with judgments about law breaking.  Those who 
believe street vendors have no other options to earn a living, for instance, may be sympathetic both 
to street vendors and forbearance.  However, enforcement attitudes also depend on how individuals 
assess the use of state coercion to regulate behavior.  Continuing with the Les Misérables example, an 
individual may condemn Jean Valjean for theft and uphold property laws in the abstract.  But, he 
also can believe that the French state should treat individuals who steal food out of desperation 
differently from common criminals and forgo penal sanctions.  An analogous contemporary 
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situation concerns immigrant deportations.  Even though many individuals disapprove of illegal 
immigration and support the passage of restrictive laws, they still may find deportations of 
immigrants who have spent their lives in a country to be abhorrent.  These regulations represent a 
class of “coercive social regulations” that impose concentrated costs on otherwise sympathetic 
individuals, and often go unenforced because “the problem in democracies is weak support for the 
use of coercive power” (Ellermann 2009: 4). Individuals thus can support compliance, and diverge 
in their beliefs about whether state sanctions are necessary or appropriate.  
Conceptually, these two dimensions produce a four-fold typology summarized in Figure 2.1. 
I include the frequency of response categories for the offenses examined in this study, street vending 
and squatting.  The top cell in the diamond shows a belief in state enforcement in which individuals 
disapprove of the offense and approve of coercive sanctions.  This combination can be thought of 
as the maximum—and the conventionally expected—attitude toward law enforcement.  Consider 
the case of a murder: individuals both condemn the action and clamor for state sanctions.  In this 
case, politicians enjoy robust support for enforcement because individuals fully reject a repugnant 
behavior and embrace the need for coercive measures to control it. 
The bottom cell in the diamond represents the opposite combination of beliefs: individuals 
approve of the legal violation and eschew state sanctions.  In the context of laws that benefit the 
poor if ignored, this position reflects the chief attitude of interest, or support for informal welfare 
provision. My contention is that this attitude represents a programmatic orientation that legal 
violations are acceptable and should not be met with sanction due to the poor’s economic 
circumstances.  Note that this is quite different from a particularistic attitude toward the law.  Da 
Matta (1991) famously proposed that Latin Americans show limited support for law because they 
see their personal circumstances as meriting legal exceptions.  Informal welfare attitudes, in contrast, 
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involve a belief about the law in the abstract.1  The philosophical principle that undergirds this view 
is that unequal treatment in the eyes of the law is justified when it is a means to level preexisting 
inequalities (for a discussion of this principle in Brazilian law, see Holston 2008: 28).  In other 
words, this approach represents a principle of comparative justice along the lines articulated in the 
Aristotelian maxim that opens this chapter.  Given that the person who violates squatting and street 
vending regulations tends to be poor, he should systematically be treated differently in the eyes of 
the law. 
!
FIGURE 2.1.  A Typology of Legal Attitudes 
The incentives for politicians to pursue forbearance are strong where informal welfare 
beliefs dominate because it can be easy to portray enforcement as unjustified.  Politicians can garner 
support for forbearance when the offenders are viewed as poor and deserving of informal welfare. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 In cases of laws that both the poor and nonpoor violate, or what the previous chapter introduced 
as cases of segmented enforcement, then this attitude requires a belief that a class of individuals 
merit legal exceptions.  Because both the poor and nonpoor can squat on land, I specify the class 
identity of the person to clarify the type of individual who has violated the law and thus merits the 
abstract exemption.     
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Individuals with informal welfare beliefs are likely the strongest proponents of forbearance, given 
that they oppose both the regulatory attempt and the sanction.  
Weak support for enforcement also can arise from a second source apart from distributive 
concerns.  As shown in the right-hand of the diamond, some individuals disapprove of legal 
violations but also oppose the use of coercive measures to control these activities.  A disjuncture 
forms between the ideal level of compliance and the use of state force necessary to achieve that 
outcome.  This gap likely reflects distaste for repression, and grows when the individuals affected by 
enforcement are economically vulnerable (or otherwise sympathetic). Thus, even when there is 
broad consensus around the desirability of legal compliance, there can be disagreement about 
enforcement. Particularly with respect to evictions of squatters, respondents tended to condemn 
land takings but also explain that eviction actions were too punitive to be foisted on vulnerable 
individuals. I consider these individuals who hold disjunctive beliefs to support a type of “social 
regulation” in which the state discourages the violation of the law through soft means.  However, 
many of these soft means, such as persuasion through education or verbal warnings, may be 
ineffective when the benefits at stake are large, or require costly state investments, such as 
substitutive social policies, that meet resistance when put up against other spending priorities.   
Finally, the left cell is a rare combination where individuals approve of violations of the law 
and state enforcement.  Theoretically, this combination reflects approval for civil disobedience.  
Individuals find the law unjust in certain circumstances, which merit its violation, but they believe 
that the state retains the authority qua state to enforce the law.  These individuals use violations of 
the law as a means to protest the law at risk of state sanction.  For example, blacks who staged sit-
ins in segregated public spaces to change the law were willing to go to jail to further the civil rights 
movement (Peñalver and Katyal 2010: 64)  The category of individuals with these incongruous 
demands is small, however.  Intuitively, most individuals who find legal violations to be justified also 
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oppose state enforcement, particularly on a survey where no symbolic political statement is being 
made through open violations.  
Part of the motivation of this conceptual typology is to discriminate between legal attitudes 
motivated by beliefs about distributive justice and those tied to ideas about state coercion.  In 
particular, indicators of enforcement approval (the right diagonal axis of the typology) identify 
individuals who support state sanctions.  However, indicators of enforcement attitudes lump 
together individuals who disapprove because they want to favor the poor and because they dislike 
coercive force.  Conversely, indicators of support for legal violations (shown on the left diagonal 
axis) embed the opposite assumption: they distinguish individuals who support forbearance due to 
social reasons and due to distaste for coercion. These two dimensions touch on measurement issues 
as well as questions of how politicians can use enforcement appeals to build winning core 
constituencies.   At times, enforcement politics can be understood and pitched as a class issue in 
which the poor stand to be harmed by “repressive” uses of force.  But political entrepreneurs also 
can frame it as a necessity to promote compliance and downplay the use of coercive measures.   
My claim is that a central dividing line in politics, or what I consider a cleavage around 
informal distributive politics, can be best is captured through a combination of measures of attitudes 
toward compliance and enforcement.  What I want to measure is the vertical axis pictured in Figure 
2.1, which could be thought of as a scale that measures the intensity of public support for informal 
distributive politics.  The key groups—individuals who consistently back state enforcement and 
those who favor informal welfare provision—are shaded in gray to indicate that they are the central 
focus of study.  Conceptually, I suspect that these attitudes are rooted in differences in solidarity 
with the poor, and willingness to distribute resources to the poor informally.  Therefore, I expect 
that state enforcement and informal welfare attitudes have a strong class component, which I 
explore further below.  This vertical axis cuts across preferences about law breaking and 
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enforcement, shown on the diagonals, and tries to eliminate potential noise from beliefs about the 
use of state coercion (showed on the horizontal axis).  Empirically, this division suggests that a 
principal component analysis (PCA) will better capture underlying divisions about informal welfare 
policies than any single survey question alone.   
The indicators used to measure both of these dimensions for street vending and squatting 
are shown in Table 2.1.  Formulating questions about legal violations required extensive pre-testing 
to ensure that they did not impose judgments in labeling the activity illegal so people would either 
decline to respond or automatically give the legally correct answer. With these considerations in 
mind, the survey asked individuals about hypothetical compliance and enforcement while describing 
activities as “without a license” or “without title to the land.”2   
TABLE 2.1.  Measuring Support for Law Breaking and Law Enforcement 
 
A more difficult issue to resolve was the fact that opinions are sensitive to whether questions 
are asked in the abstract or with respect to specific individuals named in a vignette, which may lead 
respondents to see the individual as an isolated case or identify with their personal situation.  This 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!2!Social desirability bias did not appear to be a major problem: survey response rates were above 95 
percent.  Moreover, the high levels of approval for law breaking and forbearance suggest that there 
are widely held social norms that make it acceptable for citizens to support deviations from the law’s 
letter.          
Concept Indicators
Support for Law Breaking How much do you disapprove or approve that people...
Street vending Sell goods without a license in the public space.
Squatting Occupy land informally to build housing.
Support for Law Enforcement How much do you disagree or agree that the government...
Street vending Decommissions the merchandise and removes an unlicensed street
vendor from the public space.
Squatting Evicts a family that occupies vacant land and begins to build
where they do not have title to the land.
Candidate 1 Candidate 2 Balance Tests
Redistribution Business Forbearance Enforcement Di erence of Means p-value
(A) (B) (C) (D) (A-B) (C-D) (A-B) (C-D)
Class 0.433 0.433 0.434 0.433 0.000 0.000 1.00 0.965
Education 0.635 0.639 0.632 0.642 -0.003 -0.010 0.869 0.622
Female 0.484 0.499 0.525 0.458 -0.015 0.066 0.662 0.048
Age 0.548 0.528 0.535 0.541 0.019 -0.006 0.362 0.783
The p-values in the final column give the probability of observing a t-statistic as large in absolute value as the
observed value, if the groups are drawn from the same distribution. N = 900 respondents total.
Table 3: Redistributive Attitudes
Inequality Tax Transfers Employment Housing
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Class 0.033 -0.024 -0.236* -0.220* -0.190* -0.168* -0.063 -0.056 -0.093 -0.082
(0.042) (0.045) (0.051) (0.055) (0.056) (0.060) (0.058) (0.062) (0.058) (0.062)
Education -0.047 -0.061 -0.013 -0.025 -0.073 -0.096 0.088 0.120 -0.093 -0.114
(0.044) (0.048) (0.053) (0.058) (0.059) (0.064) (0.061) (0.065) (0.061) (0.065)
Female 0.008 -0.006 -0.025 -0.044 0.022 0.015 0.033 0.039 -0.051 -0.049
(0.020) (0.022) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026) (0.029) (0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (0.029)
Age -0.027 -0.043 -0.013 -0.019 -0.029 -0.024 -0.117 -0.132 -0.051 -0.075
(0.033) (0.036) (0.040) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.049) (0.049) (0.045) (0.045)
Right -0.085* -0.078 -0.005 -0.048 0.045
(0.036) (0.044) (0.056) (0.049) (0.057)
N 886 750 887 749 890 754 889 752 887 754
R2 0.007 0.020 0.044 0.047 0.036 0.034 0.018 0.025 0.019 0.023
Notes: úp < 0.05; robust standard errors in parentheses; two-tailed tests.
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results in a measurement problem.  The level of support for a given legal violation or sanction will be 
dependent on whether questions are framed in personalized or abstract terms. The compromise 
struck here is to measure enforcement through questions that provide minimal details about the 
person who violates the law.  Levels of support thus can be thought of as a lower bound on support 
for forbearance when specific individuals in a community are at stake. Moreover, to the extent 
possible, I asked questions in a variety of ways and use PCA to uncover core support for 
forbearance.  While these questions help us understand differences across class groups, judgments 
about the median voter’s preferences must be made with caution.   
Returning to Figure 2.1 to look at the empirical division of popular beliefs about street 
vending and squatting suggests several important facts.  First, demands not to enforce the law are 
composed of both distaste for coercive actions (support for social regulation) and beliefs that 
individuals should be permitted to violate the law due to their economic circumstances (informal 
welfare).  Combined, support for non-enforcement is very high for both offenses studied here: 84 
percent of respondents disapprove of state enforcement for street vending, and 60 percent 
disapproves in the case of squatting.  Even given measurement challenges, what we can cautiously 
conclude is that there are non-trivial costs to undertaking enforcement actions that can come both 
from individuals who sympathize with the poor and those who reject coercive measures.   
The desire to avoid coercive sanctions and look for ways to deter law breaking without 
enforcement—or social regulation—is an important component of opposition to enforcement. 
Evictions of squatters in particular raise red flags among respondents as excessive exertions of 
authority.  While 44 percent disagree with evictions, only 16 percent agree with squatting.  Notably, 
given that this belief is widespread in society, then the structure of Latin American laws makes 
eminent sense: citizens both support the legal standard as an abstract ideal and oppose its 
enforcement in the typical case that involves sympathetic individuals and punitive measures.   In 
! 70 
contrast, if informal welfare beliefs were dominant on their own, then it would raise the question of 
why politicians do not change the law.   
Enforcement and informal welfare attitudes divide class groups.  State enforcement against 
squatting garners support among 44 percent of upper class groups and just 26 percent of lower class 
groups.  Even more extreme, while 22 percent of upper class respondents support enforcement 
against street vendors, only 4 percent of lower class respondents concur.  Conversely, informal 
welfare beliefs concentrate among the poor.  While 29 percent of the poor approve of informal 
welfare provision in the case of squatting (i.e. they approve of squatting and disapprove of 
enforcement), 7 percent of the nonpoor holds similar beliefs.  Likewise, 70 percent of the poor hold 
informal welfare beliefs about street vending compared to 34 percent of the upper class.  I probe 
these class divisions more rigorously in the next section to check whether other factors such as 
political ideology drive these beliefs. 
In contrast, preferences for social regulation do not have a strong class basis.  If anything, 
social regulation draws slightly higher support among upper class, educated respondents.  In the case 
of squatting, 42 and 46 percent of the poor and nonpoor, respectively, condemn squatting but also 
oppose evictions.  For street vending, 29 percent of the poor and 39 percent of the nonpoor prefer 
social regulation.  Hence, the desire to avoid coercive sanctions and look for other ways to deter law 
breaking without enforcement is substantively important, but it does not galvanize class groups.  
This group roughly can be thought of swing voters on enforcement issues, given that their stance on 
enforcement is more liable to shift based on the perceived desert of those in violation of the law and 
the way that coercive state actions are presented to the public.   
To wrap up, the typology of legal attitudes developed brings out the assumptions behind 
using any single measure of legal attitudes.  It also suggests the ways in which beliefs about 
compliance and enforcement diverge.  I have clarified that support for informal welfare provision is 
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best understood as a joint belief that legal violations are justified and state sanctions are unmerited.  
Support for state enforcement inverts both of these positions.  Decomposing attitudes suggests that 
support for non-enforcement is very high, even when questions are posed in abstract terms, but that 
a large group of the public may prefer less intrusive enforcement measures to promote compliance. 
The next section further probes the centrality of class to how citizens view forbearance against street 
vending and squatting.  I lay out the evidence for my theoretical prediction that the poor support 
less enforcement than the nonpoor.      
2 Material Interests 
The most basic assumption of redistributive politics is that the poor prefer social welfare 
spending and the rich resist it. It follows that income predicts support for redistribution (Meltzer 
and Richard 1981; Romer 1975).  The core idea of this study is that forbearance can serve as an 
informal mode of redistribution.  Moreover, in contrast to weakly progressive government welfare 
provision, forbearance targets the poor.  Empirically, then, two key things should follow at the 
individual level: higher income should predict less support for forbearance, and second, the 
predictive power of income should be greater for forbearance than for redistributive attitudes.  I test 
this first implication with regression analyses of forbearance attitudes in which income is included as 
an independent variable along with controls for potential confounders like gender, age, and ideology.  
To examine the second implication, I compare the relative explanatory power of regression models 
changing the dependent variable from forbearance to redistributive attitudes.  I also look at the 
consistency of class as a predictor using different measures of legal and redistributive attitudes.  The 
goal of these tests is to explore whether class groups polarize more consistently around enforcement 
issues compared to traditional social policy issues.  I investigate these propositions first with the 
evidence from Bogotá and then from across Latin America.  
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2.1 Evidence from Bogotá 
To measure attitudes toward forbearance, I use PCA to capture the axis of informal 
distributive politics proposed in Figure 2.1.  I use two measures of attitudes toward law breaking: 
approval of unlicensed street vending (Vending) and approval of squatting (Squatting).  In addition, I 
consider a pair of measures of enforcement attitudes based on the most common type of sanctions 
for these offenses, decommission of vending merchandise (Decommissions) and the eviction of 
squatters (Evictions).  These questions were asked both as vignettes and abstract propositions; I 
include both in the PCA.  A common first dimension explains 41 percent of the variance across 
individuals.  As expected if distributive beliefs underpin these question responses, the principal 
component loads negatively on law breaking and positively on law enforcement measures.  I 
therefore call this underlying attitude Forbearance.   
Conceptually, the advantage of this single dimensional measure is that it captures the 
distributive aspect of enforcement attitudes and it reduces noise from measurement error on single-
item survey questions.  For example, Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder (2008) argue that 
combining a “number of survey items on the same broadly defined issue area…eliminates a large 
amount of measurement error,” revealing “issue preferences that are well structured and stable.”  
The drawback of this strategy is that it does not allow for a natural interpretation of the dependent 
variable.  Given these concerns, I also analyze each separate question about law breaking and 
enforcement to give a sense of the substantive effects and explanatory power.   
To compare the relative predictive power of income, I measure attitudes toward 
redistribution using a similar approach. The most common operationalization of redistributive 
demand comes from survey questions that ask individuals if they agree or disagree that the 
government should take actions to reduce inequality (Inequality).  I present this generic question, 
consistent with the literature, but I also include a broader set of questions to get at an underlying 
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dimension of social policy attitudes (Social Policy).  These questions include approval for economically 
progressive measures like additional taxes on the wealthy (Tax) and cash transfers to the poor 
(Transfers).  They also include questions about approval for several social policies with less clearly 
progressive effects due to their historic exclusion of informal sector workers.  These include 
expenditures on employment (Employment), pensions (Pension), and housing programs (Housing).  The 
first component explains 45 percent of the variance in attitudes and loads positively for all questions. 
My key independent variable is an individual’s class position (Class).  Throughout, I use the 
term “class” loosely to refer to socioeconomic stratifications.  As explained in Chapter 1, Colombia 
divides the population into six class strata that are established through a detailed household survey 
that accounts for current income levels, as well as the precariousness of that income level (due to 
education levels, type of work, household size, dwelling quality, and so on).  Individuals are highly 
knowledgeable of their household’s stratum.3  Citizens and politicians alike speak in terms of “low” 
and “high” strata. Strata measures thus come far closer to capturing a broad notion of class position 
than straightforward income measures, but are not primarily rooted in labor market status.4  I expect 
the coefficient on class to be negative, given that upper class groups should prefer less forbearance.  
Education also likely affects attitudes toward forbearance through material and nonmaterial 
channels.  Given imperfect measures of class, years of education (Education) may capture additional 
socioeconomic differences.  Education also results in different socialization experiences.  It may 
inculcate a commitment to abstract ideals like the rule of law and the sanctity of private property.  I 
thus expect that more educated respondents are likely to place greater value on enforcement.  I also !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 The correlation between the strata identified on government documents and the self-identified 
household strata is 0.97.    
4 The results are robust to standard household income measures as well.  But income measures have 
known problems of measurement error and missing data (Deaton 1997; Handlin 2013), and labor 
contract status changes frequently (Perry 2007), which make government class assignments a 
preferred option.   
! 74 
expect that older respondents (Age) are less supportive of forbearance, given a higher probability of 
owning property and concerns about disorder among younger generations.  While the coefficient on 
age should be negative for beliefs about forbearance, I expect it to be neutral or positive for 
redistributive beliefs, given that Latin American welfare states spend heavily on pensions that benefit 
the elderly. I control for sex (Female), although I have no clear hypothesis about its effects.        
As I argue in the first chapter, benefits secured through forbearance fit uncomfortably into 
traditional Left-Right ideological divisions because they are pro-poor, but provided outside state 
channels.  If the basis of left-wing identification is support for an expanded state role, then 
individuals who identify with the political Left should be less sympathetic to forbearance.  They are 
likely to prefer expanded formal redistribution and see forbearance as a challenge to state provision.  
Yet if left-wing individuals identify as such because they believe in pro-poor policies, broadly 
defined, then they will support the progressive benefits provided through forbearance.  My weak 
expectation is that pro-poor views are more determinative of ideological identification at the 
individual level.  Therefore, individuals who sympathize with the political Left should be more 
sympathetic to forbearance as a way to aid the poor.  Those who sympathize with the political Right 
are more likely to reject forbearance as a threat to the existing distribution of income and property.  
To examine this hypothesis, respondents are asked to place their political views on a scale that runs 
from the political left to right, “according to the meaning that these terms have for you” (Right). On 
average, I expect that the coefficient will be negative because identification with the Right should be 
associated with less support for pro-poor policies and thus forbearance.   
Several additional measures capture whether an individual is likely to receive distributive 
benefits from forbearance and thus should predict greater support.  In particular, I expect that 
individuals who have worked as a street vendor (Vendor Past) or have occupied land illegally (Squatter 
Past) are more supportive of forbearance, given that they realize the distributive benefits at stake and 
! 75 
may be more likely to rely on informal welfare again as an insurance mechanism in the future.  A 
related prediction is that individuals in the informal sector (Informal) are more likely to support 
forbearance due to their historic exclusion from formal welfare benefits.  I measure informality by 
whether an individual has a formal sector labor contract.  The drawback of this contract-based 
definition is that it cannot capture the longer run employment trajectory of an individual; it measures 
labor market status at a single moment in time.  All three measures should be associated with 
positive support for forbearance, but should not predict (or even be negatively associated) with 
support for formal redistribution.  I rescale all categorical independent variables from 0 to 1 to aid in 
the interpretation of the results.   
Table 2.2 presents the results of an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model. Model 1 
shows the barebones model with forbearance as the dependent variable.  As predicted, class is 
associated with less support for forbearance.  A move from the lowest to the highest class moves 
the index of forbearance attitudes by one standard deviation.  Educated and older individuals also 
tend to be less supportive of forbearance, as hypothesized.  
Model 2 adds the measure of political ideology.  This model is run separately because I lose 
15 percent of the data due to nonresponse (multiple imputations of the missing data do not change 
the results).  Individuals who identify with the political Right are about a quarter of a standard 
deviation less supportive of forbearance, although class remains a significant predictor.  
Model 3 adds the variables that affect expectations about the receipt of informal benefits. 
Past experience as a squatter or street vendor is associated with a half a standard deviation more 
support on the index of forbearance attitudes.  But, even accounting for direct past participation in 
the activity, class remains a significant predictor of forbearance attitudes. This finding suggests that 
group-based effects are important as well as direct material benefits.  While the measure of 
informality is not predictive of enforcement or social policy preferences, this may be explained by 
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the difficulty operationalizing the precariousness of an individual’s labor contract.  The tenure of 
average formal sector labor contract is just three years in Latin America, and many workers rotate in 
and out of the informal sector (Schneider 2013).  Whether an individual once resorted to street 
vending thus may be a better proxy for whether he expects to rely on informal welfare policies in the 
future.   
TABLE 2.2!!!Comparing Forbearance and Social Policy Attitudes in Bogotá 
 
Models 4 through 6 replicate the analysis using social policy attitudes as the dependent 
variable.  As theorized, class is negatively associated with support for social policy expenditures, but 
it is a weaker and less consistent predictor.  The clearest way to see this difference is in the model fit: 
despite using a battery of social policy questions, demographic characteristics explain less than 4 
Forbearance Social Policy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Class -1.010* -1.008* -0.865* -0.507* -0.462* -0.485*
(0.133) (0.138) (0.133) (0.142) (0.152) (0.146)
Education -0.382* -0.293* -0.240* -0.249 -0.329* -0.239
(0.139) (0.146) (0.139) (0.150) (0.161) (0.154)
Female 0.002 -0.002 -0.007 0.023 0.022 0.029
(0.062) (0.066) (0.061) (0.066) (0.072) (0.068)
Age -0.516* -0.545* -0.426* -0.138 -0.168 -0.122
(0.104) (0.110) (0.104) (0.111) (0.121) (0.114)
Right -0.235* -0.041
(0.110) (0.121)
Vendor Past 0.468* 0.113
(0.076) (0.084)
Squatter Past 0.208* -0.008
(0.101) (0.111)
Informal 0.119 -0.014
(0.064) (0.071)
N 869 738 856 875 744 862
R2 0.167 0.168 0.213 0.041 0.041 0.040
Notes: úp < 0.05; robust standard errors in parentheses; two-tailed tests.
Table 2: Enforcement Attitudes
Vending Squatting Titling Decommissions Evictions
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Class -0208* -0.197* -0.202* -0.218* -0.194* -0.214* 0.194* 0.179* 0.239* 0.251*
(0.052) (0.055) (0.047) (0.048) (0.053) (0.056) (0.043) (0.046) (0.054) (0.057)
Education -0.262* -0.237 -0.039 -0.011 -0.128* -0.123* 0.127* 0.130 -0.033 -0.065
(0.055) (0.058) (0.049) (0.051) (0.056) (0.026) (0.045) (0.049) (0.057) (0.061)
Female -0.008 -0.007 0.005 0.001 0.018 0.043 -0.009 -0.008 0.008 0.005
(0.024) (0.026) (0.022) (0.023) (0.025) (0.264) (0.020) (0.022) (0.025) (0.027)
Age -0.147* -0.139* 0.119* 0.123* -0.005 0.018 0.033 0.019 0.138* 0.136*
(0.041) (0.044) (0.037) (0.038) (0.042) (0.044) (0.033) (0.037) (0.042) (0.046)
Right -0.066 -0.128* -0.104* 0.007 0.020
(0.051) (0.380) (0.044) (0.037) (0.046)
N 887 753 886 749 877 745 889 752 880 747
R2 0.116 0.103 0.055 0.074 0.058 0.071 0.084 0.073 0.046 0.048
Notes: úp < 0.05; robust standard errors in parentheses; two-tailed tests.
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percent of variation in social policy attitudes compared to 21 percent for forbearance attitudes.  
These results are consistent with past work on redistributive attitudes.  While some scholars find 
that demand for redistribution is higher among poor individuals (Gaviria 2008; Haggard, Kaufman, 
and Long 2013; Morgan and Kelly 2010), others find no correlation (Cramer and Kaufman 2011; 
Dion and Birchfield 2010; Kaufman 2009).  In comparing the results to advanced industrial 
economies, Blofield and Luna (2011: 167) conclude that, while income seems to predict attitudes 
toward inequality in Latin America, its “significance is less consistent across countries and over time, 
and the predictive power of the models is weaker overall.”  
The other finding of note is that political ideology is not predictive of social policy attitudes.  
This finding is slightly surprising given the dominant definition of the political Left and Right in 
Latin America as rooted in different orientations toward the state’s role in redressing economic 
inequalities (Levitsky and Roberts 2011; Luna and Kaltwasser Rovira 2013).  However, much data 
are lost due to low response rates, and there has been a broad Latin American trend toward 
clustering at the center of the political spectrum (Dosek 2011; Seligson 2007),  
Another way to judge the results, and to give them a more substantive interpretation, is to 
look at their robustness across survey question specifications.  Figure 2.2 presents a plot of the 
estimated coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals using individual survey items, rather than 
the first components, as dependent variables.  Only the core coefficients of interests are shown 
(although the control variables are included in the model). The horizontal axis measures the 
predicted effect of moving from the lowest to highest class (the class coefficient) for each dependent 
variable measure.  Each question was measured on a 4-point scale running from “strongly disagree” 
to “strongly agree,” rescaled from 0 to 1.  A value of 0.25 means that a move from the lowest to 
highest class group is associated with a single ordinal category increase in approval for the activity, 
say from disagreement to agreement. 
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The left panel shows the results for the questions on law breaking and enforcement. Looking 
at the results for the class variable, the fact that none of the coefficients cross the vertical line at zero 
underscores that they are all significant in the direction expected.  The coefficients on class for law 
breaking are negative—meaning that the wealthy are less likely to approve of squatting and street 
vending—and the coefficients for law enforcement are positive—meaning that the wealthy are more 
likely to favor decommissions and evictions.  These effects are substantively as well as statistically 
important: nonpoor respondents are roughly one ordinal category less supportive of enforcement 
than poor ones.  
This effect of class is both larger and more consistent than political ideology or past 
violations of the law.  Disaggregating the results by survey question shows that most of the effect of 
political ideology comes through opposition to squatting, possibly because it represents a more 
direct threat to private property rights and political order.  A typical right-leaning respondent is 
about half an ordinal category less supportive of squatting than a left-leaning one.  Even controlling 
for class position, direct participation in an illegal activity like squatting or street vending does make 
an individual about half an ordinal category more sympathetic to legal violations and less supportive 
of enforcement.    
The right panel probes responses to the disaggregated questions on social policy preferences.  
Breaking down the results by types of social policy helps make sense of the weak effect of class.  
Consistent with my theory, only in the case of progressive forms of social policy, such as taxation of 
the rich or cash transfer programs, does class predict policy support.  Moving from the lowest to the 
highest class predicts an ordinal category decrease in support for progressive taxation, as well as cash 
transfer expenditures.  The magnitude of class differences for progressive social policies is on par 
with those observed for forbearance. In contrast, class is not predictive of support for expenditures 
on housing or employment, or general inequality reduction and pension expenditures (the latter two 
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are now shown for purposes of space).  Estimating the model separately by types of social 
expenditures thus allows us to see that the central role that economic progressivity is playing.  Some 
types of economically progressive social expenditures do polarize the electorate, but when asked 
about redistribution writ large or programs with less clearly progressive effects, class has muted 
effects.   
!
FIGURE 2.2 Predicted Effects of Class, Ideology, and Past Violations          
Note: Horizontal bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals.  Controls for age, education, and gender not shown.  
To further probe whether the economic progressivity of forbearance compared to formal 
social expenditures drives these results, I conduct two additional types of tests.  First, my theory 
predicts that support for legal violations only differs by class when offenses favor the poor.  The 
poor’s support for legal violations should not extend more broadly to instances when the wealthy 
violate the law.  This prediction distinguishes my theory from those rooted in legal culture, which 
hold that the poor are simply less legalistic than the nonpoor.  The right panel of Figure 2.3 
compares approval for different types of offenses across class groups.  The solid lines show 
approval for legal violations that benefit the poor, squatting and street vending, along with the 95 
percent confidence intervals.  The level of support for these violations is substantial.  It also declines 
sharply as income increases.  In contrast, the dotted lines show support for two legal violations done 
Table 1: Redistributive Attitudes
Inequality Tax Transfers Employment Housing
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Class 0.033 -0.024 -0.236* -0.220* -0.190* -0.168* -0.063 -0.056 -0.093 -0.082
(0.042) (0.045) (0.051) (0.055) (0.056) (0.060) (0.058) (0.062) (0.058) (0.062)
Education -0.047 -0.061 -0.013 -0.025 -0.073 -0.096 0.088 0.120 -0.093 -0.114
(0.044) (0.048) (0.053) (0.058) (0.059) (0.064) (0.061) (0.065) (0.061) (0.065)
Female 0.008 -0.006 -0.025 -0.044 0.022 0.015 0.033 0.039 -0.051 -0.049
(0.020) (0.022) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026) (0.029) (0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (0.029)
Age -0.027 -0.043 -0.013 -0.019 -0.029 -0.024 -0.117 -0.132 -0.051 -0.075
(0.033) (0.036) (0.040) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.049) (0.049) (0.045) (0.045)
Right -0.085* -0.078 -0.005 -0.048 0.045
(0.036) (0.044) (0.056) (0.049) (0.057)
N 886 750 887 749 890 754 889 752 887 754
R2 0.007 0.020 0.044 0.047 0.036 0.034 0.018 0.025 0.019 0.023
Notes: úp < 0.05; robust standard errors in parentheses; two-tailed tests.
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by the nonpoor, using business tax loopholes (Tax Loopholes) and paying less than registered on 
industrial electricity meters (Electricity).  These offenses were selected because they are common 
infractions with regressive effects. Despite their ubiquity, there is near universal condemnation of 
these legal violations by poor and nonpoor respondents alike.  Thus, consistent with my theory, only 
legal violations with progressive benefits polarize voters along class lines.  
FIGURE 2.3.  Support for Law Breaking (Left) and Benefit Receipt (Right) by Class 
A second way to probe whether differences in economic progressivity undergird attitudes is 
to look at the fraction of individuals who benefit from social expenditures compared to forbearance.  
To do this, I asked individuals if they believe that social expenditures benefit “people like them” 
(Benefits).  This question is meant to judge perceptions that an individual receives benefits, whether 
past or future, from the welfare state. The solid line in the right panel of Figure 2.3 reveals that the 
fraction of respondents who believe that they benefit from social expenditures is amazingly constant 
across class groups.  About a third of poor and nonpoor respondents believe that they benefit from 
state social policies.  It is unsurprising that attitudes toward social policy differ little by class when 
the key mechanism that underpins theories about class-based attitudes—expectations of material 
benefits—does not vary at all based on class position. 
Conversely, the dashed line plots the fraction of the population that has worked as a street 
vendor or lived in a squatter settlement as a proxy for those who benefit from forbearance.  For the 
Table 1: Redistributive Attitudes
Inequality Tax Transfers Employment Housing
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Class 0.033 -0.024 -0.236* -0.220* -0.190* -0.168* -0.063 -0.056 -0.093 -0.082
(0.042) (0.045) (0.051) (0.055) (0.056) (0.060) (0.058) (0.062) (0.058) (0.062)
Education -0.047 -0.061 -0.013 -0.025 -0.073 -0.096 0.088 0.120 -0.093 -0.114
(0.044) (0.048) (0.053) (0.058) (0.059) (0.064) (0.061) (0.065) (0.061) (0.065)
Female 0.008 -0.006 -0.025 -0.044 0.022 0.015 0.033 0.039 -0.051 -0.049
(0.020) (0.022) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026) (0.029) (0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (0.029)
Age -0.027 -0.043 -0.013 -0.019 -0.029 -0.024 -0.117 -0.132 -0.051 -0.075
(0.033) (0.036) (0.040) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.049) (0.049) (0.045) (0.045)
Right -0.085* -0.078 -0.005 -0.048 0.045
(0.036) (0.044) (0.056) (0.049) (0.057)
N 886 750 887 749 890 754 889 752 887 754
R2 0.007 0.020 0.044 0.047 0.036 0.034 0.018 0.025 0.019 0.023
Notes: úp < 0.05; robust standard errors in parentheses; two-tailed tests.
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poorest class group, the fraction that concretely benefited from forbearance is larger than those who 
expect to benefit from social expenditures.  This is amazing given the differences in question 
wording (future versus past benefits) and scope (all social programs versus street vending and 
squatting).  It is consistent with my theory that informal welfare provision can be more important to 
the lives of the poor than the formal welfare state.  Critically, we also can see that the class 
difference across groups is very sharp for forbearance.  Only the poor work as street vendors and 
squatters—and thus are likely to voice support for forbearance—while all class groups capture some 
social policy expenditures in countries with truncated welfare states like Colombia.  
The basic materialist interest model thus seems to apply once we pay attention to a key 
assumption that underpins it: that distributive policies provide benefits to the poor.  The results 
show a clear association between class and attitudes for forbearance, as well as other policies like 
progressive taxation and cash transfers that offer clear benefits to the poor.  Class poorly predicts 
attitudes toward forms of forbearance and social policies with less clearly progressive effects.  Many 
formal welfare benefits in Colombia, as in many other Latin American countries, accrue to formal 
sector workers. Squatting and street vending, in contrast, offer targeted benefits to the poor.  The 
greater polarization of attitudes around forbearance toward street vendors and squatters thus makes 
sense when the relative progressivity of social expenditures is considered. I now show that these 
results are not unique to Bogotá.  Class cleavages in enforcement preferences emerge consistently 
across Latin America, while they do not for redistributive preferences. 
2.2 Evidence from Latin America 
Operationalizing support for forbearance cross-nationally is not straightforward.  Widely 
administered surveys rarely ask about attitudes toward enforcement.  Given these constraints, testing 
the predictions of my theory with cross-national quantitative data requires some creativity.  I make 
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use of a novel indirect method to measure attitudes toward squatting using public opinion data from 
AmericasBarometer.  I pool the data from the 2008, 2010, and 2012 waves across eighteen countries.  
The AmericasBarometer core questionnaire asks respondents to score their approval of 
“seizing private property or land to protest.”  Responses to this question likely reflect three things.  
First, the question forms part of a block where respondents score their approval of a series of 
contentious actions on a 10-point scale that runs from “firmly disapprove” to “firmly approve.”  
Responses thus capture beliefs about the general appropriateness of behaviors that citizens use to 
achieve their political or social objectives.  Second, scores reflect the “response style” of an 
individual, meaning the tendency to give extreme or moderate answers.  Third, the specific question 
asks respondents to evaluate the inviolability of property.  It probes whether private property rights 
can be sacrificed to achieve other goals.  This chapter attempts to isolate this latter aspect.  To do so, 
I create an index of general attitudes toward protest using PCA and then use this index in a first-
stage regression to isolate the dependent variable of interest.5  
In constructing an index of general protest attitudes, the goal is to establish the common 
determinants of protest approval.  Therefore, I include three questions about attitudes toward 
disruptive or illegal protest: seizing property, blocking roads, and organizing to overthrow the 
government.  I also include three measures that capture approval of legal protests: past protest 
participation, legal protests, and legal protests by groups that criticize the government.6 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Here, PCA is a superior technique to the addition of controls in an OLS style regression because it 
captures underlying attitudes toward protest behaviors and response styles, rather than opinions 
about any single type of contentious action. 
6  These are AmericasBarometer questions e14, e15, e3, prot (prot1, prot2, or prot3 depending on the 
wave), e5, and d2, respectively.  The phrasing of the protest participation question prot has varied by 
wave.  To create a comparable measure across waves, I create an indicator variable prot that codes 
individuals who have participated in a protest in the past twelve months as “1” (participants) and 
those who have not as “0” (nonparticipants).  This is consistent with the prot3 question from 2010.  
However, the 2006 and 2008 waves asked respondents if they participated in a protest “a few times,” 
“almost never” or “never” in the past year.  I code respondents who said that they participated “a 
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Applying the method of principal components, all variables load positively on the first 
component.  This is consistent with the hypothesis that the primary driving factor behind opinions 
about all protest variables is an overall stance toward contentious actions.  I refer to this index as 
Protest approval.  This common first component explains roughly a third of the variation in opinions 
about various protest behaviors in the Latin America wide data.7  The second component loads 
negatively for illegal behaviors—seizing property and plotting to overthrow the government—and 
positively for less disruptive protest behaviors—including peaceful protests and protest 
participation.  Blocking roads falls in the middle with a loading near zero.  The second component 
(Legality) appears to capture a common attitude toward law breaking and violence, similar to the 
index of protest illegality constructed by Opp (1990).  While the first component captures general 
approval of protest, the second seems to align with a stance toward illegal behaviors. Cumulatively, 
the first and second components explain over half of the variance. 
To isolate attitudes toward property seizures, I take the residuals of a regression of the first 
component (Protest approval) on the question that asks for approval of land seizure as protest.  The 
intuition is that the residuals capture the extent to which respondents differ in their reactions to 
property takings compared to their individual baseline attitudes toward protest.  Protest approval 
explains 68 percent of the variance in property seizure attitudes.  In other words, most of the 
differences between respondents come in their general protest attitudes.  The remaining variation 
represents how individuals’ responses change when considering land takings.  I use these residuals as 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !
few times” as participants and those who said “almost never” or “never” as nonparticipants.  After 
comparing the proportions of participants in years when respondents were asked the binary 
question, I determined that respondents who state that they “almost never” participate most likely 
had not participated in the year in question.  The results are robust to an alternative coding where 
those who say “almost never” are coded as participants. 
7 PCA analysis disaggregated by country and by year produces similar results with the first 
component explaining between 29 to 40 percent of the variance.   
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the dependent variable, Property seizure, for the remaining analysis. I also run a different specification 
of the dependent variable in which I control for both protest approval and the legality of protest 
behavior, but find no difference in the results.8 ! 
As above, I compare opinions about squatting to redistributive attitudes.  
AmericasBarometer includes very few questions on social policy preferences, but it does include the 
standard redistributive demand question.  This question, also included on my Bogotá survey, asks 
whether individuals agree or disagree that the government should take actions to reduce inequality 
(Inequality). 
My main independent variable is income. Unlike on the Bogotá survey, there are no clear 
socioeconomic stratifications measured in the AmericasBarometer survey.  Instead, respondents 
self-report their household income range, Income, divided in ten categories (and sixteen categories in 
the 2012 wave).  Given the change in methodology, I divide income into deciles, which I rescale 
from 0 to 1.  I also test wealth-based measures for robustness.9  The coefficient on income should 
be negative for forbearance toward squatting, given that it is a progressive transfer so support 
declines with income.  I also expect income to predict less support for redistribution, although the 
effect should be weaker, particularly in countries with truncated welfare states.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 The second component Legality is only included as a robustness check because it explains little of 
the overall variation in property attitudes (2 percent) and does not affect the findings.    
9 Research has shown that expenditure-based economic status indicators are more reliable than 
income-based indices in developing countries where recall of volatile income flows is often 
inaccurate and households tend to smooth consumption patterns (Deaton 1997).  To alleviate this 
problem, LAPOP asks respondents to indicate their income range, rather than a precise monetary 
amount.  LAPOP also collects information on household assets with the aim of obtaining 
consumption-based measures of economic status.  A consumption-based measure can be 
constructed using the first component from a PCA analysis of all questions about household assets.  
The first component assigns a larger weight to assets that vary the most across households (Córdova 
2008).  I use the first component in a first-stage regression on income and run the same set of 
regressions.  The results do not change so household income is reported here because it has a more 
natural interpretation. 
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I include the same set of core independent variables used above: Age, Education, Female, and 
Right.  The question wordings are identical to my survey. One concern with the construct validity of 
my dependent variable is that urban and rural property seizures are perceived differently. While 
urban residents squat to secure housing, rural residents tend to take land for subsistence production 
purposes.  Both types of land takings involve distributive claims by the poor so I do not expect 
substantial differences in attitudes.  Nonetheless, given that AmericasBarometer is a nationwide 
survey, I also include an indicator variable for whether the respondent lives in an urban area as a 
control (Urban).  
There are no questions on past history as a squatter or street vendor.  Recent waves do 
include questions on whether an individual works in a business with less than five employees and is 
a non-professional.  This labor status definition of informality is commonly used by the ILO and 
therefore provides a proxy for informality (Informal).  Again, my prediction is that individuals in the 
informal sector often are excluded from formal redistributive policies, and more likely to support 
land takings.  Informal workers should be less sympathetic to state redistribution. As above, I rescale 
all categorical independent variables from 0 to 1 to create comparable measures.   
I estimate a simple OLS regression with robust standard errors, as well as country and time 
fixed effects (coefficients not shown).  The coefficient, say for income, thus represents how a move 
from the lowest to higher income decile within a given country-year affects attitudes toward 
property seizures.  Table 2.3 presents the results. 
Model 1 examines the determinants of attitudes toward forbearance.  Consistent with the 
findings from Bogotá, I find that poor, less educated respondents are more tolerant of squatting 
across the region.  This follows directly from my claim that property seizures constitute progressive 
transfers and thus gain greater support among the poor.  The effect of education is substantively 
more important than income in the regional results.  Moving from having no education to a college 
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degree is associated with a fifth of a standard deviation difference in the index of beliefs about 
property seizures.  The fact that education is a stronger predictor of property seizure attitudes is 
unsurprising given the known problems of measuring household income and the importance that 
even a few years of schooling can make for work opportunities.     
TABLE 2.3. Comparing Forbearance and Social Policy Attitudes across Latin America 
 
Model 2 shows that identification with the political Right is associated with less support for 
property seizures in the cross-national data.  This result is consistent with my finding in the Bogotá 
data that political identification most significantly predicts attitudes toward threats to property 
ownership, while having a less significant association with other enforcement attitudes.  Finally, 
Model 3 tests whether informality is associated with attitudes toward squatting, but finds no effect.  
Property Seizure Inequality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Income -0.070ú -0.066ú -0.082ú -0.018ú -0.016ú -0.024ú
(0.014) (0.015) (0.019) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Education -0.187ú -0.201ú -0.192ú 0.007 0.016ú 0.018ú
(0.021) (0.024) (0.027) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Female 0.007 0.015 0.019 -0.006ú -0.010ú -0.009ú
(0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Age -0.084ú -0.083ú -0.063ú 0.008 0.009ú 0.008
(0.016) (0.018) (0.023) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Urban -0.019ú -0.018 -0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.005
(0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Right -0.076ú -0.014ú
(0.016) (0.004)
Informal 0.012 -0.003
(0.012) (0.003)
N 60449 50352 31258 63438 52203 32686
R2 0.044 0.047 0.042 0.050 0.052 0.048
Notes: úp < 0.05; robust standard errors in parentheses; two-tailed tests; country and year fixed e ects not shown.
Source: AmericasBarometer, Pooled 2008, 2010, and 2012 Waves.
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It is possible that measuring informality through self-employment does not adequately capture an 
individual’s labor market or housing experience in a context where more than half of respondents 
are self-employed.  
Models 4 through 6 compare the same specifications for redistributive preferences.  Income 
predicts less support for redistribution in the pooled data, but its effect is small and inconsistent 
across countries. To visualize the fragility of this result, Figure 2.4 plots support for property 
seizures and redistribution by deciles of the income distribution and country.   The left panel 
suggests that attitudes toward redistribution show a neutral and sometimes even positive relationship 
to income in most of Latin America. The positive slope indicates that as one moves up the income 
scale, support for redistribution actually increases.  In separate work (Holland 2013), I show that the 
coefficient on income is more negative in countries where the welfare state does more to redistribute 
income.  In contrast, the right panel demonstrates that the slope on support for property seizure 
never reverses: the poor always prefer more land takings than the nonpoor.  This follows directly 
from my claim that property seizures constitute progressive transfers and thus gain greater support 
among the poor.   
!
FIGURE 2.4.  Support for Redistribution and Property Seizures by Class and Country 
 3 
 
The paper’s central argument is that preferences only polarize along class lines when 
social policies genuinely redistribute resources.  Polarized preferences thus emerge in two 
situations.  First, preferences follow expected class lines in countries with more progressive, 
though not necessarily larger, welfare states.  This paper finds that countries with more pro-
poor expenditures, such as Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay, follow a “social democratic” 
preference structure where the poor support more redistribution than the middle class.   
Second, policies that concentrate benefits at the bottom of the income scale do generate 
class-based attitudes.  These benefits often come through informal channels.  
Government policy may (or may not) be responsive to the policy preferences of 
individuals.  Nonetheless, it is important to understand whether shortcomings stem from the 
way that citizens view redistribution or from the way preferences translate into politics.  
Here, the takeaway is that decades of truncated welfare policies have reshaped public 
preferences.  This is not to ignore problems of representation.  Acting in their material self-
interest, the poor often do not support or act collectively to enlarge the welfare state, though 
they may support and mobilize to maintain informal benefits.  There are reasons for 
optimism: as the targeting of social expenditures improves, preferences also can be expected 
to realign along class lines. 
 
Figure 1.  Support for Formal Redistribution.   Figure 2.  Support for Informal Redistribution. 
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One concern about the dependent variable operationalization is that the AmericasBarometer 
question does not specify if property seizures involve the poor attempting to secure housing or 
agricultural land.  The construct validity rests on the assumption that Latin American respondents 
tend to associate land takings with actions by the poor and landless.  Put otherwise, the claim is that 
land seizures involve a distributive claim by popular sectors against property holders. 
To check the construct validity, I use the AmericasBarometer surveys from Peru in 1996 and 
1997.  The survey used a more precisely worded question that asked respondents how much they 
approve of individuals who “invade private property (houses or unoccupied land).”  Given that this 
question excludes the awkward “in protest” phrasing, it permits a more direct analysis of the 
relationship of interest.  The use of the word invasion and clarification that invasions occur for 
housing purposes also more clearly conjures up images of the poor taking land.  Luckily, the survey 
also included the full bloc of protest questions, which allows me to compare the direct question to 
my indirect construction using PCA.      
Model 1 of Table 2.4 shows the results using the direct question, and Model 2 compares the 
results for the indirect Property Seizure construction.  The results are consistent.  Income and 
education predict less support for property seizures in both specifications.  This result gives me 
additional confidence that my measure of property seizures in the cross-national data indeed isolates 
attitudes about the taking of land.  Plus, the direct question phrasing allows me to judge the 
substantive significance of my results.  Poor respondents are four times more likely to approve of 
land invasions compared to nonpoor respondents.  Nonetheless, only 21.2 percent of poor 
respondents approve of land invasions.  The relatively low level of approval even among the poor 
may be explained by the different social norms surrounding the taking of private, rather than state 
land, as I explore in the next chapter.  This estimate also is relatively similar to my findings in the 
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Bogotá survey, which suggested that 29 percent of poor respondents approved of illegal land 
occupations, although a much larger fraction opposed evictions.!!      
TABLE 2.4. Property Seizure Attitudes and Land Invasions in Peru and Brazil 
  
Peru Brazil
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Income -0.022ú -0.066ú -0.046ú -0.007 -0.011ú -0.008 -0.012ú
(-3.85) (-2.89 ) (-2.11) (-1.45) (-3.37) (-1.63) (-3.65)
Education -0.021ú -0.080ú -0.112ú -0.016ú -0.011ú -0.016ú -0.010ú
(-3.85) (-3.58) (-6.03) (-6.32) (-3.16) (-6.11) (-2.90)
Female -0.003 0.078ú 0.173 0.024 0.023 0.025 0.025
(-0.29) (2.00) (1.50) (1.37) (1.35) (1.47) (1.45)
Age -0.035 0.049 -0.016ú -0.002ú -0.002ú -0.002ú -0.002ú
(-1.37) (0.48) (-3.72) (-2.77) (-2.77) (-2.87) (-2.87)
Urban 0.045ú 0.046 -0.253 -0.038 -0.038 -0.034 -0.034
(3.90) (0.99) (-1.20) (-1.32) (-1.33) (-1.22) (-1.21)
Income*Invasions -0.003 -0.003
(-0.95) (-0.94)
Education*Invasions -0.004ú -0.004ú
(-1.97) (-2.13)
Invasions 0.050ú 0.068ú
(2.10) (2.84)
State Gini -0.069 -0.085
(-0.20) (-0.24)
State Poverty 0.001 0.001
(0.67) (0.68)
Observations 2587 2587 3076 3076 3076 3058 3058
States — — 20 20 20 20 20
Model — — — FE FE RE RE
Notes: úp < 0.05; t statistics in parentheses; two-tailed tests.
Source: AmericasBarometer, Peru 1996-97, Brazil 2010. The dependent variable in Model 1 is Invasions, Models
2-7 use Property Seizures as the dependent variable.
Peru Brazil
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ab
t statistics in parentheses, ú p < 0.05, AmericasBarometer Brazil 2010.
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A second way to check the construct validity is to compare attitudes in places that have 
experienced land invasions by the poor to those that have not.  If property seizure attitudes reflect 
material concerns about redistribution, they should correlate with substantive threats to property.  
While no region-wide data on land takings exist, I examine this implication using an available dataset 
on 5,299 rural land invasions from 1988 to 2004 in Brazil (Hidalgo et al. 2010).  I expect to see 
greater approval of property seizure in areas where the poor have claimed land.  Land invasions also 
likely polarize opinions.  While the poor may benefit directly or sympathize with the distributive 
claims of squatters, the wealthy likely see greater dangers to their property in areas where land 
invasions have occurred.   
To test these claims, I run the same basic model for the Brazil data.  Additionally, I create a 
state-level variable of the average number of land invasions per municipality (Invasions).10  My 
expectation is that higher rates of land invasions are associated with more support for property 
seizures because the poor are the majority in most states, so the coefficient should be positive.  I 
control for state level characteristics, namely the poverty rate (State Poverty) and the Gini coefficient 
(State Gini), because it is possible that states where land invasions occur are poorer and more 
unequal, and these demographic differences account for the attitudinal effects.  I also test whether 
attitudes are more polarized around land invasions by interacting income and education with the 
state land invasions variable.  The core idea is that class should be more predictive of attitudes in 
states with higher levels of land invasions.  If this is the case, then the coefficient on the interaction 
between the level of land invasions and class should be negative.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 The original dataset on land invasions was coded at the municipal level, but few municipalities 
included in the AmericasBarometer survey directly experienced land invasions. Creating a municipal-
level measure thus would allow a handful of municipalities to drive the results.  Instead, I pool the 
number of land invasions across the state.   
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Model 3 in Table 2.4 presents the individual-level results using a standard regression model.  
It serves to confirm that Brazil looks much like the rest of the region in that class and education 
predict less support for property takings.  Models 4 through 7 are hierarchical models with fixed and 
random effects, and standard errors clustered at the state level.  Hierarchical models are necessary 
because attitudes are measured at the individual-level, but my key independent variable—land 
invasions—is measured at the state level.  In both the fixed and random effects models, the 
interaction between invasions and education is negative, which means that education more strongly 
predicts opposition to land invasions in states with more invasions have occurred.  While the 
interactive coefficient of income and invasions is correctly signed, it does not reach conventional 
levels of statistical significance.  Due to the problems measuring household income, also seen in the 
region-wide data, it is not surprising that education is a better predictor than income.  In the random 
effects model, the coefficient on land invasions is positive.  States with more land invasions have 
higher levels of support for property seizures on average, as expected given that the poor are in the 
majority.  These observations— that a higher frequency of land invasions in a state is associated with 
greater polarization in attitudes by class groups and more support for property seizures on 
average—increase my confidence that I am measuring attitudes toward property takings by the poor, 
and that these attitudes correspond to real experiences with squatting in the region. 
Taken together, these results confirm my core finding that the poor are more supportive of 
law breaking than the nonpoor, and that this effect is consistent across country context. By 
comparing enforcement to redistributive preferences, I suggested that differences in economic 
progressivity explain why beliefs about social policy are less tightly tied to class than for forbearance.  
I found robust evidence for my hypotheses using a battery of questions about legal and social policy 
attitudes in Bogotá. While constrained by data availability, I developed an innovative, indirect 
measure of support for property takings and showed that income also predicts enforcement 
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attitudes against squatting across countries in Latin America.  Additionally, I showed that these 
effects held using a more direct operationalization of support for property takings in Peru.  More 
than cheap talk on a survey, I used data on land invasions in Brazil and found support that attitudes 
reflect lived experiences with land invasions.  These class-based differences support my broader 
theoretical claim that politicians face very different incentives to enforce the law depending on 
whether their core constituencies are poor or rich.   
3 Social Policy Substitution  
Material interests do not exhaust the determinants of individual preferences.  This section 
evaluates the claim that the social policy context shapes attitudes toward compliance and 
enforcement.  The basic argument is that opinions about informal welfare turn on whether 
individuals need to violate the law because the state fails to provide them other welfare alternatives.  I 
consider three empirical implications of this proposition.  Individuals should be more supportive of 
forbearance when they have 1) worse evaluations of the state’s distributive capacity, 2) less direct 
experience with substitutive social policies, and 3) information that social policies do not reach the 
poor.  I examine each of these implications in turn.  I concentrate on attitudes toward squatting in 
this section, given that the social policy substitute (housing policy) is clearer than in the case of 
unlicensed street vending.    
3.1 Perceptions of Distributive Capacity 
First, I examine the correlation between an individual’s assessment of state distributive 
capacity and informal welfare attitudes. I measure perceived access to housing by asking whether 
individuals agree with the statement, “The poor sometimes need to invade land to access housing” 
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(Housing Need).11 I expect individuals who perceive greater obstacles for the poor to access housing 
to be more tolerant of squatting and less supportive of evictions.  In the context of squatting, 
another measure of support comes from beliefs about property titling (Titling).  The provision of 
property titles legitimizes squatting as a way to acquire housing.  I expect individual who have better 
perceptions of state housing options will be less supportive of the provision of property titles to 
those who have invaded land. I control for the demographic characteristics that I expect to 
condition enforcement attitudes used in the previous section (class, education, gender, age, having 
lived in an informal settlement).   
Table 2.6 presents the results.  Encouragingly, beliefs that the poor do not have housing 
options are associated with more sympathy for the violation of the law (squatting).  Model 1 shows 
that moving from a belief that the poor have housing options to a belief that they poor have no 
other way to access housing is associated with an increase in support for squatting of about half an 
ordinal category.  It has an even bigger impact on support for the provision of property titles, shown 
in Model 2.  Individuals who believe that the poor have no other housing options are more than a 
full category more supportive of the provision of property titles.  The provision of property titles 
can be thought of as a proxy for approval of squatting and also can help people who are sympathetic 
to the poor and supportive of the rule of the law to reconcile their beliefs.  Finally, Model 3 shows 
that the belief that the poor do not have other housing options is associated with about half an 
ordinal category less support for evictions.  The only other effect of interest is that a personal 
experience of squatting actually makes individuals slightly less supportive of squatting in the abstract, 
although it has no relationship with approval for property titling or evictions.  This finding may 
reflect that individuals who live in squatter settlements suffer many of the negative externalities of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 I present the results in terms of Housing Need, but I also examine another formulation that, “The 
right to dignified housing is a reality for the poor in Bogotá” (Housing Right) with similar results.  
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additional land occupations, although they also are ambivalent about enforcement actions.  
In the Latin America-wide data, there are no specific questions on state housing provision.  
Several questions help approximate this idea.  My substitutive logic suggests that individuals who 
support the idea that the state should promote a more equal distribution of resources should express 
skepticism toward informal redistributive channels.  The belief that the state should take 
responsibility to reduce inequality (Inequality) should be associated less support for squatting.  Of 
course, this question does not capture whether the state actually manages to provide social 
alternatives to the poor.  AmericasBarometer also asks respondents to evaluate the extent to which 
the government combats poverty, ranging from “not much” to “a lot” (Effort).  I predict that 
individuals who believe that the government effectively combats poverty should be less supportive 
of forbearance as a way to aid the poor.  The drawback is that responses about the extent of effort 
to combat poverty do not reveal whether individuals believe that more still needs to be done.  As 
such, I create an indicator variable for individuals who both believe that states should take steps to 
reduce inequality and that they do not at present (Social deficit).  This comes the closest to capturing 
the idea of unmet needs motivate support for forbearance.  Individuals who both believe that the 
government should reduce inequality and that it does not should be most sympathetic to property 
seizures, even if holding those beliefs independently has divergent effects.  I expect that these 
individuals who perceive a social deficit will support efforts to seize resources informally and 
therefore the coefficient will be positive.        
Models 4 through 6 show the results of these analyses.  The findings are mixed.  As 
expected, individuals who attribute greater responsibility to the state in guaranteeing individual 
wellbeing are less supportive of property seizures.  This finding coincides with the idea that informal 
transfers are more attractive to individuals who believe in a minimal state.  However, I find that 
individuals who think that the current administration combats poverty are more supportive of 
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property seizures.  This finding goes against my expectations.  It partially can be reconciled when 
considered alongside the social deficit variable.  I find that a gap in an individual’s desired level of 
redistribution compared to the perceived reality is associated with more support for property 
takings.  Thus, while less clear-cut, these findings—combined with those from Bogotá—largely 
support my logic of social policy substitution in which citizens support forbearance when formal 
distributive channels do not offer sufficient alternatives to the poor.  
TABLE 2.6.  Distributive Capacity and Forbearance Attitudes 
!
While these attitudinal measures confirm my hypotheses, they have severe limitations.  
Despite controls, it is hard to know whether individuals with varying beliefs about the housing needs 
Bogotá Latin America
Squatting Titling Evictions Property Seizure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Class -0.190* -0.184* 0.221* -0.076ú -0.090ú -0.092ú
(0.047) (0.053) (0.055) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
Education -0.028* -0.125* -0.030* -0.179ú -0.212ú -0.216ú
(0.050) (0.055) (0.058) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
Female -0.000 0.021 -0.002 0.005 0.012 0.012
(0.021) (0.024) (0.026) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Age -0.011* 0.004 0.130 -0.081ú -0.094ú -0.091ú
(0.037) (0.041) (0.043) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018)
Squatting Past -0.093* -0.017 -0.053
(0.035) (0.039) (0.041)
Housing Need 0.076* 0.272* -0.096*
(0.035) (0.039) (0.041)
Urban -0.022ú 0.003 0.003
(0.009) (0.011) (0.011)
Inequality -0.377ú -0.542ú -0.512ú
(0.016) (0.018) (0.019)
E ort 0.251ú 0.313ú
(0.015) (0.019)
Social Deficit 0.089ú
(0.016)
N 868 859 862 59540 46744 46744
R2 0.069 0.108 0.046 0.053 0.070 0.071
Notes: úp < 0.05; robust standard errors in parentheses; two-tailed tests.
Country and year fixed e ects not shown for Latin America-wide data.
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of the poor differ in other ways that drive their enforcement attitudes.  Simply showing that attitudes 
cluster together also tells us nothing about the direction of causality.  Individuals may justify their 
legal attitudes by exaggerating their perceptions of the needs of the poor, which suggests that the 
causal relationship between legal attitudes and perceived state capacities is reversed.  A pair of 
experimental approached based in a quasi-experiment and a survey experiment better helps me 
separate the impact of social policy context.   
3.2 Social Policy Experience: A Quasi-Experiment 
Another way to observe if substitutive social policy reduces sympathy for offenses is to 
exploit spatial variation in how states target their social expenditures.  In particular, a quasi-
experiment emerges from the placement of state housing projects in Bogotá.  I call this a quasi-
experiment, rather than a natural experiment, because it falls short of the key condition that the 
assignment of treatment—in this case, the placement housing projects—is “as if” random (see 
Dunning 2008 on this distinction).  The idea is to compare individuals who have been exposed to 
housing projects with those who have less experience.  If, relative to other residents in the city with 
similar demographic characteristics, the attitudes toward squatting and enforcement are different in 
districts where housing projects have been built, this is suggestive evidence that the social policy 
context affects enforcement attitudes.   
Housing projects have been concentrated unevenly across space in Bogotá for largely 
exogenous reasons related to the structure of private land ownership.  Housing projects have been 
built in just two districts: Bosa and Usme.  These can be thought of as “treated” districts. Now, 
where governments place housing projects is not entirely random because they tend to be placed on 
the urban periphery where land is cheap.  In the case of Bogotá, there are five potential sites for 
large-scale housing development within the city limits (Bosa, Ciudad Bolívar, Rafael Uribe Uribe, 
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Suba, and Usme).  My claim is that among these districts the placement of housing projects occurred for 
reasons unrelated to the factors that impact enforcement attitudes.  Aggregating land for housing 
projects runs into severe hold-out problems and projects proceeded based on whether large 
landowners were willing to sell their land to the state.  Former Mayor Antanas Mockus describes the 
geographic concentration of housing assistance based on where land first became available: 
“Understanding that [the Samper government] could not approach universal provision, the 
government decided they were going to manage projects in a few districts of the city, and not 
discriminate between poor applicants within those districts. And basically, they managed to build 
projects in Bosa and Usme because they got land there first, and that pattern has 
continued…That meant that the poor from Suba, for example, and Ciudad Bolívar accepted, or 
rather their community leaders accepted, that they were left outside of the housing programs.”12 
 
Observations of how the city chose sites for housing projects is plausibly consistent with 
random assignment at least among the candidate districts.  Nonetheless, with one exception, the 
non-treated districts were more economically developed, and had fewer squatters than the selected 
districts.  Thus, there are doubts about the degree to which control units can credibly proxy for 
treated units’ counterfactual outcomes.  Given these concerns, the best that I can do is use matching 
to test whether individuals who live in districts that received housing projects—but are similar on all 
other observable characteristics—are more supportive of evictions compared to individuals that live 
in districts that were considered but did not receive housing projects.  
To do this, I use coarsened exact matching to control for the observable characteristics that 
affect opinions toward squatting, namely class, political ideology, education, and past participation in 
illegal land occupations.13  Using the matched individual-level data, I then estimate the impact of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Author interview with Antanas Mockus, Mayor (1995-97, 2001-03), Bogotá, Colombia, July 29, 
2013.   
13 I also match by demographic characteristics in the full sample. I find the same results: residents of 
these districts are less supportive of evictions and housing expenditures, and more likely to believe 
that the poor need to occupy land to access housing.   
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living in a district that received a housing project compared to living in the other three candidate 
districts.   
Figure 2.5 displays the estimated attitudinal differences of living in a district with housing 
projects compared to a district that was considered but did not receive housing projects for matched 
individuals.  The results are mixed.  Although I do not find effects of living in a district with housing 
projects on approval of squatting or perceptions that the poor sometimes need to occupy land 
informally, individuals in treated districts are about half an intensity category more supportive of 
housing expenditures.14  They also are more supportive of evictions of squatters, although the result 
falls just below conventional levels of statistical significance.   
In short, the placement of housing projects provides suggestive evidence that state social 
policies can shape support for enforcement, consistent with the individual-level observational 
results.  The fact that the results are weak is unsurprising given that housing expenditures on the 
poor in Bogotá have been relatively small, as I describe in the next chapter, so the treatment was 
weak.  Only 1 percent of individuals included in the sample have ever even applied for housing 
assistance.  As we will see in the next section, individuals are deeply skeptical that the state can 
address the poor’s housing needs, despite a few large housing projects.  A more decisive future test 
may look at cities with larger scale housing expenditures.15  I now turn to a third method to evaluate 
whether social policy substitutes can change attitudes toward enforcement. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 While these results are statistically significant at the 10 percent level, the actual “treatment unit” is 
not the individual, but the district.  Conventional standard errors thus underestimate the standard 
deviation of the estimators (Bertrand, Banerjee, and Mullainathan 2004).  The small sample size—
only 215 matched observations—means that these results would lose statistical significance with 
district-level controls.  What I am interested in, however, is simply the direction of the effects.   
15 Another shortcoming of these results is that theories based on contextual variables face difficulties 
of selection. Individuals almost always have some degree of autonomy about where they choose to 
live.  Perhaps the type of individuals who choose to live in districts with state housing projects differ 
in other unobservable ways—for instance, they may be more economically secure or attentive to the 
quality of state services—than those who live in districts that have not received housing investments.  
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FIGURE 2.5. Mean Difference and Confidence Intervals Between Living in a District With 
and Without Housing Projects in Bogotá 
3.3 Social Policy Salience: A Survey Experiment 
To further try to isolate the impact of housing expenditures on attitudes, I attempted an 
informational survey experiment.  It is hard to vary actual elements of the policy environment so an 
alternative is to make salient information about that environment to see how making individuals 
aware of the social policy context changes attitudes.  In this spirit, I tried to make salient information 
about the targeting of housing policy and randomize the treatment at the individual-level in a survey 
experiment.  My hypothesis is that information about the housing options available to the poor will 
increase support for enforcement against squatters, just like living in a district with housing projects 
shows to residents that the poor have formal options to access housing.  
Survey and lab experiments have had some success observing how attitudes change in 
response to information about social policy progressivity. Citizens often are unaware of who 
benefits from social policy programs.  Mettler (2011), for example, finds that less economically !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !
In an ideal world, I would compare the evolution of public opinion in districts that received housing 
projects to the evolution of opinion for a control group that did not receive housing projects.  
Unfortunately this is not possible here due to the timing of housing project investments and data 
constraints.   
Estimated Difference and Confidence Intervals
Squatting
Need to Occupy
Housing Expenditures
Evictions
N=215
-0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2
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progressive programs are less popular when their distributive effects are emphasized in a survey 
experiment.  Faricy and Ellis (2013) also use experiments on a sample of undergraduates to evaluate 
the impact of information on policy progressivity on expenditure preferences.  They find that 
regressive programs are less popular when their distributive effects are revealed to respondents, and 
changes in information about the extent of redistribution matter most to Democrats.  Other 
scholars have less success changing attitudes and actions through informational interventions.  
Kuziemko et al. (2013: 3) find that policy preferences toward the minimum wage and taxes are 
surprisingly “sticky” even to what they call “relatively aggressive informational treatment.”  
Lieberman, Posner, and Tsai (2013) found no effects of providing parents information on their 
children’s educational performance.  They use the null result to highlight that informational 
interventions only work in motivating action under several conditions, including that the 
information is understood, new, and able to cause people to update their priors.  Thus, 
informational treatments can have some—but variable—success in changing contextual beliefs and 
thus attitudes.    
The experiment that I designed provided three types of information on housing policy.  The 
first control condition provides basic information on housing subsidy programs in Colombia.  The 
targeted treatment condition adds information on subsidy targeting and tells respondents that nine 
out of ten housing subsidies go to poor families.  The truncated treatment condition tells 
respondents that nine out of ten houses contracted by the government go to the middle-class 
families.  All three pieces of information are roughly accurate.  As I describe in greater detail in the 
next chapter, housing subsidies in Colombia overwhelmingly are allocated to poor families.  Most 
poor recipients then fail to use the subsidies because they require access to complementary bank 
loans and savings.  Thus, the houses constructed by the government have largely been distributed to 
lower-middle-class families.  Contingent on the ability of information about subsidy programs to 
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change priors about housing availability for the poor, my expectation is that individuals who receive 
the information that housing programs are targeted to the poor will be less sympathetic to squatting 
and more supportive of evictions. 
Unfortunately, my results suggest that opinions about the poor’s housing options are very 
hard to change.  There was no impact of any of the informational treatments on perceptions that the 
poor have formal housing alternatives.  All class groups are skeptical that the poor have ways to 
access housing other than informal land occupations.  Given the failure of information to change 
perceptions of housing availability, the experiment does not provide a test of my hypothesis that 
improved perceptions of housing options result in greater support for enforcement.  Unsurprisingly, 
there are no differences in attitudes toward illegal land occupations, property titling or evictions 
across the treatment conditions.  
In some ways, this null result is reassuring in that it suggests that housing attitudes are 
relatively stable.  Individuals have some sense of how hard it is to obtain housing in their society and 
barebones information cannot change their beliefs.  The lack of an effect may show how difficult it 
is to shift mass beliefs that housing programs can provide for the needs of the poor, given decades 
of lousy programs in Colombia.  Alternatively, it also is possible that the information simply was too 
complex for respondents.  However, were the design of the informational intervention the problem, 
I would expect that upper income, educated respondents would have been swayed by the prompts 
due to a greater ability to process complex information.  Instead, I find no difference in their 
opinions.  
To wrap up, this section tested my hypothesis that the social policy context—and 
specifically, the availability of state housing options—shapes mass support for forbearance.  I 
provided two types of suggestive evidence for this relationship: 1) individuals who have more 
positive assessments of state housing programs or perceive fewer defects in state welfare programs 
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are more supportive of enforcement, and 2) individuals who live in districts that have received 
housing projects in the past are more supportive of evictions and state housing expenditures relative 
to individuals with similar demographic characteristics in other districts.  An experimental test of the 
role of substitutive social policy failed due to the difficulty of shifting citizens’ beliefs about housing 
availability through information alone.  All Colombians seem to be pessimistic about the availability 
of housing for the poor.  While imperfect, these tests lend some support to my hypothesis that 
forbearance acts as a substitute form of informal welfare provision in contexts where formal welfare 
alternatives lag.  The next chapter returns to these issues in the natural world to show that the 
availability of housing programs alters how politicians make enforcement decisions.  Next, I 
consider what enforcement signals about politicians in a weak social policy context.   
4 Distributive Signals  
Even if citizens understand the distributive functions of forbearance, it does not necessarily 
follow that they hold politicians responsible or change their voting behavior in response to 
enforcement choices.  This section explores my final hypothesis: that politicians who propose 
forbearance are identified as sympathetic to the poor’s broader distributive interests, while those 
who run on enforcement platforms are viewed as anti-poor.  Given the progressive and more 
credible nature of the benefits from forbearance, I expect that enforcement is a clearer cue about 
distributive commitments than traditional social policy platforms.   
To understand what enforcement conveys about a politician to the public, I designed a 
survey experiment.  This experiment draws on a tradition of using hypothetical candidates to isolate 
the effects of policy (or personal characteristics) on voter evaluations and behavior (for recent 
examples, see Dunning and Nilekani 2013; Weitz Shapiro 2011; Hidalgo and DeFiguereido 2012).   
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Each survey respondent heard two short statements about a hypothetical candidate 
considering a run for city mayor.  The combination and order in which they heard the candidates 
varied. All of the statements were loosely based on actual candidate proposals from past mayoral 
elections.  Individuals heard one vignette about a candidate with a plan for pro-poor job creation 
(Pro-Redistribution) or pro-business investment (Pro-Business).  My goal was to simulate a classic Left-
Right division on employment issues.  The vignettes read as follows: 
Pro-Redistribution: As a City Councilor, the candidate criticized the lack of projects for 
vulnerable sectors of the population.  If he were mayor, he would promote social inclusion, 
and specifically, invest in government employment programs to help unskilled workers 
find jobs. 
 
Pro-Business: As a City Councilor, the candidate criticized the lack of projects to generate 
private sector investment.  If he were mayor, he would promote economic development, and 
specifically, cut government bureaucracy to help businesses grow and generate jobs. 
 
In addition, individuals evaluated a candidate with a plan for either forbearance or 
enforcement against unlicensed street vendors. As with real politicians, the forbearance vignette 
does not state that the mayor will not enforce the law, but rather that he opposes enforcement and 
will privilege workers’ rights: 
Forbearance: As a City Councilor, the candidate criticized the abuses of previous mayors 
against unlicensed street vendors.  If he were mayor, he would respect the rights of workers 
in the informal economy until the government provides other job alternatives. 
Enforcement: As a City Councilor, the candidate criticized the permissive attitude of previous 
mayors against unlicensed street vendors.  If he were mayor, he would work for greater 
order in the streets and clear out unlicensed vendors.    
Respondents assess the candidates separately, rather than through a matched comparison in 
order to avoid framing effects.  If respondents were to see both candidate pairs, they may attempt to 
make their answers consistent by preferring the perceived left-leaning candidate in both cases.  The 
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groups hearing each candidate prompt were balanced with respect to class and other pretreatment 
covariates. 16 
After being read a candidate’s position, voters were asked to evaluate how likely they found 
the following three statements, on a four-point scale running from “highly unlikely” to “highly 
likely”:  
Pro-poor. How likely is it that the candidate promotes the interests of the poor? 
Benefits. How likely is it that the candidate promotes the interests of people like you? 
Vote intention. How likely is it that you would vote for this candidate for Mayor? 
 
The first pair of questions is intended to tap into representation and expectations of benefits, 
whereas the last gets at vote intention.  Finally, respondents place the candidate on a five-point 
ideological scale ranging from “Left” to “Right.” I rescaled all the dependent variables from 0 to 1 
for comparability’s sake.  
Figure 2.6 shows the perceived likelihood that the candidate will promote the interests of the 
poor, and the ideological placement.  The plot shows the mean response and standard deviation by 
candidate. The results strongly confirm my hypothesis that enforcement/forbearance messages send 
clearer anti/pro-poor cues than traditional social policy platforms. While both traditional social 
policy candidates are perceived as slightly unlikely to favor the poor’s interests, and there is no 
significant difference in means, the forbearance candidate is perceived as significantly more likely to 
favor the poor’s interests than any of the other candidates.  Meanwhile, the enforcement candidate is 
viewed as extremely unlikely to favor the poor’s interests.  
The ideological placement of candidates shows similar trends.  Both the pro-redistribution 
and forbearance candidates are perceived as representing the center-Left, but unlike with the 
perception of pro-poor benefits, there is no distinguishable difference between them.  The pro-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 See Appendix A for significance tests for differences of means using standard t-tests, as well as p-
values based on permutation tests.   
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redistribution and forbearance candidates are placed further to the left than the enforcement and 
pro-business candidates. However, the enforcement candidate is identified as significantly farther to 
the right than the pro-business candidate.   
!
FIGURE 2.6.  Perceptions of Distributive Benefits and Ideological Placement by Candidate  
Note: Mean and 95 % Confidence Interval by Candidate Statement. !
Both candidate pairs elicit “correct” Left-Right placements from upper income respondents.  
But the forbearance-enforcement candidate pair is correctly identified much further down the 
income spectrum.  Poor respondents struggle to distinguish the ideological placements of the 
redistribution/business pair.  Nonresponse on political ideology questions, however, is a major 
problem among low-income respondents (22 percent of the data is lost) compared to the highest 
income bracket (2 percent of the data is lost).  The terms Left-Right, unsurprisingly in the 
Colombian context, are confusing or meaningless to many poor citizens.  Nonetheless, the idea of 
pro/anti-poor candidates evokes clear opinions across the income spectrum, and leads to a strong 
identification of forbearance candidates as supportive of the poor and enforcement candidates as 
against their interests. This signaling helps make sense of why the poor may support forbearance 
even when they are not direct beneficiaries.   
Mean and Standard Deviation by Candidate Statement 
Benefits the Poor (Likely to Unlikely), N=890
Ideological Placement (Left to Right), N=787
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
Pro-Redistribution
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FIGURE 2.7.  Perception that Candidate Will Benefit Respondent’s Group by Class and 
Statement 
Consistent with my theoretical expectations, the candidate statements impact poor and 
nonpoor voters differently when respondents are asked whether the candidate would support 
“people like you” and whether they would vote for the candidate.  The phrase “people like you” is 
left deliberately vague so individuals can interpret their own class position or alternative 
identification (Dunning and Nilekani 2013).  The idea is to allow respondents the flexibility to judge 
the candidate that they perceive as closest to their interests.   
Figure 2.7 shows that the poor perceive large differences in the candidates’ likelihood to 
benefit people like them.  The poor believe that the forbearance candidate is more likely to benefit 
them by a wide margin compared to the enforcement candidate.  In contrast, the candidates with 
social policy promises are perceived as equally likely to benefit all class groups.  Again, this may 
reflect the fact that social policy promises are not credible, even when they are pitched as targeted 
ways to assist the poor.   
For upper income respondents, perceptions of the candidates’ likelihood of benefitting them 
are indistinguishable for all the candidates.  This lack of differentiation for upper class respondents 
goes against my theoretical predictions, given that I expected the enforcement candidate to be 
Bogotá Latin America
Squatting Titling Evictions Property Seizure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Class -0.190* -0.184* 0.221* -0.076ú -0.090ú -0.092ú
(0.047) (0.053) (0.055) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
Education -0.028* -0.125* -0.030* -0.179ú -0.212ú -0.216ú
(0.050) (0.055) (0.058) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
Female -0.000 0.021 -0.002 0.005 0.012 0.012
(0.021) (0.024) (0.026) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Age -0.011* 0.004 0.130 -0.081ú -0.094ú -0.091ú
(0.037) (0.041) (0.043) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018)
Squatting Past -0.093* -0.017 -0.053
(0.035) (0.039) (0.041)
Housing Need 0.076* 0.272* -0.096*
(0.035) (0.039) (0.041)
Urban -0.022ú 0.003 0.003
(0.009) (0.011) (0.011)
Inequality -0.377ú -0.542ú -0.512ú
(0.016) (0.018) (0.019)
E ort 0.251ú 0.313ú
(0.015) (0.019)
Social Deficit -0.089ú
(0.016)
N 868 859 862 59540 46744 46744
R2 0.069 0.108 0.046 0.053 0.070 0.071
Notes: úp < 0.05; robust standard errors in parentheses; two-tailed tests.
Country and year fixed e ects not shown for Latin America-wide data.
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associated with modern, middle-class values, and thus to be perceived as representing the middle 
class.  
Lastly, respondents across the class spectrum say that they are equally likely to vote for the 
pro-redistribution and pro-business candidates, as seen by the flat lines on the left panel in Figure 
2.8.  In contrast, class strongly predicts an individual’s intention to support the enforcement or 
forbearance candidates.  The poor are more likely to vote for the forbearance candidate over any 
other candidate presented, and significantly less likely to vote for the enforcement candidate.  There 
are no significant differences in the willingness of respondents at the top of the income distribution 
to vote for any of the candidates.  
!
FIGURE 2.8.!Likelihood to Vote for Candidate by Class and Position on Street Vending and 
Employment  
There are several possible explanations for why no differences are detected for upper class 
groups.  First, the nonpoor may not view street vending as an issue and thus disregard information 
about a candidates’ enforcement position.  But nonpoor respondents are likely to care about 
business issues, and therefore should have responded to the pro-business prompt.  A second 
explanation is that nonpoor respondents tend to know more about politics, which makes their 
preferences harder to alter through skeletal candidate information in the context of a low stakes 
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survey experiment.  
In sum, the experimental results largely support the idea that enforcement signals the 
distributive positions of candidates, and that it does so more powerfully than traditional social policy 
platforms.  The main drawback, as with all experimental work, lies in the generalizability of these 
claims.  While hypothetical candidates, these vignettes invoke associations with real politicians.  
Zaller and Feldman (1992) argue that citizens draw on known-frames and experiences to answer 
even abstract survey questions.  As Chapter 4 illustrates, Bogotá has elected mayors with sharply 
divergent positions on street vending issues that likely resonate with the vignettes.  The mayor who 
pursued forbearance, Luis Garzón, is identified with the poor, workers, and the labor-based Left.  
The mayor who enforced, Enrique Peñalosa, is an iconoclast, although many poor citizens associate 
him with traditional elites who less clearly defend their interests. Running the same experiment in 
Mexico City or San Salvador where center-left mayors (Marcelo Ebrard and Héctor Silva, 
respectively) evicted street vendors could attenuate the observed relationships between forbearance 
and pro-poor positions.  In other words, the experiment may pick up the specific associations made 
by voters in Bogotá, rather than a more general trend of how enforcement attitudes motivate the 
poor’s political behavior.  The methodology developed here could be tested elsewhere to understand 
the generalizability of associative signals to other country contexts.  
Another potential concern is that quirks of language artificially induce the gap between social 
policy and enforcement candidates in an experimental setting.   Enforcement positions may polarize 
politics because the hypothetical enforcement/forbearance candidates involved phrases like “order” 
and “abuses” that could induce strong reactions.  However, these vignettes are drawn from 
candidate platforms from past elections and were actually deliberately toned down not to include 
even stronger phrases like “use of police force” and “social clean up,” as some past candidates have 
done.  It also was not clear a priori that phrases included in the social policy vignettes like 
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“vulnerable sectors,” “unskilled workers,” and “private sector business” would not generate equally 
strong reactions.  Overall, it is possible that semantic reasons inclined citizens to react more strongly 
to the enforcement/forbearance candidates.  But attempts were made to use comparable language 
drawn from real-life campaigns.  Moreover, the power of enforcement-related language is part of the 
reason that it can be an important electoral strategy.  Further dilution would stray from my 
argument’s premise that enforcement requires the use of coercive force against the poor, and thus 
conveys a politician’s class commitments.   
A final limitation of this approach is the “competing frames” problem.  Druckman (2004) 
shows that the effects of frames disappear when individuals are exposed to different frames.  It is 
hardly true that most of the time individuals have a single piece of information about a candidate, 
and use that information to assess candidate attributes.  This experiment cannot distinguish how 
enforcement combines with social policy information to alter candidate perceptions.  Future 
examinations of enforcement cues may rely on conjoint analysis to combine policy information with 
other demographic characteristics and policy proposals of candidates.  Still, the goal of this 
experiment was to show that candidate information can have the hypothesized effects on distributive 
perceptions and vote choice.  If enforcement positions were unable to communicate candidates’ 
distributive commitments, particularly to poor voters who are at the core of my theory, it would 
have been disconfirming evidence of a signaling mechanism.  Studies of the natural world, as 
presented in the next chapters, are necessary to understand when and how enforcement information 
actually serves this role in political life.!
5 Conclusions 
This chapter explored the individual-level determinants of enforcement preferences.  
Original and cross-national survey data, as well as experiments, allowed me to show how 
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enforcement pressures vary with individual and contextual variables.  The core finding is that the 
poor support less enforcement than the nonpoor, but only for offenses that offer progressive 
distributive benefits. Individuals also are less supportive of enforcement in contexts where the state 
is perceived to provide social policy substitutes for the distributive demands leveled through law 
breaking.  The results presented cast considerable doubt on claims that broad cultural characteristics 
can explain weak support for law enforcement in Latin America.  Forbearance also tends to be 
favored by the poor as a group, not just by those who directly violate the law and plausibly exert 
interest association pressure.  Material interest theories imported from the study of redistributive 
preferences help to make sense of popular pressures for informal modes of redistribution.  
The empirical results also suggest that politicians will worry about what enforcement signals 
about their broader welfare agenda.  Forbearance platforms convey a politician’s commitment to the 
poor and, at least in an experimental context, are more likely to win the support of poor voters.  
Systematic variation in enforcement attitudes by class, and clear consensus about what enforcement 
signals to voters, means that politicians plausibly can use voter demographics as a heuristic for the 
electoral repercussions of their policy choices. Building from this micro-foundation, it follows that 
politicians’ incentives to enforce will vary depending on the demographic composition of the 
electoral district where they seek office and the centrality of poor voters to their winning electoral 
coalitions.  Subsequent chapters explore how politicians make choices depending on their 
calculations about the electoral and reputational repercussions of enforcement in the real world. 
It may seem unsurprising that the rich are more enthusiastic about property law enforcement 
and politicians who support it.  But, this chapter also highlights that income does not fully account 
for enforcement attitudes.  Beliefs about the functioning of the welfare state play a role in how 
citizens view squatting and street vending. The next chapter on squatting dives further into how the 
availability of housing policy affects mass pressures and thus politicians’ enforcement choices. 
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Chapter 3 
Housing the Poor 
 
“The only way to compete with a free house is with an almost free house.” 
— Coordinator of Social Policy, Finance Ministry, Chile 
 
 
Most of this study focuses on how electoral incentives determine enforcement at the city and 
district level where urban property law violations occur.  But local enforcement decisions do not 
occur in a vacuum.  This chapter demonstrates how national social policy choices crucially determine 
the local electoral costs of enforcement, and therefore help to explain why some governments 
enforce the law and others do not.  Here, I focus on a common property law violation by the poor, 
squatting, because it has a well-defined welfare substitute, housing policy.  Squatting also occurs in 
poor areas on the urban periphery, leading electoral geography to have more muted effects.  
This chapter argues the social welfare context better accounts for variation in enforcement 
than explanations rooted in administrative capacity alone.  More specifically, I argue that national 
housing policy decisions affect subnational politicians’ enforcement incentives through three 
channels laid out in Figure 3.1.  First, intuitively, in-kind housing expenditures on the poor—or what 
I refer to as substitutive housing policy—directly “crowd out” the need to occupy land illegally and 
reduce demands for forbearance.  National governments that spend minimal resources or primarily 
aid the middle class, what I call complementary housing policy, create inverse material pressures.  The 
poor access housing through illegal land occupations and demand forbearance toward them.  But, 
even with generous welfare policies, countries rarely sop up all land claims and squatting can remain 
attractive compared to state housing projects. The second mechanism through which social policy 
affects enforcement concerns the target of mass demands.  Substitutive policy concentrates demands 
and organizing on national housing authorities.  In contrast, the insufficiency of housing policy leads 
citizens to expect little from national programs and displaces demands to local politicians who 
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control enforcement.  Third, housing policy changes the electoral signals conveyed by enforcement.  
When the state provides housing alternatives, voters view enforcement toward squatters as a positive 
cue about a politician’s commitment to the welfare state and the rule of law.  Without housing 
options, enforcement instead tends to signal a politician who cares little about the poor’s wellbeing, 
as demonstrated experimentally in Chapter 2.  Combined, these mechanisms powerfully determine 
the electoral incentives of mayors to enforce against squatters. 
 
Demonstrating that politicians choose not to enforce against squatters for electoral reasons 
requires an empirical approach that pays close attention to the underlying mechanisms and the 
institutional constraints that politicians face.  States that can build housing for the poor also may 
have the police, courts, and bureaucrats to enforce against squatters.  To show that social policies 
independently alter enforcement through electoral incentives, I move beyond the limited survey data 
presented in the previous chapter to introduce three additional indicators of the configuration of 
mass preferences: 1) the frequency and aims of popular interest associations, 2) the demands 
reported by local politicians or addressed on their campaign platforms, and 3) the willingness of 
ordinary citizens to cooperate with enforcement.  Sharp differences in patterns of popular demands 
depending on the structure of housing expenditures suggest that electoral incentives structure the 
decisions that local politicians make about enforcement. 
To further separate the role of state capacity from electoral politics, this chapter also 
develops a method of enforcement process tracing.  In any country, rich or poor, we expect resources and 
Legalism Signal 
Enforcement seen as pro-welfare 
 Demand Reinforcement 
Poor demand state provision 
Crowding Out 
Material demands resolved 
Low Electoral Costs of  Enforcement 
ENFORCEMENT 
Substitutive Housing Policy 
Distributive Signal 
Enforcement seen as anti-poor 
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FIGURE 3.1.  The Effects of Housing Policy on Enforcement Incentives 
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administrative capabilities to constrain enforcement.  There is some natural loss at each step of the 
enforcement process that makes perfect control unattainable.  My electoral theory makes two 
distinct predictions about the enforcement process compared to a null hypothesis of natural 
attrition.  First, under my theory, enforcement should stop at political bottlenecks. Mayors should 
make decisions to halt enforcement against squatters, even when bureaucrats and police perform 
their jobs.  Second, my argument has implications not only for when enforcement breaks down, but 
for what type of cases survive the enforcement process.  As I showed in Chapter 2, few individuals 
approve of legal violations by the nonpoor.  The electoral costs of enforcement therefore are low so, 
under my theory, politicians should be more likely to enforce when the wealthy occupy land illegally.  
This prediction constitutes a strong test, given conventional wisdom that the wealthy are able to use 
their money and power to evade the law.   
To preview the argument, housing policies vary widely by country.  Peru has done little to 
create formal housing options for the poor.  Colombia has dedicated substantial resources to 
housing, but has struggled to reach the poor. Chile has made large, sustained investments to build 
housing for the poor. In Colombia and Peru, the urban poor organize and demand forbearance.  
Since 1990, close to half of all new urban development in Bogotá and Lima has occurred through 
illegal construction.  Sanctions are rare.  Enforcement process tracing reveals that, although there is 
equifinality in outcomes, illegal land occupations stem from a truncated welfare state that leads 
citizens to demand informal welfare alternatives and local politicians to choose not to enforce—or 
what I distinguish as forbearance—in the case of Bogotá.  They occur due to a combination of 
strategic electoral choice and institutional capacity constraints in the case of Lima, or a more 
traditional case of weak enforcement.  Consistent with my argument, only in Chile do citizens 
organize around state housing provision and support politicians in enforcement.  Chile’s distributive 
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capacity to house the poor has been the lynchpin of its control of squatters, not stronger courts or 
police.   
The theoretical contribution of this chapter is not only to show how social policy impacts 
enforcement, but also to flesh out how enforcement choices alter welfare state politics.  My claim is 
that strong policy complementarities exist between limited social policy and forbearance, on the one 
hand, and between targeted social policy and uniform enforcement, on the other.  Specifically, I 
argue that past forbearance reduces the political incentives to provide housing because it absorbs 
and restructures housing demands.  The poor pressure for forbearance at the local level and, once 
land is seized, they prefer reactive housing policies at the national level, such as property titling, basic 
services, and construction loans for improvements on land that they already have seized.  These 
measures allow national executives to expand their support base: they can focus formal housing 
expenditures on the middle class or forgo expenditures altogether, while securing the poor’s support 
on the cheap through forbearance and eventual legalization.  In so doing, however, politicians 
legitimize squatting as the way to acquire housing and reproduce incentives to invade land.  A 
“forbearance trap” results. Conversely, substitutive housing expenditures reinforce an equilibrium in 
which the poor demand formal housing provision.  National politicians who depend on the poor’s 
support to win office have strong incentives to sustain targeted expenditures.   
Forbearance toward squatting is an inefficient equilibrium.  It imposes costs on both the 
poor and the state.  Moving to substitutive expenditures is hard, but not impossible, once 
forbearance reconfigures popular demands.  Exogenous shocks, such as repression under a military 
government, can catalyze shifts.  Endogenous changes, such as the rising costs of land invasions, 
also improve the chances for investments in substitutive housing policies, particularly when coupled 
with strong political parties or centralized institutions that can lengthen political time horizons and 
coordinate local actors’ behavior around formal housing programs.  
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The argument proceeds in a series of deliberate steps.  I first outline the key features of 
illegal land occupations.  The second section reviews why governments invest in housing policy (and 
why many do not), and how enforcement decisions arise from and perpetuate these choices.  The 
third section develops a typology of housing policies and categorizes my case studies.  The following 
three sections analyze how distinct housing policies influence mayors’ enforcement incentives in 
each capital city, and create feedback effects on national housing policies. The seventh concludes.  
1 Context: Illegal Land Occupations 
Illegal land occupations involve two separate types of property violations: physical takings, 
where the poor occupy land with no property rights claim, and regulatory takings, where the poor 
pay reduced prices for an incomplete property right to land owned by others or inappropriate for 
housing development.  I consider these property law violations as a single category because, on 
paper, both property law infractions should end with an eviction or demolition.1   
The severity and complexity of housing evictions helps make sense of why they are 
comparatively rare.  Housing evictions embody a type of coercive social regulation in which the state 
imposes severe personal costs on the sanctioned individuals.  Recall from the previous chapter that 
60 percent of survey respondents disapprove of evictions, even though the majority also rejects 
squatting.  Given the gravity of the sanction, police evictions only can occur within 48 hours of an 
illegal land occupation.  Otherwise, governments must use the administrative or criminal law process 
to guarantee squatters’ due process rights prior to an eviction.  Even in countries that recognize a 
                                                
1 The legal difference is that a purchaser in an illegal subdivision retains a property right over the 
land itself.  However, even in the case that there is no competing claim to the land, the government 
technically is required to demolish the construction.  In some cases, the government instead can 
change the zoning.  In other cases, which have become common in recent years, illegal land 
occupations occur in environmental risk zones or preserves where the government cannot easily 
readjust the zoning.  When governments demolish housing constructions and leave the poor with 
land ownership, it constitutes a de facto eviction, given that land that does not allow for any 
construction is useless to poor occupants.    
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constitutional right to housing, such as Colombia, or that have ratified international covenants that 
recognize the right to housing, which include Peru and Chile, evictions are possible when conducted 
with adequate guarantees of due process.2  The potential legal complications require special attention 
to when eviction proceedings fail.  I trace four steps in the enforcement process—the detection of 
an offense, the opening of an administrative case, the eviction ruling, and the execution of the 
eviction—to separate whether enforcement fails at police, judicial or political decision points.  
While cumbersome, there are few more palatable enforcement alternatives to evictions.  
Governments can impose fines, but squatters’ precarious economic situation means that they lack 
the capacity to pay.  It also is unclear that a fine can deter squatters, given the magnitude of benefits 
at stake.  Other than evictions, the main lever for states to control illegal land occupations comes 
from the pace of basic service provision and legal recognition.  By refusing to extend basic services 
to illegal land occupations, governments can make life so nasty that they deter potential squatters.3   
Much like evictions, however, withholding urban services or investments—particularly in the 
absence of housing alternatives—raises a political dilemma for politicians.  On the one hand, the 
attraction of squatting decreases as the expected time to receive services and property titles mounts.  
The pace of service provision is widely understood as an enforcement tool, and a more discrete one 
than evictions.  On the other hand, the state decreases the informal welfare value of squatting when 
it denies or delays the accompanying urban infrastructure.  Elected politicians in search of the 
                                                
2 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognizes a right to housing 
and protects against “forced evictions.” A forced eviction is defined as a temporary or permanent 
removal of individuals “without the provision of, and access to, appropriate forms of legal or other 
protection.”  See, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 7, Forced 
evictions, and the right to adequate housing (Sixteenth session, 1997), U.N. Doc. E/1998/22, annex 
IV at 113. 
3 A clear analogy comes in American politics in debates over the “self-deportation” of illegal 
immigrants.  Denying illegal immigrants the benefits that accompany American citizenship clearly 
can force some individuals to reconsider their choices, but to many citizens who observe this sub-
citizen treatment, it is perhaps even less morally justifiable than enforcement itself.  
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support of poor voters, and particularly those who have violated the law, can implement reactive 
housing policies, such as the provision of basic services, construction assistance, and ultimately 
property titles to illegal land occupations.  These are reactive measures in the sense that the benefits 
only can be secured by the poor once they have violated the law.  When asked whether participants 
in land invasions should receive these reactive benefits, most politicians reply that they cannot 
“prejudice new settlements”4 or “condemn them for years without land titles or services worrying 
about some future contingency.”5  Politicians claim to support existing settlements and to oppose 
new ones.  But this position collapses due to the electoral costs of enforcement against new illegal 
occupations.   
Despite the challenges of evictions, forbearance is revocable in the context of illegal land 
occupations precisely because it involves more than the single decision to allow squatters to build 
their houses.  The degree of legal insecurity can be altered at multiple decision points about national 
investments and city service provision.  Most illegal land occupations occur on land that is zoned for 
other uses.  Land can fall within a district or city’s administrative boundaries, but outside the “urban 
perimeter,” meaning the zone that is eligible for residential services and infrastructure investments.  
In some cases, such as land at risk of environmental disaster, rezoning is prohibited altogether. To 
access urban amenities, politicians make choices about whether to grant exemptions for specific 
services or incorporate illegal land occupations into the urban perimeter (through rezoning and risk 
mitigation projects).  The ability to extend urban services piecemeal makes forbearance attractive to 
politicians compared to housing projects, which must provide urban amenities all at once.   
Legal dependence makes squatter settlements ripe arenas for political clientelism, as has been 
extensively documented across Latin American cities (e.g. Collier 1976; Cornelius 1975; Dietz 1998; 
                                                
4 Author interview with Erasmo Segundo Cardenas Obregon, Local Councilor, District of Ate, 
Lima, Peru, November 23, 2011. 
5 Author interview with Ivan Coronado, Local Councilor, District of Comas, November 25, 2011. 
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Gay 1990, 1999; Hilgers 2008; Leeds 1974; Ray 1969).  Clientelistic bonds are not only secured 
through the poverty and precariousness of squatters’ incomes, but rather through politicians’ legal 
power to determine squatters’ eligibility for basic goods and services.  Consider the case of garbage 
collection in Lima.  Only settlements included in the district’s service perimeter map (plano perimétrico) 
are supposed to be on the garbage collection route.  Prior to changes in the perimeter, politicians 
can extend the garbage route as a reward to favored illegal land occupations.  Given that mayors can 
do this for each district service, they exert continuous power over squatter settlements.  Additionally, 
district mayors approve perimeter maps as part of a broader “urban authorization” (prehabilitación 
urbana) process in which squatters become eligible to receive a bundle of urban services.  This choice 
is separate from the provision of property titles that legalize individual land claims, but it shapes the 
extent of legal insecurity.  Hence, forbearance involves multiple choices about the legal status of 
squatters.  Much of the value of property titles comes from the fact that they allow squatters to 
access national government services and programs as a matter of right, rather than subject to 
politicians’ discretion.6  
The degree to which politicians can withhold services either to deter land invasions or to 
make service provision contingent on political support varies by country.  Most politicians have 
some types of investments that can be denied based on squatters’ legal status.  But the privatization 
of public services, as well as the recognition of constitutional rights to basic services, can remove 
                                                
6 This tends to be a poorly understood point: property titles are important to the poor not so much 
because they represent additional legal security against state evictions or allow the poor to access 
financial markets, as touted, but because they facilitate city and national investment projects.  The 
marginal impact on security against evictions is tiny: one survey of informal settlement residents in 
Lima, for example, finds that 91.8 percent of those without land title said that the probability of 
eviction by state authorities is low or very low compared to 93.5 percent of those with title (Caria 
2008). Credit access has not budged because banks rarely want houses in poor neighborhoods as 
collateral (Gilbert 2002).  But there is a gap in the quality of public services in informal settlement 
with and without property titles, and in the ways that they can apply to receive these goods. 
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local mayors’ powers.7  More extensive discretion to deny services and investments fosters more 
clientelistic linkage strategies, as we will see in Lima.  But it also offers authorities additional tools to 
control the extent of illegal land occupations.  
In sum, enforcement against illegal land occupations involves evictions, which are strong 
deterrents given the investments at stake and displacement of poor households.  For these reasons, 
evictions are rare undertakings.  Governments also can prevent illegal land occupations through 
their choices to deny services, investments, and property titles.  I now turn to some of the contrasts 
between reactive and substitutive housing policies.  In contrast to the costly and lumpy construction 
of housing, reactive housing policies can be provided cheaply and respond to the urban poor’s 
housing demands once land takings have occurred.  But, in so doing, they perpetuate the 
forbearance and the cycle of limited prospective housing provision.   
2 The Forbearance Trap 
My core argument is that housing policy and forbearance are policy complements, meaning 
that the provision of one reduces incentives to offer the other.  This section reviews the general 
reasons why states invest in social interest housing.  In the second part, I argue that developing 
democracies tend to underprovide housing because it is an indivisible, expensive good that both the 
political Left and Right have reasons to avoid.  Third, I flesh out how underinvestment in housing 
policy can lead to forbearance toward land invasions.  Fourth, while illegal land occupations create 
                                                
7  More specifically, the privatization of public services and the recognition of social rights have 
taken some of these tools out of the hands of mayors.  Colombia, for instance, proposed a measure 
that would ban service provision in illegal land occupations—even by private companies—on the 
basis that it would deter future squatters.  However, the Constitutional Court ruled that the state 
could not deny individuals access to water or electricity based on the legal status of their land claims 
on the grounds that it violated the right to a minimum living standard.  Mayors no longer can 
withhold public services from illegal settlements, but they can deny other types of goods, such as 
investments in roads and schools, or access to development funds for community development 
projects.  Service privatization has had a similar effect in Peru because private companies generally 
prefer paying customers to those who tap electricity wires or steal services, so will extend services 
regardless of legal status. 
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incentives for states to offer in-kind housing policy, they also change the structure of societal 
demands in ways that sustain forbearance.  Weak housing policy and forbearance thus form a stable, 
inefficient policy equilibrium that is hard to escape. The section ends by reviewing the institutional 
and political conditions that help countries exit the forbearance trap and move toward substitutive 
housing policy.  
2.1 Why Governments Provide Housing  
Why should governments promote housing access?  Why not—as many Latin American 
governments now do—just provide cash to the poor and allow them to allocate the funds to 
different goods as they choose?  Understanding the mixed motivations for in-kind housing policy is 
critical to why housing policy in Latin America almost universally entails the provision of new 
houses, and why these benefits tend not to reach the poor.   
The most common argument for housing policy concerns the benefits of creating a society 
of homeowners.  Physically rooted homeowners participate more in their communities and politics, 
have better welfare outcomes, and favor long-run investments in their communities and children 
over short-run transfers.8  Equity in a house also can constitute savings for old age and thus offer 
insurance benefits as a type of pension policy.9  Given these positive externalities, public funds often 
try to encourage groups that are on the homeownership margin to become owners. Because lower-
middle and middle-class groups are closest to purchasing housing through their own means and 
                                                
8 For empirical studies on the positive externalities of home ownership for politics, health, children, 
and life satisfaction, see, Dipasquale and Glaeser (1999), Haurin, Parcel, and Haurin (2002), Rossi 
and Weber (1996), Gaviria and Tovar (2011), Ruprah 2010) and Shapiro and Glaeser (2003).   
9 In developed countries, the effectiveness of housing as a device to encourage savings has fallen 
with easy access to home equity.  However, in developing countries without sophisticated financial 
markets, it is difficult to borrow against home equity so mortgage payments can force households to 
save more in their future. Most arguments from behavioral economics suggest that individuals want 
to save for the future, but they discount their future utility or fall prey to temptation to consume in 
the present, and therefore promoting savings through home ownership might increase social 
welfare. 
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most likely to have the capacity to repay mortgages, many governments use funds to nudge these 
sectors to purchase a house.10  The emphasis on creating a class of homeowners helps make sense of 
why housing programs often exclude the poorest tranches of the income distribution. 
Second, housing production can be a countercyclical economic policy that generates jobs for 
unskilled workers.  For example, Latin American governments used housing construction as a way 
to reactivate economies after the 2008 financial crisis and housing ministries reported the progress 
of their programs in terms of construction jobs created.  The vital question is why a government 
invests in a privately consumed good like housing, rather than other public works projects or fiscal 
policies to stimulate the economy.  Decisions to use housing construction to jumpstart an economy 
presume that homeownership is a social goal.  The political pitch that housing construction 
generates jobs for unskilled workers can be used to justify channeling housing subsidies to the 
middle class on the margin of a home purchase.  It also explains the focus on new construction.11 
Third, a basic needs or social rights approach justifies housing provision to the poor. The 
idea that a just society cannot permit the poor to live in conditions below a certain standard often 
motivates housing investments.  The social rights argument still butts up against the question of why 
not improve the poor’s income and then allow individuals the liberty to invest in housing as they 
wish. Arnold Harberger (1978, 1984), an economist who influenced the design of Chilean social 
policy, elaborated an early justification for in-kind transfers based on the idea that individuals derive 
utility from others’ consumption of particular goods or services (education, housing, and so on).  
While paternalistic, society wants recipients of redistributive transfers to spend more on living in 
                                                
10 The tools through which this shift can be accomplished can vary from direct building programs to 
cash grants, mortgage subsidies, and tax deductions.   
11 The emphasis on new construction also stems from the fact that construction chambers tend to 
be the lair of Latin America’s politically powerful business groups (Schneider 2013).  New housing 
also provides symbolic advantages to politicians who can be photographed handing over a nice-
looking house and plays to a cultural stereotype that each family wants a house of their own.   
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adequate shelter, rather than on what are judged to be sumptuary or frivolous desires.12  The 
recognition of a right to housing in domestic and international law reinforces the idea that 
governments have a responsibility to make housing accessible.13  An emphasis on social rights 
provides a clear rationale for targeted in-kind expenditures on the poor.  
A final reason for housing provision in the developing world is to “crowd out” illegal land 
occupations.  Many of Latin America’s urban problems stem from a lack of planning in informal 
settlements.  Few residents see the long-run land shortages, excess service and infrastructure costs, 
and shortage of green spaces that emerge from unplanned sprawl.  These negative externalities fall 
on taxpayers, and come on top of the more obvious harms that animate property laws—the loss of 
state land and threat to private property rights from takings.  While housing provision for the poor 
has upfront costs, it is cheaper in the long haul.  As Bouillon (2012: 145) puts it, “Trying to solve the 
problem of informal housing once it is established is more complex and expensive than preventing 
it.”  In order to reduce squatting, housing programs need to target those liable to take land, or the 
poorest segment of society willing to live without services or property titles. 
The takeaway of this review is that states have multiple objectives for housing policy, and 
how to target limited resources for housing depends on the goal.  Hopes to provide minimum 
shelter and deter land invasions suggest targeting the poor.  But encouragement of home ownership, 
savings, and construction all justify expenditures on the middle class.  These mixed aims, and 
                                                
12 Recent literature on other-regarding preferences (see Fehr and Schmidt (2006) for a review) has 
brought back in this idea to understand redistributive demands. Harberger modeled this idea as a 
social demand curve, which exceeded the private demand curve for goods like housing or education. 
13 Cuba signed but has not ratified the covenant.  A host of Latin American constitutions give this 
covenant the weight of law, and the majority of countries also include a right to housing within their 
domestic constitutions (e.g. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Venezuela, 
Uruguay).  Some, such as Bolivia and Uruguay, even specify that state laws need to promote access 
to housing. 
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particularly the focus on job creation, creates a policy bias toward new construction that complicates 
the politics of housing provision, to which I now turn.  
2.2 Why Governments Do Not Provide Housing  
Providing new houses is an unattractive investment for politicians with short time horizons. 
First, housing is an expensive, indivisible good.  The benchmark for social interest housing 
construction is $15,000 per home, although costs often run much higher (Bouillon 2012: 62).  Given 
the huge expense per household, the benefits of housing provision concentrate among a few 
recipients in any given political period.  For instance, winning a slot in Colombia’s free housing 
program is colloquially referred to as a “golden ticket” for the lucky few.  Unless non-recipients 
believe that benefits will continue in future periods, housing provision only may deliver a handful of 
(very enthusiastic) votes.   
Second, the electoral benefits of housing provision rarely come to fruition in a single term in 
office, while the costs are immediate.  Housing construction is a slow process.  The government 
must contract, manage, and distribute units in housing projects, which can take years.  Governments 
with longer time horizons may reap substantial gains because sustained investments create highly 
visible constructions that can demonstrate political commitments to the poor. Authoritarian regimes 
have longer time horizons, and many developmental states—most famously Singapore—have spent 
substantial sums on housing development.  In the context of democracy, political parties are 
enduring organizations that can help extend time horizons and generate stability in social policy 
commitments (Aldrich 1995: 23).  Institutionalized political parties, as in Chile, thus make housing 
investments more likely.  
Even with programmatic parties, however, housing policy is an awkward cause for both the 
political Right and Left to champion.  On the one hand, the emphasis of housing policy on creating 
a class of homeowners—and likely more politically conservative ones—points to one reason that the 
  124 
political Right might invest in housing policy.  Margaret Thatcher, for instance, expanded housing 
policy with a promise of a “right to buy” housing on the expectation that it would promote 
conservative values and strengthen the Right’s electoral fate (Jones and Murie 2008).  But, housing 
projects require substantial investments and bureaucracies to manage, even when the state contracts 
private sector companies to build the homes.  Governments often help to assemble land, permits, 
and builders that undercut the Right’s ideological commitments to a minimalist state “enabling” the 
market.  As one politician put it, “The government still ends up fixing crooked door knobs, and with 
the finger pointed at it when the houses start falling apart.”14   
On the other hand, the guarantee of housing as a right of social citizenship seems consistent 
with the broad aims of the political Left and a focus on the most needy.  But, the idea of creating a 
class of bourgeois property owners does not match the Left’s goals.  Rewarding a small number of 
families with houses also creates concerns about horizontal inequities and leads many on the Left to 
prefer social policy programs that can guarantee universal benefits.   
It is possible that both political camps could converge on the need to “crowd out” illegal 
land occupations motivated, for the Right, as violations of the law and, for the Left, as abstract 
harms imposed on the poor.  Yet, while illegal land occupations create an efficiency argument to 
implement substitutive housing policy and a conceivable political compromise, forbearance 
reconfigures political demands to make the implementation of substitutive housing policy less likely.   
  2.3  The Informal Welfare Equilibrium  
 Regardless of the reason that countries to not invest in housing policies for the poor, my 
claim is that states create incentives for local politicians to forbear when they do not provide 
housing substitutes through the mechanisms charted out in Figure 3.1.  This section expands on 
these three channels, and adds on the reverse path: forbearance also decreases incentives for 
                                                
14 Author interview with Antanas Mockus, former mayor, Bogotá, Colombia, July 27, 2013.   
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substitutive housing expenditures by diverting policy demands to local politicians and reactive 
housing policies. 
First, absent or truncated housing policies create direct material incentives for the urban 
poor to take land.  Quite simply, squatting is more valuable to the poor when there are no other 
housing options.  
Second, once the poor decide to attempt illegal land occupations, their demands at the local 
level shift to forbearance and reactive housing policies.  This claim differentiates my argument from 
scholars like Soifer (2013) who argue that the lack of state intervention leads the poor to “opt-out” 
of the state and rely on their own initiatives to access basic goods.  Were this the case, we would 
expect the poor to participate less and demand less from their elected representatives.  Instead, my 
prediction is that the poor still make demands on local politicians, but what they want is to secure 
and raise the value of their informal property.  
Third, local politicians face weak electoral incentives to enforce if housing programs are 
unavailable and popular demands center on forbearance.  As I showed in the last chapter, 
individuals who believe that the state provides limited housing options for the poor are more 
sympathetic to squatters.  Enforcement signals a politician who lacks sensitivity to the poor’s 
wellbeing. Because squatting occurs exclusively in poor districts in the city, unlike street vending 
studied in the next chapter, elected politicians risk losing pivotal votes if they send anti-poor signals.  
Thus, weak housing policy creates strong electoral incentives for politicians not to enforce.   
These mechanisms operate inversely where states invest in substitutive housing policies.  
The urban poor are unlikely to take land when state housing options exist.  At the local level, the 
poor demand constituency service in which mayors facilitate access to national housing programs.  
Rather than view squatters as sympathetic individuals with no other resort, even the poor equate 
squatting with a type of cheating and attempt to use extralegal means to force governments to 
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prioritize them in the allocation of houses.  Enforcement toward squatters thus is taken as a positive 
signal of the quality of local government and a politician’s commitment to the welfare state.  State 
housing provision creates a virtuous process in which citizens make demands on state authorities to 
expand and improve housing provision.  
The virtuous cycle induced by substitutive housing provision raises a question.  Once 
forbearance has occurred, why don’t national governments invest in substitutive housing policy to 
stop future squatting?  Housing expenditures become less likely due to changes in the structure of 
political demands induced by forbearance.  When land takings succeed, the poor begin to pressure 
to legalize and improve their informal holdings.  The electoral rewards to satisfy these demands are 
immediate.  Reactive housing policies tend to be cheap—property titling initiatives often cost as 
little as $50 per household—and they can be done en masse.  While advocates espouse property 
titles as a way to generate legal equality, promote access to credit, and recognize the reality of illegal 
land occupations (De Soto and Ghersi 1989; De Soto 2000), the incentive effects of property title 
provision go unstated.  The problem is that property titles raise the value of land takings and 
reinforce societal expectations that land takings are the route to housing for the poor.  Squatters and 
local politicians trot out past legalization as a reason not to bother with enforcement.  
A possible counterargument is that the provision of property titles unleashes an 
embourgeoisement process in which squatters who receive property title turn against the next 
generation of claimants.  Indeed, the previous chapter showed that former squatters are less 
supportive of squatting, all else equal.  However, former squatters are equally supportive of property 
title provision and opposed to enforcement.      
Past forbearance simultaneously can reduce demands for substitutive housing policy.  
Housing programs tend to exclude existing property owners, thereby removing squatters from the 
potential pool of beneficiaries.  When squatting persists for generations, the effect on the poor’s 
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material interests in housing provision is non-trivial.  In Lima, for example, more than half of the 
population has acquired property informally.  The median voter therefore has a reduced material 
interest in expanded housing expenditures.  Instead, this population likely prefers housing policies 
that provide legal title and subsidize improvements to existing houses, or other social policies 
altogether.  Even for those who have not seized land, the state’s credibility to provide formal 
housing solutions may have eroded, further dampening popular demands.   
Thus, illegal land occupations can reduce voter demands and political rewards for housing 
provision, even as the negative externalities of squatting mount.  Continued weak provision 
perpetuates actors’ beliefs that the way to acquire housing is through illegal land occupations 
followed by forbearance and eventual legalization.  Hence, countries are trapped by demands for 
property titles and investments in existing land invasion to reproduce conditions that encourage 
squatting. 
  2.4  How Countries Escape the Forbearance Trap  
This section proposes a stylized argument to think through the conditions that help 
countries move away from the forbearance equilibrium.15  The basic set-up is that national 
governments develop housing policy in part depending on whether they think local politicians will 
control squatting. There are some net benefits to housing provision for national governments, which 
come from the economic externalities, political benefits, and fiscal costs.  Critically, when local 
politicians choose forbearance, the national government pays additional costs that come from the 
negative externalities of squatting.  These costs accumulate over time so we can think of them as 
dependent on a discount factor.  When politicians enforce, the national government does not pay 
the forbearance costs.   
                                                
15 This set-up is modeled as a game in which the national government is a Stackelberg leader in 
Appendix B. 
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How national politicians will act depends primarily on the structure of societal demands and 
their time horizons.  The political rewards for housing provision are large in circumstances where 
past politicians have enforced the law, such as following a dictatorship in which the landless poor 
need housing provision.  Rewards are lower when the urban poor have already seized land 
informally and see limited material gains from housing provision.  Moving out of a forbearance 
equilibrium thus will be trickiest in countries that confront squatters who want reactive housing 
policies, as we will see in Peru, and easiest in cases where governments confront smaller numbers of 
squatters, as we will see following the military dictatorship in Chile.  
Time horizons also play an important role in a national government’s housing policy 
decision.  If national politicians have short time horizons, then forbearance truly is redistribution on 
the cheap and substitutive housing policies are less likely.  The government does not pay the long-
term costs of squatting because the expenses associated with service provision can be shifted to 
future administrations, and avoids the upfront expense of housing programs.  Conversely, 
governments with long time horizons pay the costs of an informal housing model.  Recall that they 
also reap greater rewards from formal housing provision. Thus, my prediction is that 
institutionalized party systems lead national governments to weigh the long-run costs of forbearance 
and invest in substitutive housing policies.  Of my cases, Chile has an institutionalized party system 
and Colombia did at the beginning of the time period under examination.  Peru exemplifies a 
collapsed party system, and thus should be least likely to implement substitutive housing policies.     
Additionally, institutional features affect the national government’s discount factor.  For 
example, national governments that do not fully internalize the costs of squatting, as in politically 
decentralized systems where local taxes fund the additional service costs from forbearance, should 
be less likely to implement substitutive housing policies.  This dynamic most clearly emerges in Peru 
where the national government shifts substantial costs associated with forbearance to local and city 
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governments.  On the flip side, some governments are required to provide services to illegal 
settlements immediately.  The best example of this dynamic comes from Colombia where the 
Constitutional Court has ordered that politicians cannot deny basic public services to illegal land 
occupations.  Administrative centralization and mandated provision make national authorities weigh 
the costs of forbearance more heavily, increasing the likelihood that national governments will 
implement substitutive housing policies.   
Lastly, national governments face weaker incentives to invest in substitutive housing policy 
when local governments lack the administrative capacity to enforce, or national authorities cannot 
provide sufficient housing to shift local electoral incentives.  Countries then slip into the forbearance 
trap in which land invasions occur, resulting in renewed pressure for reactive housing policy.  
Political parties again may make substitutive housing policies more likely if they can coordinate the 
behavior of local politicians to enforce and wait for housing programs to scale up. 
In sum, the general intuition is that any institution that increases popular demands for 
housing provision or that leads national authorities to bear the costs of squatter settlements in the 
short run will ease a transition to substitutive housing policy.  Several circumstances seem most 
important here: smaller preexisting squatter settlements, political centralization, and strong political 
parties. As I return to below, these factors converged in Chile to help the country establish 
substitutive housing policies.  Conditions are least propitious for Peru to move out of an informal 
welfare equilibrium, and slightly more so in Colombia due to greater political centralization and a 
legal mandate to service informal settlements.   
3  Housing Policies Compared 
This section lays out a typology to distinguish among state housing policies and then 
classifies the country cases.  The most basic distinction between housing policies concerns the scale 
of public sector investments.  A skeletal housing policy is characterized primarily by a lack of 
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resources.  Elements of policy design mean less when there are no resources for their 
implementation.  Skeletal housing policies may include reactive expenditures to formalize past illegal 
constructions or to facilitate home improvements in informal settlements, as in Peru, or they can 
disregard the housing sector entirely, as in parts of sub-Saharan Africa.  The defining feature is that 
the state does little to provide housing for those who do not already own property.  
States with housing policies of scale differ in how they target their expenditures.  The main 
distinction concerns the contrast between truncated and substitutive housing policies.  Both of these 
policies are characterized by significant engagement in real estate and financial markets to provide 
housing for some segment of the population—unlike the skeletal states.   
One type of housing policy is “truncated,” meaning that whatever the nominal degree of 
universality, it assists those with formal employment or private resources.  Truncation indicates the 
limited progressivity of expenditures whether by design or default.  Latin American housing 
programs typically began as emoluments meant for relatively small groups such as state employees 
or unionized workers.  Many countries, such as Colombia and Argentina, preserve these legacies.  
For example, the state telephone company in Bogotá spent more on housing for its workers than all 
other city and national social interest housing programs combined in the 1990s.16  While historically 
housing programs explicitly assisted formal sector workers, many housing policies in Latin America 
now do so through their omissions.  For instance, Colombian authorities claim to prioritize the 
urban poor, but policies do not reach these segments of the income distribution due to requirements 
like access to commercial credit or savings that make it near impossible for the poor to participate.  
Both skeletal and truncated housing policies can be thought of as policy complements to 
informal land takings.  They leave the poor to look to illegal land occupations to access housing.  In 
                                                
16 The state telephone company is the Empresa de Telecomunicaciones de Bogotá.  Author interview with 
Antanas Mockus, Mayor, Bogotá, Colombia, July 29, 2013.   
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contrast, substitutive housing policies do much more for low-income groups.  In order to assist the 
poor, substitutive policies tend to involve a heavy state hand to make housing benefits effective for 
poor families.  The poor lack savings and capacity to access a loan, which means that housing 
involves a substantial transfer.  They tend to provide homes or land nearly free of charge to the 
poor.  Given the fiscal burden that this imposes, substitutive housing policies rarely address the 
poor’s housing demands in full.  But countries with substitutive housing policies make substantial 
attempts to target poor households and reduce demand for informal housing alternatives.  They 
create a path through which the poor eventually can access housing. Chile exemplifies substitutive 
housing policies.   
To compare housing policies, this chapter relies on both quantitative indicators and in-depth 
qualitative investigations. Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics and reveals sharp contrasts 
between the country cases.  Peru maintains a skeletal housing policy.  Meanwhile, Chile is a 
prototypical example of substitutive housing policy, and Colombia is case of truncated (although 
aspiring to become substitutive) housing policy. 
The most straightforward way to compare the scale of housing investments is through 
expenditures.  Housing expenditures as a fraction of GDP are a standard measure of a country’s 
effort.17  The cases reveal clear variation in the scale of housing investments.  Peru spends just 0.04 
percent of GDP on housing programs, which stands among the lowest percentage in Latin America 
(Szalachman and Collinao 2010).  This statistic alone suggests that the country does little to house 
                                                
17 More so than in other social policy areas, national accounts data on housing expenditures are 
rarely comparable so I turned to line-item budget reports and studies that attempt to standardize 
reports to estimate expenses on all housing supply and demand-side interventions.  CEPAL and the 
IMF, for instance, report a vague category of public expenditures on “housing and other.”  The 
inaccuracy of this categorization arises from two issues—many housing ministries lump together a 
variety of housing, infrastructure, and environmental functions, such as water provision and road 
construction, and second, many housing expenditures occur through non-housing entities. In 
particular, Chile’s housing budget tends to be underestimated in comparative data sets because its 
housing vouchers are classified as social security expenses. 
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the poor through formal means.  In contrast, Colombia spends 0.25 percent of GDP, roughly on par 
with Greece and Spain.  Chile spends 0.8 percent of GDP on in-kind housing benefits (compared to 
an OECD average of 0.6 percent).  Other indicators of scale, such as the share of public sector 
construction and state mortgage lending, reinforce these contrasts.  For instance, the Colombian 
state plays a minor role in mortgage credit provision, offering just 0.4 percent of all credit, while the 
Chilean state accounts for more than 25 percent of credit (Bouillon 2012: 189).   
While expenditures are useful to evaluate the overall scale of housing investments, states 
differ in their policy targeting.  States can intervene to improve housing supply for the poor.  The 
clearest supply side intervention is state construction of affordable housing.  But, since the 1990s, 
direct housing construction has lost favor as part of broader privatizations of public sector 
enterprises (Mayo and Angel 1993).  Nonetheless, states still play a central role in housing supply 
through a number of tools—tax incentives, direct contracting of projects, land grants, expedited 
construction licenses, legal clauses that require a percentage of social interest housing construction 
as part of new projects, and informal prodding of construction chambers.  The best summary 
statistic of supply side interventions comes from the number of social interest housing projects 
initiated as a share of all new construction. Whether social interest housing exists on the market 
gives a sense of how effectively states incentivize affordable housing, regardless of the precise way 
that they manage to do it.   
Again, we see dramatic contrasts across the cases: almost no social interest housing is on 
offer in Peru, while Chile and Colombia make substantial efforts.  In 2010, 90 percent of housing 
supply in Lima was built for the richest quintile of families, and 69 percent of Lima households 
could not afford any housing on the market (Bouillon 2012: 69).  Social interest housing, in contrast, 
constitutes the majority of new construction in Chile.  The pace of construction has been 
astounding—Chile promoted the construction of 1.9 million homes between 1990 and 2006, or 
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roughly 100,000 new homes per year (Rodríguez et al. 2006: 22).  In a year, Chile builds more 
affordable housing than what Peru and Colombia have managed in the past two decades.  Colombia 
is an intermediate case with important, but erratic, efforts to ramp up state housing construction.  
Social interest housing construction has climbed to two-thirds of new housing supply, but in recent 
years, only a third of new housing in Bogotá has been classified as social interest.  Moreover, much 
of what Colombia calls “social interest” housing is targeted at a lower-middle class tranche of the 
market (Camacol 2009).      
TABLE 3.1.  Housing Policy Descriptive Statistics, 2010.  
 
SOURCES: Statistics come from the national housing authorities and construction chambers in each country.  In Peru, 
these are the Ministerio de Vivienda, Construcción y Saneamiento del Perú and the Cámara Peruana de la Construcción 
(Capeco); in Colombia, the Ministerio de Vivienda, Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, and the 
Cámara Colombiana de la Construcción (Camaco); in Chile, they include the Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo de 
Chile and the Cámara Chilena de Construcción (CChC). 
 
States also can intervene to improve the ability of the poor to purchase housing through 
demand subsidies.  In so doing, the state limits its role to “enabling” the housing market to grow 
and serve the poor.  The Chilean military regime pioneered a demand-side subsidy approach to 
housing, which has been replicated throughout the developing world (Gilbert 2004).  All three cases 
examined here have used “ABC” models that encourage the poor to save (Ahorro), provide a subsidy 
to improve capacity to pay (Bono), and require access to mortgage credit (Crédito).   
To judge how much countries do to help the poor through demand-side assistance, I include 
statistics on both the number of housing subsidies assigned to the poor, and the share of subsidies 
put to use by poor recipients.  While governments advertise the quantity of subsidies allocated, the 
latter measure of usage is more revealing to judge housing access.  In Chile, the poor almost always 
Peru Colombia Chile
Lima Nation Bogotá Nation Santiago Nation
State Housing Expenditures as % GDP 0.04 0.25 0.80
Social Interest Housing as % Construction 1.6 33 65
Subsidies Approved for Lower Class 217 5,991 2,473 31,601 26,488 34,853
Subsidies Used by Lower Class as % Granted 0.6 14.7 82.0
Table 1: Ill gal Land Occupations Comp red
Peru Colombia Chile
Lima Nation Bogotá Nation Santiago Nation
Illegal Land Occupations 0.04 250,000 0.80
Quantitative Housing Deficit 158,523 282,678 65
Qualitative Housing Deficit 269,456 87,197 65
Housing Deficit Ration 1.7 0.31 65
Housing Deficit (Bottom Quintile)
Illegal Land Occupation Rate 0.6 14.7 82.0
Classification High Intermediate Low
Police Evictions 0.6 14.7 82.0
Administrative Law Cases 0.6 14.7 82.0
Titling & Service Provisi n 0.6 14.7 82.0
Public Statements 0.6 14.7 82.0
1
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use housing subsidies to purchase a home.  In contrast, the vast majority of housing subsidies go 
unused in Peru and Colombia because the poor cannot find affordable housing on the market, or 
they struggle to meet requirements for a home purchase like approval for a commercial mortgage.  
The descriptive statistics confirm that there are very important differences in the scale and 
targeting of housing policy in these three cases.  The next section uses detailed case studies to 
demonstrate how these housing policy choices affect incentives for mayors to control squatting, and 
how enforcement choices serve to reinforce housing policy differences.  To preview, Figure 3.2 lays 
out the national differences.  I begin with the case of Peru because it most clearly illustrates a 
country that relies exclusively on forbearance, which is depicted as a non-state, pro-poor policy.  
This choice reshapes demands around reactive housing policies, which complicates moves toward 
substitutive housing policy.  I then turn to the intermediate case of Colombia.  As shown in Figure 
3.2, Colombia provides state benefits to the middle-class.  Like in Peru, the absence of targeted 
expenditures creates incentives for city mayors to rely on forbearance to help the poor access 
housing.  At various moments, Colombia has redirected benefits to the poor and shrunk squatter 
settlements.  Smaller squatter populations and court mandates to provide services to them have 
helped spark very recent moves toward substitutive housing policy.  Finally, I conclude with the case 
of Chile, which escaped the forbearance cycle through substitutive housing policy.  Repression 
under the military government and a strong party system facilitated the shift.  The Chilean case 
demonstrates how social policy, rather than functioning courts or police, was essential to change 
mayors’ enforcement incentives and end illegal land occupations.   
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FIGURE 3.2.  Substitutive and Complementary Housing Policies by Country Case 
 
 
3 Skeletal Housing Policy and Forbearance: Lima 
 
Inadequate formal housing provision is at the heart of squatting’s persistence in Peru.  
Skeletal housing policy set in motion a pattern that has led the poor to access housing through illegal 
land occupations and, ultimately, to demand infrastructure and property titles to improve their living 
conditions.  Presidents have responded with titling drives.  Given skeletal housing policies and 
common knowledge that land invasions end in legalization, district politicians face weak incentives 
to enforce.  Growing fiscal and administrative capacity to provide complex reactive housing policies 
suggests that state weakness does not fully explain enforcement outcomes.  Quite a different type of 
weakness, namely lousy social policy and a collapsed party system that leads executives to favor 
short-term projects like property titling, drives forbearance against illegal land occupations.   
4.1 Skeletal Housing Policy 
National governments have done little to provide housing to the poor in Peru.  In the 
twentieth century, the country never invested substantially in housing policy due to a combination of 
geographic and political factors (see, Calderón Cockburn 2006; Collier 1976; Riofrío 1991).  
state 
non-state 
pro-poor pro-middle 
Peru 
Substitutive housing policies 
   
Complementary housing policies 
  
Colombia         Chile 
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Geographically, the existence of wide expanses of state land reduced the costs of land invasions 
compared to cities like Bogotá, where private owners held most peripheral land and threats to 
property rights were greater.  During the period of peak migration to Lima (the 1950s through the 
1970s), governments made brief attempts to repress land invasions.  Ultimately, it was politically 
expedient to tolerate land invasions as a way to move the urban poor out of central city areas and, 
particularly during the revolutionary military government of Juan Velasco, to create linkages to the 
urban poor. Collier (1976: 29) argues that politicians were attracted by the political dependence that 
squatting created and the inexpensive solution to the country’s housing demands leading to a gradual 
recognition of squatting “as a legitimate part of housing policy.”   
With the return of democracy, there were attempts to expand formal housing programs.  
President Fernando Belaúnde (1980-85) had a background as an architect and city planner.  He 
emphasized large-scale public housing projects and initiated a number of state housing assistance 
programs.  However, Belaúnde designed projects primarily for formal sector workers.  This focus 
likely reflected his middle-class support base in urban areas.  President Alan García similarly 
promised to expand housing provision for the poor, but the government had made no real progress 
before Peru’s debt crisis shelved efforts.  It also was unclear that Belaúnde and García could have 
coordinated the behavior of local mayors to end illegal land occupations. Poor districts 
overwhelmingly elected mayors from a coalition of parties, the United Left (Izquierda Unida, IU), 
which promised to legalize illegal land occupations and improve service provision (IU 1986: 76).18  
Fiscal decentralization also left district mayors with miniscule budgets and administrative resources 
in the 1980s.  Thus, land invasions continued apace. 
                                                
18 The IU also proposed a “site-and-service” program that would allocate state land with services in 
an orderly fashion. 
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President Alberto Fujimori gutted what little existed of the country’s formal housing system.  
In 1993, Fujimori eliminated existing state housing programs and struck the right to housing from 
Peru’s constitution.19  Fujimori created just one housing program to provide state land to poor 
families, the Family Lot Program (Programa de Lotes Familiares, Profam).20  The program 
announcement—just prior to the 2000 presidential election—followed a massive land invasion, 
which allegedly was promoted by Fujimori’s allies.21  Hardly a systematic effort to crowd out land 
invasions, the program was a transparent pre-election ploy. More than 60 percent of mass 
respondents believed that the program was a vote buying measure.  Nonetheless, it was a hugely 
popular one: 86 percent of the poorest residents supported Profam, compared to 45 percent of the 
wealthiest respondents (Carrión 2006: 143-144). More than 15,000 people applied for a free lot 
through Profam in Lima just the first day the program was announced, and more than 700,000 
people applied by the closure deadline.22  The wild popularity came from the fact that the program 
                                                
19 These included fifteen housing programs, including the housing bank (Banco Nacional de la 
Vivienda), state credit agency (Banco Central Hipotecario), the savings agencies (Sistema Mutual de 
Vivienda), and site and service lot programs (Fondo Nacional de Vivienda). Copying from Pinochet, 
Fujimori liberalized the sale of agricultural land, which allowed peripheral land to be sold for 
housing purposes and encouraged private development (Law 26505, Ley de Tierras, Published in the 
Gaceta, 18 July 1995). 
20 Fujimori also passed the legislation that created the Fondo MiVivienda in 1998, but it only 
provided 3000 credits under Fujimori and did not begin in earnest until Toledo took up the project 
(Cockburn 2009: 110). 
21 The mayor of Villa El Salvador complained that politicians arrived to provide food and water to 
the invaders, and that the invaders clearly announced their political allegiances.  “Entrega de 
alimentos sólo consolida invasión,” El Comercio 31 Jan 2000.  The police also allegedly remained 
passive despite immediate complaints of the invasion.  “Invasiones de terrenos continúan ante 
inexplicable pasividad policial,” El Comercio 27 Jan 2000; “Policía no evita invasiones, pese al pedido 
del alcalde,” El Comercio 26 Jan 2000.  The invaders were relocated to land in Ciudadela Pachacútec 
in Ventanilla, generating complaints of rewards for land invasions. “Reubican a 18 mil invasores en 
la ciudadela Pachacútec,” El Comercio 7 Feb 2000; “Trasladan a Ventanilla a la mitad de invasores de 
Villa El Salvador,” El Comercio 4 Feb 2000. 
22 “Se inscribieron veinte mil personas en el primer día,” El Comercio 16 Feb 2000.; “Aumentan en 
Lima locales de inscripción para el Profam,” El Comercio 29 Feb 2000; “Falta de presupuesto haría 
imposible habilitar Profam,” El Comercio 30 Nov 2000. 
  138 
replicated the logic of land invasions: it distributed state land directly to the poor, rather than 
through the state’s housing bureaucracy, and therefore credibly could be implemented on a large 
scale.    
Analogous to a land invasion, Profam allowed families to occupy empty lots (albeit with state 
authorization) without services, permits or zoning approvals.  Future authorities would be 
responsible for providing urban infrastructure to families after they built their homes.  This choice 
reduced the costs and administrative strain on the national government, but with few of the 
accompanying benefits of controlling informal development.  Housing Minister Juan Incháustegui 
explained that the government did not have the funds to provide more than the land because “there 
we are talking about a budget that exceeds all economic and fiscal possibilities of the 
Government.”23  As I return to below, Profam also was consistent with Fujimori’s broader embrace 
of reactive housing policies that allowed the government to distribute infrastructure and benefits in a 
piecemeal fashion after the poor claimed land.24  Expectedly, Profam drew sharp criticism from city 
and district politicians who saw the program as a form of unfunded mandate.  Fujimori took credit 
for what would end up falling on the city mayor, who came from an opposing party (as I discuss 
more in Chapter 4), to finance.  For example, Jorge Ruíz de Somocurcio, the president of the Urban 
Development Commission of Lima, called the program “useless” because the poor would settle on 
land with no transportation, schools, or basic services, and questioned, “why an outgoing 
government has put in a place a housing policy to be implemented in the medium term.”25  
Substitutive housing policies reemerged as a goal with the return to democracy and the 
election of Alejandro Toledo in 2001.  In theory, Toledo supported substitutive housing policies due 
                                                
23 “Falta de presupuesto haría imposible habilitar Profam,” El Comercio 30 Nov 2000. 
24 These benefits could be provided contingent on a settlement’s political loyalty, but no detailed 
statistics exist to know whether they were distributed as a form of pork to supporters.   
25 “Una parte de las áreas para lotes del Profam estaría en Ancón,” El Comercio 19 Oct 2000. 
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to the escalating costs of illegal land occupations.  He reinstated a housing ministry (Ministerio de 
Vivienda, Construcción y Saneamiento, MVCS) and proposed major housing investments to stop land 
invasions.  With an implicit dig to Fujimori’s government, Vice-Minister of Housing Miguel Romero 
Sotelo embraced the catchphrase, “growth by investment, not invasion,” to promote Toledo’s 
housing programs.26  Romero viewed substitutive housing policy as part of a broader transformation 
in which Peru would reap lower service costs and higher taxes.  In a speech, for instance, he made 
the explicit connection between housing programs and invasion dynamics:  
“Given the sluggishness of the State, it was foreseeable that to solve housing needs, families 
appealed to the pernicious process of invasion-self-construction-tax evasion generating an 
informal society.  What our administration is promoting is a virtuous chain to produce a city: 
investment-construction industrialization-taxation with which we would pass from an informal to 
a formal society.”27 
 
At first, Toledo seemed poised to pay the costs to implement substitutive housing policy.  
He introduced a demand subsidy program modeled on Chile’s ABC model: applicants would 
receive a subsidy, provide a 10 percent down payment, and seek a commercial bank loan for the 
remaining cost of a new house.  The program was designed so one segment, Techo Propio, assisted 
the poor, while another, MiVivienda, offered housing subsidies to the middle class.28  Toledo set a 
goal of building 800,000 houses under his plan, Housing for All (Vivienda para Todos), and claimed 
that it would generate 300,000 construction jobs.29  The comeback of Alan García as president in 
                                                
26 “Ciudades deben crecer por inversión no por invasión,” Gestión 14 Jan 2014.; “Crecimiento por 
inversión,” Gestión 26 Oct 2010. 
27 Romero, Miguel.  “La meta democrática de una vivienda para todos,” La República Feb 4 2001. 
28 Peru stratifies class groups into five segments lettered from A to E.  Throughout the text, I refer 
to Class A as the upper class, Class B as the middle class, Class C as the lower-middle class, and 
Classes D and E as the lower class.  Techo Propio was designed to assist households from Classes D 
and E.  MiVivienda targeted Class B (and the upper part of Class C, or C+).  “La mitad de Lima vive 
en pueblos jóvenes: plan nacional Vivienda para Todos busca revertir la situación,” Construcción e 
Industria, July 2003. 
29 “Edificación de viviendas generaría 300 mil puestos de trabajo,” El Comercio 6 April 2000.   
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2006 did not produce major shifts in housing policy.  García promised an additional 250,000 
houses but through continued demand subsidy policies.  Both presidents fell short of their goals. 
The model of a minimalist state “enabling” the market failed to reach the poor.  On the 
demand side, few poor families could access commercial credit to use housing subsidies.  This 
problem was anticipated even when the program was announced.30  When reports showed that the 
poor could not access commercial credit, the Toledo administration reversed course saying that it 
would be “excessively statist” to create a public bank to target the poor and that subsidies would 
assist “emerging” (i.e. middle-class) sectors.  Housing Minister Carlos Bruce dismissed criticisms 
on the grounds that, “The problem of poverty cannot be solved by the Ministry of Housing.”31 A 
recent study confirmed that 62 percent of households that managed to use Techo Propio subsidies 
were employed in the formal sector, often as police and teachers.  Only 5 percent came from lower 
class strata (Calderón Cockburn 2013a: 18).   
Even if poor households managed to access credit, there were major problems with the 
supply of affordable housing.  Just 3,000 subsidies went to use under Toledo, leading one housing 
expert to call Techo Propio a “sample size program.”32  Reflecting the lack of attention to the 
poor, Toledo dropped mention of Techo Propio entirely from his housing achievements.  He now 
heralds that his programs served “those who want a house that costs between $30,000 and 
$50,000.”33  This price range falls well above the standard $15,000 threshold for social interest 
housing projects.  García fared even worse.  Of 21,577 houses sold in 2011, lower class groups 
                                                
30 “En Techo Propio se subsidia el 90% del costo de una casa,” El Comercio 11 Aug 2002.   
31 “Créditos para Mivivienda se triplican en primer trimester,” El Comercio 3 April 2003.   
32 Author interview with Ramiro García, Head of Urban Program, Centro de Estudios y Promoción 
del Desarrollo (DESCO), Lima, Peru, May 23, 2011.  Nationwide, Techo Propio produced 30,000 
housing units between 2003 and 2012 (Calderón Cockburn 2013: 45). 
33 “Experiencia de gobierno,” Alejandro Toledo Presidente, accessed 15 April 2014,       
< http://www.alejandrotoledo.pe/vision-de-futuro-1_V2.php?codigo=69>. 
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purchased only 2.6 percent and the lower-middle class purchased 6.7 percent.34  There were only 
800 houses that cost less than $30,000 on the Lima market in 2011.35  Only 9,781 subsidies for new 
housing purchases went to poor and lower-middle class households in Lima under García (MVCS 
2011).  While the middle class constitutes only 17.4 percent of households in Lima, it received 
more than 90 percent of housing credits, although still only totaling 51,500 from the program’s 
introduction in 2003 (Calderón Cockburn 2013a: 8-9).  National governments allocated little land 
or resources to contract housing projects for the poor.  City Councilor Sigifredo Velásquez put it 
bluntly: “For the truly poor—say the bottom third of the income distribution—there is no housing 
to be purchased and no housing policy beyond legalizing land invasions.”36   
Why, then, did Toledo and García pursue complementary housing policies?  The decision 
to abandon substitutive housing policies reflected the calculations of shortsighted politicians.  
Toledo genuinely began his administration with Chile’s example of substitutive housing policy in 
mind.  The state would contract massive projects from private construction companies to “crowd 
out” illegal land occupations.  It would reach substantial numbers of households by only 
subsidizing a portion of the housing cost; families would receive commercial mortgages and use 
savings to cover the remaining part.  However, construction companies insisted that they could 
only build housing for the poor in the far-flung districts in the urban periphery. A tension arose 
because lower-middle class households that could access a commercial credit did not want to live 
in these districts, and households that wanted to live in those districts could not qualify for credit 
(Cockburn 2009: 111).  To serve the poor, who could potentially occupy land illegally, the 
government would have to increase the size of housing credits to cover the entire costs of the 
                                                
34 “Se venderán más de 21 mil viviendas en Lima este año,” El Comercio 8 Nov 2011.   
35 “Oferta de vivienda varía entre US$15,000 y US$2.8 millones,” El Comercio, 2 Dec 2011.   
36 Author interview with Sigifredo Velásquez Ramos, City Councilor (2011-13), Lima, Peru, 
November 7, 2011. 
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house.  In that case, programs would cover far fewer households in any political cycle.  Moreover, 
Toledo allegedly abandoned efforts to build housing for the poor after he learned that his first 
major housing project would not be completed until after he left office.  If Toledo expected to 
hold power for multiple periods, or that his party would sustain investments, it may have made 
sense to invest.  Similarly, if Toledo could convince local mayors to stop land invasions and wait 
for housing projects to come on line, he could have achieve his goal of “growth by investment.”  
But Toledo had neither of these advantages.  Toledo was a political novice who created his party 
Perú Posible for no other reason than his presidential candidacy.  He only had loosely affiliated 
mayors at the local level.  Thus, there was little incentive to make costly investments in housing 
projects for the poor.              
The strategy that maximized political support in the short run was to appease the poor 
through property titles and use housing subsidies to increase construction for the urban middle 
class.   At the same time that Toledo abandoned targeted housing investments, Toledo reversed 
course and provided property titles to the poor, as I describe in the next section.  The massive 
number of illegal land occupations that already had occurred meant there was strong demand for 
such reactive housing policies.  Property titles could be used to build support among the poor, 
while formal housing subsidies went to middle-class households that were at the cusp of home 
ownership.37   
This segmented approach in which each class sector received something from housing 
policy proved immensely popular.  Polls show that 37 percent of the public considered housing 
                                                
37 Housing construction concentrated on houses between $30,000 and $50,000 where, with the 
assurance of government assistance, construction companies could begin to enter the market.  
Meanwhile, studies showed that the market was saturated with used housing stock that was dropping 
in price and satisfied lower-middle class demand.  Housing for less than $30,000 came from the 
rapidly depreciating price of housing stock and constituted 90.2 percent of the formal housing stock 
in the city (Cockburn 2009: 113).      
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and titling programs to be the best part of (an albeit unpopular) Toledo administration.38  Thus, 
ignoring targeted housing programs made political sense in light of the ability of forbearance and 
reactive policies to serve the poor’s interests.  It opened up the possibility to divert state resources 
to urban middle-class sectors.     
García arrived at a similar calculation that reactive housing policies plus subsidies for the 
middle class best expanded his support base.  Although García represented a populist political 
party with a long trajectory, APRA (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana, APRA), had weak local 
routes that made it difficult to control squatting.  García also ignored the long-run costs of 
forbearance.  His administration explicitly counted property titles and construction credits for the 
poor—which presumed that the poor already had accessed land through illegal means—as part of 
the state’s housing portfolio, and by this dubious definition of a “housing solution,” claimed that it 
achieved its initial goal of “providing” a quarter of a million houses even though almost no houses 
were built for the poor.39 Housing Minister Juan Sarmiento Soto explicitly pitched the state’s 
housing policy in terms of “diverse products destined to finance housing for each socioeconomic 
level.” The poor were granted subsidies to improve construction on their (invaded) lots and the 
middle class were provided subsidies to purchase new houses.40 García touted his achievements in 
providing property titles to the poor to claim that his government had “favored the poorest.”41 
                                                
38 Housing programs beat out the US-Peru free trade agreement, the gas deal with Camisea, and the 
highway from Brazil to Peru, economic stability, democracy, or increase in exports. “Califican como 
logro los planes de vivienda y critican escándalos,” El Comercio 16 July 2006.   
39 For the poorest Peruvians, the García administration viewed state assistance as coming through 
property titling and credits to improve constructions on existing land from Sitio Propio and 
Mejorando Mivivienda “Este es el balance de los mensajes presidenciales de Alan García en su 
segunda gestión,” El Comercio 25 July 2010; Juan Sarmiento Soto, “Vivienda para los más pobres,” 
La República, 2 July 2011.   
40 Juan Sarmiento Soto, “Vivienda para los más pobres,” La República, 2 July 2011.   
41 “Alan García: “Mi gobierno ha sido para los más pobres,” El Comercio 19 Feb 2011. 
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Meanwhile, statistics underscore that his formal social expenditures, even beyond the housing 
sector, did almost nothing for the poor (Cameron 2011; ECLAC 2010).  
To summarize, complementary housing policies have been attractive in Peru because the 
poor’s housing demands are structured around reactive housing policies.  Fiscal constraints 
partially explain the lack of investment in housing for the poor during and just following Peru’s 
debt crisis, but they cannot explain recent outcomes.  Peru experienced a commodities export 
boom in the 2000s.  Strong growth rates could have resulted in major investments in housing 
projects for the poor.  But presidents had short time horizons that made housing investments 
unattractive and faced strong demands for reactive housing policies, as I now document.  
4.2 Crowding In Squatting  
The absence of housing policy encourages the poor to occupy land illegally.  Informal land 
occupations are ubiquitous in Lima.  Given that numerous studies have documented the city’s 
extensive, sustained informal growth (Calderón Cockburn 2006; Collier 1976; Dietz 1985, 1989, 
1998; Dosh 2010; Riofrío 1991; Soifer 2013; De Soto and Ghersi 1989; Stokes 1995), I focus here 
on a few key facts about recent illegal land occupations and the more novel idea of reactive housing 
policies.  
Many observers predicted that informal growth would slow as invasions saturated proximate 
land and the shock of neoliberal economic reforms passed (Eckstein 1989; Portes 1989; Stokes 
1995).  Instead, illegal land occupations have continued apace throughout the 1990s and 2000s.  
Peru’s National Household Survey (Encuesta Nacional de Hogares, ENAHO), run each year, gives a 
sense of the number of households that have acquired land through invasions.42  Roughly 89,000 
households report that their house was acquired through an invasion since 2005.  This calculation 
understates the extent of informal construction because it excludes sales through intermediaries, and 
                                                
42 Exact annual counts are imprecise because they are sensitive to how the survey is weighted.   
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does not count houses originally acquired through invasions that now have been rented or sold.43 
Roughly half of Lima’s population lives in informal settlements (Cockburn Calderón 2006: 75).  
Lima has experienced at least fourfold more informal construction compared to Bogotá, and as 
Chapter 1 showed, it is an outlier compared to most cities of similar development levels (UN-
Habitat 2009).   
The sheer number of poor households affected by enforcement against land invasions versus 
housing programs makes clear why demands center on reactive housing policies.  Household surveys 
show that 0.01 percent of Lima residents have received some form of state subsidy to purchase a 
house.  Meanwhile, 18 percent of residents in poor districts live on land seized through invasions 
since 2004, and thus need property titles.44  Government statistics similarly underscore the 
importance of illegal land occupations.  The most common statistic about the housing sector is a 
country’s deficit, which is divided between a qualitative deficit, meaning the number of households 
that live in houses or apartments that require improvements in services or shelter quality, and a 
quantitative deficit, meaning the number of households that live in overcrowded conditions.  In 
many cities, such as Bogotá, the majority (76 percent) of the total deficit is quantitative—the city 
needs more housing units (DANE 2005).  In contrast, almost 80 percent of the Peruvian housing 
deficit (1.5 of 1.9 million units) is a qualitative deficit (Calderón Cockburn 2013a: 6).  People have 
accessed housing, but they need better housing.     
                                                
43 An estimated 260,000 households, or roughly one seventh of the city’s population, say that they 
live in houses that they acquired through a land invasion.  Other scholars put the number of 
individuals in informal settlements closer to a half by counting housing resold or purchased 
informally.  The fact that illegal land occupations occur as collective invasions mean that many 
statistics are kept at the level of a settlement, rather than the household level, which makes precise 
estimates of the affected population difficult.  MCVS, for instance, tracks the number of informal 
settlements included in its survey of local governments.  Nationwide, the government identified 
3,003 informal settlements in 1993, 7,419 in 2002, and more than 10,000 by 2012 (Calderón 
Cockburn 2013: 46-47).  An estimated 200 new settlements formed just between 1996 and 2001.   
44 “Lima Este y Sur albergan al 55,4% de los pobres extremos,” El Comercio 16 April 2004.  For 
statistics on the southern cone, also see Ramírez Corzo and Riofrío (2006). 
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To what extent has the government actively encouraged illegal land occupations as an 
informal housing policy?  Direct political involvement in land invasions is relatively rare, although 
major exceptions occurred in the run-up to the 2000 presidential elections when Fujimori and his 
allies were accused of promoting a spate of land invasions and the 2006 presidential elections when 
an APRA operative allegedly exchanged large tracts of land for votes.45   
More consistently, the Peruvian government has incentivized land invasions through how it 
shapes the expected benefits of land invasions.  The Peruvian government raises the appeal of land 
invasions by creating easy procedures to gain property title and public services.  In 1996, Fujimori 
created the Committee for the Formalization of Informal Property (Organismo de Formalización de la 
Propiedad Informal, COFOPRI).46  Based on Hernando De Soto’s work, the agency looked to 
streamline property titling and provide land rights to informal settlements.  While the old process of 
                                                
45 These invasions included “Chancherías” in San Juan de Miraflores and massive invasions of more 
than 10,000 people of agricultural land and 1500 people who took land reserved for a hospital in 
Villa El Salvador.  Fujimori denied involvement in the land invasions; however, he gave a speech in 
which he identified open land in the city, which led to near immediate invasions. (See “La situación 
en Villa El Salvador sigue tensa,” El Comercio 31 Jan 2000). One of the invasions also called itself 
“Perú 2000,” the name of Fujimori’s party, and the Ministry of the Presidency arrived to offer water 
to the invaders (Caretas, No. 164, 3 Feb 2000).  José Peralta, spokesperson for the invasion, 
commented, “We agree with the situation that Fujimori is bringing forth.  We will support him in a 
reelection as a form of recognition.” Moreover, the land reserved for a hospital—which led the 
mayor and the local public to call for police intervention and denounce the invasion to the Attorney 
General’s Office—did not result in police action.  Instead, the Vice-Minister of Health Alejandro 
Mesarina stated that the ministry would not evict the people until they were relocated so as “not to 
prejudice these people” (El Comercio 21 May 2000).  Mayors aligned with Fujimori like Adolfo 
Ocampo in San Juan de Miraflores also allegedly supported land invasions like Nueva Rinconada to 
help win the elections.  Author interview with Paulo Hinostroza, Mayor (2003-2006), District of San 
Juan de Miraflores, June 24, 2011.  In 2006, Germán Cárdenas León, a close ally of congress 
members Mercedes Cabanillas and César Zumaeta, was accused of land trafficking and now has 150 
charges against him, although they have not resulted in a conviction.          
46 Previously, titling was the responsibility of local governments.  In 1995, Fujimori had launched his 
own mayoral candidate Jaime Yoshiyama in Lima and his main proposal was to distribute land titles 
to poor neighborhoods.  When Yoshiyama lost to Alberto Andrade, Fujimori looked to undercut 
the city government.  COFOPRI thus worked around local governments and expedited the titling 
process (Calderón Cockburn 2006: 192).  Its charter established COFOPRI as an independent 
national entity outside the traditional line ministries. 
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acquiring a land title was cumbersome and run by a host of overlapping authorities, the new process 
was virtually free and centralized.  Claimants only had to verify residence on an eligible property 
prior to the program’s start date.47  Under Fujimori, COFOPRI issued almost a million property 
titles. Fujimori’s laissez faire housing policy thus was complemented by property title provision as 
part of what his government called a “payment of the social debt to the poor” (Calderón Cockburn 
2013: 52).   
Property titling was billed as a one-time policy to formalize existing constructions and create 
streamlined procedures to register and purchase future property.  However, titling for land invasions 
has become a recurring event.  The deadline to title informal property has been extended by both 
the Toledo and García administrations, and there is pressure on the current president, Ollanta 
Humala, to pass a new extension.48  Given the sheer number of new land invasions and the low cost 
of titling, there are considerable electoral reasons to offer property titles.  Toledo, for example, 
initially announced formal housing programs and rejected “populist” measures like property title 
provision.  But just in Lima, authorities counted 50,000 new invasion lots from when COFOPRI 
began in 1996 to Toledo’s inauguration.  As Toledo’s popularity flagged, he announced that he 
“would travel up and down the country to provide property titles to those excluded from 
ownership.”49  García similarly promised to give out 100,000 property titles in his first six months in 
office (and to expand subsidies to the middle class). 50 Over his term, García distributed an additional 
818,124 titles and 72,900 titles in Lima (MVCS 2011).  Property titles also were a boon for local 
                                                
47 Excluded properties included archeological sites and flood plains; even private property could be 
negotiated. 
48 Toledo extended the deadline to legalize land occupations that occurred between 1996 and 2001 
(Supreme Decree 021-2002-JUS), and García again extended the deadline to 2004 (Law 29320-2009). 
49 “Darían títulos a ocupantes de 700 mil lotes,” El Comercio 16 June 2002.   
50 “Ponen bajo la lupa plan de 180 días que ofreció García,” El Comercio 11 July 2006.   
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politicians: Feierherd (2013) confirms that areas that received property titles had higher vote shares 
for the incumbent in the subsequent period.   
Land titling initiatives continued because they cost little and reached large numbers of 
citizens, but also because they met a genuine demand of the poor once they had chosen to violate 
property laws.  As the director of COFOPRI summed up, “The extension of formalization periods 
was used politically by the national government and subnational governments in order to give residents 
what they wanted” (emphasis added).51  The popularity of property titling in Peru partially rests on the 
fact that it has not been conducted in a way to maximize rent extraction.  Quite the opposite, the 
extent to which titling initiatives were meant to build electoral support can be seen in the fact that 
the government made no attempt to turn newly minted property owners into taxpayers.  COFOPRI 
provides property titles, but it does not require owners to register their constructions locally, which 
would make them subject to local property taxation.  It also does not share its database of newly 
titled properties to help district governments develop land cadasters to collect property taxes 
because it would “undermine COFOPRI’s efforts to maximize the number of titles provided and 
popular appreciation for the presidential initiative.”52  In this sense, the continuous and rapid nature 
of titling is a response to democratic demands, but a myopic one given the incentive effects.   
For the most part, it is common knowledge among state officials that the provision of 
property titles is good politics, but bad urban planning.  Some government officials insist that land 
titling does not encourage land invasions because there are clear deadlines for the recognition of 
                                                
51 Author interview with Ais Jesus Tarabay Yaya, Executive Director, COFOPRI, Lima, Peru, 
November 17, 2011. 
52 COFOPRI legalized the land, not the constructions, and used its own map technology separate 
from local cadasters required for property tax collection.  Author interview with Ais Jesus Tarabay 
Yaya, Executive Director, COFOPRI, Lima, Peru, November 17, 2011; Also see, “Proliferación de 
viviendas ilegales crea problemas de recaudación,” El Comercio 19 Aug 2000. 
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settlements.53  But repeated extensions mean that titling deadlines increasingly lack credibility.  The 
Director of the Superintendency for State Goods (Superintendencia Nacional de Bienes Estatales, SBN), 
the central agency in charge of the protection of state land, recognizes that land invasions have 
become commonplace because “no one believes that formalization will end.”54 Of the 28 local 
politicians that I interviewed, every single one believed that COFOPRI had increased the pace of 
land invasions and made it harder to prevent their spread.  The typical reasoning of mayors was 
that land invasions were acceptable because the state itself recognized them, or as one mayor put it, 
“If the president wanted me to stop land invasions, then he would stop legalizing them every three 
years.”55  Even COFOPRI’s executive director recognizes the perverse incentives created due to 
the electoral gains from titling: 
“Institutionally, the idea of COFOPRI in the past was just to formalize for formalization’s sake.  
If there was more to formalize, then all the better!  It’s just like a factory where the more orders 
you have, the better that you do…If the state options are better than the invasions, then the 
invasions will stop.  But the problem is that people aren’t necessarily grateful when you put order 
to things.”56 
 
The other reason that illegal land occupations have continued apace is that Peru’s capacity to 
service and incorporate new settlements has improved.  Since Fujimori, investments in local public 
                                                
53 For example, García’s Housing Minister Nidia Vílchez insisted that the extension of COFOPRI 
“does not encourage invasions, it does not encourage traffickers, on the contrary, we have seen that 
many people want to pay for the land that they invaded a long time ago, nonetheless they do not 
have anyone to pay because there are two or three owners in the judicial process.”  “En 30 días 
estará listo reglamento de Ley de Expropiaciones, afirma ministra Vílchez,” Diario Gestión 18 Feb 
2009.  Other officials stress the clear end date of the program, “Cofopri no formalizará invasiones,” 
RPP, 30 Jan 2009.   
54 “En poco más de dos años se han vendido 100 predios del Estado,” Gestión 17 May 2010.  
55 Author interview with John Barrera, Mayor, District of Ancón, Lima, Peru, December 1, 2011. 
56 Author interview with Ais Jesus Tarabay Yaya, Executive Director, COFOPRI, Lima, Peru 
November 17, 2011. 
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goods in informal settlements—with or without property title—have increased.57  As has been 
documented for other projects run by the Ministry of the Presidency (Schady 2000), the widespread 
belief is that these housing improvement funds and local public goods were allocated to advance 
Fujimori’s electoral aims.  Nonetheless, these types of investments were successful in improving the 
quality of life and more broadly demonstrating a preoccupation in Lima’s vast informal settlements, 
which previously had been excluded from many infrastructure projects due to their illegal status.  
Interviews with local settlement leaders revealed an enduring sense of gratitude for Fujimori’s 
investments in projects like roads, schools, telephone, water, and light, while disregarding and 
eventually altering their legal status.  Common sentiments were that Fujimori was the first politician 
to “put things in the hills”58 or “not to ignore the informal settlements.”59  
Toledo and García, along with Lima’s mayors, continued many of the initiatives to boost 
local public goods provision in informal settlements.60  For example, water infrastructure now can be 
installed in a matter of months to years, rather than decades, as long as settlements receive pre-
approval from district governments to apply for the central government’s Water for All (Agua para 
Todos) initiative.  Peru’s Construction Chamber complains that a cottage industry of land traffickers 
has developed to invade state land and “turn around to ask for water, sanitation, and light,” that 
                                                
57 In particular, the Materials Bank (Banco de Materiales) provides loans to improve house 
construction, and the National Housing Fund (Fondo Nacional de Vivienda) invests in water and public 
services along with a major national water initiative. 
58 Author interviews with informal settlement leaders, District of Ventanilla, Callao, Peru, May 30, 
2011.   
59 Author interview with Adolfo Diez Vargas, Leader, AAHH Felipe Las Casas, May 30, 2011.   
60 Some of these programs include construction credits on existing lots like Mi Barrio, parts of 
Techo Propio, and Mi Construcción, as well as stairs to informal settlements (Escaleras de Solidaridad). 
The biggest presidential initiative has been a push to universalize water coverage (Agua para Todos).   
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“costs the city millions.”61  Indeed, the costs of servicing informal settlements have escalated as land 
invasions occur on ever more precarious land in previously disconnected districts.62  
In sum, it is clear that the poor’s material demands are met through illegal land occupations 
rather than state housing provision.  The acceleration of legalization and service provision has 
increased the benefits of occupying land illegally. This model has mounting costs.  Nonetheless, 
presidents prefer to pass these expenses off on future administrations and, as I return to below, 
local governments.  In so doing, they avoid the upfront outlays for housing projects on the poor 
and heighten their approval among middle-class constituents.  Now, I show how skeletal housing 
policies plus expectations of legalization generate strong electoral incentives for districts mayors to 
tolerate land invasions. 
4.3 Demand Displacement 
Skeletal formal housing policies have sculpted popular demands to sustain informal welfare 
policies.  Evidence for demand displacement comes from public opinion polls, organizational 
structure, reports by local politicians, and cooperation in enforcement processes.  I also make use of 
a unique database of the 2010 district government platforms to understand the relative salience of 
forbearance and reactive policies in poor districts.63    
First, surveys confirm that housing policy has done more for the middle class than for the 
poor.  Under García, more than 52 percent of middle-class respondents believed that options to 
                                                
61 “Invasiones están frenando inversión en el sector inmobiliario,” Diario Correo, 20 Feb 2013.  
62 These districts include Ancón, Carabayllo, and Puente Piedra in the north; Ate and Chosica in the 
east, and Lurín in the far south. Settlements often run into zoning issues if they are in protection 
zones (Zona de Protección y Tratamiento Paisajista, PTP) or in environmental risk areas, although this 
does not necessarily stop the recognition by mayors in the service provision process.  See, “Siguen 
las invasiones en Lima,” El Comercio, 7 Nov 2011.   
63 Platforms (Plan de Gobierno) are available for each district and candidate through the National 
Electoral Authority’s Governance Observatory (Jurado Nacional de Elecciones, Observatorio para la 
Gobernabilidad, http://www.infogob.com.pe). 
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access adequate housing improved in Lima, and only 9 percent saw deterioration.  In contrast, only 
25 percent of lower class respondents saw improvements in housing and a full third of the poor 
believed that housing options got worse (Lima Cómo Vamos 2011).64  While this question cannot 
capture expectations for state housing provision, it confirms that the poor have not perceived 
benefits from formal housing policies.   
In contrast, the general perception is that the poor accept land takings as the method to 
access housing. Even the Housing Ministry recognizes that one of the main constraints to control 
squatting is that “the informal occupation of public and private land is a socially accepted form to access 
land in peripheral zones” (emphasis added) (MVCS 2006).  Support among residents of poor 
districts runs high in part because the children or relatives of past squatters are the protagonists of 
most new land invasions in Lima (Calderón Cockburn 2013b: 105).  Chapter 2 highlighted the sharp 
class gradient of support when individuals were asked directly about their approval of private 
property takings in Peru: 21 percent of poor respondents approved compared to 5 percent of 
nonpoor respondents.  Low levels of approval come in part from different social norms surrounding 
the taking of private, rather than state land.  Local leaders commonly told me that taking state land is 
acceptable because “it should be given to those who need housing anyhow.”65  Taking private land 
meets with greater condemnation, and also is more likely to end with an eviction.66   
                                                
64 The question asked, “For a family like yours, would you say the possibilities to access an adequate 
house in the city of Lima are…(improving, the same, getting worse)?” 
65 Author interview with anonymous settlement association leader, District of Ventanilla, Callao, 
Peru, May 21, 2011. 
66 There are clear social norms surrounding acceptable land takings.  Invaders should not take land 
reserved for public purposes or private use.  When on open land, invaders should not build directly 
above existing settlements without adequate measures to contain sewage.  In some cases, neighbors 
have tried to evict new settlement through violent means when they directly infringe upon existing 
settlements. A classic type of case comes from a recent land invasion in Carabayllo.  The 
neighboring settlement tried to evict land invaders through violence because they took land reserved 
for recreation purposes.  “Peligro inminente en el AH Sol Naciente de Carabayllo,” Agencia de 
Noticias Lima, 16 Sept 2010.  Another important example occurred in Villa El Salvador when 
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Second, data on participation in interest associations confirms my claim that the urban 
poor’s demands do not center on state housing provision, but that they are organized around 
forbearance and formalization.  The Peruvian state explicitly channels organizing by squatters 
through the state.  Illegal land occupations register their neighborhood associations through national 
and district offices.67 This registration both helps squatters to prove the date of their invasion’s 
foundation to authorities, and is required to apply for many state and local programs.  Informal 
settlement associations are ubiquitous.  Take the case of Puente Piedra, a poor district in Lima’s 
northern cone with 230,000 total residents and around 25,000 people in new land invasions without 
legal title (approximately 5,000 lots).  The district’s citizen participation office has records on 268 
informal settlement associations.  Around 60 associations lack land titles, but have requested or 
received urban authorizations.  In contrast, not a single association is registered to pressure the 
district for formal housing provision.68  This example suggests that illegal land occupations structure 
popular participation around claims for land titles and services, rather than around formal housing 
provision.   
The importance of informal settlement associations in part helps explain the high rates of 
civic participation in Lima.  A full 54 percent of Lima’s population participates in a civic association 
and, unlike most other cities in Latin America the popular sector participates at equal rates to other 
class groups.  Even more pertinent to this study, past participation in a land invasion is associated 
                                                                                                                                                       
squatters tried to take land reserved for the construction of a university and citizens protested 
against the taking.  “Nuevo gobierno, Viejas demandas,” DESCO 8: 2006. 
67 National registration occurs through the National Superintendency of Public Registries 
(Superintendencia Nacional de los Registros Públicos, SUNARP); district registration occurs through offices 
of citizen participation (Gerencia de Participación Ciudadana). 
68 Data from the Office of Citizen Participation, District of Puente Piedra.  These dynamics are very 
similar in other districts.  For example, Carabayllo also lists 40 percent of its more than 100 informal 
settlement organizations as in need of regularization and services (saneamiento físico legal). 
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with a 7.2 percent increase in the probability of being a member of an association (Dunning 2009: 
124).  
It is worth emphasizing the importance of informal demands and organizing because they 
contrast with explanations in the literature that view informality as a broader “opting out” of the 
state.  Soifer (2013), for example, argues that the low level of housing provision in Peru leads the 
poor to expect little from the state and therefore use self-help measures to meet their needs.  
Roberts (2002) argues that the fragmented, precarious nature of the urban informal sector makes it a 
weak basis for organizing.  Were this the case, we would expect the poor to participate less and 
demand less from their elected representatives.  But attention to squatters reveals tremendous 
organizational activity and demands on the state.  Survey data confirms that individuals who support 
land invasions are no less engaged in politics.  Those who approve of land invasions, which may be a 
rough proxy for past or future participation, are no more or less willing to contact their local mayor, 
participate in local events, or to have voted in past elections (AmericasBarometer 1997).  In this 
sense, I coincide with Holston (2008) who argues that illegal land occupations in São Paulo have 
generated a type of “insurgent citizenship” in which the poor deeply engage the state and use the 
physical occupation of land as the launching pad for their claims to inclusion in a host of urban 
services.  When I ask association leaders why they never push the state for housing provision, they 
emphasize that occupying land is essential to make other distributive claims: 
“I’ve always said that the city should give its land to those who truly need them in an orderly 
process and help us build houses, but this is not the way things are done.  We all know that the 
land is from the state, it’s not your land when you start, you only have possession…but it is the only 
way to start the process to get the politicians involved” (emphasis added).69 
 
There is some evidence that expansions in housing programs under Toledo and García have 
begun to shift pressure to state housing authorities.  Protests, for example, have occurred to demand 
                                                
69 Author interview with settlement founder, Villas de Ancón, District of Ancón, Lima, Peru, 
November 8, 2011. 
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increases in funding for Techo Propio.  But, consistent with my theory, these protests have 
demanded subsidies to improve constructions on preexisting sites (Techo Propio en Sitio Propio), not 
new housing projects.70   
Third, local politicians make clear that they face consistent pressure for forbearance toward 
land invasions, as well as accompanying goods like basic services and legal recognition.  In poor 
districts with open land, local councilors report that about half of the complaints that they receive in 
their office are for authorizations and service extensions to new settlement neighborhoods.  As one 
local councilor describes, “I don’t get involved until the invasion has stabilized and stopped growing, 
but then these neighborhoods have so many needs that most of my work comes from continuously 
trying to help the residents.”71  
Pressure to provide authorizations and property titles can be seen more systematically 
through a review of district campaign platforms.  In poor districts, issues of legalization for squatter 
settlements were one of the most frequent subjects of political campaigns; three-quarters of 
candidate platforms proposed some form of legalization in the 2010 district elections (72 of 98).  
Standard platforms, for example, promised to work to provide property titles and urban 
authorizations with phrases like, “Ancón, a district of homeowners,”72 “To promote massive titling 
and property regularization,”73 and “For the defense of urban authorizations in ALL of our 
district.”74  
                                                
70 “Asentamientos Humanos de Lima reclaman más presupuesto para Techo Propio en Sitio 
Propio,” El Comercio 22 Oct 2009.  
71 Author interview with Humberto Vargas, Local Councilor, District of Pachacamac Lima, Peru, 
November 3, 2011. 
72 Movimiento Independiente de Ancón para el Perú, Plan de Gobierno, 2010-15. 
73 Perú Posible, Plan de Gobierno Municipal, 2011-14, District of Ate.   
74 Cambio 90, Plan de Gobierno Municipal, 2011-14, District of Villa María del Triunfo.   
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Conversely, politicians acknowledge that there is little return to proposals for programmatic 
housing policies.  City Councilor Sigifredo Velasquez’s account that he dedicates his time to reactive 
housing policies is typical:  “Popular demands are all for what comes after land invasions, titles, 
services, urban authorizations…it is so easy to satisfy these demands each election cycle—you give 
them a little bit of this, and a bit of that, and you can help many people.  The harder work to create 
housing programs or enforce regulations doesn’t generate votes so no one does it.” 75 Again, political 
platforms confirm the irrelevance of housing platforms.  Only a tenth of campaigns mentioned 
housing programs at all, and these tended to be in reference to reactive housing policies.  The usual 
platform promise was to coordinate with state authorities on Techo Propio programs for 
construction subsidies on existing land.   
The balance of platforms is not meant to suggest that mayors are satisfied with the informal 
housing situation in their districts.  Some platforms stressed the lack of decent land to continue the 
“occupy in order to then urbanize” (ocupar para luego habilitar) model.76  About a quarter of platforms 
discussed the disorderly growth that left basic needs unmet in poor districts and strained local 
resources.  Typical laments were that informal growth due to the inadequacy of state housing 
projects multiplied demands for “roads, sidewalks, contention walls, stairs, and so on, to which 
municipal authorities cannot respond effectively.”77  Local districts shoulder many of the costs of 
illegal land occupations and mayors probably do prefer to stop land invasions.  However, mayoral 
candidates cannot credibly campaign on such a platform, given the absence of housing policy for the 
poor and the lack of coherent political parties to promote programmatic housing reforms.78  The 
                                                
75 Author interview with Sigifredo Velasquez, City Councilor, Lima, Peru, November 7, 2011. 
76 Perú Posible, Plan de Gobierno Municipal 2011-14, District of Villa María del Triunfo. 
77 Somos Acción Vecinal, Plan de Gobierno Municipal, 2011-14, District of Carabayllo. 
78 Interestingly, even at the local level, the only candidates that proposed policies that looked like 
enforcement platforms came from Toledo’s party, which had invested in housing, and the Christian   
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role that parties could play in the transition to a formal welfare model is suggested by the fact that 
the district candidates that consistently gestured at the need for enforcement by promoting “urban 
control” came from the established center-right Christian People’s Party (Partido Popular Cristiano, 
PCC) and more erratically from Toledo’s party (Perú Posible), which at least had attempted formal 
housing programs.79  
Finally, popular sympathy for squatters can be observed in the fact that police reports of 
land invasions are relatively rare.  As in Bogotá, the police can act on land invasions within 48 hours 
without judicial or mayoral authorization.  The quick turnaround time means that control depends 
on the complaints of neighbors.  In discussing reports by citizens so that the police can intervene, 
officials stress the public does not tell authorities because they think that “people need somewhere 
to live, they are not committing a crime.”80  SBN Superintendent Sonia Cordero similarly professes 
that the state agency receives very few complaints from citizens and attributes it to the lack of 
alternatives for squatters:  
“We need better police support to stop land invasions, but we also need to develop better 
housing plans like they have in Chile.  We need to be able to tell people when they invade a land, 
‘Hold on, no, you can’t just take this piece of land because we have housing projects for people 
who need housing that you can access.’  Then there wouldn’t be so much support for invaders so 
people would help us when they saw something happening.”81  
 
These examples thus illustrate some of the ways in which state officials understand the low 
levels of cooperation in denouncing land invasions that are physically visible to local residents.  
More broadly, this section has combined evidence from surveys, popular associations, campaign 
platforms, and citizen reports to argue that poor residents support and expect forbearance toward 
                                                
79 The PPC consistently complained about disorderly development in poor districts, and never 
offered urban authorizations.  Some Peru Posible candidates clearly promised to improve reactive 
housing policies, but others seemed to suggest that they preferred enforcement, using promises “to 
exercise urban control as the law allows and mandates.”  See, Perú Posible, Plan de Gobierno 
Municipal, 2011-14, District of Carabayllo.   
80 Author interview with Dennis Zegara, Sub-director of Cadaster, District of Ventanilla, Callao, 
Peru, November 23, 2011.  
81 Author interview with Sonia Cordero, Superintendent, SBN, Lima, Peru, November 24, 2011. 
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land invasions followed by reactive housing policies.  This brings us to the next issue of whether 
politicians choose not to enforce, or whether they cannot do so. 
4.4 Mayoral Decisions 
Given the absence of housing programs and the structure of popular demands, district 
politicians have weak incentives to enforce against illegal land occupations.  This section argues that 
mayors choose not to control illegal land occupations to increase their support through informal 
welfare provision and to present themselves as protectors of the poor’s well-being.  I focus here on 
enforcement through the administrative law process.82  Enforcement process tracing helps 
understand the relative role of political calculations and lousy institutions in a comparatively weak 
state like Peru.  The administrative data and qualitative interviews confirm that enforcement breaks 
down at political decision points.  While an underfunded bureaucracy contributes to weak 
enforcement, I suggest that it is an endogenous choice that reflects political pressure for 
forbearance.  
 To establish the universe of cases against which authorities could possibly enforce, I use 
household surveys.  Recall that there were 89,980 households that reported having acquired their 
house through an invasion and that had not applied for a property title.  These cases most likely 
formed after the titling deadline and thus could have been subject to administrative law proceedings 
since 2004. 
The first, and most politically charged, step in the enforcement process is the detection of a 
land invasion.  Calculating how many land invasions are detected is tricky because no single 
authority monitors illegal land occupations, as we will see in Bogotá.  Invasions also can be “seen” 
for different purposes.  By law, the Lima city government is supposed to report land invasions to the 
                                                
82 As described above, enforcement also can occur through the police if they discover an illegal land 
occupation within 48 hours, but the short time frame makes this route very complicated.    
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state agency that owns the land.83  But the city government does not maintain procedures to track or 
aggregate information on land invasions.  The city planning authority (Instituto Metropolitano de 
Planificación, IMP) follows land invasions through newspaper reports, and has no policy to contact 
the police or prevent land invasions.  Not a single city inspector is assigned to monitor illegal land 
occupations. 
Three additional institutions are involved in detection depending on the type of land at stake: 
the Ministry of Defense, the SBN, and district governments. With the exception of strategic military 
property, the Ministry of Defense leaves most of its land unmonitored. The SBN, which manages 
state property, also has no monitoring process.  Moreover, it only maintains a registry of an 
estimated five percent of state land holdings.84  The SBN can take months to determine if invaded 
land even belongs to the state, let alone act on the case. In the words of a former housing minister, 
the central government with respect to land invasions is “a referee that doesn’t watch the field, it 
only looks at a little area or the center of the field.”85  Likewise, only a handful of district 
governments reported any type of proactive monitoring of land invasions.  Combined across district, 
city, and state institutions, I found 5,920 cases, or just 6 percent of all illegal land occupations, were 
sent to legal authorities to take action. 
What is critical to underscore is that the low rate of detection results from failures to pass 
information about illegal land occupations to enforcement authorities, not a lack of information.  
Informal land occupations register their associations.  Leaders approach district governments for 
                                                
83 See Law 28687 that states that all parties that promote land invasions after COFOPRI’s 
formalization date of December 31, 2004 are to be denounced by provincial authorities to the 
pertinent authorities.  The law also claims that those who invade land will be barred from state or 
municipal housing programs and credits.  COFOPRI, Boletín Informativa, August 2012.   
84 Ironically, the reason that the SBN does not register more land is that it is easier for potential 
invaders to identify state land to occupy.    
85 Interview with Augusto Ortiz Ceballos, Perú21.   
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“certificates of possession” (constancias de posesión), which verify the physical occupation of land, as 
well as urban authorizations for service acquisition.  Mayors use this information to report invasions 
to authorities when the case involves valuable resources (land reserved for public goods, private 
property, archeological reserves, and so on).  The bulk of detection of illegal land occupations 
occurs through district governments that offer their existing information to state authorities.  
Justifications for squashing information concentrate on the informal welfare benefits and 
political costs of enforcement.  Politicians cite the lack of formal welfare programs as the reason that 
they will not stop illegal land occupations.  A mayor who has served several terms, Washington 
Ipenza, complained about the costs of an informal housing model both to the poor and to the 
district government.  Yet, he still concluded that forbearance was necessary: “We can’t stop land 
invasions when there is no policy from the central government to offer housing to people.”86 
Politicians were quite explicit that their enforcement decisions depended on national choices about 
the welfare state:   
“The major issue is there’s no social interest housing policy so in the end a lot of what we can do 
depends on the central government.  We’re not isolated in how we deal with these themes 
because, even though there are clear legal norms that people can’t invade the land and that the 
government should act, there’s no clear option for what to do with people.”87 
 
Beyond the welfare benefits, politicians avoided reporting on illegal land occupations due to 
the reputational costs.  They feared being seen as anti-poor if they reported on illegal land 
occupations. A concrete example comes from a local councilor who was indignant when asked 
about providing information to higher level authorities: “How can I say that I support the poor and 
then go behind their back to try to get people who need housing taken off their land?”88  Conversely, 
                                                
86 Author interview with Washington Ipenza, Villa María del Triunfo (1984-86, 1999-2006), June 18, 
2011.   
87 Author interview with local councilor, District of San Agustino, Lima, Peru, November 18, 2011. 
88 Author interview with Ivan Coronado, Local Councilor, District of Comas, Lima, Peru, 
November 25, 2011. 
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politicians saw electoral benefits in supporting land invasions.  One local councilor emphasized that 
working with new invasions, which more commonly is understood as a type of clientelism, was a 
way to build his reputation among the poor residents of the district: “People look for politicians 
who can empathize with their problems and when you work for communities that are just getting 
off the ground, it shows that you understand how hard things are and what people need to do to 
find housing.”89 Support for settlements—both promising their permanence and assistance in their 
formalization—thus is seen as an effective way to resolve the poor’s housing demands and signal a 
commitment to poor voters.  Providing information to authorities about new land invasions would 
undercut this support for illegal land occupations.   
When local authorities do provide information on where illegal land occupations have 
occurred, city and state officials struggle to act for capacity reasons.  The number of reported land 
occupations that result in administrative actions is tiny.  I found 180 cases open across state 
entities.90  However, each case can involve multiple claimants.  I estimate that a case involves 25 
households on average, or 4,500 illegal land occupations total.91  Given that cases take between five 
and ten years to complete, open cases roughly include those for the period examined.   
Most legal cases end with judicial resolutions to negotiate the land in favor of the squatters.  
Because legal cases drag on, courts find it impractical to order the removal of squatters.  
                                                
89 Author interview with César Augusto Lerzundi, Local Councilor, District of Villa El Salvador, 
November 4, 2011. 
90 This estimate coincides roughly with investigations that have found between 15-20 cases each year 
for usurpation of public or private land.  The Supreme Court also receives roughly 80 cases to clarify 
ownership.  However, these cases are hard to classify because they can involve a wide variety of 
property situations.  “Poder Judicial atiende cada año unos 80 juicios por venta illegal de terrenos,” 
El Comercio 14 May 2007.   
91 The registry of the Attorney General also registers cases for usurpation of land (with or without 
violence).  Not all cases of usurpation constitute takings, but this provides another sense of how 
many cases are entering the system.  In 2006, for instance, there were 1348 people denounced just in 
Lima.  “Mala aplicación de la ley permite trafica de tierras e impunidad de invasores,” El Comercio 28 
May 2007.   
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Unfortunately, I was unable to find statistics on the number of court cases that ended with an 
eviction order.  Administrative officials reported that 212 evictions occurred through legal means.  
Evictions involved land owned by the Ministry of Defense, a private mining concession, and 
central city property reserved for the wholesale market.92     
Figure 3.3 plots the enforcement chain.  On the vertical axis, I log the number of cases so 
the change can be interpreted as the percent decline at each step.  In other words, the straight dotted 
line would represent a constant percent change in the cases lost at each step, or constant institutional 
weakness.  To provide a baseline, the dotted line plots a uniform rate of institutional weakness of a 
third.  In other words, this line shows what the trend would look like if only a third of cases passed 
through at each enforcement step.  This seems like a relatively low bar to meet.   
 
FIGURE 3.3.  Enforcement Against Illegal Land Occupations, Lima, 2006-2011         
SOURCES: National Household Surveys (Encuesta Nacional de Hogares, ENAHO) (occupations); Author’s Survey of 
District Housing Offices, National Planning Institute, Ministry of Defense, Superintendence of State Goods, Lima 
Attorney General’s Office and Inspections Office, and COFOPRI (detection, cases, evictions). 
The most important thing to notice is that a sharp drop-off occurs in the number of cases 
that are brought to the administrative system in the first place.  Local mayors have a strong impact 
on detection because they observed illegal land occupations in their districts.  They see no political 
                                                
92 This count also includes the case of the illegal land occupation of land reserved for a wholesale 
market in Santa Anita even though the invasion occurred in 2000.  By the end, it only involved 70 
households and took until 2007 to resolve.  
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benefits from reporting them.  The second plunge comes from court cases opened to evictions.  
Unfortunately data are unavailable to separate how many cases end with eviction orders and how 
many eviction orders the police execute.  A substantial fraction of cases stop at the judicial stage.  
Courts prefer, as in many countries, to negotiate settlements with property owners and state agencies 
to avoid evictions.   
Process tracing thus suggests that both political and bureaucratic constraints play a role in 
Lima, but that the most substantial drop-off occurs at political decision points.  Bureaucrats 
confirmed that they consider political interference to be a more fundamental constraint than 
resources or administrative weakness. The electoral costs of enforcement against squatters were 
perceived to be high: not a single bureaucrat believed that local mayors would gain political support 
by evicting squatters.   
The goal of this enforcement process tracing exercise was to expose how political decisions 
contributed to illegal land occupations in Lima.  A political bottleneck emerged in the detection of 
land invasions.  Invasions go undetected not because of a lack of information, but rather because 
politicians prefer to improve their constituents welfare informally and signal their commitment to 
the poor due to the absence of housing policy.  I now turn to how urban political decentralization 
further erodes attempts to enforce and cements the forbearance equilibrium, before concluding with 
a discussion of alternative explanations.   
4.5 Political Decentralization 
Lima is a hybrid political system in which voters elect a mayor at the sub-city district level 
and at the city level.  Both levels of city government have levers to control land invasions.  The city 
government has formal authority to report illegal land occupations to state authorities and also can 
prosecute cases on city land; local governments have informal responsibilities to detect illegal land 
occupations due to their proximity of the event.  District governments also have control over urban 
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authorizations that shape the value of illegal land occupations.  Critically, they also absorb many of 
the additional service costs from forbearance.  These shared responsibilities—and the vital role 
assumed by district governments—have important effects on enforcement politics compared to 
more centralized political systems.  
First, whereas mayors in politically centralized cities could win office without the support of 
the poor, district mayors in Lima cannot.  Illegal land occupations occur in the urban periphery 
where voter demographics mean that the poor’s support is dispositive.  Above, I mentioned the 
frequency of reactive policies in political campaigns in poor districts.  To understand the strong 
electoral incentives for this position, consider an example of a mayor who proposed to enforce for 
ideological reasons.  Michel Azcueta is one of the founding figures of the iconic district of Villa El 
Salvador, and he long favored urban planning to promote the long-run development of the district.  
As mayor in the late 1990s, he reserved land for a university and a hospital.93  He again ran for 
mayor in 2006 and told residents that he would not authorize services in illegal land occupations in 
order to conserve the district’s remaining space.  But his opponent, Jaime Zea, disagreed.  A local 
councilor during the period explained Zea’s direct involvement with land invasions: “The basic deal 
was that Zea agreed not to bring in the police if [the squatters] supported him, so they came to all 
the rallies and meetings.”94  Zea won the election by less than 1500 votes.  The consensus among 
observers, as well as Azcueta himself, was that Zea’s forbearance swung the election.95 
                                                
93 Azcueta was mayor from 1984-90, and again from 1996-1998. 
94 Author interview with Walter Quispe, Local Councilor, Villa El Salvador, November 4, 2011; The 
land invasions took place at Cerro de Lomo de Corvina and Centro de Acopi.   
95 Author interview with Ramiro García, Head of Urban Program, DESCO, May 23, 2011; Author 
interview with Walter Quispe; Author interview with Cesar Augusto Lerzundi, Local Councilor, 
Villa El Salvador, November 10, 2011; Author interview with Michel Azcueta, Mayor (1984-90, 
1996-98), District of Villa El Salvador, Lima, Peru, July 6, 2011; Author interview with Paula 
Gamboa Perez, Local Councilor, Villa El Salvador, November 4, 2011. 
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Second, beyond the high costs of enforcement under urban decentralization, the very local 
nature of enforcement decisions makes them ripe for political clientelism.  Exchanging favors for 
political support becomes more attractive relative to local public goods provision as district size 
shrinks.96  Forbearance has been used to cement durable clientelistic linkages that mayors then have 
incentives to perpetuate and recreate.  Continuing with the example, Zea both negotiated votes in 
exchange for looking the other way when land invasions occurred and, once in office, used the 
settlements’ precarious legal position and lack of basic services to force residents to come to all his 
events.97  Politicians commonly expressed the view that squatters’ organizations were valuable 
because they could be compelled to support them at project openings, rallies, weekly meetings, and, 
in the worse case scenario, recall referenda (revocatorias).98   
The glue that ties informal settlements to district politicians is the access to accompanying 
goods and services, not the threat of evictions (with rare exceptions).99  Evictions are not credible 
threats because they damage politicians’ reputations and, as one politician put it, “make the mayor 
look bad in the whole community.”100  Instead, because benefits can be allocated contingent on the 
                                                
96 For a nice review of this point, see Hicken (2007: 56-57). 
97 Author interview with Paula Gamboa Perez, Local Councilor, Villa El Salvador, November 4, 
2011. 
98 Author interview with Carlos Sapaylle Lapayo, Vice Mayor, District of Villa María del Triunfo, 
Lima, Peru, October 28, 2011. 
99 I only found one case in which the threat of eviction was used to cement a political bargain.  A 
land trafficker, Carlos Arce Arias, ran for mayor of Santa Rosa in 2010.  In the small district, Arce 
depended on the support of occupants of the informal settlement Profam.  A voice recording 
made the eviction threats to residents clear: “I have changed 2800 DNI here in Profam, if I don’t 
win the elections it’s because you betrayed me and that’s not pardonable, because with 2800 votes I 
will have won the mayor of Santa Rosa and I will win against the poor devils that are running, and 
if one of you fails me everyone will pay and you can all forget about your shacks.  Is that 
understood?”99  But the threats were an ineffective strategy, which confirms my argument.  The 
mayor that took office ran on a platform to chase away the land trafficker, and work for the 
interests of the poor.  Author interview with John Barrera, Mayor, District of Ancón, Lima, Peru, 
December 1, 2011. 
100 Author interview with Pablo Ivan Balvin Aliaga, Local Councilor, District of Villa Maria del 
Triunfo, Lima, Peru, October 28, 2011. 
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mayors making legal exemptions, forbearance can cultivate a bloc of dependent supporters. Informal 
settlement leaders confirm that politicians largely control their fate by deciding whether to ignore 
their neighborhoods’ legal problems for each investment decision.  A typical description of the legal 
hassle created when an invasion does not support the mayor comes from the president of a 
settlement association in an environmental risk zone: 
“During the last election, we didn’t support the candidate who won and so we had a lot of 
problems.  We couldn’t get the mayor’s approval for our projects, and they would delay our 
paperwork for as long as possible or tell us that we didn’t meet the legal requirements—but who does 
here!  So we couldn’t do anything during four years…this election we all discussed to back the 
winning candidate and showed up at all his rallies and now we have all the facilities possible to 
get our projects approved…There isn’t always money but the mayor always approves our profile and 
then we can go to the central government to ask for projects” (emphasis added).101   
 
These comments underscore how forbearance toward illegal land occupations can be revocable, 
even if evictions themselves carry too high of an electoral cost to conduct in poor districts. Mayors 
can use legal requirements to block benefit access, or they can ignore them contingent on a 
settlement’s political loyalty.  
Work on political clientelism provides some useful insights for understanding forbearance 
in the context of a politically decentralized city like Lima, but with several adjustments to standard 
models of vote buying.  There is no monitoring of vote choice at the individual or group level.  
Expressions of political support come from participation in rallies and meetings, but in the end, 
squatter communities are free to vote as they choose. No coherent party organizations exist to 
enforce the bargain, although informal settlement leaders sometimes mimic the role of party 
brokers and negotiate their association’s votes in exchange for payment.102  This process fits 
                                                
101 Author interview with anonymous settlement leader, District of Puente Piedra, Lima, Peru, 
November 9, 2011. 
102 Local leaders in illegal land occupations can maintain tight control over members because of 
insecure property rights.  While the state struggles to remove squatters from their land, leaders will 
evict uncooperative members or simply authorize other families to occupy a squatter’s house while 
they are away.  Associational participation drops precipitously once squatters acquire land titles in 
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Muñoz's (2013) description of what she calls “campaign clientelism” in which politicians try to 
signal their electoral viability to strategic actors and improvise a party organization for campaigns.  
What mayors want is that squatters show up at events to create an impression of popularity that 
snowballs into widespread support and makes voters perceive risks if they defect to other 
candidates.   
Third, in my model, the central government had stronger incentives to invest in substitutive 
housing policy when it assumed the costs associated with land invasions and it could commit to 
reduce these burdens.  Political, as well as administrative, decentralization means that the costs of an 
informal welfare system are split between levels of government.  While the national government 
provides property titles to illegal land occupations, they do not fully internalize the costs of their 
actions.  City and district mayors shoulder many of the additional expenses.  This burden shifting 
means that the central government can promote forbearance through the provision of property 
titles, while assuming a fraction of the costs associated with this choice.  Alan García famously 
visited new land invasions in Lima and promised them property titles, while telling them that, “You 
should bring Mayor Castañeda [the Lima city mayor] to build public works here.”103  As we will see 
in the next chapter, conflicts between the president and the city mayor often result in one level of 
government undermining the enforcement intentions of another.    
District mayors, who stand to gain from a formal housing model, are poorly situated to push 
back against it because they need the support of poor core constituents to win office.  Mayors in 
Lima frequently stressed their preference for a system in which the state assumed the costs of a 
                                                                                                                                                       
part because these coercive mechanisms are removed.  But, during a period of insecurity, leaders 
may be able to extract payments from politicians in exchange for their bloc of votes.  “Leader 
buying” was a frequent complaint of both politicians and informal settlement leaders who I 
interviewed, and helps make sense of how clientelism can persist even in a collapsed party system. 
103 “Alan García se lanza a la conquista de votos en asentamientos humanos,” La República 26 Jan 
2006. 
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formal housing model.  But district mayors run political risks if they try to withhold approvals and 
investments to deter future invasions, as seen in Azcueta’s case.  As another mayor put it, “There are 
huge economic consequences to letting invasions occur because [district governments] assume all 
the service costs, but there also are such strong social and political reaction to evictions that we are 
stuck until the central government chooses to build housing.”104  
In sum, urban decentralization contributes to the stickiness of the informal welfare model: it 
segregates the population into homogeneously poor districts where mayors lose support if they 
enforce, it encourages district mayors to manipulate forbearance as a form of clientelism, and it 
allows national governments to ignore the costs of its housing provision choices.   
4.6 Conclusions 
To wrap up, the objective of the Lima case is to underscore the extent to which skeletal 
housing policy has encouraged forbearance toward squatting.  I showed that small and poorly 
targeted housing expenditures reconfigured popular demands around forbearance and reactive 
housing policies.  In turn, local politicians confronted weak incentives to enforce the law.  Peru is 
stuck in a cycle of inadequate housing provision, squatting, and eventual legalization.  The collapse 
of Peru’s party system, weight of a generation of squatters who expect property titles, and urban 
decentralization make it unlikely that national governments will transition to a system of substitutive 
housing provision. 
Given the generalized weakness of the Peruvian state, it is worth considering whether weak 
administrative capacity can explain the enforcement outcomes.  My take is that administrative 
capacity still plays an important role in enforcement decisions, but it is a secondary factor that is 
endogenous to the political environment.  In my survey, for example, bureaucrats complained about 
the lack of cars, updated maps, and support from the city government to conduct their jobs.  While 
                                                
104 Author interview with John Barrera, Mayor, District of Ancón, Lima, Peru, December 1, 2011. 
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the majority of bureaucrats cited political interference as the central motivation for forbearance, 42 
percent of bureaucrats named the lack of resources and 45 percent of bureaucrats thought that 
squatters commonly bribed the police to stop enforcement.     
Further analysis of the types of cases that survive the enforcement process also shows 
substantial administrative constraints.  I looked at cases where the electoral costs of controlling 
illegal land occupations are lower, and thus my theory would predict enforcement.  While most of 
the land at stake in Lima is far-flung and thus unattractive to upper income groups, there are a 
handful of summer beach houses constructed illegally in districts at the far tips of the city. I found 
no evidence that state authorities acted more decisively in these cases.105  Observations that the 
government has failed to control illegal land occupations on valuable public property that district 
residents likely prefer also show important limits on enforcement capacity.106  
Nonetheless, there are several reasons to believe that incoherent and underfunded 
enforcement procedures reflect political preferences for forbearance in light of the state’s weak 
distributive capacity, rather than an inability to muster the police or bureaucrats to enforce.  First, city 
and national officials could pressure district mayors to exert more enforcement effort.  They do not.  
Some district mayors even complained that they reported land invasions, but central authorities 
                                                
105 Author interview with Julio Martínez, Director of Urban Development, District of Punta 
Hermosa, Lima, Peru, November 21, 2011.   
106 For example, major land invasions have occurred on lands reserved for public purposes, such as a 
hospital and a university in Villa El Salvador. “Nadie desaloja a invasores de terreno para hospital,” 
El Comercio 21 May 2000; “Invaden terreno destinado para universidad en Villa El Salvador,” El 
Comercio 9 April 2006.  Archeological preservation land raises some similar issues in which the public 
and central government likely supports its preservation, and yet land invasions have been hard to 
stop.  Toledo finally published a special law to make clear that land reserved for public purposes and 
archeological reserves could not be formalized through Cofopri but this has not stopped attempts at 
takings. “No legalizan invasiones de terrenos para uso público,” El Comercio 17 March 2006. 
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never responded.107 Apathy is surprising given that land invasions often occur on state land over 
which central authorities have jurisdiction and therefore could intervene even if district politicians 
have electoral reasons not to enforce.  City officials explained their choice not to monitor land 
invasions in much the same terms as district politicians.  IMP director Carlos Escalante, for example, 
redirected blame to national housing authorities: “We understand that in a poor country, market 
mechanisms are insufficient to result in an orderly occupation of land, but we can’t repress invasions 
until there are other housing options.”  When pushed on the long-term costs of the system, 
Escalante emphasized the government’s short time horizons: “If you can spend the money either to 
build an interchange that all citizens want and see or to stopping land invasions in places that no one 
except those who want to live there can see, guess which one wins?”108  
Second, the Peruvian state has managed to mobilize its bureaucracy for tricky reactive 
housing policies.  Mayors withheld information, which they already had for administrative 
purposes.  Resources and skills from a vast property titling bureaucracy have not been applied to 
enforcement.  The maps and property registries generated by COFOPRI, for example, are not 
shared or used for local enforcement efforts.  Relatively simple reorganizations of the bureaucracy, 
such as the assignment of monitoring responsibilities to a single authority or the registry of state 
property, could vastly improve Peru’s administrative capacity in this area.  The central and city 
government have few incentives to do so.  
Hence, the taproot of weak enforcement against land invasions at all levels of government 
is a calculation about the positive political benefits and—unlike street vending—limited costs of 
                                                
107 For example, in one recent case, the mayor of the neighboring province of Cañete allegedly called 
the SBN only to be told, “Call back next week,” at which point a police eviction was out of the 
question.  “Invasores vuelven a San Antonio de Cañete,” La República 27 July 2010. 
108 Author interview with Carlos Escalante, Executive Director, IMP, Lima, Peru, June 23, 2011.   
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letting violations continue.  The next section on Bogotá further reinforces the centrality of social 
policy choices, rather than administrative resources, in enforcement outcomes.  
4 Truncated Housing Policies and Forbearance: Bogotá 
The case of Colombia helps differentiate my theory from capacity-based alternatives.  
Bogotá has a capable bureaucracy and police that would lead us to expect enforcement against 
illegal land occupations.  Nonetheless, with few exceptions, national executives have designed 
housing policies to favor mobilized middle-class groups and construction interests. 
Complementary housing policy elevates the political costs of enforcement, which leads mayors to 
block enforcement against squatters even after bureaucrats have completed length administrative 
and court proceedings to enforce.  The fact that enforcement has occurred against nonpoor 
squatters, and that some mayors with nonpoor core constituencies have enforced, provides 
disconfirming evidence of capacity-based theories. 
5.1 Truncated Housing Policies 
Colombia has a checkered record of housing provision.  With a pair of exceptions, the 
middle class has captured the benefits of state housing expenditures.  This section reviews how 
shifts in the party system and the costs of illegal land occupations motivated different periods of 
Colombian housing policy.       
Since the 1940s, Colombia ran state housing programs that assisted the middle class.  
Confronted with a migratory wave and major land invasions, Bogotá’s appointed mayors began to 
voice frustration that the state offered no options for the poor. Colombia’s then-institutionalized 
party system meant that executives expected continuity in social policy initiatives and controlled city 
mayors so that they could compel a transition to a formal housing model.  Political centralization 
also meant that the national government internalized the costs of squatting.   
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President Belisario Betancur (1982-86) saw the potential benefits of substitutive housing 
policy and campaigned on a proposal to create housing options for the poor.109 As he diagnosed on 
taking office, “Our problem is not the lack of resources, but the use of resources…our country has 
been guiding housing subsidies to middle and upper income groups.” Construction for the poor 
would jumpstart the economy and “provide lower-income families a realistic alternative within the 
law to spontaneous solutions such as clandestine developments, land invasions and the like.”110  
Betancur built a record 400,000 houses for the poor and, as I return to below, control over illegal 
land occupations reached its (albeit imperfect) pinnacle. 
The targeting of housing subsidies remained a thorny issue due to the existence of mobilized 
middle-class groups and construction interests that opposed redirecting resources to the poor.  The 
diversion of housing resources to middle-class groups worsened under Betancur’s successor, 
President Virgilio Barco (1986-90).  Barco understood the need for substitutive social interest 
housing investments from his time as mayor of Bogotá in the late 1960s.  He had introduced a small 
city program of social interest housing called “Substitution for Slums” with the objective to end 
illegal land occupations (Martínez Tocancipa 2007: 43).  However, national legislators did not share 
the goal of crowding out squatting.  Slots in housing programs were valuable patronage to reward 
political brokers and formal sector workers.  Legislation blocked informal sector workers from 
access to the state mortgage system (UPAC) and ceded to pressure from middle-class debtors’ 
associations to forgo repayment requirements. Reflecting on the deterioration of his housing 
                                                
109 National Popular Alliance (Alianza Nacional Popular, ANAPO), a populist challenger to 
Colombia’s two-party system, began to pressure for national housing solutions for the poor.  
Betancur likely embraced targeted housing policies as a way to co-opt ANAPO’s popular initiative 
(evidenced by the fact that he appointed ANAPO’s president, María Eugenia Rojas, to head the state 
housing agency) and to demonstrate a more social orientation of the government as Betancur 
pushed for peace.   
110 Palabras del Presidente Betancur en la posesión de la Señora María Eugenia Rojas de Moreno 
Díaz como Directora del ICT y del Doctor Javier Soto Ramírez como Consejero Presidencial de la 
Vivienda, 31 Aug 1982. 
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program, Betancur lamented the “unseemly” capture of housing policies as legislators “threw out 
many poor people” from housing programs to siphon benefits to the middle class.111  State housing 
policies soon lost favor due to issues of corruption, inefficiency, and manipulation for patronage 
purposes.  Trying to house the poor along with substantial subsidies to the middle class literally 
bankrupt state housing authorities (Cuervo and Jaramillo 2009: 7-8).      
President César Gaviria (1990-94) revamped Colombia’s housing policy as part of a broad 
packet of neoliberal reforms. The idea was to reduce political discretion in housing allocation, and 
limit the state’s role to “enabling” the market.  State agencies that directly built homes or provided 
credit to the poor were closed.  In their place, Colombia adopted an ABC demand-subsidy program 
modeled on the Chilean experience. Housing reforms coincided with the adoption of new 
constitution that recognized a right to housing.  On paper, Colombia committed to a formal focus 
on housing options for the poor; at the same time, the state retreated from housing markets and 
abandoned tools like credit provision that helped to reach the poor (Cuervo and Jaramillo 2009: 7-
8).  Housing reforms also coincided with the introduction of direct elections for mayors.  Betancur 
proclaimed that whether Gaviria’s housing program reached the poor following electoral reforms 
would be “the best test” of whether representative democracy “has come to life in Colombia.”112 
At first blush, Colombia’s demand subsidies looked like targeted, nondiscretionary transfers 
to the poor that could substitute for informal housing demand.  Subsidies are provided to two 
tranches of the income distribution: a “priority” category for poor families who earn below two 
minimum wages (approximately $7,250), as well as a separate category for lower middle-class 
                                                
111 Belisario Betancur, “El plan Gaviria de vivienda popular,” El Tiempo 19 Nov 1990.   
112 Belisario Betancur, “El plan Gaviria de vivienda popular,” El Tiempo 19 Nov 1990.   
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families who earn below four minimum wages ($14,500).113  Half the Colombian population falls 
into the “priority” category. Colombia scores and ranks subsidy applicants using a nationwide 
poverty census (SISBEN) and assigns a larger subsidy to poorer applicants.  
Nonetheless, subsidies have done little for the poor.  The use of housing subsidies—in other 
words, the number of subsidies that are used to purchase a house—is dismal.  In 2010, there were 
24,644 subsidies granted and 3,600 or 15 percent were used (Gaviria and Tovar 2011: 5). Usage did 
reach more than half in other years, but largely among lower-middle class groups.114  The main 
reason that subsidies fail to assist the poor is that there are no affordable houses to buy.  Particularly 
in major cities like Bogotá, construction companies avoid building housing for the poor due to the 
low profit margins and high costs of land.  There were only 3,290 priority units on the market in 
2009, and not a single unit in 2011 (Alfonso 2012: 32).   
Second, government subsidies do not cover the cost of a home so they must be 
supplemented with savings and commercial credit.  However, 46 percent of Colombian households 
have no capacity to save (Gaviria and Tovar 2011: 5).  Being able to document income also is a 
prerequisite to access a mortgage.  Yet, among the poor eligible for housing subsidies, 70 percent 
work do not have formal labor contracts and fall outside of commercial credit markets.  A builder 
explains the paradox: “To receive a subsidy, one has to show that you are poor, and to receive a 
                                                
113 The category for the poor is referred to as priority interest housing (vivienda de interés prioritario, 
VIP).  But the category for the lower-middle class is called social interest housing (vivienda de interés 
social, VIS), despite the fact that social interest housing commonly refers to units for the poor.  I 
avoid using this terminology so as not to create confusion.  Instead, I refer to Colombia’s VIS 
housing simply as housing for the lower-middle class. 
114 In 2007, of 33,500 subsidies, 21,400 were used, or 64 percent, but these were largely not in the 
priority interest category.  The one low-income group that fares better under the housing system is 
internally displaced people.  The Constitutional Court required that national officials take action to 
rectify housing injustices against internally displaced people (Sentence T-025 of 2004). It required 
that 40 percent of the housing budget is dedicated to internally displaced people.  Much of this goes 
to temporary housing assistance.  But internally displaced people also can combine local and national 
subsidies that often add up to the cost of a $17,000 home, and do not face savings requirements.   
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credit, one has to show that you are rich.”115 The subsidy system thus preserved the same barriers to 
state housing access under the old mortgage system through new guises: only creditworthy, and thus 
formal sector employees, can access housing benefits. 
Why design a program to reach the poor that cannot be used in practice?  Part of the answer 
is that organized beneficiaries maintained political advantages over the informal sector poor, even 
when the latter were more numerous.  In the case of housing, political insiders include both 
construction lobbies and potential middle-class beneficiaries.  Colombian presidents long have 
viewed housing policies as a way to generate construction jobs.  President Andrés Pastrana (1998-
2002), for instance, made the expansion of housing subsidies a central part of his campaign and 
promised “to fulfill two purposes: to give shelter to the least favored people and to generate 
employment by reactivating construction.”116  In the end, the focus on stimulating construction 
undermined a focus on the poor.  Draft legislation to increase affordable housing in Bogotá, for 
example, initially proposed that construction companies would need to build a certain fraction of 
“priority” housing units for each new housing project.  Construction lobbies pressured to change 
the requirement so they could meet the requirement by building a larger fraction of lower-middle 
class housing.  Housing for the poor has fallen by the wayside, although options for the lower-
middle class have improved (Maldonado Copello 2009).    
The middle class also continues to maintain housing policy perquisites.  The best functioning 
part of the Colombian housing system works through pension funds that provide mortgage 
assistance (Cajas de Compensación Familiar).  As part of Pastrana’s housing policy, reluctant legislators 
signed on by expanding the funds dedicated to housing through pension funds.  Attempts to expand 
                                                
115 “Planeación y vivienda en Bogotá fue tema de discusión en el debate de CityTV,” CityTV, Oct 27, 
2011. 
116 “Usar fondos de pensiones en vivienda.” El Tiempo 21 Apr 1998.   
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housing expenditures by subsequent presidents have followed a similar pattern in which benefits for 
the middle class have increased in tandem with stated prioritization of the poor.  In 2000, for 
example, the government increased the number of subsidies for the poor, but it also established far 
larger tax incentives (similar to the American home mortgage interest deduction) to encourage home 
ownership among wealthier groups with the capacity to save and pay income taxes.117  
The second key reason that housing programs have flopped in Colombia are the short time 
horizons of national governments. Colombia’s traditional parties lost strength following the 
adoption of electoral reforms in 1991.  No coherent party system emerged to replace Colombia’s 
bipartisan arrangement.  Executives look to maximize their electoral support during their terms in 
office.  This short-term focus has led to a bias toward housing policies that cover large numbers of 
beneficiaries during a president’s term in office.  For instance, to create housing supply for the poor, 
the Colombian government could have increased the size of housing subsidies or grants to 
construction companies.  But, in the absence of a coherent party system, providing huge subsidies to 
a small number of households is electorally unattractive.  Instead, governments have ballooned the 
quantity of subsidies to “reach” more poor voters.  President Álvaro Uribe (2002-10), for example, 
promised to “avoid the formation of new precarious settlements” through the provision of a million 
housing solutions (DNP 2005).  Uribe increased the number of subsidies by 18 fold, yet the 
production of housing for lower and lower-middle income groups picked up by just 40 percent 
(Cuervo and Jaramillo 2009: 17).  To increase coverage in Bogotá, the Uribe administration cut the 
generosity of subsidies to cover a calculated additional 15,800 families.  Instead of expanding 
coverage, applications for subsidies fell and usage rates dropped.118  The announcement offered 
shortsighted gains: Uribe awarded the subsidies and claimed credit for program expansions.  Former 
                                                
117 These were saving plans (Ahorro para el fomento de la construcción, AFC) meant to increase 
homeownership through tax breaks and subsidized mortgage rates. 
118 “Favorecidos no reclaman los subsidios de vivienda,” El Tiempo 14 June 2005. 
  177 
Bogotá Mayor Antanas Mockus explains: “Politically, it was profitable to reassign the subsidies—if 
you don’t use it, then I’ll give it to another person.”119 Blame for the inability to use subsidies was 
shrugged off on construction companies and city mayors.  Assigning subsidies was a cheap way to 
boost political support; building the houses to meet demand was a less attractive task.   
Third, the ability to build affordable housing depends on coordination with city mayors.  In 
particular, one way to stimulate construction for the poor is to provide land and permits to private 
developers.  Beginning in 2006, the Uribe government tried to allocate land for massive housing 
projects for the poor.  It first picked land without consulting local governments.  Mayors brought 
suit against Uribe for interfering in their powers to control urban planning; the Constitutional Court 
ruled in favor of local governments.120  The national government now must coordinate large-scale 
housing projects with elected mayors.   
Coordination is tricky in the absence of political alignment. Some city mayors do not want to 
accept large-scale housing projects for which the national government will take credit. Mayor 
Gustavo Petro stalled in approving land in Bogotá on which the central government, which was 
controlled by an opposing party led by Juan Manuel Santos (2010- ), could build houses for the 
poor.  Petro claimed that the lot that the national government desired for housing construction was 
situated in a flood plain on the city’s urban periphery and that the government would not sufficiently 
mitigate the risk.  He “couldn’t send the poor to live in areas that may flood” or “segregate” the 
poor.121   
                                                
119 Author interview with Antanas Mockus, Bogotá, Colombia, July 27, 2013.   
120 The central government initiated “macroprojects” to co-finance land development projects 
(Macroproyectos de Interés Social Nacional, MISN) (Bouillon 2012: 146-47, 253).  The Constitutional 
Court ruled that the imposition of macroprojects on local governments violated the rights of local 
governments to determine the urban planning in their district.  The national government now must 
coordinate housing development projects with local authorities.  See, Colombian Constitutional 
Court. Sentence C-149/10.  Published in the Gaceta Corte Constitucional, 4 March 2010. 
121 See, “Vivienda enfrenta a Germán Vargas y Gustavo Petro por Twitter,” El Tiempo 15 Aug 2012; 
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Despite these obstacles, Colombia has started to recognize the flaws in its truncated housing 
policies.  Like Uribe, Santos announced a program to build a million houses for the poor, only this 
time to be given away for free so that the poor could access them without commercial credit.  Again, 
the Santos administration justified the program as a way to substitute for informal housing 
construction.  The Housing Minister noted that the market only built for the middle class and 
“forced the poor to invade land.”  Free houses “will change this paradigm.”122  This shift toward 
substitutive housing policies in part reflects that the Colombian government now bears the costs of 
informal settlement constructions immediately.  Due to a Constitutional Court ruling, the 
government must provide access to water and electricity regardless of the legal status of an 
individual’s land claim.123  Illegal land occupations in Colombia now receive provisional services 
almost immediately, making the costs of an informal housing model tangible in the short-run.  
Santos’ decision also reflects a broader emphasis on using the state to guarantee a constitutional 
right to housing, and the declining availability of land in major cities that has increased the political 
benefits of offering formal housing options.124  
                                                                                                                                                       
“Mivivienda da tres meses para hallar lotes y garantizar casas gratis,” El Tiempo 17 Aug 2012; “Vargas 
Lleras a Petro: si Campoverde no es el lote, defina cuál es,” La F.M, 15 Aug 2012; “Las viviendas 
gratis en Bogotá desnudan los retos del proyecto de Petro,” La Silla Vacía, 26 Sept 2012.  
122 “El Gobierno no está cambiando casas por votos: Ministro de Vivienda,” El País 19 Jan 2014.   
123 The Colombian government had proposed a measure that would ban service provision in illegal 
land occupations—even by private companies—on the basis that it would deter future squatters.  
However, the Constitutional Court ruled that the state could not deny individuals access to water or 
electricity because it violated the right to a minimum living standard.  See, Colombian Constitutional 
Court. Sentence C-1189/08.  Published in the Gaceta Corte Constitucional, 3 Dec 2008.  The law in 
question was Law 812 of 2003, Art. 99. 
124 Prior to Santos’ administration, ideological resistance to use the state to intervene in land and 
credit markets contributed to the lousy targeting of housing projects.  Analysts consider Colombia’s 
housing model a more anti-statist approach than adopted in its originator, Chile (Cuervo and 
Jaramillo 2009; Gaviria and Tovar 2011; Jaramillo González 2009).  In the 1990s and 2000s, 
Colombia refused to use a state bank or state promoters of housing projects to make programs 
effective.  Santos has started to reverse this position by having the government directly contract 
housing projects after mayors identify land that is suitable for purchase and development. 
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The success of Colombia’s move toward substitutive housing policy remains in doubt.  Due 
to a combination of capacity and coordination issues, the Santos administration has struggled to 
realize its housing goals. The government has reduced the goal from a million to 100,000 homes.  
Even after Petro identified land suitable for national housing projects, the government has 
contracted only 4,800 housing units in Bogotá.  “Gifting” houses also has exposed the government 
to charges of populism125 and pork-barrel politics.126 So far, housing policy has done little to stop 
illegal land occupations.   
5.2 Crowding In Squatting 
 Illegal land occupations in Bogotá have been a common route for the poor to access 
housing, given exclusionary formal provision.  The Bogotá Secretary of District Planning (Secretaría 
Distrital de Planeación) houses an archive on the city’s more than 2000 illegal settlements that have 
applied for legalization since 1946.  These records suggest that housing for 2.1 million people, or 
more than a quarter of the city’s population, has been built through illegal land occupations 
(Martínez Tocancipa 2007).  Between 1990 and 2010, an estimated 6.8 square miles, or roughly 
250,000 new plots of land, have been settled informally (Camargo and Hurtado 2011: 16).  By 
comparison, only 76,000 units of priority interest housing were built during roughly the same period 
(Camacol 2009: 3).127   
                                                
125 “Vivienda: ¿apuesta ambiciosa o reducción de metas?” Semana 25 April 2012.   
126 Emerging studies show that Santos’ initiative has been most successful in cities where the 
government coalition controls the mayoralty.  However, further research would be needed to 
confirm allegations of politicized distribution, given that Santos built a broad alliance that controls 
roughly 71 percent of mayoralties.  Within the alliance, housing does appear to favor those parties 
closest to him (Partido Liberal and Partido de la U).  It is unclear if the skewed distribution is due to 
the fact that unaligned city mayors refuse to generate projects—as initially was the accusation with 
respect to Bogotá Mayor Gustavo Petro—or national authorities refuse to allocate projects to 
opposition districts.  See, “El color político de las casas gratis,” El Espectador 12 Aug 2013.   
127 Individual-level data confirm the importance of informal housing to the poor.  In my public 
opinion survey, I found that less than 10 percent of the poorest sectors of the population ever have 
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The observable implication of the “crowding out” mechanism is that housing expenditures 
should be inversely related to illegal land occupations over time.  A common methodology to 
measure informal construction calculates the difference between the number of dwellings registered 
in the national household census and the number recorded in the city’s official building census (on 
this approach, see Caldeira 2000: 267; Holston 2008: 210). In broad strokes, informal construction 
fell in Bogotá in the 1980s when Betancur constructed housing for the poor.  But informal housing 
resurged in the 1990s as subsidy policies failed to provide options for the poor.  Cuervo and 
Jaramillo (2009: 21) find that informal construction accounted for almost 300,000 homes and 
constituted 44 percent of all new construction in the city in the intercensal period from 1993 to 
2005.  This period showed the highest share of informal construction since the 1970s.  More 
precisely, there is a very strong negative correlation (! =-0.79) between the amount of affordable 
housing construction and the rate of illegal land occupations.  This relationship is consistent with the 
theory that state housing provision can reduce informal land occupations, although it must be taken 
with a grain of salt given measurement error and changing demographic trends.  
Direct political interventions in illegal land occupations are rare.  In the 1980s, the 
promotion of illegal land occupations propelled several famous land traffickers to office.  They used 
their willingness to ignore property and zoning laws as a signal of their support to the poor, and 
promised to work for service extensions.128  However, the rising threat of criminal sanctions for the 
                                                                                                                                                       
applied for state housing subsidies.  A quarter of respondents, in contrast, have lived in an informal 
settlement (Author’s Survey 2013).  
128 Prior to the direct election of mayors in Bogotá, city councilors were the most important elected 
politicians, and some were directly involved in illegal land sales for electoral ends.  In particular, 
former senator and city councilor, Alfonso Guerrero Estrada sold 19,000 land plots in Bogotá and 
was involved in over twenty squatter settlements.  He was elected to the City Council largely based 
on support from squatters on a ticket called “Bread and Roofs” (Pan y Techo). Many squatters 
supported and protected Guerrero, even as he faced legal investigations in the 1990s. Guerrero 
called himself a “revolutionary,” not an intermediary who illegally “trafficked” land to the poor, and 
was known colloquially as the “Commander.”  He believed that he “solved” the housing needs of 
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sale of informal land and the reduced importance of city councilors means that direct political 
involvement in illegal land occupations seldom occurs. 
As in Peru, the Colombian state indirectly encourages illegal land occupations through its 
investments in reactive housing policies that legalize and provide services to informal settlements.  
Since the introduction of direct elections, Bogotá mayors moved to title informal settlements in 
massive numbers.  Figure 3.4 shows the surge in titling initiatives once city mayors became sensitive 
to popular demands.  Mayor Enrique Peñalosa (1998-2000), for instance, legalized more than 400 
informal settlements.  The provision of property titles is immensely popular.  On my survey of 
Bogotá residents, I found that 74 percent of the poor (and 48 percent of the nonpoor) agreed that 
the government should provide property titles to the poor.  In comparison, only 52 percent of the 
poor supported more housing program expenditures compared to 42 percent of the nonpoor.   
More broadly, the city invests heavily in public service and infrastructure projects in illegal 
land occupations.  The director of Bogotá’s Office for Settlement Legalization, Glenda Luna, calls 
the model one of “ex-post planning.” Authorities recognize illegal land occupations that already 
have occurred and “are obligated to increase the resources dedicated to social development and 
services.”129 Some authorities calculate that infrastructure projects cost ten times more in informal 
                                                                                                                                                       
poor communities, and many poor communities seem to have agreed in voting and not filing legal 
claims against him. Rafael Forero Fetecua, who won seats on the City Council and Congress, and his 
alternate in Congress, Mariano Porras, similarly was one of the great illegal urbanizers in Bogotá who 
ran a movement Popular Integration (Integración Popular) that again promised the incorporation of 
informal settlements in public investment plans.  See “Los dueños del sur,” El Tiempo 4 Nov 1999; 
“A Guerrero Estrada le premiaron,” El Tiempo 20 Feb 1999; “Cuando la Cruz decidieron vender 
Bosa,” El Tiempo 5 Nov 1999. 
129 Individual property titling initiatives have been more restrained in Colombia compared to Peru, as 
we will see below.  Because a central city mayor makes choices about titling initiatives and bears the 
costs of additional service provision—unlike we will see in the case of Peru—central city mayors 
have been wary of the incentive effects and additional costs of property titling.  As Luna explains, 
“Cities fear that there would be more land invasions if we extend the deadline [to legalize property], 
and it would require investments in all sorts of issues at the same time like more housing and control 
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settlements ex-post than were they done ex-ante as part of housing projects.130  Recall that 
Colombian authorities are legally obligated to provide basic services to settlements, regardless of 
their legal status.  This court order means that the time that settlements now wait to receive basic 
services has dropped from an average of five years in the 1980s to months (Camargo 2011).  
Officials lament that this has made illegal land occupations more attractive, and encouraged a new 
wave of invasions, particularly on environmental protection land where illegal land occupations now 
cannot be denied public services.131  I now turn to how informal land occupations refocus the poor’s 
demands on forbearance and eventual legalization by city authorities, rather than state housing 
policies.   
 
FIGURE 3.4.  Settlement Formation and Legalization in Bogotá, 1930-2002          
SOURCES: District Housing Secretary (Secretaría Distrital de Hábitat) and Informal Land Market Observatory (Observatorio 
del Mercado Informal de Tierras) 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
for future demand.”  Author interview with with Glenda Luna, Director, Office of Barrio 
Legalization, Department of Planning, Bogotá, Colombia, August 2, 2011.   
130 Author interview with Carlos Cordoba, National Planning Department, Bogotá, Colombia, July 
29, 2011. 
131 Author interview with judicial advisor, District of Rafael Uribe Uribe, Bogotá, Colombia, July 7, 
2010; Author interview with housing inspector, District of San Cristóbal, Bogotá, Colombia, 
September 6, 2011; Author interview with housing inspector, District of Chapinero, Bogotá, 
Colombia, July 6, 2010.  
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5.3 Demand Displacement 
 
The ubiquity of informal land occupations means that the poor do not expect or demand 
state housing provision.  Instead, popular demands focus on forbearance and local public goods that 
raise the value of informal land occupations.  I concentrate on indicators of popular preferences 
drawn from survey data, contentious activity, engagement with state officials and local politicians, 
and willingness to cooperate with enforcement.  Taken together, the evidence suggests that reliance 
on informal welfare provision displaces housing demands from the national arena to city mayors.  
As in Lima, this displacement creates a feedback cycle in which strong demands for forbearance, 
followed by titling and local public goods provision, reinforce complementary housing policies.   
Survey data support the interdependence of formal and informal housing demands.  Chapter 
2 showed that the poor do not support enforcement if they perceive that there are no housing 
alternatives.  I marshaled two pieces of evidence in support of this claim: first, only a third of poor 
respondents believed that social policies benefitted “people like them,” while more than 80 percent 
agreed that “the poor sometimes need to occupy land informally to access housing.” The second 
critical finding was that individuals who believe that the poor need to occupy land informally are less 
supportive of evictions.  While 67 percent of poor individuals who believe that formal housing 
option are available support government evictions, only 37 percent are willing to evict squatters 
when they perceive that there are no formal housing options.132  Thus, at least on surveys, the poor 
understand the flaws in Colombian housing policy, and these inadequacies are correlated with less 
support for enforcement.   
Second, additional insights come from analyzing the nature of collective action by the poor.  
If the urban poor look to the state to resolve their housing claims, we would expect to see 
                                                
132 Interestingly, this gap only emerges for poor respondents.  The perceived availability of housing 
options has no impact on the enforcement preferences of the nonpoor.    
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mobilization demanding housing solutions. A database of all social conflicts countrywide shows that 
37 percent of all protests between 2002 and 2007 involved demands by urban informal settlements.  
Yet only 3 percent of these protests involved housing claims (Archila Neira 2010: 127).  In addition, 
my review of Colombia’s national newspaper El Tiempo showed minimal collective action emerged 
surrounding housing programs for the poor.  In contrast, if housing needs are fulfilled through 
forbearance, collective action should center on the improvement of informal land occupations.  
Indeed, collective action to improve conditions in illegal land occupations abounded. Archila Neira 
(2010: 127) finds that 17 percent of all social conflicts involved claims for public and social services.   
The type of urban popular organizations that form also confirms the importance of informal 
housing provision.  Compared to a handful of organizations dedicated to state housing provision, 
there were 893 local community organizations (Juntas de Acción Comunal, JAC) in informal settlements 
(Observatory for Informal Land Markets 2011). A review of the correspondence of these 
associations with state authorities shows that a primary role of JACs is to pressure state authorities 
to protect against evictions when land disputes arise, as well as to pressure for public services, 
property titles, and access to transportation.  Organizing around state housing policies was stronger 
in the 1980s when Colombia attempted to pursue a substitutive housing policy.  Major housing 
organizations, such as Fedevivienda and the National Federation for Popular Housing (Federación 
Nacional de Vivienda Popular, Fenavip), worked with the state to organize the poor in housing 
cooperatives.  These organizations have lost much of their strength as the state moved toward 
demand subsidies and the poor have been skeptical that organizing will lead to housing solutions.133 
Third, societal preferences can be inferred from the demands that the poor make on 
politicians and state officials.  Citizen complaints to housing authorities are minimal.  Even among 
subsidy beneficiaries, who we would expect to mobilize to make use of their allocated benefits, there 
                                                
133 Author interview with Alejandro Florian, director, Fedevivienda, Alejandro Florian, June 23, 
2010. 
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has been little citizen pressure.  Complaints to the Housing Ministry for unused subsidies were so 
insignificant that the Ministry instead had to call beneficiaries to understand why subsidies went 
unused.134  Local and city councilors, who play a key role as intermediaries between citizens and state 
offices, told me that they almost never assist with housing subsidy applications.  A shared sense of 
skepticism came out in the comments of local councilors with remarks like, “People know that you 
need to have savings and credit, and people here don’t even have enough money for the bus,”135 and 
“Helping someone with a housing application doesn’t cause anyone to win or lose votes because 
demand is met through other forms.”136 Even the one mayor in Bogotá who has invested heavily in 
substitutive housing policies, Peñalosa, said that he invested out of a vision of the city’s future 
improvement and need for urban planning, not expectations of electoral rewards.137 
Politicians do respond to the poor through constituency service to mediate the claims of 
informal settlements to public services and legal titles.  Local councilors view their jobs in terms of a 
responsibility to “orient” informal land occupations to receive public services and legalization.  Help 
with public services and legalization is a common campaign promise.  City councilor Felipe Rios, for 
example, explained how most of his votes came from informal settlements where he promised that 
he “wouldn’t forget the neighborhoods and would help them get services.”138 The records on 
squatter settlements stored in the city’s archives include extensive correspondence from squatters 
with requests for zoning changes and service extensions.  Some of the letters emphasizes the 
                                                
134 “Call center del viceministerio de Vivienda,” El Tiempo 25 June 2004. 
135 Author interview with Heidi Luz Quiroga, Local Councilor, San Cristóbal, Bogotá, Colombia, 
October 13, 2011.   
136 Author interview with Alfredo Díaz, Local Councilor, Ciudad Bolívar, Bogotá, Colombia, 
October 14, 2011. 
137 As Peñalosa put it, “No one will judge the mayor of Bogotá if he [makes housing available for the 
poor] or not, but it is so painful [not to do it] because it is something that affects tons of 
generations.”  Author interview with Enrique Peñalosa, Bogotá, Colombia, September 7, 2011.   
138 Author interview with City Councilor Felipe Rios, Bogotá, Colombia, August 8, 2011.   
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electoral rewards of reactive housing policies.  For instance, a typical entreaty to a city councilor for 
the extension of the water system concludes, “Do not doubt that we, in our capacity as voting 
inhabitants of this city, are willing to help you in whatever you think necessary.”139   
Finally, societal support for forbearance can be observed through cooperation with 
enforcement.  Citizens play a central role in the detection of new illegal land occupations.  The 
police have a short window (48 hours) in which they can evict squatters before they need an 
administrative order.  Neighbors are best situated to identify and report illegal land invasions to 
police and mayoral authorities within this timeframe.  However, citizen reports of new land 
occupations are rare in Bogotá.  In Ciudad Bolívar, for example, there are 500 new land occupations 
detected by the city each month, but local district authorities report an average of two citizen 
complaints.140  Bureaucrats frequently explained to me that no one reported the occupations because 
residents were in “solidarity” based on squatters’ economic position141 or “because they think the 
state will come for them next” if they report on new occupations.142  
Given that Colombia recognizes a constitutional right to housing, many bureaucrats and 
politicians explained popular backing for invasions in social rights terms.  The idea is that the poor 
have housing rights too, and that until the state fulfills them through substitutive housing policies, 
squatters cannot be removed.143  Officials tie the problem of weak cooperation in the enforcement 
                                                
139 Letter from Junta de Acción Comunal, Barrio Unir II to City Councilor, June 1992, Bogotá’s 
Department of Planning Archive (Secretaría Distrital de Planeación). 
140 Author interview with judicial coordinator, Ciudad Bolívar, October 14, 2011.   
141 Author interview with housing inspector, Chapinero, Bogotá, Colombia, July 6, 2010.; Author 
interview with housing inspector, Rafael Uribe Uribe, September 16, 2011.     
142 Author interview with housing inspector, San Cristóbal, Bogotá, Colombia, July 10, 2010.   
143 For instance, author interview with housing inspector, District of Santa Fe, Bogotá, Colombia, 
July 8, 2010; author interview with District Mayor, Engativá, Bogotá, Colombia, July 21, 2010; 
author interview with Inés Esteban Parra, Lawyer, Government Secretary (Secretaria de Gobierno 
de Bogotá), Bogotá, Colombia, July 16, 2010; author interview with Virgilio Rueda, housing 
inspector, Ciudad Bolivar, July 28, 2010. 
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process back to the inability of the state to provide housing.  The director of control operations for 
the city’s housing program expressed a common sentiment: “The social problem [of not having 
housing to offer] means that neighbors believe that the state hasn’t done its job to provide housing 
so they don’t tell us about illegal occupations.”144  It is important that this reasoning reflects a 
popular interpretation of what the right to housing requires, not the Court’s reading, which balances 
the protection of property rights with a structural requirement for the government to work toward 
housing solutions. 
Popular sentiment toward illegal land occupations is not uniform.  Some residents of 
legalized neighborhoods worry about their property values and prefer to see formal developments.145 
Others oppose new construction because it can impose direct harms such as when illegal 
occupations tap water mains or electricity connections.146  Even so, citizen complaints of land 
occupations are rare.  It remains to be seen if Santos’ free housing projects can grow public support 
for enforcement.   
On balance, the poor’s housing demands do not center on the state in Bogotá.  The poor 
take land informally, and then turn to politicians for forbearance, public services, and ultimately legal 
recognition. I now turn to how societal pressure for informal welfare provision motivates politicians 
to choose not to enforce the law.   
5.4 Mayoral Decisions 
 
                                                
144 Author interview with Francisco Álvarez, Director of Control and Director of Projects, 
Metrovivienda, Bogotá, Colombia, July 10, 2010. 
145 A focus group in Ciudad Bolívar revealed split opinions about new settlements, September 18, 
2011; Author interview with local councilor, Juan Carlos Tavara, San Cristobal, October 12, 2011.    
146 Author interview with judicial advisor, District of Bosa, Bogotá, Colombia, July 30, 2010.   
  188 
To separate whether politicians will not or cannot control illegal land occupations, I walk 
through the enforcement process.  Careful attention to where enforcement breaks down can isolate 
the share of variation explained by political strategy compared to institutional constraints.  
Governments first need to detect where illegal land occupations have occurred.  Unlike in 
Lima, a single agency in Bogotá has monitored illegal land occupations using satellite imagery and 
teams of inspectors since 2003.147  City authorities have registered 13,931 illegal land occupations 
from 2006 to 2011.  Of course, it is unclear if the detected occupations match the underlying level of 
offenses.  A plausible measure of the wider universe of illegal land occupations comes from the 
number of new “provisional” water connections registered in the city. Informal settlements almost 
immediately apply to receive services, and the city’s water company acquiesces to avoid service theft 
and comply with the Constitutional Court’s mandate.  These statistics suggest that there were 23,024 
new “provisional” connections in Bogotá in the same period (Camargo and Hurtado 2011: 13).  
Water connections could overstate informal land occupations because they can be granted to legal 
constructions too, and the city water company sometimes services districts outside of the city limits.  
But even assuming that all provisional water connections are made to informal constructions in 
Bogotá, the city would spot 60 percent of informal land occupations.  Given the rigor of the city’s 
satellite monitoring process, it is probable that the fraction of illegal land occupations detected is 
much higher. 
The second step in the enforcement process is to open an administrative case against an 
illegal land occupation.  Detection is the responsibility of the city government, but subcity districts 
headed by appointed mayors take responsibility for subsequent administrative proceedings.  District 
                                                
147 The Subsecretary for Inspection, Oversight, and Control within the District Housing Secretary 
(Secretaría Distrital del Hábitat, SDH, Subsecretaria de Inspección, Vigilancia y Control) tracks and reports 
illegal land occupations.  There were important changes in the areas that they monitored in 2006, 
which means that only the data for recent years are comparable to examine changes in the growth of 
informal land occupations.   
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governments face a number of obstacles on top of limited staff and resources that reflect challenges 
unique to enforcement in low-income settings.  For one, informal settlements lack addresses.  City 
officials identify illegal land occupations using geographic coordinates.  Local officials often do not 
have access to GPS units, or choose not to carry them due to high crime rates in peripheral districts.  
Relying on photographs and approximate locations, local officials struggle to identify land 
occupations because physical appearances change rapidly.  Between visits by officials, an isolated, tin 
shack may suddenly be surrounded by other homes.  All legal correspondence must be hand-
delivered, which means that the identification process needs to be repeated multiple times.  In 
addition, given the high stakes of land claims, residents in illegal settlements are savvy about 
property laws and can outsmart bureaucrats.  Squatters claim to be renters (administrative sanctions 
must be filed against the owner of the construction) or to have occupied the land for three years 
(past the statute of limitations).  Given these obstacles, only 20 percent of illegal land occupations 
have resulted in administrative actions.   
Third, once the local government opens an administrative case, a court must review the case 
and issue a demolition approval.  By law, courts should respond within six months, but the average 
is closer to a year (Lemus Chois and Lemus Chois 2010).  Cases can drag on if the occupants file 
constitutional rights claims to protect their right to housing.  Despite the fact that the Colombian 
Constitution recognizes a right to housing, administrative courts do order demolitions and fines to 
protect private property rights, as well collective rights to the environment and planning, which 
trump the individual right to housing.  Most sentences require the government to protect the 
removed individuals’ housing rights, but this could involve the provision of temporary rent 
assistance or help applying for housing programs.  About 39 percent of administrative actions make 
it through the judicial review to end in a demolition order.  
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The final part of the enforcement process is the execution of a demolition order.  Mayors 
must sign and schedule the removal of an illegal land occupation.  But mayors largely refuse to do 
so.  Or, they postpone demolitions until the orders must be archived.  Only 4 percent of court 
orders end with a sanction, which is the lowest rate of efficacy in the entire enforcement process.   
Figure 3.5 visually summarizes the “leakage” at each step of the enforcement process to 
produce almost no enforcement.  The vertical axis again represents the log of the number of cases 
so the change can be interpreted as the percent decline at each step; the dotted line shows a constant 
rate of institutional weakness of a third.  In Bogotá, the rate of institutional leakage seems to be 
about a third, which is higher than observed in Lima.  This observation is consistent with anecdotal 
evidence that the bureaucracy is stronger in Bogotá.  What is most important to note is that a sharp 
deviation occurs from the log linear trend when mayors have to sign eviction orders.  This drop 
reflects a “political bottleneck.”  
 
FIGURE 3.5.  Enforcement Against Illegal Land Occupations, Bogotá, 2006-2011          
SOURCES: Bogotá Water Company (Empresa de Acueducto, Alcantarillado y Aseo de Bogotá, EAAB) (occupations); District 
Housing Secretary (Secretaría Distrital del Hábitat) (detection); Author’s Survey of District Housing Offices (cases, orders, 
and demolitions). 
It may seem that weak state capacity is the major explanation for enforcement outcomes, 
given that such a small set of cases even makes it to the stage when enforcement orders are issued.  
However, it is important to emphasize that evictions have a very strong deterrent effect if executed 
due to the severity of sanction involved.  If the roughly thousand cases that proceeded through the 
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bureaucracy actually ended with the execution of enforcement orders, squatters would have a 
roughly 1 in 25 chance of losing their house and investments.  The harshness of the sanction is part 
of what makes it so repulsive to elected officials, but it also means that even a small amount of 
action can result in substantial deterrence.  
Qualitative evidence supports the contention that the drop-off in actual sanctions reflects 
political calculations.  Probing further, the demolitions that do occur are designed to minimize the 
impact on low-income squatters.  Roughly half of demolitions resulted from pressure from the 
district comptroller (Contraloría), which monitors and sanctions officials for inappropriate or 
inadequate completion of assigned functions.148  This concern has led some districts to conduct 
demolitions.  One housing director explained the standard process by which districts created the 
impression of action for the Comptroller without affecting the use of land occupations as a way to 
house the poor: 
“We did a few easy demolitions of abandoned constructions because technically the mayor is 
insubordinate if he does not execute the court’s orders.  But we didn’t want a social drama, and 
we can’t let urban control norms become more important than the need for housing, so we just did enough to 
satisfy the Comptroller” [emphasis added].149   
 
Other local mayors flaunted the threat of sanction by the Comptroller because they attributed 
blame to other authorities.  A typical comment was that, “The failure comes from [housing 
programs] that offer no social plan to house these people, and from the city mayor who does not 
want evictions.”150  
The second category of demolitions that have occurred in the city involve illegal land 
occupations by the upper class.  Under institutional capacity theories, these demolitions are 
                                                
148 In particular, a 2008 audit by the Comptroller faulted local mayors, particularly in Ciudad Bolívar 
and San Cristobál, for the failure to control illegal land occupations.   
149 Author interview with construction and zoning administrator, Ciudad Bolívar, Bogotá, Colombia, 
September 7, 2011.   
150 Author interview with housing inspector, Engativá, Bogotá, Colombia, July 21, 2010.   
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surprising because it is cheaper to demolish the homes of the poor (due to the size of the 
construction) and less complicated administratively (due to the poor’s inferior access to lawyers).  
Yet mayors were willing to undertake these demolitions due to the reduced social and political 
costs. The political logic of targeting the upper class comes out in the comments of bureaucrats, 
such as one housing director who explained to me why her office ignored the poor and focused on 
enforcement against wealthy homeowners: 
“The city mayor doesn’t want to disrupt things, where are you going to move all these poor 
people to?  What good would it serve to take away their homes?  There is no other place for 
them to go so you just can’t do it…It’s different when wealthy people decide to build weekend chalets in 
the forest preserve.  We took down 16 elegant homes last year because there is no reason that they 
should be there” [emphasis added].151 
 
More broadly, enforcement actions stop at the demolition stage for both social welfare and 
electoral reasons.  Of housing sector bureaucrats that I interviewed, 96 percent (23 of 24) mentioned 
the “social costs” given the inadequacy of state housing policy as a reason that there was no 
enforcement. Bureaucrats emphasized that local governments would not enforce “until the 
[national] government had a response to those evicted who come to ask where they could go live.”152  
Political calculations also matter in stopping enforcement actions.  I asked bureaucrats 
whether they believed that the mayor lost (“1”) or gained (“10”) votes if he enforced against illegal 
land occupations.  The average response was a “3,” and only one of 24 housing bureaucrats believed 
that the mayor would gain electoral support if he acted against squatters.  Typical sentiments were 
that, “Any politician who dares to do [evictions] dies politically”153 and “No mayor will have a 
political career going after the poor who build simple houses unless they have somewhere to put 
                                                
151 Author interview with construction and housing director, Santa Fe, Bogotá, Colombia, September 
7, 2011.   
152 Author interview with housing inspector, Ciudad Bolívar, Bogotá, Colombia, September 23, 2011.    
153 Author interview with judicial advisor, Rafael Uribe Uribe, Bogotá, Colombia, July 7, 2010.   
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them.”154  Bureaucrats emphasized that mayors acted in line with popular preferences.  In Ciudad 
Bolívar, where land invasions on open agricultural land continue apace, bureaucrats explained that 
mayors would not sign demolition orders because “the community does not think that evictions are 
the solution—they just want housing, and the mayor serves the community.”155  Other politicians 
emphasized the effects on their broader image.  In San Cristóbal, the district mayor signed eviction 
orders, but allocated no resources to the demolitions because “it would alienate the community, 
cause inconformity among citizens, and hurt the administration’s image.”156  
Additionally, I asked bureaucrats whether they perceived that the lack of resources or 
political intervention in enforcement was the major constraint on enforcement.  Only 8 percent (2 of 
26 bureaucrats) named resources as the primary constraint on enforcement.  Overwhelmingly, 
bureaucrats alleged that they could not enforce due to the political costs.  Thus, political factors play 
an even more decisive role in weak enforcement in Bogotá compared to Lima. 
In sum, fine-grained process tracing of enforcement outcomes helps to distinguish the role 
of institutional capacity and electoral incentives.  Observations that mayors block bureaucrats from 
taking enforcement actions against the poor, and push for enforcement when upper class groups 
violate the law highlights the incomplete explanatory power of administrative capacity.  Electoral 
politics provides greater leverage to understand why politicians let illegal land occupations persist in 
Bogotá.   
5.5 Political Centralization 
Bogotá is politically centralized, meaning that voters elect one mayor for the entire city.  
Given the heterogeneity of the city population, it is plausible that mayors who win election with the 
                                                
154 Author interview with housing director, Rafael Uribe Uribe, Bogotá, Colombia, July 7, 2010.   
155 Author interview with housing inspector, Ciudad Bolívar, Bogotá, Colombia, July 28, 2010.   
156 Author interview with local mayor, San Cristóbal, Bogotá, Colombia, July 10, 2010. 
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support of nonpoor core constituencies would choose to enforce, as I illustrate in the next chapter 
on street vendors.  Mayors with nonpoor followers plausibly could ignore the political costs of 
enforcement, and use their middle-class support as a buffer to implement enforcement policies in 
the long-run interests of taxpayers.  Squatting differs from street vending, however, in that middle-
class constituents do not easily observe control measures.  Chapter 2 also showed how the harsh 
nature of evictions means that the middle class does not necessarily clamor for coercive measures.  
Hence, the upside of enforcement is muted even for mayors who do not depend on the poor’s 
support for their political careers.  This section confirms that mayors with nonpoor core 
constituencies do conduct slightly more enforcement than those with poor core constituencies, but 
these time trends are less pronounced than we will see in the case of street vending in Chapter 4.        
Antanas Mockus was elected to his first term as mayor in 1995.  He drew his core support, 
which only became concentrated with time, from middle-class voters.  In office, Mockus undertook 
several important enforcement actions.  According to Mockus, his predecessor as mayor did not 
impose a single sanction for violations of urban laws and he intended to enforce the parchment 
laws.157  Mockus undertook 130 housing demolitions.158  He also conducted one of the largest 
housing evictions in recent history, removing 7000 people from a newly formed settlement.159  
Enforcement events under Mockus are best explained by his “anti-politics” position; he deliberately 
positioned himself as a defender of the city’s long-term interests against the typical office-seeking 
politician.  Mockus considered the tolerance of squatting a “shortcut” in which the long-term 
consequences for quality of life and urban planning were discounted (Mockus 2012).  However, 
even Mockus was aware of the reputational costs of enforcement. As Mockus explained his reaction 
                                                
157 Author interview with Antanas Mockus, Bogotá, Colombia, July 29, 2013. 
158 These statistics include partial housing demolitions and are compiled for Mockus’ second term 
due to data availability.  Statistics come from the 2008 locality reports to the District Planning 
Secretary and exclude the district of Santa Fe due to differences in reporting over time. 
159 El Tiempo 2001. 
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to a large land invasion that occurred early in his term, he noted, “I didn’t have any interest in my 
second day as mayor to begin with an eviction and all the media attention that it generated about not 
caring about the poor”—but he chose to enforce because he “didn’t want to create a precedent.” 
Mockus admits that enforcement against squatting was “not a grand theme” in his administration, 
unlike street vending, because “sincerely more than half of Bogota was built illegally.”160  Although 
Mockus did more enforcement than most mayors, he risked alienating the poor majority with little 
upside in terms of middle-class support if he went further with enforcement.         
Likewise, Peñalosa was elected with the support of nonpoor core constituencies but saw 
minimal gains from enforcement.  In contrast to his firm enforcement position against unlicensed 
street vendors, which I explore in Chapter 4, Peñalosa largely favored forbearance and reactive 
housing policies for squatters.  There are two major reasons for this difference.  First, illegal land 
occupations were invisible to the middle class and thus there was little to gain from enforcement.  
And, second, Peñalosa supported a position of social regulation, meaning that he disapproved of 
illegal land occupations, but saw coercive sanctions as too harsh in the absence of housing 
alternatives.  Peñalosa set out to offer housing alternatives to the poor so subsequent 
administrations could enforce, and reduce the long-run costs on the middle class.  On this basis, 
Peñalosa invested heavily in social interest housing programs, including the creation of Bogotá’s 
own land bank and housing agency, Metrovivienda.  He also legalized hundreds of existing squatter 
settlements.  Reactive policies were intended as a one-off legal recognition that would be combined 
with substitutive housing investments to transition to a formal development model.  However, the 
                                                
160 Mockus’ main regret was that his administration did not create a system to track illegal land 
occupations so that the city government could understand “whether housing programs actually were 
making progress in stopping illegal constructions.”  Author interview with Antanas Mockus, Bogotá, 
Colombia, July 29, 2013. 
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small scale of the city’s housing projects meant that it could not crowd out squatting without greater 
cooperation from the national government, which was not forthcoming.161  
The election of Luis Garzón, who represented the labor-based Polo Party (Polo Demócratico 
Alternativo, Polo), marked a sharp shift in core constituency.  The Polo administrations were elected 
overwhelming with the support of poor voters, and in line with this commitment, they quietly 
defended illegal settlements when they involved the poor.  More than three-quarters of bureaucrats 
that I surveyed believed that the Polo Party was more tolerant of illegal land occupations than 
previous administrations.  That said, in the case of illegal land occupations by upper-class groups, 
Garzón worked with district mayors to conduct housing demolitions.162 Likewise, Petro has 
defended the poor who have invaded the forest preserve, while urging a hardline against illegal 
occupations by the nonpoor.  A court order required the removal of all construction in the forest 
preserve.163  Petro instead signed a pact to legalize illegal land occupations by the poor, and block 
wealthy groups that built in the preserve. As he told the press, “We only want [the agreement] not to 
affect land in the Forest Preserve that traditionally has been used as neighborhoods in the eastern 
hill and that are low-income neighborhoods, we do not want a single square meter more of the hills 
                                                
161 Metrovivienda has built just 12,000 homes, or 1.65 percent of the housing stock in its most 
active period between 1993 and 2005 (Casasfranco and Arcos 2007).  It has been all but 
abandoned since then.    
162 These land occupations occurred primarily in the nonpoor districts of Chapinero and Usaquén.  
Garzón’s scheduled demolitions were to protect the forest reserve and remove wealthy homes.  See 
“Se inicia demolición de construcciones sin permisos en zonas forestales de Bogotá,” Caracol 20 Jun 
2006.  One local mayor, Angélica Lozano in Chapinero, ordered and conducted several demolitions, 
while several recent demolitions also were reported in Usaquén and Santa Fe.   
163 In 2006, environmental groups brought a lawsuit against the city government for its failure to 
protect the preserve from urbanization.  Environmental advocates won in the lower court, which 
ordered the city to remove all constructions from the preserve and protect the area from future land 
occupations.  The removal—if it relocated or compensated poor residents—would cost more than 
the city’s entire budget.      
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touched by construction industry interests and to capture rents that end up impoverishing the city” 
(emphasis added).164   
In sum, only mayors with middle-class constituencies have been willing to stomach the 
political costs of evictions of the poor, and even these mayors have recognized the electoral 
repercussions and pushed for improved housing policies as a precondition for enforcement.   
Mayors with poor core constituencies have tried to enforce against the nonpoor, but have avoided 
harming the poor who invade land out of necessity.  These observations are consistent with a theory 
in which electoral politics, not capacity constraints, explain enforcement choices. 
5.6 Conclusions 
It is useful to close this section by highlighting just how unique these observations are 
compared to dominant explanations in the literature.  First, the common view is that states are 
unaware and unable to sanction illegal land occupations.  This section concurs that enforcement 
against illegal land occupations is complicated and costly. But process tracing reveals that Bogotá 
actually maintains substantial knowledge and infrastructure to control illegal land occupations.  Even 
when district governments manage to prosecute illegal occupations, mayors block sanctions when 
they arrive at their desk.  Further evidence that these choices are politically motivated come from 
observations that mayors are less willing to enforce against the poor compared to the nonpoor, and 
they are less likely to enforce when they represent poor core constituencies.  
Some may ask, why bother with these administrative proceedings at all?  The idea of an 
entire bureaucratic process that almost never results in a sanction seems Orwellian if viewed through 
conventional perspectives on enforcement.  In some ways, the case of Lima, which has never built a 
                                                
164 “Petro no permitirá construcciones en los Cerros Orientales,” El Espectador, 26 Jul 2013; “Firman 
pacto para atajar construcción en los cerros orientales de Bogotá,” El Tiempo, 26 July 2013.  Petro 
also has shifted the enforcement focus to intermediaries who sell land in areas unsuited for urban 
development, rather than the purchasers.   
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bureaucracy to control land invasions, makes more sense.  Indeed, because so few cases end in 
evictions, some districts in Bogotá endogenously choose not to invest in the other steps of 
enforcement.  A pair of district officials told the city government to stop sending them reports of 
new illegal land occupations because, “if no mayor will enforce, then our resources are better spent 
on other types of cases.”165    
The choice to invest in an enforcement apparatus relates to my contention that weak 
enforcement does not involve state neglect or withdrawal from these areas.  Bureaucrats emphasized 
that they viewed their job as expanding institutional presence to informal settlement areas.  When 
asked how it feels to see complex administrative work end without a sanction, one bureaucrat 
provided a common rationalization: “The idea is to show that the city is watching, and to show that 
this isn’t a no man’s land.  I can’t really stop things, but I can show people that the state exists.”166 
The state goes through the motions of enforcement to show that it could control illegal land 
invasions.  Mayors choose not to take the final step because it would erode, rather than build, 
support in the eyes of poor constituents. The issue is not whether Colombia can bring in the police 
to evict squatters; it is whether squatters have anywhere else to live. 
Second, some theories of squatting have focused on strategic decisions by rent-seeking 
politicians.  The spirit of these arguments is that politicians enforce when it is in their economic 
interest, and leverage the revocable nature of forbearance to extract the most rents from the 
population (e.g. Collier 1976; Fischer 2008; Onoma 2010).  But rent seeking explanations flop in the 
case of Bogotá.  The rare cases of enforcement have involved upper class groups that should be 
most capable of preventing enforcement.  It is unlikely that squatters can organize and bribe officials 
to stop enforcement more effectively than the nonpoor. Only four bureaucrats surveyed, for 
                                                
165 Author interview with judicial advisor, District of Engativá, Bogotá, Colombia, July 13, 2010. 
166 Author interview with housing inspector, Ciudad Bolívar, Bogotá, Colombia, July 28, 2010.   
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example, believed that it was common that squatters paid the police to prevent enforcement.  
Instead, forbearance in favor of the poor has been a strategy to provide welfare informally in the 
absence of effective national housing alternatives. 
5 Substitutive Housing Policies and Enforcement: Santiago 
In contrast to Peru and Colombia, Chile’s housing policy reduced the electoral costs of 
enforcement against land invasions. While substitutive housing provision ultimately reduced 
material demands for illegal land occupations, its initial effects were on mass attitudes.  The public 
held national authorities responsible for housing provision and turned against land invaders 
because they jeopardized more desirable state solutions.  Whereas politicians lost electoral support 
if they enforced in Bogotá and Lima, voters in Santiago viewed local politicians who enforced as 
committed to helping the poor through the welfare state and upholding property laws.  Hence, it 
was in the electoral interests of local politicians to enforce.  Enforcement in turn led voters and 
mayors to push to improve state housing policies, which further expanded the state’s distributive 
capacity. 
The Chilean case also exposes how historical legacies and political parties affect the 
transition to a formal welfare equilibrium.  Repression of land invasions under a military 
government meant that demands were structured around prospective, rather than reactive, housing 
policies.  The context of a democratic transition also elevated and made visible the costs of 
forbearance.  Beyond the unique historical context, I argue that a coherent party system lengthened 
political time horizons to make initial housing investments and convinced mayors to buy in to a 
system of state housing provision before it effectively sopped up the poor’s housing demands.  
6.1 Substitutive Housing Policy 
 
Chile’s history of democratic breakdown colored its housing policy. In the run-up to the 
election and early years in office of Socialist President Salvador Allende (1970-73), more than 380 
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informal settlements housing 400,000 people formed through land takings in Santiago (Castells 
1971: 8; Fadda and Ducci 1993).  Allende—who aspired to build massive quantities of social interest 
housing—was explicit in his support for forbearance as an additional form of informal 
redistribution.  As a “government of the people,” Allende refused to repress informal settlement 
formation (Portes and Walton 1976: 83). Rampant land invasions contributed to the sense of social 
chaos and redistributive threat that provoked the military to overthrow Allende. 
When General Augusto Pinochet took power in a coup, he ended land invasions as an 
informal housing policy.167  The military government initiated demand-based subsidy policies to 
assist the middle class.  To free up land in upper-class neighborhoods, Pinochet relocated at least 
50,000 poor families to barracks on the urban periphery (Schneider 1995: 99-101).  With little 
possibility to invade land or enter housing programs, many poor families crowded into whatever 
spaces they could afford.  “Overcrowded” residents (allegados) in apartments and existing settlements 
organized politically as part of the Movement of Shantydwellers (Movimiento de Pobladores, MPL).  
MPL played a central role in protests against the dictatorship, and drew attention to the plight of the 
poor. 
The popular demand for housing was clear at the end of the dictatorship.  An estimated 
583,220 households lived in overcrowded conditions or shantytowns in urban areas, or a fifth of the 
urban population (Arriagada Luco and Moreno Crossley 2001: 29-30).168 Because squatters had been 
repressed, Chile’s housing deficit was largely quantitative in nature.  Households in overcrowded 
                                                
167 There was one major exemption.  The poor did stage a huge land invasion of some 8,000 families 
in September 1983.  The government did not evict the massive invasion, given the depth of the 
economic crisis at the time.  However, it purposely attempted to deter any further attempts.  The 
army, police, and secret police conducted neighborhood searches at all hours and arrested men at 
random to make the invasion community serve as a warning to others (Klaarhamer 1989: 186; 
Oxhorn 1995). 
168 Overcrowding statistics are available at the household level.  If we assume that each households 
has an average of four members, then out of Chile’s 10.9 million urban residents, one in five lived in 
an overcrowded household.  
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conditions needed more houses, not reactive policies to upgrade existing ones. A fifth of the 
population nationwide named the lack of housing as one of the country’s principal problems 
(Centro de Estudios Públicos 1991).   
The democratic transition brought an intense focus on how to resolve the poor’s housing 
demand out of fear that social pressures would explode in land invasions and destabilize the regime.  
A series of land invasions during the transition stoked this concern.  Housing Minister Alberto 
Etchegaray condemned the invasions as “concerted actions designed to destabilize the future 
government,”169 and his sentiments were echoed by a host of congressmen and party officials 
(Hipsher 1996: 283).  A Housing Ministry report captures the centrality placed on crowding out land 
takings: “Overcrowding induced a fear of a massive process of land invasions…the success of the 
[state housing policy] is manifest in that land invasions never occurred” (Arriagada Luco and 
Moreno Crossley 2001: 15). 
President Patricio Aylwin (1990-94), a member of the Christian Democratic Party (Partido 
Demócrata Cristiano, PDC) that formed part of a bloc of parties on the political Left (Concertación), 
designed his housing policy to stymie invasions. The goal was to accelerate the number of housing 
units that the state produced, largely irrespective of quality or surrounding urban features.  
Government-commissioned production of housing nearly doubled from 78,000 in 1990 to 138,000 
units per year in 1994. The mark of success was that Chile produced more social interest housing 
than the increase in demand, thereby becoming the only Latin American country to reduce its 
quantitative housing deficit (MINVU 2006).  
The Chilean housing system is often erroneously viewed as a neoliberal model where the 
state provides savings and credit to correct market failures and then backs off.  What is missed is 
that the state maintains a heavy hand to make housing reach the poorest segmented of the income 
                                                
169 El Mercurio, 13 Feb 1990 
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distribution.  Unlike in Colombia and Peru, for example, the state contracts the private sector to 
build the number of housing units required to match the subsidies provided.  Chile initially faced 
many of the same problems that construction companies refused to build for the poor, but it 
worked its way through these issues.  As one former housing ministry official notes, “There is a 
price for everything, and the government just paid [construction companies] enough until they 
would build…The government made clear that the targeting was non-negotiable.”170  The 
effectiveness of Chile’s direct housing project promotion can be seen in the fact that roughly three-
quarters of recipients use their assigned subsidies within the course of several years.171  Moreover, 
the state bank provided loans to poor families who would not qualify on standard markets.  Massive 
defaults on state mortgage loans to the poor made the housing program even more generous than 
intended.   
Despite extensive state intervention, housing construction initially struggled to reach the 
poor.  The lowest two quintiles only received 25 percent of total budget outlays in 1992.  The 
poorest households within these quintiles failed to meet the savings requirements, and fell outside of 
state policies (Marcano and Ruprah 2008: 10).  But the poor’s share of public expenditures would 
climb to 56 percent in 1996 and 67 percent in 2003, as the Chilean state adapted to the challenges of 
reaching the poor. As official in the Finance Ministry put it, “The voucher system has never worked 
for the first and second quintile, we learned that you just have to give houses away.”172 
Indeed, housing policy became more bottom-targeted as the government simply gave houses 
to the poor.  President Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006) understood that there was a trade-off between 
                                                
170 Author interview with former housing ministry official, Santiago, Chile, June 21, 2012. 
171 The Construction Chamber shows that the number of homes constructed usually is about 75 
percent of the level of subsidies granted, but recipients have several years to use the subsidies so 
roughly 82 percent of recipients eventually find housing (CChC 2008). 
172 Interview with Slaven Razmilic, Coordinator of Social Policies, Finance Ministry, Santiago, Chile, 
June 21, 2012. 
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savings requirements and coverage of the poorest.  He opted to extend housing programs to the 
poor by eliminating mortgage and savings requirements. Fear of land invasions had faded as they 
were repressed and squatter settlements were a minor issue.  Instead, as I discussed in outlining the 
broader justifications for housing investments, the Chilean Left stressed a basic needs approach to 
housing provision. Lagos, for instance, justified the housing investments as “a matter of human 
dignity.”173  Cabinet members objected that gifting houses to the poor without savings or mortgage 
requirements would build dependency on the state.  To alleviate these concerns, the government 
introduced participatory measures in which poor families would help design the housing projects 
that they received.  The Casas Lagos, or Lagos Houses, as they were colloquially known, proved 
immensely popular.174  Demand outstripped the large supply of 100,000 houses built each year 
(Lagos 2012: 188).  A testament to the improved targeting, the government spent three-quarters of 
its housing budget on the bottom third of the income distribution under Lagos (Rodríguez et al. 
2006: 14). 175    
Not to idolize Chile’s housing policy, the downside of an emphasis on housing construction 
has been spatial segregation.  A rush to build houses meant that government projects were placed in 
the poorest districts of Santiago distant from the city center.  Subsequent presidents have tried to 
rectify these problems.  In particular, President Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010) reformed housing 
programs to increase the size of state benefits from an average upfront subsidy of $10,000 to over 
$18,000 for the poorest quintile to purchase houses in better locations.  Central government 
                                                
173 Author interview with Ricardo Lagos, Cambridge, Massachusetts, October 8, 2013. 
174 This program was called Dynamic Social Housing Without Debt (Vivienda Social Dinamica sin 
Deuda). 
175 In recent years, President Sebastián Piñera has expanded subsidy programs for middle-income 
groups in an attempt to universalize coverage up the income distribution.  In 2011 and 2012, 46 
percent (28,753) of all subsidies allocated went to middle-class families (MINVU 2013). 
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investments in transportation and public services have started to address some of the broader 
problems of urban segregation created by the spatial clustering of housing projects in poor districts.  
The discourse surrounding housing policy has shifted away the provision of housing to the 
quality of conditions in large part due to Chile’s success in meeting the poor’s basic demands.  
Bachelet’s Undersecretary of Housing Paulina Saball—also a central figure in Aylwin’s 
administration—explains that a lack of attention to social segregation was the unfortunate downside 
of an intense focus on making sure that each household had an adequate house.  Saball, however, 
emphasizes that the government had no other choice after the democratic transition.  The priority 
was to prevent land invasions and reset societal expectations: 
“The key pragmatic question was how in a short period of time could the government signal that 
it was possible to absorb a housing deficit of this magnitude through the State?  We had to 
recover the confidence of the poor that the State would build housing—not all in one term—but 
that under democracy it would happen and make land takings unnecessary.”176   
 
These remarks bring out two ways in which Chile’s housing policy was not a foregone 
conclusion.  First, substitutive housing policy constituted a major shift from the dictatorship’s 
approach.  The dictatorship had disrupted beliefs that the state would provide for citizens’ housing 
needs, and the magnitude of the accumulated housing deficit made actors doubt that the state could 
step in to address the issue.  This view contrasts with Soifer (2013)’s argument that Chile’s 
substantial distributive capacity led citizens to expect a state role in housing provision.  Instead of 
drawing on preexisting welfare expectations, national officials intentionally tried to use housing 
expenditures to change beliefs about the state’s distributive capacity.  Second, it was unusual that the 
Concertación made housing the cornerstone of its social policy investments.  Indeed, many scholars 
have underestimated the size and progressivity of the Chilean welfare state, particularly in the 1990s, 
by only looking at other social policy areas like income support or health where it made limited 
                                                
176 Author interview with Paulina Saball, Director de la Unidad de Difusión y Fomento, Ministerio 
de Vivienda y Urbanismo under Aylwin, Subsecretaria de Vivienda y Urbanismo under Bachelet, 
July 4, 2012. 
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advances (Garay 2010; Huber and Stephens 2012; Pribble 2013).  Yet, as President Lagos puts it, the 
provision of housing to the poor has been one of Chile’s most important social policy investments 
and, unlike most of Latin America, Chile “can truthfully say that it has almost eliminated slums.”177  
I now show how the turn to substitutive housing policy crowded out illegal land occupations and led 
to uniform enforcement.       
6.2 Crowding Out Squatting 
 
Chile transitioned to democracy with an enormous advantage over countries like Peru and 
Colombia: only a small fraction of the population lived in squatter settlements.  The military 
government had provided more than 500,000 property titles to the urban poor (Gilbert 2002: 5), 
relocated squatter settlements, and repressed land invasions. The central issue was whether the 
national government could prevent new land invasions from forming under democracy.   
Substitutive housing policies began to directly “crowd out” the poor’s material demands for 
housing.  Even with a building crunch and deep pockets, Chile’s investments barely dented the 
poor’s housing demand in the short run.  Most applicants waited five to ten years in the housing 
queue.  The Concertación’s policies only reduced the housing shortage among the poorest quintiles 
by 12 percent in the 1990s (Marcano and Ruprah 2008: 6).  In the 2006 household survey, 47 
percent of poor families nationwide still lived in overcrowded conditions, and the quantitative 
housing deficit stood at half a million houses (CASEN 2006).  Housing policies absorbed some 
demand.  Nevertheless, it would be a stretch to say that Chile “crowded out” land invasions by 
offering an immediate resolution to the poor’s material demands.     
In critical ways, Chile created disincentives for illegal land occupations.  It took a firm stance 
against reactive housing policies like the provision of property titles, unlike in Peru and Colombia.  
In 1996, Chile instituted its only reactive housing policy called Chile Barrio to improve conditions in 
                                                
177 Lagos (2012: 188) and author interview with Ricardo Lagos, October 8, 2013.  
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preexisting informal settlements. The government stood firm on the program’s end date.  As the 
program subdirector Marcelo Carvallo explained, “Chile Barrio will not incorporate new settlements, 
by definition; from its creation, we did not want to signal that we are going to solve the social 
housing problem through land takings” (Carvallo 2000: 61).  This promise was credible in large part 
because the government had ramped up its housing expenditures. Contrast this single reactive 
program, coupled with a major push to create formal housing solutions, with Peru and Colombia’s 
near constant legalization of informal settlements without options for the landless urban poor to 
access housing. 
The success of Chile’s joint housing investments and abstention from reactive housing 
policies can be seen in the decline in illegal land occupations.  The Housing Ministry maintains a 
census of informal settlements (Catastro de Asentamientos Informales), which shows a sharp drop in the 
number of families living in informal settlements.  The settlement population in Santiago dropped 
from 10,162 in 1995 to 3,179 in 2006 (MINVU 2013: 104). Because housing programs promised 
property ownership within the span of years and land invasions were unlikely to end in legal 
recognition, the attractiveness of land takings to the poor fell in Santiago.  The poor instead looked 
to the state to meet their housing needs.  
6.3 Demand Displacement 
 
A central effect of Chile’s housing policy was to shift popular demands from local politicians 
to state housing authorities.  Frist, substitutive housing policies reorganized popular interest 
associations.  At the democratic transition, Chile saw a massive movement of “overcrowded” 
residents who demanded solutions to their housing needs.  Yet, rather than take land and create 
squatter settlement associations, citizens created housing committees to apply for state subsidies.  
State authorities deliberately promoted this transference.  Applicants received priority if they applied 
for housing as a group.  Housing committees had to acquire legal status to apply—which they would 
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lose along with all social benefits—if they attempted to take land illegally.  This process inverted the 
Peruvian one in which illegal land occupations were required to register their associations with the 
state and only once they had possession over illegal land could they become eligible for basic 
services and construction subsidies.  Given state encouragement in Chile, local housing committees 
with a minimum of 50 families proliferated to apply for subsidies.  The social movements around 
housing like the MPL and the national shantytown association Solidarity themselves were 
transformed.  They directed their energies to support local housing committees in the “struggle for 
state housing.”178  
In addition, the government established a transparent housing queue so applicants knew 
where they stood in the process.  Applicants opened bank accounts and began to save for the 
deposit on their new home.  Accordingly, even if they did not receive a house in the early period, 
they were committed financially to the system.  The transparent enrollment process—combined 
with rapid construction and concrete financial investments in the system—helped instill a shared 
belief that the state would address housing demands through sustained investments in the sector.  
The head of the PDC’s shantytown unit praised the housing policy design because it “gives people 
hope and makes them believe that the government is with them. If these mechanisms didn’t exist, the people 
would have exploded” [emphasis added] (qtd. in Hipsher 1996: 286).  
Strengthened popular demands can be seen in the national housing application process itself.  
Since the transition, more than 100,000 households have applied for housing subsidies in Chile each 
year (CChC 2011).  Local mayors believe that they are judged for their willingness to generate 
housing projects in conjunction with local housing committees and the national government.179 I 
                                                
178 Author interview with MPL leader, Santiago, Chile, June 23, 2012. 
179 This association was particularly true in the early years of the program.  The role of local mayors 
was reduced when collective applications were eliminated, and the market was opened to the 
purchase of used construction.  In addition, mayors in poor districts have come to be wary of new 
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found that 8 of 16 mayors in poor districts made mention of their work on housing projects as part 
of their campaign materials in the 2008 campaign.  For example, Mayor Claudio Orrego considered 
one of the “11 most frequent lies” about his campaign to be that “he did not support overcrowded 
residents and refused to change zoning requirements (Plan Regulador) to create new social interest 
housing.”180  Local councilors described their work in terms of constituency service (tramitador, 
orientador) to help residents access national housing projects.181  The frequency of state housing 
demands suggests the key role of substitutive housing policy in displacing demands to the state as 
the central provider of housing; district mayors then become intermediaries who increase pressure to 
improve access to state resources.   
Concomitantly, demands for forbearance plummeted.  State officials believed that the public 
rejected land invasions as a threat to state housing programs.  Common impressions of state officials 
were that land invaders were impatient—they “just tried to jump the queue”182—or fraudulent and 
lazy—“they are people who don’t qualify for state housing” or “don’t want to pay the monthly 
installments” required in housing projects.183  To see this difference in impressions of squatters more 
systematically, I asked bureaucrats whether they believed that illegal land occupations were justified 
because the poor had no other means to access housing.  In Lima and Bogotá, roughly half of 
bureaucrats agreed with this statement.  Not a single housing official believed that land takings were 
justified in Santiago.   
                                                                                                                                                       
housing projects given that the compensation to the district is insufficient for the demands placed 
on local services.  Author interview with Pedro Isla, Mayor, District of San Ramón, June 21, 2012.   
180 “Las 11 mentiras más frecuentes para desprestigiar al Alcalde Orrego y las verdades que debe 
saber,” Campaign Pamphlet for Claudio Orrego, 8 Aug 2008.   
181 Author interview with Claudia Lange, Councilor, District of San Ramon, Santiago, Chile, June 19, 
2012. 
182 Author interview with head of rents, San Bernardo, June 23, 2012. 
183 Author interview with director of inspections, District of Peñalolén, January 11, 2012.  
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Lastly, the fact that citizens were willing to report land takings to local authorities highlights 
the extent of societal rejection.  Common experiences of local mayors and bureaucrats were that 
constituents reported land invasions immediately. Local housing committees feared that squatters 
would take the district’s land and undermine their ability to access state housing programs.184 
6.4 Mayoral Decisions 
 
Santiago elects district mayors who report land invasions to the police and state authorities.  
However, unlike Lima, district mayors called the police to suppress land takings in Santiago.  No 
government tally of attempted and failed land invasions exists for the period so I culled newspaper 
for reports of invasions.  I found 25 reports of attempted illegal land occupations in Santiago 
between 1990 and 1996, ranging in size from 25 to 860 families, in the country’s main newspaper El 
Mercurio.  Of these, 19 met with immediate police repression, and the response to the others could 
not be identified.   
It is impossible to replicate the enforcement process tracing exercise in Santiago because the 
government has so thoroughly suppressed land invasions that no cases pass through the system.  
The best approximation comes from asking state officials what hypothetically happens in the case of 
illegal land occupations.  First, when asked, politicians reject the idea of forbearance as a form of 
informal welfare provision.  Even politicians from the Communist Party, which had a long history 
of involvement in land invasions in Chile and thus were most likely to remain sympathetic, scoffed 
at the idea of informal welfare provision: “Obviously, we cannot return to the old system where 
people invaded land.  We now have a housing system to help people who need it.”185  Second, within 
a functioning formal housing system, the electoral costs of enforcement were perceived quite 
                                                
184 Author interview with Pedro Isla, Mayor, District of San Ramón, Santiago, Chile, June 21, 2012.; 
Author interview with Juan Carlos Riveros, Director of Operations and Inspections, District of 
Peñalólen,  January 11, 2012. 
185 Author interview Tamara Homel Navarro, Local Councilor, District of Pudahuel, Santiago, Chile, 
January 17, 2012. 
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differently.  As in Bogotá and Lima, I asked district bureaucrats if they believed that mayors in 
Santiago lose (“1”) or gain (“10”) political support when they evict squatters.  The average response 
in Santiago was a 7.3 (compared to just 2.8 and 3.4 in Bogotá and Lima, respectively).  In other 
words, enforcement was perceived to a have a positive impact on the public’s impression of the 
mayor.  Third, qualitative data reinforce that evictions do not compromise a mayor’s image in the 
community.  Enforcement was perceived to show deference to state housing programs and the rule 
of law, rather than pro-poor sympathies.  For instance, local officials explained that enforcement 
“just made clear that the mayor was committed to the state’s housing policies” 186 and “it hurts more 
than it helps the candidate to not support the law.”187 Cooperation with the state to provide 
housing—not forbearance—signaled a mayor’s commitment to the poor.   
A focus on the illegal land occupations that did succeed further reinforces the relationship 
between enforcement and housing programs.  The first successful land taking under democracy, the 
Campamento Esperanza Andina, occurred in Peñalolén in July 1992.  It included 850 families. 
Government officials condemned the invasion, which they saw as a threat to state housing policy 
and a dangerous precedent.  But the government’s housing policy remained in its infancy. Officials 
faced a tough dilemma: they feared that evicting squatters would be excessively similar to the 
military regime’s tactics, but they also worried that forbearance or relocation would encourage other 
invasions (Figueroa 2003: 563).  Ultimately, the government negotiated the expropriation of the land 
in favor of the squatters and took steps to prevent that the invasion set a precedent.  The 
government increased training for mayors and police to evict squatters immediately.  As a housing 
official describes, “The policy was to use force immediately so that takings would not consolidate 
                                                
186 Author interview with director of inspections, District of Peñalolén, Santiago, Chile, January 11, 
2012. 
187 Author interview with Genaro Ballardes, Local Councilor, District of Pudahuel, Santiago, Chile, 
January 17, 2012. 
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and create tension between repression and social needs, and at the same time to accelerate housing 
programs as much as possible.”188 Hence, we can see that before substitutive housing policy 
developed in Santiago, politicians faced similar tensions to those observed in Lima and Bogotá.  As 
housing policies improved, illegal land occupations nearly ceased. 
Political parties played an important role in prodding mayors to stop illegal land occupations 
before Chile’s housing system managed to address the poor’s housing demands.  Given Santiago’s 
political decentralization, it could have been in the interests of district mayors to boost their 
constituents’ welfare and tolerate illegal land occupations in the 1990s.  Strong political parties 
worked to prevent this situation.  State housing officials met extensively with district mayors to 
secure their cooperation with the state’s housing policy, but their main concerns centered on 
districts where allied mayors from the Left were in power. When poor districts elected district 
mayors from the political Right, these mayors were unlikely to promote land invasions.  The popular 
Right party, the Independent Democratic Union (Unión Demócrata Independiente, UDI), used a 
segmented strategy that combines clientelism to attract the poor with a programmatic defense of its 
core constituency of business and conservative elites (Luna 2010).  The promotion of land invasions 
would have been anathema to the party’s nonpoor constituencies, even if it gained favor in poor 
districts where UDI mayors took office.  The main threat of forbearance thus came from district 
mayors aligned with the Concertación, many of whom had ties to squatter movements.  Party elites 
in both the Christian Democratic and Socialist Party were very explicit that state housing programs 
for the poor, not illegal land occupations, were critical to the success of their parties’ programmatic 
initiatives.  As the Socialist Party Secretary explained, “It would be easy to occupy the piece of land 
near the airport and to encourage a big land seizure to solve the problem but that would be 
                                                
188 Author interview with Paulina Saball, Director de la Unidad de Difusión y Fomento, Ministerio 
de Vivienda y Urbanismo under Aylwin, Subsecretaria de Vivienda y Urbanismo under Bachelet, 
July 4, 2012. 
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irresponsible on our part.  We don’t want to provoke the police or our opponents” (Hipsher 1996: 
284).  As one mayor who governed a poor district during the 1990s explains, “There were some 
segments of the ultra-Left that went to take land, but the major political parties all committed to 
evict them immediately and worked with the committees of overcrowded residents to find formal 
housing solutions.”189 
6.5 Conclusions 
 
To wrap up, this section demonstrated how substitutive social policies were designed, and 
succeeded, to prevent illegal land occupations in Santiago.  While state construction reduced material 
needs, it took decades for housing policies to meet social demands.  Instead, substitutive housing 
policies first impacted citizens’ demands and beliefs about the way to secure housing. Land takings 
were viewed as a challenge to the state’s provision, and therefore mayors ran limited political risks if 
they enforced.   
A potential counterargument is that the threat of a coup, not substitutive housing policies, 
led Chile to enforce against land invasions.  Hipsher (1996), for instance, persuasively demonstrates 
that social actors held back from taking land because they did not want to repeat the radical 
redistributive claims that undermined democracy.  Local mayors may have understood the centrality 
of enforcement to their political careers, but primarily because they worried about democratic 
stability.  It is unclear if substitutive social policies could have controlled land invasions as 
resoundingly in “normal” political times.   
I agree that the ability of substitutive housing policy to thwart land invasions was aided by 
Chile’s political history.  Nonetheless, I see the main effect of the precarious historical moment to 
be a rare political consensus on the need for housing policy to prevent land invasions and the 
benefit of a tabla rasa in which the urban poor did not live in informal settlements.  The persistence 
                                                
189 Author interview with Pedro Isla, Mayor, District of San Ramón, Santiago, Chile, June 21, 2012. 
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of popular condemnation of squatting after threats to democracy eased attests to the role of 
substitutive housing policies in maintaining an enforcement equilibrium, rather than the military 
waiting in the wings.  Popular sentiment turned against squatters as impatient and disrespectful of 
state housing policies.  A consensus rejecting land invasions helped mayors enforce against squatters 
and centered demands on state housing provision. 
The fact that the public condemns land invasions as a form of cheating suggests that state 
capacity plays a role in enforcement, although not the one conventionally discussed.  Chile’s 
distributive capacity was critical in its ability to control squatting.  Popular rejection of squatting was 
aided by a belief that Chile’s housing system worked in a fair, transparent way.  Were programs 
riddled with patronage or targeted at undeserving groups, perhaps the poor may have accepted land 
invasions as a justified response to welfare state dysfunction.  Or, if programs were mere token 
initiatives, mayors would have incentives to tolerate land invasions to supplement politicized or 
minimal housing allocations.  Instead, Chile created an institutionalized and transparent system to 
allocate housing.  It also put money behind these programs.  As such, mayors could claim that they 
promoted the poor’s well-being through an orderly use of district land for state housing projects.      
To date, Santiago is the only case of a large city in the region that has eliminated the 
formation of illegal settlements through social policy mechanisms.  Its uniqueness lies in the political 
consensus that developed to design housing policies to stop land invasions; these commitments 
were credible due institutionalized political parties that helped coordinate the behavior of mayors 
and a competent housing bureaucracy.  Substitutive housing policies displaced demands to state 
authorities and shifted the incentives for district mayors to enforce.  As I show in Chapter 5, the 
legacy of dictatorship plays out very differently—and favors forbearance due to limited social policy 
and negative associations with the dictatorship—in the case of street vending. 
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7    Conclusion 
How do informal and formal welfare policies relate?  This chapter has demonstrated their 
substitutive properties in the case of housing.  It demonstrated the importance of national welfare 
policies for enforcement incentives in three countries that vary in the scale and targeting of housing 
expenditures. Peru has implemented skeletal housing policies and Colombia has favored middle-
class groups through truncated expenditures.  These complementary housing policies have 
encouraged forbearance by local mayors.  In contrast, Chile’s substitutive housing policies reshaped 
political incentives to make enforcement possible.  Beyond simply identifying these different welfare 
equilibria, this chapter has explained how these different patterns have been reproduced.   
Complementary housing policies heightened the electoral benefits from forbearance.  The 
case of Peru most dramatically illustrated this process. Inadequate housing policies led the urban 
poor to seize land, mayors to tolerate invasions, and national governments to bow to demands to 
legalize past takings.  Expectations of inadequate provision and eventual legalization reproduced the 
forbearance cycle.  Widespread squatting, weak parties, and political decentralization make it unlikely 
that Peru can move away from an informal housing model.  Colombia represented a similar, 
although less extreme case, of the forbearance equilibrium.  The absence of effective housing policy 
substitutes has encouraged mayors, and particularly those with poor core constituents, to favor 
forbearance.  However, the lower rate of illegal land occupations—plus rules that mean that the 
governments pay the costs of forbearance immediately—increases the chances for a successful 
transition to substitutive housing policies. 
The contrast of substitutive housing policy in Chile reinforces both how housing policy 
changes local enforcement incentives, and the virtuous cycle that ensues once land invasions are 
blocked as a means of housing access.  Chile’s housing policy reflects a deliberate attempt—albeit in 
very special historical circumstances—to get local mayors and citizens to overcome instincts to 
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permit land takings to resolve short-term housing demands.  Investments in housing policy prodded 
citizens to demand and receive more from the state, which helped Chile to sustain improvements in 
the targeting and scale of housing projects. 
In many ways, it is unsurprising that a capable state like Chile both builds houses for the 
poor and prevents land seizures, while a far feebler state like Peru manages neither task.  This 
chapter has taken seriously concerns that weak state capacity both determines a country’s social 
policy expenditures and enforcement actions, and used a rich array of administrative and qualitative 
data to pull apart different dimensions of state weakness.  What is novel is that the case study 
evidence shows the importance of distributive capacity, rather than police or bureaucrats, in 
facilitating divergent enforcement outcomes.   
Even in Chile, the case-study evidence revealed the government deliberately invested in 
housing for the poor to deter illegal land occupations.  Chapter 5 reinforces that this outcome was 
not an inevitable result of a state with capable police and courts.  In a context where the Chilean 
government has been unable to resolve the poor’s distributive needs—employment—politicians 
have pursued forbearance against street vending as an informal welfare policy.  
Colombia stood out as an instructive case of intermediate and checkered state strength 
where a well-equipped bureaucracy and police plausibly can control illegal land occupations. Mayors 
stopped enforcement after the administrative process was complete, and they did so most frequently 
when cases involved the poor and when their core constituencies were drawn from poor voters.  
These observations are hard to square with conventional capacity-based theories.   
While the evidence for forbearance was weaker in Lima due to its less capable and coherent 
enforcement institutions, state officials were explicit that weak enforcement resulted from skeletal 
housing policy.  Existing information about squatter settlements, for instance, was not applied to 
enforcement.  National authorities could create a coherent agency to monitor illegal land 
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occupations, as in Bogotá, but they see little incentive to do so when the housing bureaucracy is 
designed to legalize and assist land invasions.  Quite a different type of weakness, namely lousy 
social policy and a collapsed party system that leads executives to favor short-term projects like 
property titling, drives weak enforcement against illegal land occupations.  The next chapter shows 
how a divergent enforcement outcome emerges in the case of street vending in Lima, despite the 
same weak police and bureaucracy.  While only mayors in poor districts are tasked with enforcement 
against squatters, street vendors spread across the city and have led to effective control by mayors 
with nonpoor core constituencies and in middle-class districts.  Electoral geography, rather than 
state weakness, is critical to understanding these differences.  
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Chapter 4 
Employing the Poor  
 
“Street vendors receive a ‘subsidy’ in the form of free rent, public services, 
and a way to make a living.  This is the bare minimum of what a just society 
owes the poor.” 
—Yezid García, City Councilor, Bogotá, Colombia 
 
 
 The previous chapter showed how the social policy context results in divergent enforcement 
incentives and outcomes for squatters.  This chapter takes up the challenge of explaining divergent 
enforcement responses in a context in which social policy substitutes are largely unavailable: street 
vending.  If we expect similar responses from cities with similar political and economic profiles, then 
we would expect parallel courses of enforcement from governments in Bogotá and Lima.  Both 
countries lack substantial unemployment insurance and job training programs to substitute for street 
vending.  If anything, Lima confronted street vendors with fewer institutional resources and faced a 
deeper economic crisis. And yet Bogotá has allowed street vendors to expand throughout the city, 
even as the economy has boomed in past decades.  Lima responded aggressively to street vendors in 
the 1990s and largely has kept them out of central city streets.  What can account for these 
differences?   
  The explanation presented here highlights the role of core constituencies.  Citywide 
electoral districts, such as those used in Bogotá and Lima, incorporate diverse class groups.  Mayors 
can win office with the support of divergent core constituencies.  I argue that politicians elected by 
poor core constituencies are more likely to promote forbearance to lift local welfare informally and 
signal their commitments to the poor.   Politicians may incorporate the interests of the core 
constituency that elected them because they seek the group’s continued electoral support for 
reelection or election to a higher office.  Other politicians select enforcement policies based on their 
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ideological views.  In this case, my prediction is that enforcement platforms attract nonpoor core 
constituencies and mayors enforce because they were sympathetic to those views in the first place.  
Unlike the previous chapter, forbearance toward street vending is an unstable equilibrium in 
citywide elections because the winning core constituency can change due to probabilistic voting and 
shifts in voter preferences.  Periods of forbearance make enforcement against street vending more 
likely in the next period.  Forbearance increases opposition to street vending among nonpoor voters 
because it inflates the costs imposed on the public and increases vendors’ visible wealth.  These 
shifts make it easier for candidates to use enforcement appeals to mobilize nonpoor core 
constituencies to win office.  In a symmetric manner, past enforcement can swing sympathy toward 
street vendors and galvanize the poor to elect a candidate who proposes forbearance.  Forbearance 
cycles should be most pronounced in politically centralized cities where enforcement results in a 
more uniform foreclosure of work opportunities.  In politically decentralized cities, city mayors can 
control vending in the downtown and leave district mayors to absorb unemployed workers.  
Segmented policies dampen the poor’s mobilization against enforcement.  Given the complexity of 
public opinion, putting forward a unidirectional explanation of how electoral preferences influence 
politicians would be unrealistic, although more parsimonious.  But I think electoral incentives are, 
once we account for shifts in mass opinion in response to enforcement choices, the major 
precipitant of enforcement outcomes.   
The juxtaposition of these city cases highlights that enforcement does not passively follow 
fluctuations in the number of vendors, state capacity or economic conditions.  State capacity poorly 
explains both forbearance in conditions of growing institutional and economic growth, as in Bogotá 
in the mid-2000s, and enforcement in the context of weak institutions and economic malaise, as in 
Lima in the mid-1990s.  While the timing of enforcement patterns is unexpected under conventional 
capacity-based explanations, I show that mayors’ core constituencies make sense of both of these 
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seeming anomalies.  I also draw on extensive qualitative evidence from administrative documents 
and newspapers together with elite interviews, focus group meetings with street vending association 
leaders, and participant observation with bureaucrats and police to probe the extent to which mayors 
choose how to enforce based on political calculations.  Causal process observations are more 
consistent with a theory in which city mayors elected with the support of poor voters use 
forbearance to appeal to and reward their constituents with a form of informal welfare provision.   
This chapter proceeds in four major parts.  I begin by comparing objective facts about street 
vending, as well as subjective perceptions of vendors over time in Bogotá and Lima.  I use 
newspaper articles to track the issue salience and framing of the public debate around street vending.  
Second, I show that social policy alternatives to employ the poor have lagged in both cities.  Third, I 
compare enforcement policy across time in Bogotá.  City mayors with nonpoor core constituencies 
conduct almost five times more enforcement operations against street vendors than those with poor 
constituencies.  I highlight that recent mayors have been elected with poor core constituencies and 
have used forbearance to build electoral support among the poor, despite significant institutional 
improvements.  Fourth, I extend the argument that enforcement varies with core constituencies to 
Lima.  The election of a mayor who drew on middle-class support explains the unexpected turn to 
enforcement in the mid-1990s, while the continued election of mayors with mixed-class 
constituencies leads to enforcement continuity in the city center in the 2000s.  The final sections 
discuss alternative explanations and conclude.   
In the next chapter, I return to the least-likely case under conventional capacity theories for 
forbearance, Santiago, and demonstrate how electoral rules help make sense of enforcement patterns 
across space in all three cities.  I exclude Santiago from the discussion in this chapter because it only 
elects mayors at the sub-city district level. 
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1 Context 
 
Street vendors exemplify the gap between law and reality in Latin American cities.  On 
paper, cities ban street vendors or restrict their operation to specific hours, zones, and products.  In 
practice, street vendors proliferate.  While the poor work in many informal jobs, I concentrate on 
street vending because it involves the taking of public property, as with squatting.  This section 
establishes the basics of what street vendors do (and should not do), how many street vendors exist, 
and how they are perceived in Lima and Bogotá.  I show strong cycles in public opinion in the 
politically centralized case of Bogotá, and a secular decline in interest in the hybrid electoral system 
of Lima, despite the fact that the cities have followed similar economic trajectories.  
1.1 Defining Street Vending  
 
Street vending encompasses two different activities.  First, there are mobile vendors who 
walk city streets offering goods and services.  Itinerant vendors tend not to concern governments 
because they circulate and sell on a small scale.  Second, stationary vendors install carts, tables, 
blankets or entire “shops” to sell their merchandise.  I focus on stationary vendors because they 
violate property laws by usurping public space for private commercial use. The fact that street 
vending constitutes a property law violation differentiates it from informal economic activities more 
broadly defined.1   
Stationary vendors cause a host of negative externalities, including problems with transit, 
urban planning, noise, garbage, and public health and safety risks.  Some vendors also sell goods that 
compete with licensed businesses.  For instance, one study estimates that street vendors in Bogotá 
reduce commercial sales and formal sector employment by 14 and 16 percent, respectively (Rocha, 
                                                
1 Measures of the informal sector include the fraction of the labor force that is self-employed, that 
receive social security or labor benefits, or the fraction of economic activity not reported for tax 
purposes (Perry 2007: 28-32).  Street vendors qualify under all standard definitions, but are a subset 
of the broader informal economy that includes any unregulated activity. 
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Sánchez, and García 2009).  As with other forms of informal commerce, most street vendors do not 
comply with tax or labor laws.   
The majority of vendors are poor and their earnings fall below the minimum wage.2  The 
income distribution also tends to be quite skewed, with a small fraction of vendors earning incomes 
comparable to successful business owners.  In broad terms, street vendors who work in city centers, 
and particularly those with fixed stands in the streets, tend to be better off than those who work in 
the urban periphery (Bromley 2000).  There is important historical variation in the wealth of street 
vendors, as I return to below.  Forbearance allows vendors to accumulate wealth and capital, and 
thus incomes tend to be higher in periods of lax enforcement.  
Street vendors often form associations to protect their interests and organize themselves in 
public spaces.  Around half of vendors in central city areas in Lima participate in associations, while 
rates are likely lower in the urban periphery (Roever 2005).  A large-scale survey in Bogotá found 
that a third of vendors participate in associations (FVP 2004).  Critics of vending associations tend 
to view them as “mafias” that rent out public streets and exploit the most vulnerable vendors; their 
members and supporters often emphasize that associations provide order to street spaces and 
defend vendors’ policy and enforcement interests. 
                                                
2 In Bogotá, 78 percent of street vendors earn below minimum wage, and 95 percent earn below two 
minimum wages (Encuesta de Calidad de Vida 2009).  Earlier surveys showed that vendors were 
wealthier.  For example, a 2001 survey of 6,382 ambulatory and stationary vendors in Bogotá by the 
FVP showed that the majority earned below minimum wage, but 24 percent earned a monthly 
income between 1 and 3 minimum wages, and 13 percent earned more than 3 minimum wages 
(Roever 2006: 9). Although using different methodologies, surveys suggest that incomes declined in 
the late 1990s.  A 1995 DANE study showed that street vendors earned an average income of 
US$223, while a 1999 survey of centrally located vendors measured an average net income of 
US$197; both fell below the minimum income (Donovan 2002: 89).  A 2007 household survey in 
Lima shows that 46 percent earn under minimum wage, and 50 percent earn between one and two 
minimum wages (Encuesta Nacional de Hogares 2007).  Even though incomes are low, street 
vendors report higher job satisfaction than in many other unskilled jobs, which suggests that there 
are non-pecuniary benefits that come from autonomous and flexible work like street vending (Perry 
2007: 5).   
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Street vending raises broad questions about economic inequality because it makes the poor 
visible to a broad segment of society.  Unlike squatters analyzed in the previous chapter, street 
vendors occupy public spaces where different class groups circulate and meet.  Debates over 
enforcement raise issues about who should be allowed to use public resources that belong to all 
citizens and society’s obligations to the poor, as well as whether poverty should be visible in a city. 
Nonpoor groups pressure for vendors’ eviction in part due to the direct harms imposed, particularly 
traffic jams and street congestion, but also due to aesthetic objections.  Street vendors, according to 
detractors, damage a city’s image due to the poverty, dirt, and disorder on display.  The poor tend to 
see vendors’ removal as a denial of important employment opportunities and insurance in the case 
of a job loss.  They also see enforcement as a broader effort to whitewash poverty.  Preferences 
toward street vending thus divide by class, as demonstrated empirically in Chapter 2.   
In general, when governments try to control street vending, they use strategies to make it 
unprofitable to work as a vendor.  The police impose fines, confiscate merchandise and equipment, 
and dismantle stands to deter vendors.  Enforcement, of course, is not the only policy option to 
manage street vendors, but it is an essential complement to alternatives like licensing, relocation, and 
small business promotion. 
While the police control vending at the street level, politicians receive the blame and credit 
for enforcement.  Because street market clearances occur in public view, they are salient events that 
allow voters to apportion responsibility.  For example, I find in my survey that more than 77 percent 
of Bogotá residents name the mayor as the office responsible for the control of street vendors.  
Only 12 percent hold the police responsible.  Likewise, a third of Lima residents name the recovery 
of the city center from street vendors in the late 1990s as “the greatest public works project of past 
decades,” beating out major mayoral initiatives like highway construction and a public water park 
(IOP 2008).  The direct beneficiaries of forbearance toward street vendors also are substantial: while 
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estimates vary wildly, most concur that, at peak, there were more than 300,000 street vendors in 
Lima and 200,000 in Bogotá.   
The origins of street vending, and the informal economy more generally, are the subject of 
substantial debate.  A first lens emphasizes the factors that exclude the urban poor from formal 
labor markets. A long tradition of labor economics emphasizes that the lack of industrial growth and 
labor market rigidities force the poor into precarious jobs like street vending.  Segmentation in the 
labor market due to state-mandated benefits, high taxes, and generous severance packages is blamed 
for preventing workers in informal jobs from entering more productive and stable jobs (for example, 
see Heckman and Pagés 2000).  Labor market studies show that informal economic activities 
“cushion” the business cycle by offering employment during slow growth periods (e.g. Bosch and 
Esteban-Pretel 2012; Loayza and Rigolini 2011; Perry 2007; Saavedra and Chong 1999).  A related 
perspective associated with De Soto and Ghersi’s (1989) seminal work is that burdensome 
regulations to open and maintain businesses prohibit entrepreneurs, including street vendors, from 
entering the formal sector.  Street vendors, in this view, are small capitalists and engines for 
economic development; their extralegal status reflects excessive business regulations.   
A second framework, emphasized by Perry et al. (2007), looks at the factors that lead 
informal workers to exit formal sector employment.  The logic is that workers implicitly undertake a 
cost-benefit analysis in which they choose their degree of formality.  Individuals opt out of formal 
sector employment depending on the valuation of the net benefits associated with formality (i.e. 
wages, job opportunities, welfare benefits, small business perquisites, taxes and feeds), and the costs 
that come with informality.  The state’s enforcement effort and capability strongly determines the 
costs of informality (see also, Loayza 1997).  Weak enforcement makes informality more attractive.     
The central idea of both of these perspectives is that unskilled workers make rational choices 
about whether to work in the informal sector based on both the labor market opportunities and the 
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incentives that states provide.  Street vending populations shrink as high-quality employment 
becomes available, barriers to open businesses fall, and enforcement intensifies.  However, unlike 
other forms of informal economic activity where the main benefit to firms comes through regulatory 
evasion, street vending also involves an additional benefit: street vendors use public property as the 
“site” for their business.  They do not pay commercial rent.  Simplifying regulations on opening 
businesses does not change the fact that street vending allows vendors to set up shop in public 
streets and forgo rent payments.  Enforcement reduces the value of public space and thus can 
convince street vendors to rent commercial property or shift into other forms of employment.   
1.2 Business Cycles and Labor Market Trends  
 
For a comparison of enforcement policy, it is necessary to establish that the aggressiveness 
of responses cannot be entirely explained by the most obvious drivers—that is, that governments 
respond directly to the business cycle, or even more pointedly, to the number of street vendors.  
Examining this null hypothesis requires indicators of both enforcement actions and legal violations.  
These are tricky tasks given the limited availability of historical time series data on enforcement 
actions or street vending.  This section explains my primary empirical measures, and then compares 
enforcement to economic and vending trends through simple descriptive statistics. 
First, I classify each administration’s enforcement policy based on government and 
newspaper reports.  I look for two types of enforcement activity: the first type involves 
“punctuated” operations in which authorities target a geographic area for the removal of street 
vendors.  These operations often involve negotiations to relocate vendors in the area either with the 
government’s direct financial backing or indirect assistance.  These enforcement events tend to be 
large-scale efforts that make the news.  A second type of enforcement is “continuous” control in 
which authorities try to prevent street vendors from working in the streets through fines, 
decommission of merchandise or equipment, and blockades.  These routine actions tend to receive 
 225 
less attention, although most authorities consider them essential for the control of street vending 
and the maintenance of public space.     
For simplicity’s sake, I divide policies into two gross categories: forbearance and 
enforcement. What I want to measure is roughly enforcement effort, where forbearance implies 
limited effort given the magnitude of the problem.  For the purpose of over-time comparisons, I 
consider that a mayor pursues a forbearance policy if she 1) postpones or avoids punctuated 
enforcement operations against street vendors, or 2) blocks routine control through the deliberate 
withdrawal of police resources or the suspension of sanctions.  A mayor only has an enforcement 
policy if she uses punctuated enforcement operations and control procedures to maintain recovered 
public spaces in at least some segment of the city.  A more permissive categorization might take 
occasional crackdowns against street vendors as sufficient evidence of an enforcement policy.  
However, sporadic operations do not deter vending because both vendors and officials know that 
street vendors return after operations end.  A more restrictive categorization might require a certain 
frequency or spatial coverage of enforcement actions as a threshold.  But it is unclear how to draw a 
threshold, given differences in offense levels (and data limitations on their measurement). This two-
part definition best captures whether politicians are willing to impose costs on street vendors to 
deter their action. Categorical measures provide more direct indicators of the concept of forbearance 
than any other available measure. The qualitative evidence presented in the case studies adds nuance 
to these distinctions by separating forbearance from weak enforcement policies.   
By this categorical definition of enforcement effort, only two mayors in Bogotá and four 
mayors in Lima have enforced street vending regulations, and they have done so under diverse 
economic and institutional conditions.  Figure 4.1 places vertical lines around the time periods in 
which city governments enforced against street vendors.  To see whether enforcement accompanied 
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improvements in the business cycle, I plot the economic growth rate measured as the percent 
change in GDP (solid line) and the urban unemployment rate (dashed line).  
 
 
FIGURE 4.1.  Economic Growth, Unemployment, and Enforcement in Bogotá (Left) and 
Lima (Right), 1985-2013                                             
SOURCES: Author’s classification (Enforcement); World Bank (GDP growth); International Labor Organization (Urban 
unemployment rate as percent of total labor force).  
 
Economic conditions provide limited leverage to understand enforcement.  The first major 
enforcement episode in Bogotá and Lima occurs in the mid-1990s.  Colombia maintained stable, if 
middling, growth rates throughout Latin America’s debt crises.  The economy entered its worst 
recession and urban unemployment rates soared above 20 percent in the late 1990s.  Mayors moved 
to enforce against street vendors as the economy plunged.  Peru suffered a profound economic crisis 
in the late 1980s. Peru’s GDP per capita declined more than 25 percent from 1988 to 1990, and 
close to half the population fell below the poverty line (Crabtree 1992).  While Peru’s economy had 
begun to recover when enforcement operations began, economic conditions were hardly robust.  
Growth averaged just 2 percent from 1996 through 2002, and more than half of jobs created were in 
the informal sector.  Yet the mayor enforced firmly against vendors.   
More puzzling still, Bogotá and Lima have followed divergent enforcement paths in the 
2000s.  Both countries have seen strong growth thanks to a commodities boom.  Poverty rates 
halved during the period.  Yet, while Bogotá has eased enforcement, Lima has moved forward with 
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operations.  The fact that the cities took divergent enforcement trajectories makes it hard to believe 
that governments passively responded to changes in the business cycle.   
It is harder to evaluate directly whether the number of street vendors could explain the 
temporal patterns given data limitations; measures from labor market surveys and government 
records do not follow a consistent methodology over the time period examined.  I averaged the 
statistics cited in newspaper, business chamber, and city reports to get a sense for the broad trends.  
These statistics (shown in Figure 4.2) should be interpreted as much as a matter of popular myth as 
reality given the noise in the underlying data.  But, by all accounts, Bogotá’s street vendor population 
never reached the heights seen in Lima and the cities have seen a declining number of vendors.  In 
Bogotá, the number of street vendors peaked in the early to mid-1990s at 220,000 before declining 
to around 130,000 in 2002 and 90,000 by 2011.  Peru experienced a similar drop.  The number of 
street vendors ballooned to more than 300,000 during the depths of its economic recession in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s.  Street vending gradually has declined to around 220,000 vendors in 1999 
and 115,000 in 2011, as Peru’s economy has improved and stabilized.  Again, given the broadly 
similar trends in street vending, it is hard to understand the cities’ divergent enforcement policies in 
the 2000s. 
 
FIGURE 4.2.  Street Vending in Bogotá and Lima, 1985-2011                                     
SOURCES: Compiled from El Tiempo, Cámara de Comercio de Bogotá, IPES, FVP, DANE (Bogotá); El Comercio, 
RENAMU, ILO, Alternativa, Roever (2006), Cámara de Comercio de Lima, ILD (Lima).       
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The objective of these descriptive statistics is to show that the business cycle and the 
number of street vendors cannot explain the varied enforcement patterns across time and city.  Both 
cities enforced during weak economic periods in the mid-1990s.  They have experienced secular 
declines in street vending as the pace of economic growth and labor markets have improved.  Yet 
they have pursued divergent enforcement strategies in the 2000s.  While economic conditions clearly 
shape the number of street vendors and enforcement policy, they are incomplete explanations of 
enforcement variation.  As I show next, numerous street vendors make enforcement a salient 
political issue and stoke middle-class concerns.  But these effects are filtered through politics. The 
impact on enforcement depends on the mayor’s core constituency and the way that electoral rules 
encourage street vendors to scatter across city space.   
1.3 Social Perceptions  
 
The extent of street vending likely affects enforcement preferences in two ways.  First, street 
vendors result in negative externalities that drive middle-class opposition.  As the street vending 
population grows, more poor individuals depend on income from the activity.  Economic 
downturns or past forbearance thus increases the issue salience of street vending.  Second, 
forbearance allows street vendors to accumulate wealth and power.  While this leads street vendors 
who directly benefit to pressure for further forbearance, it potentially can turn other voters against 
vending.  Entrenched street vendors create barriers to entry that reduce the insurance value of 
vending to the poor; wealth also dilutes vendors’ claims that they will be unable to work or purchase 
shops if evicted from city streets.  Combined, these two effects make it easier for politicians to build 
enforcement coalitions of nonpoor and some poor voters following periods of forbearance.  
I would ideally measure how issue salience and preferences vary with past enforcement 
policies through historical poll data on approval of street vending, much as I presented in Chapter 2. 
Unfortunately, pollsters do not ask about perceptions of street vendors.  To capture changes in 
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interest and sympathy with street vending in past decades, I examined two national newspapers, El 
Comercio in Peru and El Tiempo in Colombia. I chose these papers because they have been published 
continuously and have the highest circulation over the period studied.3  They represent centrist 
positions and lean to the right compared to their main rival papers.  These newspapers have 
educated and wealthy readerships.  Research shows that newspapers respond strongly to readers’ 
preferences (e.g. Gentzkow and Shapiro 2010), and therefore coverage can give a loose sense of how 
middle-class interest and understandings of street vending have changed within a country and have 
differed across countries.  Given possible differences in editorial slant, comparisons can most 
reliably be drawn over time within each case.4  Appendix C provides additional details on the 
newspaper selection and coding rules.   
First, newspaper coverage gives us a sense of issue salience. I first identified every article 
related to street vending in Lima and Bogotá that these papers published between 1990 and 2010.  
An average of 55 and 17 articles appeared each year in Bogotá and Lima, respectively.  At peak 
interest, more than a hundred articles a year appeared about street vending in each city.  For 
comparison’s sake, consider that Gilens (2000) classic study of welfare politics finds a maximum of 
25 stories per year about poverty and welfare appearing in all American news magazines.  Hence, 
street vending is an issue of significant discussion.  
Second, beyond the absolute issue salience, interest in street vending has changed over time, 
particularly in Lima.  Figure 4.3 plots the trends in media coverage in the two cities.  Intuitively, the 
number of stories increases in tandem with the number of street vendors in the early 1990s. The 
                                                
3 Tabloids have taken off in both countries, leading both papers now to be outpaced in circulation, 
but these papers have higher circulation than their news rivals on the center-Left, El Espectador in 
Colombia and La República in Peru.  
4  If anything, El Comercio likely leans further to the right than El Tiempo.  However, this difference 
partially mirrors the political spectrum in the two countries and both papers are considered to 
represent center/center-right positions in their media markets.     
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increased stories on street vending in the mid-1990s report the political initiatives of mayors to 
tackle street vending, rather than denounce the growing severity of street vending.  Street vending 
remains a salient issue in Bogotá, but it fades from public interest in Lima in the 2000s, despite 
similar trends in the number of street vendors.  As I return to below, the continued debate over 
street vending management in Bogotá likely reflects urban political centralization.  Mayors set policy 
for the entire city, which causes sharp swings and citywide enforcement debates.  In contrast, 
coverage of street vending issues has plummeted in Lima, as seen in the overall articles published.  
Lima has a hybrid political system in which the city mayor controls vending in the downtown and 
district mayors set local policy.  Once downtown and nonpoor districts achieved control of street 
vending in the late 1990s, street vending disappeared from middle-class discussion.  Street vending 
continues to be a contentious issue in low-income districts in Lima.  
 
FIGURE 4.3.  Newspaper Coverage of Street Vending in Bogotá (Left) and Lima (Right) by 
Article Tone, 1990-2010                    
SOURCES: Author’s compilation from El Tiempo and El Comercio. 
Third, content analysis reveals key contrasts in how street vendors are portrayed both over 
time and across cities.  Here, I divide newspaper articles into two major categories based on their 
primary theme.  The first type of story consists of sympathetic portrayals.  These include human-
interest stories (sympathetic narratives) focused on a single street vendor’s plight, such as a laid-off 
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street vendor.  They also include reports (sympathetic polemics) that tie street vending to external 
conditions like unemployment, political violence or migration, or that defend street vendors as 
honorable and innocent when faced with enforcement actions.  Sympathetic accounts of street 
vending cultivate social solidarity with street vendors through a focus on their precarious economic 
situation or structural conditions that lead them to informal employment.   
The second category includes items that highlight the harms of street vending, or 
unsympathetic portrayals.  These include personal interest stories that portray street vendors as 
exploitative, lazy or criminal (unsympathetic narratives).  The more common articles in this broad 
class are reports that highlight negative externalities of street vending, like jammed traffic or 
sidewalks, unfair business competition, tax evasion, clandestine electricity connections, and 
unsanitary or illegal merchandise. Unsympathetic stories create social distance between street 
vendors and other class groups, and point to the criminal nature of street vending.  Figure 4.3 
divides coverage between these categories by year.  It marks all other type of articles simply as 
“other.”  These articles tend to include discussions of state actions, such as relocation or 
employment programs, evictions, protests, and court decisions about street vending.   
In Bogotá, what stands out is that coverage splits on street vendors.  Complaints about the 
harms caused by street vendors are a dominant theme, constituting 38 percent of all news items on 
street vending over the time period.  Of these news items, 40 percent are letters to the editor that 
pillory street vendors’ “invasion” of city streets.  The more detailed coding reveals that a major 
complaint concerns how street vendors encourage and partake in criminal activities.  About a third 
of all letters to the editor complain about the ties between crime and street vending.  This emphasis 
reflects objective crime fears in the city.  While Lima had among the lowest homicide rates in the 
region, Bogotá boasted the dubious distinction of among the highest, peaking at 124 homicides per 
100,000 inhabitants in 1993 (Moncada 2009).  Particularly in the 1990s, street vendors were seen as 
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facades for the drug trade, and part of a general chaos that allowed criminals to operate.  The other 
frequent unsympathetic stories concern traffic congestion (15 percent), harm to public space like 
sidewalks and parks (14 percent), business competition (9 percent), and sanitation (7 percent).5 
What is most striking in Bogotá is that coverage of the harms caused by street vending is 
counterbalanced by compassion for vendors.  Roughly a fifth of articles in Bogotá profiled street 
vendors in a positive light.  These stories discuss the economic hardships and national conditions 
that force the poor to work as vendors.  A typical story, for example, described a single mother 
“who walked the streets from dawn until night [as a street vendor] when, her feet exhausted, she 
returned home to attend not only to her mother, but a sick elderly woman who lived with her.”6  
After major enforcement operations in the 2000s, more than half of articles and letters to the editor 
objected to enforcement measures, denouncing operations as “persecution,” “repression,” and 
“criminalization of poverty.” Street vendors were linked to social issues like unemployment and 
poverty by the newspaper. Even when discussing the association between vendors and crime, for 
instance, many articles emphasized that street vending was an “honorable” profession that the poor 
relied on before turning to criminal activities.   
In stark contrast, the portrayal of street vending is almost exclusively negative in Lima.  The 
most common type of story focuses on the traffic congestion caused by street vendors.  Three-
quarters of articles in the 1990s relate to vendors’ contribution to traffic jams.  Between 1990 and 
1996, there were 36 photos per year of street vendors blocking traffic and sidewalks.  Other frequent 
complaints included that vendors marketed stolen goods, undercut formal businesses, and created 
chaos for pedestrians.   
                                                
5 These more specific article classifications have been done for a sub-set of about half of the years. 
6 “Mujeres se ajustan el pantalón,” El Tiempo 31 July 1991. 
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Although Lima faced similar, if not more severe, problems of urban poverty and had lower 
crime rates during this period, sympathetic coverage of street vending is exceedingly rare.  In the 
1980s and the early 1990s, dozens of sympathetic articles did appear in El Comercio.  Roever (2005) 
describes that the dominant view was that street vending was a structural issue resulting from Peru’s 
economic slowdown and eventual crisis.  But this type of article loses favor after the city’s 
enforcement turn in 1996.  Not a single story sympathizes with street vendors’ lousy economic 
situations or labor trajectories in the 2000s.  Such minimal sympathetic coverage is astounding given 
the depth of economic crisis that Peru experienced and continued labor market weakness.  
To summarize, this section presents evidence from newspaper coverage that street vending 
has been viewed as a major problem in Lima and Bogotá, and a salient issue to the middle class.  
However, social perceptions of street vendors change and differ across the cases.  The Colombian 
media continues to discuss street vending and shows both the harms caused and the broader 
economic injustices that may justify these impositions.  Interest in street vending fades in Peru.  By 
the mid-1990s, the middle class is largely apathetic and antagonistic to street vendors in Lima.   
Of course, editorial choices could distort or accentuate differences in middle-class opinion 
across the cases.  But, past analysts have drawn similar conclusions about differences in public 
opinion, emphasizing that street vending is viewed as a structural problem by much of the public in 
Bogotá and as a legal (and fading) issue in Lima (Aliaga Linares 2012; Nelson 1992; Roever 2005).  A 
cautious interpretation of these media descriptions is that the middle class received and sent very 
different messages about the necessity and fairness of enforcement in Bogotá compared to Lima.  
Politicians amplified these messages, as I turn to below.  Before presenting the case study evidence, 
the next section shows that these differences in opinion cannot be traced to the extent of 
substitutive social policies in Colombia and Peru. 
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2 Social Policy Substitution: The Employment Dilemma Compared 
In contrast to housing policy discussed in the previous chapter, it is less clear how to define 
substitutive social policies that reduce demand to work as a street vendor. An array of state policies 
affects economic growth and makes street vending less attractive as an employment option.  As with 
the informal economy as a whole, street vending has two primary origins. First, there is a structural 
component based on the disjuncture between demand for employment and growth of formal sector 
jobs and, second, there is a cyclical element based on economic recessions that lead to lay-offs.  The 
most direct substitutes, particularly for cyclical job demands, are unemployment insurance and 
temporary employment programs.  I classify both substitutes as absent, given that they have never 
existed or have been pursued erratically.  I then consider several less clear substitutes, namely cash 
assistance, relocation, and credit provision programs.   
First, unemployment insurance is meant to smooth consumption in the event of a job loss 
and allow workers time to find a comparable job.  The lack of unemployment insurance means that 
workers who are laid off look to be rehired as quickly as possible, or look for interim employment.  
Street vending is an attractive substitute for unemployment insurance because it tends to have low 
entrance costs and flexible hours.  In this sense, scholars refer to street vending as a social safety net 
or “cushion” for unemployment (Bromley 2000: 5).   
Few Latin American countries offer unemployment insurance.  Colombia and Peru have no 
unemployment insurance; Chile has a small program. Unskilled workers faced with job losses 
therefore rely on informal forms of employment to smooth their incomes.  Indeed, studies show 
that a sizable fraction of unskilled workers transition in and out of informal employment (Perry 
2007: 62).  Informal insurance mechanisms can be effective: Bentolila and Ichino (2008) find less 
dramatic reductions in consumption among the unemployed in southern Europe than under 
generous state unemployment insurance schemes in northern Europe due to informal work and 
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family networks.  An analysis of the Brazilian business cycles shows that recessions do not entail the 
movement from employment to unemployment, but rather primarily shifts from formal to informal 
sector employment (Bosch and Esteban-Pretel 2012: 270). 
While unemployment insurance is meant to mitigate risk for broad sectors of the population 
and works best when labor market risks are uncorrelated, a second approach to employment issues 
is an active labor market policy, such as public employment and job intermediation programs.  
These programs are intended to counteract the business cycle, rather than individual job disruptions. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, many Latin American countries established quick-disbursing public works 
projects meant to generate employment.  At its height, for example, Peru employed more than 
500,000 poor residents to collect trash and build sanitation systems (Graham 1992: 181).7 
The political logic of job provision limits its ability to crowd out street vending in two ways.  
First, employment programs tend to be pro-cyclical.  Those based on labor intermediation dry up 
when private sector growth slows, and state programs have been slashed in downturns. Given a 
weak tax base, shallow domestic capital markets, and limited international borrowing, social 
spending—including job programs—follows economic cycles (Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Wibbels 
2006).  Peru’s employment program, for example, was stopped in 1988, precisely as the economic 
crisis intensified.  Street vending, in contrast, can absorb workers when state coffers are empty. 
More broadly, informal employment has been found to be strongly countercyclical.  A 3 percentage 
                                                
7 Colombia and Peru also offer vocational job-training programs that also can be considered part of 
attempts to move the poor out of informal sector employment (Colombia’s Centro de Información de 
Empleo del Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje, SENA, and Peru’s Servicio Nacional de Adiestramiento en 
Trabajo Industrial, SENATI).  Started in the late 1950s and 1960s, these institutes now focus on 
vocational and more specialized training courses.  The main criticism is that supply-side skills 
training fails if not matched to labor market demands.  Systems of labor intermediation and job 
matching remain weak, leading to a logic of “training without jobs” (Castro and Verdisco 2000).  
Recently, Colombia established a system to match workers to private sector jobs (i.e. labor 
intermediation), but the program remains in its infancy and recent evaluations called Colombia’s 
labor market “a puzzle with pieces that don’t fit together.”  See, “Un rompecabezas que no encaja,” 
El Espectador 21 April 2014. 
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point decline in GDP per capita growth is associated with an average short run increase in the 
informal employment rate of 1.2 percent in developing economies (Loayza and Rigolini 2011: 1511).  
Second, patronage practices are common in job provision.  As in housing, a job is a lumpy transfer 
to a single individual.  Given that employment programs rarely meet labor demand, their allocation 
often depends on political loyalty.  This fact limits the ability of employment programs to reach the 
poorest segments of society, and particularly recent migrants unincorporated in political networks.  
Many Latin American governments have moved away from active employment generation 
policies.  Most governments instead have adopted conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs that 
provide income supplements to poor families.8  If the goal of employment programs is to boost and 
smooth family consumption, CCTs provide a more direct route to raise living standards.  CCTs are 
comparatively cheap, costing an average of 0.3 percent of GDP (IDB 2011).  They can reach 
millions and circumvent accusations of political manipulation by using clear targets for receipt 
(although De la O (2013) highlights variation in the strictness of program design).   
Unlike employment programs, however, the effect of CCTs on street vending is ambiguous.  
Disposable income does not employ the poor.  It is unclear whether higher incomes lead recipients 
to shift out of the labor market entirely, substituting for informal labor options like street vending, 
or to use additional income to access capital to expand street sales and favor less easily detected 
informal forms of income generation, complementing forbearance toward street vendors.  Few 
long-term studies of CCTs exist to examine their effects on labor market supply.  Regardless, it is 
worth underscoring that the intention of CCTs is not to substitute for employment.  It would be 
politically repellant to propose income support as an alternative to moving the poor into the labor 
force.  Even in Colombia, where CCTs reach a quarter of the total population, not a single 
                                                
8 Colombia’s Familias en Acción program and Chile’s Subsidiario Unitario Familiar launched in the 
late 1990s, while Peru lagged behind and adopted a smaller program, Juntos, in 2005.   
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newspaper article on street vending mentions income transfers as an alternative option for the poor 
to subsist, as may be expected if they were designed to crowd out informal labor demands.   
A final policy option targets “professional” street vendors who may not switch out of the 
sector when alternative employment options improve because they specialize in commercial sales.  
Some street vendors work in the sector for years and share characteristics with small business 
owners; they rarely want industrial or service jobs.  A controversial policy in Bogotá offered street 
vendors in a central city zone minimum wage jobs in private companies.  Most street vendors 
rejected the offer.  While politicians interpret their rejection as sign of vendors’ wealth (i.e. they must 
have earned more than minimum wage in city streets to reject the offer), vendors insist that 
politicians asked them to abandon their professions.  Instead, established street vendors often 
demand alternative commercial locations as a condition for their removal from city streets.  The 
most common substitute has been relocation projects that help street vendors rent or purchase 
storefronts in commercial centers.  These projects come with varying levels of government 
subsidies.  Lima has insisted that street vendors organize to purchase their own projects; Bogotá has 
constructed projects for vendors and has received limited repayment (and substantial criticism as 
relocation projects have been abandoned).9   
Relocation projects are reactive policies, much like the titling policies discussed in Chapter 3, 
and thus can increase demands to work as a street vendor.  Governments target vendors who work 
in city streets and offer no prospective solution for employment demands.  Relocation can 
incentivize the poor to seek employment as street vendors, and eventually pressure the government 
for assistance to move to a storefront.  Bogotá Mayor Antanas Mockus best captures the incentives 
in government-funded relocation projects for street vendors: 
                                                
9 See, “Formalización de los vendedores ambulantes fracasó,” El Tiempo 9 Sept 2004; Donovan 
(2008). 
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“We had many discussions saying, ‘If each time that the State enforces the law should it have to 
in some way compensate?’ Obviously it sounds hilarious: a group of criminals comes here and 
they tell us that we also want to be legalized (a type of early retirement), give us a pension and 
we’ll stop assaulting people; our income to assault is this much per month, and if you pay us a 
pension of 60 percent of this, that is guaranteed for our life, etc; we all see advantages, and we 
could negotiate.  But this shocks us and makes us laugh.”10 
 
Despite the reactive nature, governments have relied heavily on relocation projects.  
Relocation is a convenient policy solution because it resolves the demands of the constituency 
most mobilized around substitutive social policies, active street vendors.  The political rewards of 
generating policies for future labor demands are more diffuse and less credible.  Chapter 2 showed 
how promises of employment generation policies for unskilled workers did not change voters’ 
likelihood to identify a candidate as representing their interests or vote for the candidate.  Other 
“carrots” to move street vendors to the formal sector like preferential access to credit and 
assistance to open businesses similarly resolve the immediate demands of vendors.  However, 
these policies address a small segment of street vendors with the skills and capital to open small 
businesses.   
This section was not intended to provide a full overview of labor market policies, but rather 
to highlight that substitutive social policy is less obvious and less available than in the case of 
squatting discussed in Chapter 3.  Generating stable jobs for unskilled workers is hard.  And, 
employment policy has lost favor compared to more electorally attractive CCT programs that can 
reach a larger number of beneficiaries.  Relocation can reduce the political costs of enforcement 
operations by demobilizing street vendors’ demands, but these policies do not resolve future 
employment demands. The next section explores how politicians have relied on forbearance toward 
street vending as a way to boost employment provision in the absence of social policy substitutes, 
beginning with the case of Bogotá. 
                                                
10 Author interview with Antanas Mockus, Mayor, Bogotá, Colombia, July 29, 2013. 
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3 Forbearance and Institutional Strength: Bogotá 
 
Conventional capacity-based theories cannot explain the trajectory of enforcement policy in 
Bogotá.  Enforcement has decreased as coercive and administrative capacity has improved.  Figure 4.4 
lays out the empirical puzzle.  The bars show the number of police operations against street vendors 
from the Colombian National Police’s Public Space Unit (Unidad del Espacio Público). Operations have 
dropped off sharply from more than 3000 per administration in the late 1990s to less than 100 in the 
2000s. Changes in institutional capacity cannot account for this shift.  For instance, the solid line 
plots the funds in the city budget assigned to the police.11  The security budget more than doubled 
during the same period.  Other indicators of state capacity, such as taxes collected, number of police 
officers, and violent crime rates show similar improvements.  The business cycle also would lead us 
to expect an uptick in enforcement.  Unemployment rates halved from a high of around 20 percent 
in 1998 to 10 percent in 2012.  
 
FIGURE 4.4.  Coercive Capacity and Police Operations in Bogotá, 1998-2012  
                                                
11 While much of the Colombian National Police’s budget comes from the central government, I 
show changes in the security budget (Fondo de Vigilancia y Seguridad) under the discretion of the city 
mayor (Secretaría de Hacienda 2012).   
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My claim is that differences in core constituencies help make sense of variation in 
enforcement. Bogotá has elected mayors with distinct core constituencies since the advent of direct 
elections in 1988, as laid out in Table 4.1.  The columns classify a mayor’s class basis of support.  
Mayors labeled as “lower” receive a higher fraction of their vote share among poor than nonpoor 
voters; those classified as “upper” gain greater support among nonpoor voters.12  If the difference in 
class support is less than 5 percentage points class groups, or the direction of the difference varies 
by data source, then the mayor is classified as receiving a “neutral” constituency of support.13  Class 
constituencies can differ from political ideology: mayors identified on the political Right can attract 
lower class support just as mayors positioned on the Left can repel it.   
TABLE 4.1. Core Constituency and Enforcement by Mayor, Bogotá (1988-2014) 
 
SOURCE: Author’s compilation of electoral data by district and enforcement reports.   
                                                
12 Colombia classifies each household by strata that range from “1”, the poorest, to “6”, the 
wealthiest.  I consider poor voters to be from Strata 1 and 2, and nonpoor voters to be from Strata 4 
and above.  Strata 3 can be thought of as the lower-middle class.  Peru uses similar stratifications but 
ranks class groups from “A”, the wealthiest, to “E”, the poorest.  I consider the poor to be Classes 
D and E, and the nonpoor to be classes A and B. While I check an alternative measure of poverty 
based on unsatisfied basic needs, class stratifications better capture both a household’s economic 
level and its precariousness.   
13 The ideal way to make these classifications is to use individual-level exit poll or vote intention 
surveys by class.  Unfortunately, survey data are scarce and not available for all city elections.  I 
therefore rely on ecological correlations between district composition and vote share, and 
supplement these with survey data when available. Given high levels of spatial segregation, and 
particularly the homogeneity of poor districts, ecological correlations produce reliable estimates of 
the direction, if not the intensity, of class support.   
Lower Neutral Upper
Forbearance
Garzón (2004-07)
Moreno (2008-11)
Petro (2012-14)
Pastrana (1988-90)
Caicedo (1990-92)
Castro (1992-94)
Enforcement Mockus (1995-97)
Mockus (2001-03)
Peñalosa (1998-2000)
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This section traces the three major periods in Bogotá’s politics.  First, in the early 1990s, a 
spell of mayors from catchall traditional parties governed the city with an even distribution of 
support across classes.  These mayors straddled class preferences and undertook a handful of vendor 
clearance operations without continuous control actions.  Still-powerful city councilors manipulated 
enforcement against street vendors for electoral ends.  Second, institutional reforms in the early 
1990s gave mayors full reign over enforcement.  City residents elected independent mayors who 
drew their core support from the middle class.  These mayors enforced against street vendors largely 
on ideological grounds.  As predicted, mayors alienated poor voters through enforcement and 
cemented a nonpoor core constituency.  Third, voting patterns reversed in the 2000s.  Mayors won 
with poor core constituencies. To boost the poor’s welfare and signal broader distributive 
commitments, mayors promised and pursued a softer position toward street vending.  Qualitative 
evidence supports my contention that mayors intentionally chose not to enforce in order to increase 
their electoral support among poor voters.  Deficiencies in the police or bureaucracy cannot explain 
these decisions.  The fourth section lays out how urban political centralization raises the electoral 
stakes of enforcement and contributes to forbearance cycles in Bogotá. 
3.1 Neutral Core Constituencies and Weak Enforcement 
 
It took nearly a decade for Bogotá politics to transition from reliance on party machines to 
the election of mayors who directly courted and mobilized different core constituencies.  The 
transitional period provides a window into a different electoral logic in which work as a street 
vendor was among the patronage goods that political machines traded for the electoral mobilization 
of the poor.  Mayors, who drew their support from all socioeconomic groups via clientelistic party 
networks, largely deferred to city councilors in permitting street vendors to work.  Forbearance won 
out, despite mounting middle-class and business frustrations.   
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3.1.1 Traditional Party Politicians and Institutional Reform (1988-94) 
 
Prior to 1988, city councilors held the most important elected positions in Bogotá.  They 
distributed street vending licenses as a form of patronage.  Vending associations aggregated votes 
for councilors and received licenses in exchange (Nelson 1992).  A series of urban reforms removed 
city councilors’ ability to grant licenses in 1989.14  But the removal of licensing powers did not end 
politicians’ protection of vendors.  City councilors, and newly empowered local councilors (ediles), 
instead began to promise forbearance or employment alternatives. 
The dominance of political machines was evident in early electoral cycles.  Running as 
traditional party candidates, the first three elected mayors—Andrés Pastrana, Juan Martín Caicedo, 
and Jaime Castro—collected near even support across the income distribution. Pastrana represented 
the Conservative Party, which historically had fared badly in Bogotá.  He received 40 percent of the 
vote with marginally weaker backing from the poor.  Caicedo and Castro took more than 60 percent 
of the vote share for the Liberal Party. Large vote margins reflected the institutionalized two-party 
system and the fact that voters followed the instructions of party bosses.  Each socioeconomic 
group tried to align themselves with the winning mayor to gain access to resources (Pasotti 2009: 
87).  
Consistent with neutral class constituencies, enforcement straddled class preferences.  On 
the one hand, each mayor made at least one attempt to organize a major operation, and campaigned 
on projects to improve public spaces.  Pastrana and Castro concentrated on projects to recuperate 
one of the city’s main avenues, La Séptima, while Caicedo worked on moving vendors from the 
downtown.  On the other hand, these early mayors were unwilling to conduct continuous control 
actions.  Caicedo and Castro, for example, made statements in support of the economic needs of 
                                                
14 In particular, the 1989 Urban Law recognized public space as collective property that could not be 
sold or rented.  The 1991 Constitution would reaffirm this commitment.  Accord 18 of 1989 
clarified that the city mayor was in charge of regulating street vending.   
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vendors and engaged in operations and control actions only when the government could sponsor 
relocation options.15  Relocation severely limited the pace of enforcement: each mayor only relocated 
between 350 and 650 street vendors of the almost 150,000 in the city (Donovan 2002: 32).   
Why did enforcement depend on state-sponsored relocation projects?  The main constraint 
did not come from the electoral incentives of city mayors, who arguably hoped to take stronger 
positions against street vendors that were popular among the largely middle-class set of voters who 
showed up at the polls.  Instead, forbearance emerged from the office-seeking strategies of city and 
local councilors.  City councilors, particularly from the Liberal Party, advocated relocation as a 
precondition for enforcement.  Spots in relocation projects could be negotiated in exchange for 
support, just like licenses. Councilors also opposed continuous control actions to create linkages to 
vending associations and claim to represent poor voters.  For example, Caicedo urged the police to 
decommission merchandise from street vendors.16 Liberal Party city councilors scorned the proposal 
as an attempt to “terminally abolish” and “criminalize” vendors, and pressured for a revised police 
statute.  Ultimately, the government curbed the use of decommission to “recovered” areas from 
which vendors already had been relocated.17  As one city councilor described his colleagues, “In 
unequal and clientelistic societies, some think that it is more important to ‘do justice’ than to follow 
the law.  Traditional political party leaders negotiated with the law as a rhetorical instrument to 
support the poorest, they evaded and prevented enforcement so as to benefit the poorest.”18   
                                                
15 For example, see “Bogotá no está en crisis, está creciendo,” El Tiempo 21 Nov 1990; “Inaugurado 
Unicentro en Barrio Restrepo,” El Tiempo 19 Dec 1991. 
16 Caicedo was the former head of the national business association (Federación Nacional de 
Comerciantes, Fenalco), which strongly pressured for control of street vending and he arguably wanted 
to do more to control vending. 
17 The proposed regulations (Decree 446 of 1990) ultimately were modified to permit the 
confiscation of merchandise in recovered areas.  See, “Viciado de nulidad el reglamento sobre ventas 
ambulantes,” El Comercio 8 Sept 1990.   
18 Author interview with anonymous city councilor, Bogotá, Colombia, August 1, 2011.   
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Local councilors also stalled enforcement due to a combination of capacity constraints and 
electoral incentives.  The division of administrative powers remained in flux during the early 1990s.  
Castro was the first mayor elected under the 1991 Constitution, which established Bogotá as a 
special administrative district and gave the mayor’s office enhanced powers.  But Castro also was an 
architect and firm believer in political decentralization (Falleti 2010: 149).  Castro restructured the 
administration to invest greater powers in the mayor, rather than the city council, and devolved 
power to local councils at the district level (Junta Administradora Locales, JALs).  While a presidential 
decree gave city hall control over street vending, Castro deferred to local authorities on public space 
recovery.19  Castro allowed for the local determination of enforcement projects.  Castro himself 
admits that the early years of the local councils were a disaster.  They lacked resources, mandates, 
and technical capacity.20  
While Castro blamed limited enforcement on the greenness of local governments, the middle 
class discounted the excuse.  Bogotá mayors enjoy the power to appoint and remove local mayors 
and can use those powers to pressure districts to act; Castro did not exert this authority.  Business 
groups, in particular, spoke out against Castro’s passivity.  For example, the National Business 
Federation (Federación Nacional de Comerciantes, Fenalco) wrote: “The administration under charge of 
this mayor cannot delegate this responsibility [to local districts]…We do not lack laws, what we lack 
is authority that decides.”21   
Electoral incentives at the sub-city level pushed against enforcement in most districts.  As a 
lawyer involved in public space litigation put it, “Public space in the hands of local councils was a 
                                                
19 Castro lobbied the national government to pass the governing legislation for the city (Presidential 
Decree 1421 of 1993, Estatuto Orgánico de Bogotá). The presidential decree explicitly gave the mayor’s 
office control over street vending (Article 86) and a host of other administrative functions. 
20 “Jaime Castro sale de su hueco,” El Tiempo 19 Dec 1993. 
21 “Fenalco raja al Alcalde Castro,” El Tiempo 28 May 1993. 
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political business because the number of votes needed in each race was so small that they could win 
with just the vendors.”22  Only half of local councils reported doing any actions to control street 
vending, and enforcement efforts concentrated in middle-class districts.23 The police claimed that 
street vendors presented licenses issued by district governments and therefore they could not 
enforce.  Indeed, the Comptroller sanctioned dozens of local officials for providing illegal licenses to 
vendors.24 But Castro put little pressure on his appointed mayors to confront their councilors who 
favored forbearance.  Politicians in the Liberal Party likely preferred for Castro to ignore the issue.25   
In short, the first cohort of mayors made timid moves toward enforcement when relocation 
could occur but made limited progress due to their continued links to traditional political parties.  
This period differs from subsequent periods because city and local councilors used forbearance as a 
form of clientelism to reward political supporters.  Institutional reforms designed by Castro to make 
the mayor’s office autonomous and the collapse of Colombia’s traditional party system freed 
subsequent mayors to make independent policy choices (Pasotti 2009).  These changes helped make 
enforcement the subject of citywide, substantive debates, as we will below.  Mayors would have 
                                                
22 Author interview with lawyer and head of wholesale association, Bogotá, Colombia, August 2, 
2012. 
23 About half of local districts reported actions to manage public space, including Los Mártires, San 
Cristóbal, Engativá, Teusaquillo, Chapinero, Usaqúen, Barrios Unidos, Kennedy, Antonio Nariño, 
and Puente Aranda. City Ombudsman Antonio Bustos Esguerra complained that in 88 petitions 
sent to local authorities to act against street vendors, only 15 mayors even responded (let alone acted 
to remove vendors).  Inaction led the city ombudsman to sanction 33 bureaucrats for allowing street 
vendors to work.  See, “En defensa del espacio público,” El Tiempo 29 Dec 1993; “Alcaldes locales 
rinden cuenta,” El Tiempo 8 Nov 1993; “Guerra a invasión del espacio público,” El Tiempo 16 Oct 
1993; “Espacio público, el objectivo,” El Tiempo 27 May 1994; “Usaquén es el número uno en 
invasión del espacio público,” El Tiempo 15 Sept 1994. 
24 “Yo invade, tu invades, él…” El Tiempo 7 Feb 1993. 
25 Castro was a passionate advocate of decentralization and dedicated his two-year term to passing 
Decree 1421 of 1993 (Estatuto Orgánico de Bogotá).  While hardly the servant of the Liberal Party, 
he tried to preserve his political capital to guarantee support for reforms to reorganize the city’s 
administration and finances.  The reforms made Castro profoundly unpopular, leading to calls for 
his resignation.For example, he hiked property taxes by almost 120 percent and doubled the city’s 
revenues.  
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strong electoral incentives to use enforcement to appeal to their core constituencies, rather than 
allow councilors to trade votes for forbearance. 
3.1.2 Shifting Preferences 
 
A decade of forbearance produced changes in the wealth and negative externalities of street 
vendors that expanded the mobilized electorate in favor of enforcement.  News coverage 
emphasized that stands in some markets cost exorbitant sums.26  Some vendors in bustling central 
markets earned more than double minimum wage.  Other nefarious figures exploited vendors, many 
of whom needed to work for subsistence.27 The poverty rate had increased from 29.5 percent in 
1986 to 40 percent in 1993, and half a million internally displaced people from the civil war flooded 
into the city.  Sympathetic portrayals of vendors stressed that street vendors were the visible 
manifestation of the country’s social problems.  
                                                
26 For example, see “Retiran los vendedores ambulantes,” El Tiempo 4 May 1994; “20 de Julio: Se 
vende el ánden por pedazos,” El Tiempo 1 March 1993. Some market areas are notorious for 
powerful vending associations.  For example, one association leader, Alejandro Barrera, has 
exercised control over the 20 de Julio market for two decades.  Many consider Barrera a mobster, 
although Barrera also is known for his effective defense of vendors and former role as coordinator 
of a national vendors’ associations (Cooperativa Nacional de Vendedores, Coopnalven). “Quién arrendó 
el andén de la 19,” El Tiempo 25 Nov 1993; “20 de Julio: Se vende el ánden por pedazos,” El Tiempo 
1 March 1993.  Even under the Castro administration, Secretary of Government Hermán Arias 
described that, “the invasion of public space has converted into a lucrative business for those people 
who own carts, and has generated a business in renting them to take advantage of the needs of 
people.” “El centro de Bogotá: pura carreta,” El Tiempo 21 July 1993. 
27 Some market areas are notorious for powerful vending associations.  For example, one association 
leader, Alejandro Barrera, has exercised control over the 20 de Julio market for two decades.  Many 
consider Barrera a mobster, although Barrera also is known for his effective defense of vendors and 
former role as coordinator of a national vendors’ associations (Cooperativa Nacional de Vendedores, 
Coopnalven). “Quién arrendó el andén de la 19,” El Tiempo 25 Nov 1993; “20 de Julio: Se vende el 
ánden por pedazos,” El Tiempo 1 March 1993.  Under the Castro administration, Secretary of 
Government Hermán Arias described that, “the invasion of public space has converted into a 
lucrative business for those people who own carts, and has generated a business in renting them to 
take advantage of the needs of people.” “El centro de Bogotá: pura carreta,” El Tiempo 21 July 1993. 
Yet surveys showed that most vendors were poor.  For example, a study by the Universidad Libre 
showed that 65 percent of vendors lived in marginal neighborhoods, 78 percent owned their stands, 
and only 10 percent worked for other parties or paid rent. “El rebusque en la calle es buen negocio,” 
El Tiempo 22 Feb 1995. 
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Second, while social sympathies divided, tepid political action against street vendors led to 
widespread complaints from citizens and business groups. A close look at Figure 4.3 shows that 
media coverage of street vending surged in the early 1990s, and sympathy for the economic 
conditions of street vendors was counterbalanced by frustration about the insecurity and disorder 
that they generated. Unsympathetic portrayals reached a peak, constituting half of all articles under 
Castro.  Business mobilization against street vendors also increased.  For instance, more than 500 
business owners in the city center formed an “emergency committee” to address street vending in 
1993.28   
A flurry of new laws also shaped how politicians and the public discussed street vending.  In 
1989, the Senate passed the Urban Reform Law, which charged city authorities with the protection 
of “public space.”  The 1991 Constitution then elevated public space as a collective constitutional 
right.  Collective rights took precedence over individual rights, such as the right to work. In addition, 
the Constitution created a new device, the tutela, which allowed citizens harmed by government 
actions (or inactions) in violation of their constitutional rights to bring suit.  Although social rights 
were not intended to be judicially enforceable, the tutela became a means to force the government to 
take action to address them (Landau 2012: 417-418).  One of the first tutelas received under the 
Constitution was from a group of street vendors claiming that evictions violated their right to 
                                                
28 Business owners claimed that they had supported Castro’s campaign due to his promises to 
recover security and public space, but were disappointed. “Se ahoga San Victorino,” El Tiempo 18 
Nov 1993.  Also see, “S.O.S. lanzan comerciantes del centro,” El Tiempo 26 April 1993. 
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work.29  It was soon met with a counterclaim from business groups that street vendors infringed on 
the collective right to public space.30   
Conflicting social rights claims filtered into political debates.  On the one hand, vendors and 
advocates of the urban poor began to defend forbearance as a way to guarantee the right to work.  
On the other hand, opponents of street vending equated street vendors with special interest groups 
that damaged the collective right of citizens to public space.  Particularly coming on the heels of 
decades of negotiated enforcement by city councilors, the disregard of public space was taken as a 
sign of government corruption and disregard for the public at large.  The right to public space also 
became a convenient euphemism to discuss clearing the poor from visible areas of the city.  
Colombia’s social rights protections thus gave fodder to both sides of the street vending debate. 
3.2 Middle-Class Core Constituencies and Enforcement 
 
The election of mayors with middle-class core constituencies brought a shift in enforcement 
policy in Bogotá in the mid-1990s.  Bogotá elected eccentric mayors from the post-materialist Left.  
These mayors selected their enforcement position on ideological grounds and viewed themselves as 
representatives of the have-nots.  Nonetheless, consistent with my electoral argument, enforcement 
attracted nonpoor constituencies and alienated poor voters. 
 
 
                                                
29 Many street vendors understood the Constitution as guaranteeing their right to work.  For 
example, one street vendor told the press, “The Constitution has served us because they don’t annoy 
us, it is good because it lets us work.”  “La Constitución a los ojos de la gente,” El Tiempo 5 July 
1994. 
30 There were 169 street vendors who filed tutelas for their right to work in the city of Ibagué.  They 
were assisted by the councilor from AD/M-19 Enrique Arango.  But almost immediately Fenalco 
and formal merchants also used the tutela to defend their right to work and collective right to public 
space, leading to one of the first clear conflicts between rights established in the Constitution. 
“Vendedor ambulantes, primer favorecido por la tutela,” El Tiempo 15 Dec 1991; “La tutela asfixia la 
justicia,” El Tiempo 14 Feb 1992. “Tutela abre la calle a los vendedores,” El Tiempo 21 Dec 1991; 
“Corte definirá caso de ventas callejeras,” El Tiempo 27 Mar 1992. 
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3.2.1 The Post-Materialist Left: Enforcement Under Mockus (1995-97) 
 
The election of Antanas Mockus, a former university rector and philosopher, moved the city 
toward a uniform enforcement policy.  His election as mayor in 1994 marked the end of clientelistic 
negotiations of vending policy in Bogotá.  Mockus ran as an independent on an ‘antipolitics’ 
campaign that rejected traditional party politics.  He defeated the Liberal Party candidate, Enrique 
Peñalosa.   
Mockus’ anti-party stance united voters committed to clean government. He won by a 
landslide, receiving 64 percent of votes cast. The unconventional candidates meant that party bosses 
gave no clear instructions about how to vote (Pasotti 2009: 81).  Abstention reached over 70 percent 
and even higher among low-income groups.  Among those who turned out, Mockus performed 
equally well among all voters.31  
Mockus ran on a platform to promote a shared civic culture.  The lack of citizen 
preoccupation with urban problems was viewed as the core issue uniting a host of the city’s 
problems, like crime, street vending, and traffic.  The attempt to transform civic culture was at the 
heart of his government’s first-term plan, “Citizen in Formation.” Mockus’ campaign manager used 
the game of pirinola, a type of spinning top, to personify the campaign to the public.  He changed the 
faces on the pirinola to add the instructions that “we all put in” and “we all take out” (todos ponen, 
todos toman) to personify the government’s philosophy of collective rights and duties.  Part of 
citizens’ shared responsibilities was public space.  Mockus considered public space to be “sacred.” 
Its use by any set of individuals like street vendors undermined civic equality. As Mockus put it, 
“The street vendor finds how to survive, but he doesn’t let others survive.”32 
                                                
31 “En Bogotá, ir a votar da una pereza,” El Tiempo 31 Oct 1994. 
32 “El distrito rindió cuentas,” El Tiempo 4 Aug 2003. 
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More broadly, Mockus represented the post-materialist Left. As discussed in Chapter 1, the 
post-materialist Left promotes greater social equality.  While the post-materialist Left seeks to aid the 
poor, it proposes long-term objectives that may worsen material conditions for the poor in the short 
run. Given that Mockus pioneered many of these ideas—and they subsequently inspired other 
mayors in the region like Lima’s Susana Villarán, who I return to below—it is worth dwelling on 
how they translated into a distinct justification for enforcement.   
With respect to street vending, the post-materialist Left is differentiated in its approach to 
enforcement by three principles.  First, a core principle of the post-materialist Left is that 
forbearance harms the poor’s citizenship rights.  It leaves street vendors dependent on the whims of 
politicians, casts them as criminals, and deprives them of labor rights.33  For example, Mockus 
rejects forbearance as part of a broader clientelistic system that degrades citizenship.  Enforcement, 
from this perspective, is necessary to demonstrate a political commitment to the public’s interest 
over “special treatment” for any single group.34  Enforcement also helps to move to a system of 
social rights that makes benefits contingent on poverty, not political connections or willingness to 
violate laws.  Mockus emphasizes:  
“My perception is that clientelism and legality are tremendously linked and a major part of favors 
have to do with turning one’s head to illegality…But that converts those who don’t respect the 
norms into privileged interlocutors who get benefits that others cannot access…My philosophy is 
apply the law first, and second, if the application of the law results in a precarious social situation, 
then attend to it through social policies.”35  
 
The contrast with a materialist Left position clarifies the point.  Materialists emphasize that 
forbearance advances economic equality because it respects the poor’s right to work; post-
                                                
33 For example, as Fuerza Social City Councilor Luis Valer explains, “Being a street vendor is not a 
dignified life because they will always be conflict with the police, viewed as criminals, and excluded 
from labor laws and insurance…It’s not promoting equality to let street vendors stay in the streets; 
it’s being an irresponsible politician.”  Author interview, November 28, 2011.  
34 Author interview with Antanas Mockus, Bogotá, Colombia, July 29, 2013. 
35 Author interview with Antanas Mockus, Bogotá, Colombia, July 29, 2013. 
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materialists emphasize that forbearance slows social equality because it forces the poor to secure 
favors and violate laws to work. 
Second, connected to the promotion of social equality, the post-materialist Left uses 
enforcement to promote voluntary compliance.  The materialist view of law enforcement is that it 
changes behavior by affecting the probability that a criminal suffers an economic loss through a fine 
or lost wages in prison.  The post-materialist view advanced by Mockus stresses the idea that most 
sanctions are nonmonetary.  Deterrence comes from the incentives that others in society create.  To 
Mockus, the complication with street vending is that, while illegal, it is morally and culturally 
approved by segments of society.  Under this perspective, the goal of state sanctions is to change 
social norms so that the public reinforces the police’s coercive actions and condemns the illegal 
behavior (Mockus 2002: 22).  Mockus pursued creative techniques to amplify enforcement’s 
pedagogical function.  Most famously, he hired mimes to mock drivers and pedestrians who 
disrespected traffic conventions, and tried experiments in self-governance like a day with no police.36  
In street vending operations, Mockus used a Chinese ceremonial dragon to accompany the police to 
attract public attention and change social norms around vending.37 Again, the idea was to use classic 
coercive sanctions in ways that amplified public attention and realigned social norms with the law.  
Lastly, the post-materialist Left argues that forbearance is not in the poor’s interests even on 
material grounds.  The idea is that street vending perpetuates poverty and inequality by slowing job 
growth.  Just as with squatting discussed in Chapter 3, Mockus saw unlicensed street vending as a 
shortsighted policy that ignored the consequences for quality of life, urban planning, and economic 
development.  Enforcement serves the poor’s long-term interests, even though it removes tangible 
benefits in the short-term. A materialist view, in contrast, is that forbearance solves pressing material 
                                                
36 “Día sin policías de tránsito,” El Tiempo 13 July 2002. 
37 Author interview with William Alfonso, Secretaría de Planeación under Mockus, August 1, 2012. 
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needs, and therefore promotes economic equality.  Poor voters tend to turn away from post-
materialist positions because they directly remove material benefits and indirectly brush aside that 
many poor individuals need immediate relief, not medium-term improvements in job opportunities. 
Inspired by these principles, Mockus enforced against street vendors.  In his first term, 
Mockus added 2500 auxiliary forces to the police, which were responsible for administrative 
infractions like street vending.38 Using the expanded police force, decommissions of merchandise 
and equipment accelerated, generating a heated public debate.39  Vendors staged protests and 
claimed that they were “persecuted” by the police. 40  The government also moved forward with 
large-scale operations, such as a court-ordered action to evict vendors that had been postponed 
seventeen times by past administrations.41    
Strong support from the middle class following a period of forbearance, as well as low 
unemployment rates, reduced the political costs of enforcement.  Mockus coordinated with private 
businesses to offer minimum wage jobs to street vendors.  These policies were motivated by a belief 
that the majority of street vendors were not poor, but that substitutive social policies should exist 
for those who truly needed the work.  Politically, it served to attenuate the association between 
enforcement and weak distributive commitments to the poor.  As Mockus describes,  
“The rate of unemployment was very low in my first term, and that favored me.  If a mother 
came with children and said to me that she would have no way to feed them, I would say, look, 
‘This is the minimum salary, and I can offer you a job at that salary. I understand this will be less 
                                                
38 “El distrito se llena de bachilleres,” El Tiempo 6 April 1995.   
39 A prototypical citizen letter, for example, argued that, “It is unjust to retain the merchandise of 
poor peasants with little money who cling to the hope to profit form sales that could take place.”  
Leonor Galvis de Auzas, “Retenciones,” El Tiempo 26 Sept 1996. 
40 “Las protestas callejeros ocasionaron caos vial,” El Tiempo 27 May 1995; “Mockus entre bueno y 
regular,” El Tiempo 11 Aug 1995. 
41 The operation occurred in Siete de Agosto in Barrios Unidos. “Los beneficios del espacio 
público,” El Tiempo 12 Aug 1996; “El Siete de Agosto, Zona modelo,” El Tiempo 9 Aug 1996. 
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than you are used to making in the street’…It eased my conscience about what we were doing 
and showed to everyone that these were not the very poor because they rejected our options.”42  
 
More broadly, Mockus parted from past mayors by rejecting state-sponsored relocations of 
street vendors as a way to balance enforcement and social needs. Mockus proposed a relocation 
budget of just $69,000, or an order of magnitude less than the cost of a single relocation project 
under Castro.  The tiny amount—which city councilors then pushed up43—was meant to avoid 
perverse incentives of rewarding illegality, and encourage street vendors to relocate on their own 
accord (Castañeda and García Bañales 2007: 176).  Mockus believed that relocation projects 
rewarded those who broke the law, and were ineffective expenditures.  The average cost of 
relocation projects from 1990 and 1998 was $4,147 per vendor (Donovan 2002: 62), and most 
projects were abandoned soon after relocation.44 The administration did draw up plans to create a 
system of rotating markets throughout the city, although they were never launched.45  
Enforcement played far better with the middle class than the poor.  While Mockus drew 
even support across class groups in his first election due to a relatively general campaign, he was 
reelected in 2001 (after a break from office due to Colombia’s prohibition on consecutive reelection) 
with strong support from middle-class voters.  Letters to the editor reflected worries about Mockus’ 
emphasis on enforcement at any cost.  One letter, for example, lamented that under Mockus “public 
                                                
42 Author interview with Antanas Mockus, Mayor, Bogotá, Colombia, July 29, 2013. 
43 City councilors, particularly from the Liberal Party, complained that the government did not 
reserve sufficient funds for the relocation of street vendors and proposed to legalize vendors. 
“Espacio público: piden más plata,” El Tiempo 12 May 1995; “Plan de Desarrollo en cifras,” El 
Tiempo 1 March 1995; “Proponen legalizar las ventas,” El Tiempo 26 April 1995. 
44 “Propuestas para ordenar el uso del espacio público,” El Tiempo 18 Oct 1996. 
45 Mockus worked with an architect, Pablo Gamboa, to design a system of rotating street fairs 
(alamedas feriales), which would allow vendors to work in a different zone of the city each day.  
However, the plan never launched due to a combination of administrative hurdles in securing 
permissions for the circuit of fairs and resources to create infrastructure for them.  Author interview 
with Paul Bromberg, director of the Cultural Institute, advisor to Mockus, and interim mayor (1996-
1997), Bogotá, Colombia, January 31, 2014.   
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space is worth more than the life and health of thousands of families in the southeast and Ciudad 
Bolívar.”46 The fact that the poor turned against Mockus in his reelection confirms that enforcement 
had the predicted electoral repercussions. What is more amazing is that Mockus suffered these 
electoral costs, despite the fact that his formal welfare investments prioritized the poor.  Mockus 
targeted the poor in health, education, and infrastructure spending.  Nonetheless, the poor held him 
accountable for his visible attempts to enforce against street vendors.  Because Mockus ran in a 
citywide electoral district, he was able to sneak out a victory with middle-class support.  Those close 
to his government confirmed that Mockus was motivated by philosophical beliefs and “did not care 
about losing the poor’s support,” but that it made for a tough and surprising reelection because “so 
many poor voters hated him.”47  
During his second term, Mockus further intensified enforcement against street vendors.  In 
2002, for example, the police reportedly made 9,300 separate decommissions of merchandise.48  But, 
unlike during his first term, the economy soured.  Underemployment reached 53 percent and open 
unemployment was estimated at 20 percent. 49 Mockus could not rely on private businesses to 
generate alternatives for street vendors.50 Pressure mounted among the poor to permit vending.   
A national legislative project proposed to legalize street vending. Debate over the bill 
centered on whether street vending was an effective way to create jobs in a period of high 
                                                
46 “Testimonio de un desempleado,” El Tiempo 24 Aug 2003. 
47 Author interview with Paul Bromberg, advisor to Mockus and appointed interim mayor, Bogotá, 
Colombia, January 31, 2014. 
48 Mockus dedicated 100 police agents and 70 assistants to conduct daily operations and patrol the 
streets and decommission merchandise, using 4 trucks, 2 dump trucks, and 2 pick-ups. “La batalla 
diaria por la calle,” El Tiempo 15 Dec 2002. 
49 “De quién es el espacio,” El Tiempo 15 Dec 2002. 
50 Toward the end of his term, the government did attempt to expand the zones in which vendors 
could be authorized to work and trained to enter the formal sector. “Aprovechando el espacio 
público,” El Tiempo 29 Oct 2002; “La salida no es a corto plazo ni represiva,” El Tiempo 15 Dec 
2002. 
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unemployment.  The bill’s proponents, Liberal Party Senators José Ignasio Mesa and Flora Sierra de 
Lara, argued that it would guarantee work for thousands of Colombians. Its detractors, including 
Mockus and the Pastrana administration, argued that street vending exacerbated unemployment by 
competing with formal businesses.  When asked if street vending was a way to give work to those 
who did not have it, Mockus underscored the detrimental long-term effects: “There is a deep 
discussion: if I sell cellphone cards on the corner, stores, drug stores, supermarkets sell fewer.  No 
book recommends, as a temporary strategy to confront an economic crisis, to let street vendors 
invade.”51  Business groups calculated that street vending employed 2 percent of the unemployed, 
but that economic growth could reduce unemployment by 10 percent.  The law passed the House, 
but failed in the Senate.52   
The last major initiative under Mockus was to reform to the city’s police code to make it 
easier to control street vending and other administrative infractions.53 Protests by vendors followed, 
as well as a debate in the City Council and press about the measures.54  City councilor Luis Eduardo 
Díaz, a former shoeshiner, captured the class politics of the debate in explaining his opposition: “I 
have the blood of a poor person, and I’m not going against my people.”55  Sympathetic coverage of 
vendors multiplied in the press, reaching a high of 55 percent of articles in 2003.  Letters to the 
editor discussed the proposed police code as a repressive instrument.  The strength of social 
                                                
51 “Alcalde: Sí han servido mis shows,” El Tiempo 21 Sept 2003. 
52 The legislative project was Law 289 of 2001. For discussions, see “Frente común contra ventas 
ambulantes,” El Tiempo 5 June 2001; “A punto de hundirse ley de ambulantes,” El Tiempo 15 June 
2001; “Ley contra el espacio público,” El Tiempo 15 June 2001. 
53 Agreement 79 and Decree 462 of 2003. Although the proposed measure included fines on street 
vendors for the illegal occupation of public space, the City Council opposed their inclusion.  Instead, 
the reforms only imposed fines on businesses that abetted the occupation of public space. They did 
clarify that decommission of merchandise is permissible for 24 hours, and permanent for a second 
offense.  “Peluquean el Código de Policia de Bogotá,” El Tiempo 4 Oct 2002. 
54 “Bloquean vías y transmilenio,” El Tiempo 8 Oct 2002. 
55 “Así se votaría el código de policía,” El Tiempo 20 Dec 2002. 
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sympathy for vendors in part reflected the changed economic conditions and continued civil war 
violence.  A typical editorial, for example, warned of a “social time bomb” caused by enforcing 
against vendors due to “the explosive combination of unemployment and entrance of displaced 
people that are fleeing violence.”56 Again, Mockus downplayed social concerns and claimed that 
vending exacerbated unemployment because it reduced growth and investment.57  
 In short, Mockus was an ideologue.  He entered politics because he had a vision of how to 
improve the city.  His philosophical view was that enforcement served the poor’s and the public’s 
interest.  In this sense, Mockus goes against a pure theory of office-seeking politicians who use 
forbearance to court an electoral constituency.  He did not enforce in search of middle-class 
support, but rather attracted their support due to his demonstrated enforcement commitments.  
Mockus underscores that enforcement policies are rooted in substantive debates about how to aid 
the poor that can divide class groups.  Given that Mockus ran for office in a politically centralized 
city, his enforcement beliefs still allowed him to win elections by mobilizing middle-class support.  
Hence, politicians do sometimes follow their personal enforcement preferences, but they do so at 
greater or lesser electoral peril depending on the district demographics of where they run for office. 
3.2.2 The Urbanist Center: Enforcement Under Peñalosa (1998-2000) 
 
To Mockus, social equality stemmed from shared civic culture.  To Peñalosa, equality came 
from shared physical spaces.58  Peñalosa was an urbanist who objected to street vendors 
                                                
56 “La Guerra callejera de Mockus,” El Tiempo 23 Sept 2002; Other examples include “Entre la chaza 
y el cuchillo,” El Tiempo 14 Oct 2002; “Qué van a hacer los vendedores,” El TIempo 30 Nov 2002; 
“Qué hacer con los vendedores ambulantess,” El Tiempo 8 Dec 2002; “Tolerancia con los 
vendedores,” El Tiempo 11 Dec 2002.   
57 “Ni un paso atrás: Mockus,” El Tiempo 2 Dec 2002. 
58 Peñalosa would even argue that public spaces are an economically progressive investment because 
the poor have fewer opportunities for things to do with their free time, and reduced spaces to live 
(Martin and Ceballos 2004: 159). 
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appropriating public space for private use.59 Although rooted in principles of urban design, Peñalosa 
grounded his political appeals to enforcement in conservative terms that would attract middle-class 
support.  These included appeals to urban subnationalism, crime control, and state authority.60  
Unlike the post-materialist Left, the purpose of enforcement was to demonstrate and rebuild the 
state’s coercive power to regulate behavior.  As expected, enforcement repelled poor voters.  
First, Peñalosa argued that street vendors deteriorated the city.  Enforcement, particularly in 
the historical downtown, would help recover citizens’ pride in Bogotá.  Peñalosa caricatures how the 
city center “lost its majesty and enchantment by the invasion of carts of every brand of soda, ice 
cream, French fries; with barbeque pits for corn, stands for pork shish-ka-bobs, bathroom slippers 
and contraband watches.”  His proposal was to enforce so that Colombians visit the downtown and 
leave “proud, confident in the capacity of their institutions to confront time and the world” 
(Peñalosa 2000: 7, 18). 
Second, Peñalosa justified enforcement by emphasizing vendors’ criminality.  He 
subscribed to the “broken windows” theory of crime, which holds that signs of minor disorder 
correlate with serious criminal behavior (Kelling and Wilson 1982).  Street vendors and the 
associated neglect of city spaces created a propitious environment for crime.  A firm approach 
toward street vendors would communicate the mayor’s tough approach to all crime.  Peñalosa also 
tried to separate street vendors from the poor.  He viewed street vendors as mafias, and “middle 
class” special interest groups that broke property laws and exploited the poor.61   
                                                
59 Peñalosa in some ways fits as part of the post-materialist Left because he promoted social equality 
in non-material conditions.  To Mockus, social equality stemmed from shared civic culture.  To 
Peñalosa, equality came from shared physical spaces.  Peñalosa argues that public spaces are an 
economically progressive investment because the poor have fewer opportunities for things to do 
with their free time, and reduced spaces to live (Martin and Ceballos 2004: 159). 
60 Peñalosa in fact visited Andrade in Lima and drew inspiration from his enforcement policies. 
61 Author interview with Enrique Peñalosa, Bogotá, Colombia, September 7, 2011.   
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Finally, the control of street vending was a means to reconstruct the state’s broader 
authority.  To Peñalosa, street vendors were conspicuous examples of state neglect.  Trust in state 
institutions was low due to the drug trade, civil war, and clientelistic politics.  Public space recovery 
was highly visible to all citizens and therefore could demonstrate the city’s authority, competence, 
and public commitment (Berney 2010). The recovery of downtown spaces meant that, in 
Peñalosa’s words, “the tolerance for disorder would change to become the clearest example of how 
anything can be accomplished [by the state]” (Beccassino 2000: 2010).   
While appeals to urban pride, crime control, and state authority could be understood as 
valence issues, enforcement came at the expense of jobs for unskilled workers at a time of soaring 
unemployment.  Some poor residents supported the public space recovery, but many viewed 
Peñalosa’s policies as an imposition of middle-class values.  As one vendor told the press, “He 
simply got rid of us as if the city wasn’t ours too.”62  There indeed was something of a Potemkin 
village in efforts to rebuild the city’s image and authority by removing the poor from public view.  
Editorials, for instance, referred to the “Peñalosa syndrome” as the prioritization of “public works 
and city aesthetics” over people.63 
Enforcement appealed most strongly to the middle class. The election put Peñalosa up 
against Carlos Moreno de Caro, an independent who had abandoned the Conservative Party.  In 
contrast to Peñalosa, Moreno de Caro defended forbearance toward street vendors for its informal 
welfare benefits. He explains, “The people who work in the streets have no education, they are 
displaced, and this is their last response to survive.  You can’t repress street vending just so the 
                                                
62 “La mano que limpia,” El Espectador 21 March 1999. 
63 “Síndrome Peñalosa,” El Tiempo 27 Nov 2002. As one former street vendor wrote into the paper, 
“I also would like to live in a city where no one throws themselves at me on the corner to sell 
things…but the reality of the country is otherwise and all these people have the right to seek 
substance for themselves and their families, given the circumstances.” “Qué hacer con los 
vendedores ambulantess,” El Tiempo 8 Dec 2002.   
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street looks nice, otherwise people just resort to crime.”64  Moreno de Caro showed up at protests by 
street vendors claiming “solidarity” with their cause.  Concern about a Moreno de Caro victory led 
to high turnout among middle-income groups at the polls.65  Peñalosa gained more than fifty percent 
of the vote share at polling stations in upper class strata areas, and less than a quarter of the vote in 
poor areas.66   
The Peñalosa administration immediately began operations against street vendors and 
pushed all relevant institutions to support continuous control.  First, the government reclaimed 
more than a million square meters of public space and removed an estimated 30,000 street vendors 
(Donovan 2008: 30).  Second, Peñalosa created new institutions to improve enforcement.  He 
created a special unit within the police to seize the goods and equipment of unlicensed street 
vendors and patrol public spaces (Grupo del Espacio Público).  The unit included more than 200 
officers dedicated to public space control.  In addition, the government created a special 
ombudsman’s office for citizens to file complaints against public space invasions (Defensoría del 
Espacio Público).  Third, Peñalosa exerted his control over appointed district mayors to coordinate 
enforcement efforts.  He cut district budgets dramatically, and made clear that appointed mayors’ 
job security depended on their firm action against vendors.67  Lastly, the administration coordinated 
                                                
64 Moreno de Caro created a party Defensa Ciudadana (Citizen Defense).  He promised that he would 
give credits to female heads of households and defend street vendors’ right to work. Author 
interview with Carlos Moreno de Caro, August 1, 2011.   
65 “Por qué no ganó Moreno de Caro,” El Tiempo 28 Oct 1997.  Jaime Castro came in a distant third, 
despite support from all the traditional party organizations and the city and subcity councilors.  
Peñalosa, in contrast, ran on an independent ticket and campaigned against the power of councilors 
as a way to limit corruption (Pasotti 2009: 82). 
66 These calculations are based on data from the Registraduría Nacional, compiled by the Misión de 
Observación Electoral (MOE).  For a similar methodology, also see Santos (2007). 
67 As one bureaucrat put it, “Peñalosa would call and say clean up such and such zone, and the local 
mayor would issue the order and we’d do it.  There was no debate about the situation, or 
intervention by council members because Peñalosa had such a clear policy of recuperating public 
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among institutions by holding weekly meetings with all authorities implicated to plan the next week’s 
operations.  As a result, Peñalosa managed nearly daily control operations to prevent street vending.  
Enforcement operations resulted in a substantial backlash in the press.  Evictions occurred 
at a time when the unemployment and poverty rate were on the rise.  A third of articles were 
sympathetic to street vendors in 1998.  Stories of operations, for example, highlighted single 
mothers with children fleeing bulldozers.68  Articles decried a “witch hunt,” “persecution,” and a 
“police state” against street vendors.69  Even critics of vendors insisted that they should receive 
alternative forms of employment for humanitarian or instrumental reasons (crime would increase).70  
Peñalosa seemed callous to the economic situation of the poor and was profoundly 
unpopular.  Three-quarters of voters said that they would not vote for them again.  A third of 
respondents had an unfavorable image of Peñalosa because he caused unemployment, and a sixth 
because he did not care about the poor.  But opinions divided.  A quarter of respondents thought 
that the best part of Peñalosa’s administration was the recovery of public space (Napoleón Franco & 
Cía Oct 1999).71  
                                                                                                                                                       
space that all the mayors went along with it or they would lose their jobs” (emphasis added).  Author interview 
with coordinator of legal affairs, District of Suba, Bogotá, Colombia, August 16, 2011.   
68 “Salen los vendedores de Avenida Jiménez,” El Tiempo 5 July 1998. 
69 “Inquisición ambulante,” El Tiempo 26 April 1998; “En favor de los vendedores ambulantes,” El 
Tiempo 29 June 1998; “Los vendedores ambulantes,” El Tiempo 12 July 1998; “Ausencia de 
sindéresis,” El Tiempo 13 April 2000. 
70 “El peatón sigue sin espacio,” El Tiempo 19 Jan 1999; “Bolardos,” El Tiempo 27 Feb 1999; “Los 
vendedores ambulantes,” El Tiempo 12 July 1998; “Los vendedores y el aeropuerto,” El Tiempo 6 July 
1998. 
71 Unfortunately these poll results are not available by class strata.  A recall referendum against 
Peñalosa in part due to his cruelty toward vendors showed the depth of popular dissatisfaction.  
While the recall was in part due to Peñalosa’s street vending policy, it also united middle-class and 
business groups opposed to the bollards that Peñalosa installed to recover public spaces and an 
attempt to expropriate the golf course.   
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A host of politicians and institutional actors defended forbearance against street vendors due 
to its employment benefits for the poor.  Minister of Labor Carlos Bula asked Peñalosa to avoid 
evictions because “street vendors are people who for necessity, not caprice or taste, undertake their 
subsistence activities in plazas, parks, and streets.”72  Then-senator Gustavo Petro was a vocal critic 
of police “repression” of the poor.73  Liberal city councilors also criticized the measures and pushed 
to expand relocation alternatives.74   
The strongest ideological defense of forbearance came not from a political party, but from 
the Constitutional Court.  Street vendors had filed tutelas to protest their removal on the grounds 
that evictions violated their right to work and, by leaving them unemployed, jeopardized their rights 
to subsistence.  Their case seemed weak because earlier court rulings upheld public space as a 
collective right with priority over individual rights.75  Mockus and Peñalosa frequently drew on this 
hierarchy to defend the collective interest in public space over individual economic necessities.  
However, the Court underscored that Colombia’s economic conditions required a recalibration of 
rights in favor of the poor’s needs. The Court denounced Peñalosa’s insistence on enforcement at a 
time of high unemployment: “[I]t would be nonsensical to increase unemployment without 
presenting alternatives that mitigate it, and as such, a judge cannot support that force is used 
precisely to augment the [employment] crisis.”76      
                                                
72 “No desalojar, pide ministro de Trabajo,” El Tiempo 4 July 1998. 
73 “Personería y Defensoría piden ver alternativas,” El Espectador, 30 Oct 1998.    
74 “Peñalosa, al borde del hueco,” El Tiempo 22 Nov 1998. 
75 For example, see “Alcaldes deben garantizar espacio público: La Corte,” El Tiempo 3 June 1992. 
76 Constitutional Court of Colombia, Sentence SU-360, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional, 19 May 1999. 
This doctrine of “legitimate confidence” (confianza légitima) conflicted with the thinking that vendors 
had already received redistributive benefits from the state and thus ceded their claims after gaining 
their wealth. As the Court wrote, “The tacit or express acquiescence of the state is what generates a 
legitimate expectation for an individual with respect to his judicial situation, even if it does not grant 
the individual a right to occupy public goods indefinitely, it does empower him to first claim the 
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More than bluster, the Court issued a negative injunction to support street vendors’ social 
rights claims.  The jurisprudential logic is that there is a constitutional right to work and to 
subsistence, and while the positive aspect of these rights (the provision of employment or income 
for all) cannot be realized immediately, the Court will at least enforce the negative aspect of the right 
by making it more difficult to prevent the poor from securing a minimum income.77  Thus, the 
government could proceed with evictions only if it offered other employment to street vendors.  
The Court’s powerful language in favor of forbearance over “ideals” of public space is perhaps one 
of the most explicit philosophical defenses of informal welfare provision and is worth underscoring: 
“One cannot deny that, in the a context of poverty as extreme as that affecting the capital, there 
are not dozens of thousands of people who opt to work for subsistence and, in the absence of formal 
sector opportunities, they should use the streets, plazas, and public parks to market their diverse articles in 
order to satisfy their own basic needs and those of their families….To deny someone who tries to 
escape from poverty the only means of work that they have at their disposal, in order to clear urban 
public space, without offering them a dignified subsistence alternative, is equivalent to requiring 
the individual to sacrifice in a disproportionate form in front of a general interest formulated in 
terms of abstracts and ideals, which openly denies whatever type of social solidarity” (emphasis added).78  
 
The Court thus recognized forbearance as an informal mode of employment provision in the 
context of weak distributive capacity to meet the poor’s needs.  Enforcement was cast as anti-poor 
(a denial of “social solidarity”).  Governments needed to generate labor alternatives if they chose to 
remove the informal benefits provided through street vending.  However, the Court did not specify 
the quality or scope of these labor alternatives.  It also rooted vendors’ claims to labor alternatives in 
the fact that the poor expected to generate their income in the streets due to the government’s past 
                                                                                                                                                       
implementation of social and economic programs that, like relocation, guarantee the integrity of his 
labor rights.” 
77 For a more general discussion of negative injunctions as a way to enforce social rights, see Landau 
(2012: 444-447). 
78 Constitutional Court of Colombia, Sentence T-722, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional, 4 Sept 2003. 
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tolerance.  Therefore, there were limits to forbearance.  The Court did not bar enforcement actions 
once the government reset enforcement expectations through the “recovery” of city streets.79  
The mandate to offer labor alternatives to street vendors forced Peñalosa to invest in 
relocation and compensation projects, despite his personal distaste for the measures.80  He then 
enforced heavily in recovered zones. The scale of investments in relocation was staggering: for 
example, the city paid 700 street vendors a total of $3.7 million in compensation to leave the 
downtown market of San Victorino.  It built an $8.9 million project to house 1200 vendors 
(Donovan 2002: 57).  In spending immense resources on a small group of vendors, however, it is 
not clear that relocation projects promoted equity or even effective labor alternatives, as the Court 
had hoped.  Only a third of government relocation projects actually were occupied by vendors due 
to their poor design and location (Castañeda and García 2007: 174-177). 
The main point here is that the debate about enforcement was a social policy debate in 
Colombia.  A host of politicians and state institutions linked forbearance to greater social equality, 
given an imperfect welfare state and weak economy.  The Constitutional Court most powerfully 
                                                
79 Constitutional Court of Colombia, Sentence SU-360, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional, 19 May 1999. 
As a doctrinal matter, the Court’s sentence established that past forbearance generated expectations 
of future income among street vendors.  This “legitimate confidence” (confianza légitima) in the state’s 
non-enforcement obligated the state to provide social alternatives.  As the Court wrote, “The tacit or 
express acquiescence of the state is what generates a legitimate expectation for an individual with 
respect to his judicial situation, even if it does not grant the individual a right to occupy public goods 
indefinitely, it does empower him to first claim the implementation of social and economic 
programs that, like relocation, guarantee the integrity of his labor rights.”  Hence, once the city 
recovered public spaces through removal and relocation projects, the government would reset 
expectations and could enforce.  This doctrine conflicted with the thinking that vendors had already 
received redistributive benefits from the state and thus ceded their claims after gaining their wealth. 
80 Peñalosa shared Mockus’ conviction that government-sponsored relocation projects for street 
vendors were unjustified because they did not target the poor.  As Peñalosa explained his objections: 
“One has to remember that relocation signifies to give away public money.  Let’s not talk in 
euphemisms.  The question is: are the vendors the poorest citizens?  It is the role of government to 
support the poorest sectors of society…Who has done a study to show that [street vendors] are the 
poorest or among the poorest?  Or are we just going to reward them with state resources simply 
because they broke the law?”  Author interview with Enrique Peñalosa, September 7, 2011. 
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articulated the principle that, given the state’s failure to provide employment alternatives, 
forbearance is a necessary way to employ the poor and guarantee basic material needs.  The social 
rights discourse made it easy to peg politicians like Peñalosa and Mockus as privileging middle-
class values like cleanliness and aesthetics over economic necessities.  
Using an electoral framework rooted in office-seeking motivations cannot explain the 
behavior of politicians like Mockus and Peñalosa.  Both politicians have been described as idealistic 
and divorced from popular sentiment.  While they illustrate political choices over enforcement, 
they underscore how ideology can motivate policy.  However, in their idealism, they strengthen my 
claim that enforcement forms part of debates over how to improve social welfare and divides the 
electorate on class lines.  Their support for enforcement communicated a distributive commitment 
to the middle class, despite their substantial pro-poor social investments in other areas and their 
self-conceptualization as politicians who prioritized the poor.  Peñalosa, for example, perversely 
insists that he “did more to advance the cause of equality than any politician since Stalin.”81  At 
times, the political costs of enforcement have led even ideologues like Peñalosa and Mockus to 
soften their enforcement positions in reelection campaigns.82  Both politicians struggled to erase an 
image of their governments as unsympathetic to the poor’s distributive needs, and gained less 
support among poor voters with each election cycle.  Their governments empirically illustrate the 
survey findings that I presented in Chapter 2: voters view politicians who enforce as anti-poor, and 
the poor are less likely to vote for enforcement. 
                                                
81 Author interview with Enrique Peñalosa, Bogotá, Colombia, September 7, 2011. 
82 Mockus admits that he backed down from evictions in his first term in office because he was 
concerned about eroding the trust of poor voters.  Peñalosa, when seeking reelection in 2011, 
realized that enforcement against street vendors alienated poor voters.  He proposed a segmented 
enforcement strategy.  While emphasizing his achievements in clearing central city areas and the 
need to maintain public spaces in the downtown, he proposed that street vendors in poor districts 
could remain in the streets. The half-hearted attempt to show sympathy convinced few poor 
voters.   
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State capacity in its traditional coercive and administrative sense did not enter the 
enforcement debate in Bogotá.  Mayors could and did repress street vending at the time when the 
city’s resources were at their nadir.  In fact, they enforced the law so effectively that citizens and 
politicians objected.  The main constraint on enforcement, as explicitly recognized by courts, was 
the state’s ability to guarantee the poor’s welfare.  I now show how subsequent politicians used 
forbearance explicitly to court poor core constituencies.   
3.3 Lower Class Core Constituencies and Forbearance  
 
After almost a decade of mayors who attracted their strongest support from middle-class 
voters, a sea change occurred.  Citizens elected mayors with poor core constituencies.  Forbearance 
toward street vending was used as an explicit campaign appeal to demonstrate a commitment to 
employ the poor and mobilize poor voters.  The realignment led to a clear drop in enforcement, 
even as state capacity rebounded. 
3.3.1 The Materialist Left: Regulation and Forbearance Under Garzón and Moreno (2003-10) 
 
The 2003 elections marked a change in class constituency and enforcement policy.  Luis 
Garzón staked his campaign on representation of the city’s poor.  He represented a labor-based Left 
that attempted to build a political party, the Polo.  His slogan “Bogotá Without Indifference” 
claimed to prioritize the impoverished. Garzón grew up in the poor districts of Bogotá and had 
strong ties to organized labor, eventually becoming the president of the largest Colombian labor 
confederation. In an unusual decision, the union movement had begun to incorporate informal 
sector workers and Garzón promised benefits beyond the formal sector.   
Given the previous two mayors’ efforts to “clean up” the city, Garzón used forbearance to 
underscore his commitment to the poor.  On the campaign trail, Garzón made his rejection of 
enforcement against street vendors a central issue.  He rallied many poor voters who had not 
mobilized in previous elections around forbearance.  The campaign folded forbearance into class 
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issues by rejecting the prioritization of “aesthetics” over social policy and the concentration of police 
resources on “defenseless poor,” rather than wealthy criminals.83 Garzón stated in a debate that the 
city “should not be a blank postcard,” and that his administration intended “to take into account 
employment as a social necessity.”84 In contrast to previous administrations, he promised to create 
employment opportunities through support for small and micro-businesses and offered forbearance 
as a necessary way to employ the poor until growth accelerated. 
The electoral incentive to promote forbearance was clear due to the direct mobilization of 
street vendors and the indirect social sympathy for their cause.  Prior to the election, more than 
30,000 of an estimated 110,000 street vendors in the city marched around the slogan “Polo 
[Garzon’s party] or the Police Stick!” (Polo o Palo!).85  Social sympathy with street vendors ran high, 
with more than half of articles offering a sympathetic portrayal of vendors during this period.86  
How to confront employment and poverty dominated the 2003 election due to the 
magnitude of the economic crisis in Bogotá.  Urban unemployment still remained at 16 percent in 
the run-up to the election (ILO 2012), 57 percent of the workforce worked in the informal sector, 
and 45 percent fell below the poverty line (DANE 2012).  More than 80 percent of citizens named 
employment as their primary concern (Bogotá Como Vamos 2003).   
Garzón won powerfully among the poor.  The election was the first time that the poor 
turned out at equal rates to other class groups.  They overwhelmingly backed the Polo.  Among the 
                                                
83 “Mi lucha es por la inclusión social,” El Tiempo 22 July 2003; “Agenda de los candidatos,” El 
Tiempo 25 Aug 2003; “Antes que peajes, renegociar la deuda,” El Tiempo 6 Aug 2003. 
84 “El rebusque, para sobrevivir!” El Tiempo 13 Aug 2003. 
85 While the march in large part served to reject reforms to the police code under Mockus, it also 
showed vendors’ support for Garzón. Vendors first attempted to meet with Mockus and then 
marched to the Procuradoría General. “La protesta ambulante,” El Tiempo 19 July 2003; 
“Vendedores piden alternativas,” El Tiempo 22 July 2003.   
86 For example, see “Los informales,” El Tiempo 14 Oct 2003; “Tolerancia con vendedores 
ambulantes,” El Tiempo 27 July 2003; “Peor el remedio que enfermedad,” El Tiempo 9 Aug 2003; “El 
código, una utopía,” El Tiempo 21 Aug 2003. 
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lower two socioeconomic strata, Garzón received 74.9 percent of the votes, compared to 25.4 
percent among the uppermost strata (Bogotá Como Vamos 2005).  
Poor voters rejected continuity with past policies, represented by the losing candidate Juan 
Lozano, a Liberal Party dissident who received Peñalosa’s endorsement.  Promises of forbearance 
differentiated Garzón from Lozano, who said that he would “run the risk of losing votes” and 
enforce against street vendors because “the law is not negotiable.”87  Peñalosa warned that the city 
jeopardized its future with Garzón because he did not understand the value of public space.88 
Lozano reflected on the stark class divisions in electoral preferences saying, “Bogotá is not, in reality, 
one, but two, cities.”89  
In office, Garzón avoided enforcement against street vendors.  With few exceptions, police 
stopped decommissioning merchandise and equipment from vendors.90  Weekly meetings to 
coordinate operations ceased.  Garzón reiterated that he intended to enforce sparingly until the 
government generated job alternatives: “We are not complicit in the illegality, but we also are not 
going to tell the police to repress.”91 Garzón designed “Plan Presence” (Plan Presencia), which tried to 
convince vendors to respect public spaces and reduce negative externalities without enforcement 
actions that would compromise their ability to earn a living.92  Street vendors corroborate police data 
                                                
87 “Lozano: Transmilenio no es poesia sino dignidad,” El Tiempo 19 Oct 2003; “El ganador fue el 
debate,” El Tiempo 22 Aug 2003; “Lo que dijeron los candidatos,” El Tiempo 22 Aug 2003. 
88 “Respuesta a Peñalosa,” El Tiempo 17 Oct 2003. 
89 “Reflexiones de una campaña,” El Tiempo 2 Nov 2003. 
90 The exception came in operation to decommission pirated and copyrighted goods, although these 
concentrated in wholesale markets where the goods were sold, rather than in streets against vendors 
(Jaramillo, Cárdenas Villamil, and García Bañales 2008: 80, 128). 
91 “No voy a arrendar ni a parcelar el espacio público,” El Tiempo 12 Nov 2004. 
92 “Por ahora, será a las buenas,” El Tiempo 10 Feb 2004. 
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showing that enforcement operations plummeted.  As one vending leader put it, “Why do I support 
the Polo? Because the Polo is the only party that for better or worse has let us work.”93 
Garzón received substantial criticism for easing enforcement.  The press attacked the loss of 
control.  A full 47 percent of all news items (both articles and letters) included unsympathetic 
portrayals that berated the government for its leniency.  Typical letters feared the “chaos of the 
past,”94 denounced the “outrage against ordinary citizens,”95 and complained about the “populist and 
permissive strategy” in which “the police themselves say that they have orders not to annoy the 
vendors.”96  In 2005, 46 percent of the population considered street vendors among the principal 
problems of the city (Bogotá Como Vamos 2005).  Public opinion divided on vending with a 
majority (58 percent) in favor of more enforcement and 38 percent of the public opposed to any 
operations.97  Although criticism mounted, Garzón remained committed to street vendors.  As 
Garzón reflected, “My greatest fault can at the same time be my greatest virtue: I’m a good person, 
at times things require a hard hand (mano dura) and, since I don’t have one, others think I’m an 
imbecile” (Gilbert 2008: 276 ).  
Why didn’t the Garzón administration legalize street vending if it opposed the regulations?  
Part of the answer is that the city government lacked the authority; the Constitution required the 
protection of public space. Even if legally possible, however, legalization of street vending was not 
the goal.  Garzón preferred the revocable nature of forbearance, and set out a policy to transition 
                                                
93 Author interview with anonymous vending leader, Bogotá, Colombia, Sept. 20, 2011. 
94 Letter to the editor, El Tiempo, 4 Jan 2004. 
95 “El centro, invadido,” El Tiempo 20 Feb 2004. 
96 “Y la policía?” El Tiempo 1 Feb 2004. 
97 “Debate por el espacio público,” El Tiempo 6 Jan 2004. 
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vendors into formal solutions that would permit greater control over street vending.98  Much like the 
Constitutional Court, Garzón defended street vending as a necessary stopgap measure in the context 
of unemployment and poverty.  It is critical to emphasize that Garzón did not favor manipulations 
of the law to exploit the poor and gain power over them; his opposition was rooted in a view that 
enforcement was inappropriate given the social context and an attempt to appeal to poor voters.   
To a certain extent, the Garzón administration did work to boost substitutive social policies 
beyond forbearance. Garzón passed a “master plan” that proposed a managed approach in which 
street vending associations regulated their own activities and the government created kiosks to 
permit an orderly use of public space, as well as other labor market alternatives.99 Despite the 
ambitious strategy, the government managed to build just 300 kiosks.  Relocation projects proceeded 
no faster than under past administrations.  Forbearance remained the best alternative for the 
materialist Left.  As one city official noted, “It would have been against the people who voted for 
the Polo to evict street vendors…But the Polo still couldn’t solve the underlying issue of jobs.”100  
Street vendors, and the poor more generally, appeared to reward the Polo’s forbearance at the ballot 
box even though formal welfare solutions were not forthcoming.  
Prioritization of the economic needs of street vendors continued in the subsequent Polo 
administration of Samuel Moreno. While Moreno lacked Garzón’s working-class background, his 
family history with National Popular Alliance (Alianza Nacional Popular, ANAPO), which appealed to 
                                                
98 See, “El espacio público será todo una empresa,” El Tiempo 10 July 2005; also see, “Plan Maestro 
de Espacio Público,” Decree No. 215, Bogotá, Colombia, 7 July 2005.  
99 Decree 098 (Plan Maestro del Espacio Público).  The “master plan” laid out several objectives: 1) to 
establish a commission to manage vending with the joint participation of vendors and government 
officials, 2) to restructure the agency in charge of relocation projects, evaluate past projects, and 
generate alternative labor solutions for vendors, 3) to commission a census of the vending 
population, and 4) to promote the democratic use of public space, which in practice meant the 
construction of kiosks to relocate street vendors. 
100 Author interview with Juan Manuel Roso, Personería, Bogotá, Colombia, September 27, 2011. 
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informal sector voters, suggested that he would prioritize the interests of street vendors.101  Street 
vendors mobilized for Moreno.  They insist that their support reflected their confidence that the 
Polo would protect their interests against enforcement.102  By the 2007 election, vending associations 
formally had joined the main Colombian labor confederation (Central Unitaria de Trabajadores de 
Colombia, CUT) and formed a united bloc in favor of the Polo.  Like Garzón, Moreno won with the 
support of poor and working-class voters (Gilbert 2012: 5).   
Moreno largely continued the Polo’s policies of forbearance toward street vendors, although 
he improved security and administrative enforcement in other areas.  Police records show that 
Moreno took a comparatively lax approach against street vendors.  A high-ranking official describes 
that the Moreno administration made a policy of forbearance toward street vendors clear to officials: 
“In private meetings, we’re told not to touch the street vendors.  Vending regulatory policies aren’t 
meant to work because this is how the Polo Party gains its support base.”103 In other areas like 
public security, Moreno invested heavily in enforcement.  He doubled the police’s budget. He also 
introduced a number of innovative measures to reduce crime, such as a liquor sales ban.   
Restrictions on alcohol sales were consistently enforced (Mello, Mejía, and Suárez 2013).  These 
facts suggest that the police did not lack the capacity to act against administrative infractions.  
Rather, operations against street vendors remained minimal because the Polo needed the poor’s 
electoral support.  
                                                
101 Moreno is the grandson of Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, a populist politician who powerfully courted 
informal sector voters through his National Popular Alliance (Alianza Nacional Popular, ANAPO) 
opposition party.  He narrowly lost the 1970 presidential election (arguably due to fraud).  Moreno’s 
mother is María Eugenia Rojas, the former president of ANAPO, and a strong advocate of street 
vendors.  Samuel Moreno was active with the ANAPO opposition.  
102 Author’s focus group with street vending leaders, CUT, 1 Sept 2011. 
103 Author interview with anonymous official, Personería de Bogotá, Sept. 14, 2011. 
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Social solidarity with street vendors remained high, which expanded the number of voters 
willing to support forbearance.  Although Bogotá’s economy recovered and poverty rates fell in the 
2000s, the limited availability of good jobs and internal displacement continued to justify 
forbearance.  The sub-director of the agency tasked with the relocation of street vendors, the 
Institute for the Social Economy (Instituto para la Economía Social, IPES) explains, “In the early 2000s, 
62 percent of citizens said that they bought from street vendors, and 80 percent thought that street 
vendors damaged the city.  Now, you have 78 percent that continues to buy on the streets, but only 
75 percent see street vending as a problem…There is a certain level of solidarity with street vendors, 
instead of watching the displaced beg for money, people see them working.”104  
Again, forbearance was not the Moreno administration’s preferred policy.  The 
administration probably would have preferred policies to reduce poverty and employ the poor.  But 
these were viewed as the national government’s responsibility.  A report from the authority that 
receives citizen complaints against street vending underscores how forbearance served as an 
informal employment policy for both Polo administrations:  
“The focus of public policies implemented in the past two administrations [of Garzón and 
Moreno] center around the social imperative and citizens’ rights to work, which has resulted in 
that the recovery of invaded public space has not continued at the pace demanded by some public sectors.”  
Nonetheless, it is important to warn that lasting solutions to the problem of informal sales will 
not be achieved without the national government’s solution of the macroeconomic situations that give rise to the 
phenomenon” (emphasis added).105   
 
In short, barring other options, forbearance was the best option for both Garzón and 
Moreno to win the poor’s votes and employ them through informal means.  Particularly for Garzón, 
forbearance stemmed from a conviction that street vendors formed part of the working class and 
merited the Left’s defense.  Moreno lacked Garzón’s working class roots, but he similarly 
                                                
104 Author interview with IPES sub-director, Bogotá, Colombia, September 12, 2011.   
105 “Informe Final Auditoría Gubermental, DADEP,” Período Auditado 200, Dirección Sector 
Control Urbano, Dec 12, 2010.    
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understood that the Polo’s base needed to extend to informal sector workers.  Forbearance 
continued even as police resources doubled and crime rates fell in the 2000s.   
3.3.2 The Materialist Left Reprised: Forbearance Under Petro (2011-14) 
 
The Polo’s run in office ended in 2011.  Moreno left in disgrace on charges that he took 
bribes in exchange for public works contracts.  Corruption sunk the party’s reputation.  But the 
materialist Left’s policies largely continued under a new guise.  Gustavo Petro, a former M-19 
guerrilla and an ally turned critic of the Polo Party, won the 2011 election for mayor.  Petro garnered 
respect as a crusading opposition senator who denounced the Polo’s corruption.  He formed a new 
leftist party, the Progressive Movement (Movimiento Progresista).  Petro mixed post-materialist appeals 
to respect the environment and diversity, with classic materialist positions to promote workers’ 
rights and basic necessities for the poor.   
Petro continued to use support for street vending as a way to signal his distributive 
commitments.  He campaigned on vague proposals to promote the “popular economy,” and had a 
long history of defending street vendors since when Peñalosa removed street vendors from the 
downtown.106  In debates, Petro largely avoided street vending because it compromised his attempts 
to build multiclass appeal.  As one city official put it, “Vendors could be the million dollar question 
in a debate that separates a candidate of the poor from a candidate of the wealthy…but everyone 
wanted to avoid it because Peñalosa loses poor votes and Petro has to admit to the middle class that 
he won’t touch vendors and that will be the end of his broader coalition.”107  While Petro used only 
vague appeals on the campaign trail, some of Petro’s allies in the Progressive Party took explicit 
stances in favor of forbearance.  As a candidate, the city councilor and party spokesperson, Yezid 
                                                
106 “Personería y Defensoría piden ver alternativas,” El Espectador, 30 Oct 1998.    
107 Author interview with coordinator of judicial affairs, Bogotá, Colombia, August 16, 2011.   
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García, ran on a platform that promised “the right to work for informal vendors, the suspension of 
evictions and arbitrary decommission of merchandise.”   
Street vending leaders were skeptical of Petro because they believed that his personalistic 
party doomed the Polo.  To vendors, the Polo represented an attempt to build a real political party 
to defend informal and formal sector workers.108  Nonetheless, Petro’s primary rival in a fragmented 
field was Peñalosa.  Vending leaders were unified in their opposition to another term for Peñalosa.109 
Petro polled best among lower and lower-middle class voters in large part due to his 
reputation for denouncing corruption.  Petro attracted much stronger support among the poor than 
Peñalosa.  Half of lower class voters said they would never vote for Peñalosa.  Meanwhile, roughly 
half of upper income voters supported Peñalosa. Petro won with just 28 percent of the vote, and a 
less clear-cut class profile of support due to a slew of moderate candidates.110 
Consistent with his support among poor voters, Petro moved to protect street vendors in 
two ways.  First, going even beyond the Polo’s position, Petro dismantled police capabilities to 
control street vending.  Peñalosa had created a special unit to control street vending within the 
National Police.  The police reserved 240 officers for regular patrols of public space, and to 
coordinate larger control operations with local mayors.  Petro disbanded the unit, and according to 
                                                
108 Author interview with Alfredo Machola Rojas, president of the UGTI-CUT (Unión General de 
Trabajadores de la Economia Informal), September 1, 2011. 
109 Focus group with street vendors, CUT, Bogotá, September 13, 2011.   
110 Some polls suggest that Petro drew near even support across class groups, while others give him 
stronger support among lower and lower-middle sectors (Strata 1, 2, and 3).  High rates of 
abstention and vote fragmentation make polls of vote intention slightly unreliable.  Moreover, while 
Gina Parody initially did well among lower income voters, her alliance with Mockus boosted her 
ratings among the middle class and helped Petro surge among the poor.  “Petro 22%, Peñalosa 19% 
y Parody 17% de intención de voto, según Ipsos Napoleón,” Semana 21 Oct 2011; “Gina Parody es 
la segunda en Bogotá, según encuesta de Datexco,” Semana 27 Oct 2011; “Alianza Gina-Mockus 
evita polarización, pero la pelea sigue siendo entre Petro y Peñalosa,” La Silla Vacía 10 Oct 2011. 
“Bogotá: la campaña se vuelve seria,” Revista Razón Pública 11 Aug 2011; “A Gina le funcionó la 
alianza,” El Espectador 7 Oct 2011. 
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government officials, ordered the police to suspend control operations and end decommission of 
merchandise.  Operations largely have ceased.111  Second, Petro revived old legislative proposals to 
legalize street vending by allowing vendors to rent public spaces subject to restrictions.  As a press 
release put it, the interest of the administration is “to transform informal sales into a popular 
economy that guarantees dignified and decent work.”112  It remains unclear whether these proposals 
will move forward.  The key point is that Petro continued the Left’s policies of forbearance, despite 
mounting pressure to control street vending.  
3.4 Urban Political Centralization  
 
Street vending policy has shifted radically over time and has remained a salient political issue 
in Bogotá.  The newspaper reports showed that vending faded from the agenda in Lima, even 
though the number of street vendors in the two cities has been similar.  What explains the continued 
political salience of street vending in Bogotá?  The main factor that I want to flag, and return to in 
the next chapter, concerns the different electoral structures of the cities.  
In a politically centralized city like Bogotá, mayors decide on enforcement policy for the 
entire city and can compel district mayors to follow these guidelines.  Faced with more uniform 
enforcement policies, the spatial pattern of street vending differs.  Street vendors remain in 
commercially profitable, central areas of the city where they are visible to the nonpoor.  Political 
centralization thus increases the political salience of street vendors, and the class debate that 
surrounds vending.  In politically decentralized cities like Lima and Santiago, city mayors can pursue 
a segmented approach in which they enforce in the city center and allow district mayors to set 
enforcement policies according to local preferences.  Segmentation leads vendors to move to the 
                                                
111 Author interview with Ricardo María Cañón Prieto, Personero de Bogotá, July 31, 2012. 
112 “Reubicación de comerciantes informales, concertada con el distrito,” Press Release, Alcaldía 
Mayor de Bogotá, March 4, 2012. 
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urban periphery where they are less visible to middle-class residents.  Thus, the political costs of 
enforcement choices are reduced under decentralization.   
Of course, this does raise the question of why mayors in a politically centralized city do not 
take a segmented approach. In other words, why not tolerate street vending on the urban periphery 
and enforce in central zones?  Such a policy may satisfy middle-class groups, but segmentation 
carries a cost among poor voters who know that city mayors could let them work in commercially 
profitable areas of the city where they are visible to the nonpoor.  If mayors want to signal a 
commitment to the poor, they face pressure for forbearance in valuable zones.  In an attempt to 
expand his popular appeal in the 2011 mayoral campaign, for example, Peñalosa embraced a 
segmented enforcement policy. He stated in a campaign event that he “did not care about letting a 
single mother work as an avocado vendor in Suba [a poor district],” while he intended to enforce in 
the profitable business downtown.113  This type of appeal only reinforced his disregard for the poor.  
Rather than allow the poor to work in central areas where they earn the most money and are visible 
to all classes, Peñalosa proposed to relegate them to peripheral areas.  The logic is quite different for 
mayors in hybrid cities, as we will see next in Lima, because city mayors can justify a segmented 
approach as respect for autonomous policy determination.   
To review, the longitudinal pattern of enforcement in Bogotá defies dominant capacity-
based explanations.  Yet, the enforcement patterns makes perfect sense given changing political tides 
in the city.  Enforcement oscillated with the core constituency of each mayor.  Bogotá mayors 
proposed enforcement policies that attracted middle-class constituencies in the mid-1990s.  Even 
though Mockus and Peñalosa claimed, and in many ways acted, to represent the poor’s interests, 
their enforcement policies alienated poor voters.  Rejecting an enforcement approach, the poor 
instead voted for mayors who supported forbearance in the 2000s.  Garzón, Moreno, and Petro all 
                                                
113 Campaign rally for Partido Verde, Bogotá, Colombia, September 13, 2011.   
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sought to generate informal employment and signal their distributive commitments to the poor 
through forbearance.  Failures in the welfare state, not the police or bureaucracy, were used to justify 
forbearance politically and even constitutionally by the courts.  Hence, while capacity-based theories 
predicted a secular increase in enforcement, my electoral theory helps make sense of the sharp 
swings in enforcement outcomes.  
4 Enforcement and Institutional Weakness: Lima  
 
Peru’s notoriously weak institutions, debt crisis, and urban poverty make it an unlikely case 
for enforcement.  Indeed, elected mayors in the 1980s and early 1990s won with the support of the 
informal sector poor and used forbearance to rally their constituents.  More than a decade of 
forbearance increased opposition to street vending, however, and helped to bring a mayor who 
represented a nonpoor core constituency to power.  Enforcement followed.  The fact that 
enforcement occurred, despite limited institutional resources and a faltering economy, provides 
disconfirming evidence of state capacity-based theories.   
TABLE 4.2.  Core Constituency and Enforcement by Mayor, Lima (1981-2014) 
 
SOURCE: Author’s compilation of electoral data by district and enforcement reports.   
This section underlines how differences in winning core constituencies shape enforcement.  
To provide a blueprint for the case, Table 4.2 charts the class basis of support and enforcement 
policy for each elected mayor in Lima since the reintroduction of direct elections in 1980.  Lima city 
residents have moved to elect mayors with nonpoor or neutral core constituencies as the city 
Table 1: Class Gradient and Enforcement by Mayor, Lima (1980-2013)
Class Gradient
Lower Ne tral Upper
Forbearance Barrantes C s añeda
Del Castillo
Policy Belmont
Enforcement Villarán Orrego
Andrade
Table 2: Class Gradient and Enforcement by Mayor, Bogotá (1988-2013)
Class Gradient
Lower Neutral Upper
Forbearance Garzón Caicedo
Moreno Castro
Policy Petro
Enforcement Pastrana
Peñalosa
Mockus
Lower Neutral Upper
Forbearance
Barrantes (1984-86)
Del Castillo (1987-89)
Belmont (1990-95)
Castañeda (2007-10)
Enforcement
Castañeda (2003-06)
Villarán (2011-14)
Orrego (1981-83)
Andrade (1996-2002)
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government’s institutional capacity has improved with time.  All recent mayors are in the central 
column of neutral class constituencies.114  Unlike in Bogotá, mayors largely have maintained 
enforcement policies due to their multiclass constituencies.  Additionally, Lima’s hybrid electoral 
structure in which the city mayor controls enforcement in the center and district mayors set their 
own autonomous enforcement policies has reduced the electoral costs of enforcement.  Mayors in 
poor districts have continued to pursue forbearance, as Chapter 5 further underscores.  This section 
divides Lima’s political history into four major periods based on the types of core constituencies and 
enforcement policies pursued, beginning with the return to democratic elections.  I then expand on 
the role that a hybrid electoral system has played in sustaining enforcement policies by city mayors.   
4.1 Lower Class Core Constituencies and Forbearance  
 
Having sketched out the central correlations between class constituencies and enforcement 
policy over time, this section explores how attempts to court the votes of the poor motivated 
forbearance during the 1980s.  In order to make this link between electoral incentives and 
enforcement, this section briefly reviews the context at Peru’s transition back to democracy.  I then 
show how forbearance was used to boost welfare informally and signal distributive commitments to 
the poor by both the materialist and populist Left during the 1980s. 
4.1.1 The Transition: Redemocratization and Weak Enforcement Under Orrego (1981-83) 
 
Mayoral elections returned to Lima in 1980.  The changing social and electoral landscape 
provided an opportunity for the Left to link to the urban poor.  Millions of previously 
disenfranchised illiterate voters joined the electorate and more than doubled the voting population 
(Remmer 1985: 258).  Migration brought 75,000 peasants to Lima each year in the 1980s (INEI 
                                                
114 As I return to below, classifying a mayor’s core constituency is tricky in the case of Susana 
Villarán because there is a divergence between ecological correlations and vote preference surveys.  
Her rapid ascendance and high rates of abstention created discordant findings in the polls.  I classify 
her as winning neutral class support due to the uncertainty, although other analysts have argued that 
she attracted lower class support (Sulmont and Gordillo 2011). 
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1999); many initially found employment in professions like street vending as part of Lima’s vast 
informal economy.  Compulsory voting rules magnified the poor’s political power by compelling 
their turnout.   
The political Left pieced together a coalition of parties, the United Left (Izquierda Unida, IU), 
to contest city elections.  With little time to organize, the Left lost to the government’s mayoral 
candidate, Eduardo Orrego.  Orrego ran on the centrist Popular Action (Acción Popular, AP) ticket.  
Middle and working-class voters supported Orrego in large numbers, although he drew weak 
support from the informal sector poor (Cameron 1991: 299).115  AP’s victory in the founding 
election may have reflected hesitancy to jeopardize democracy with support for a newly formed Left 
party.  AP also made popular promises to promote jobs and fair wages to expand its electoral 
support (Dietz 1998: 196).  
The democratic transition devolved power over urban planning and street vending 
enforcement to the city mayor.  Orrego was an architect by training who promised to revitalize 
Lima’s center consistent with middle-class hopes.  Major newspapers, business associations, and 
middle-class groups complained of the deterioration and congestion in Lima’s center caused by 
street vendors. De Soto and Ghersi (1989: 88) argued that many city residents hoped street vending 
would disappear with the removal of Peru’s military government that had used forbearance to 
bolster its support.  As they wrote, “The city’s residents wanted the municipal government to take a 
stand against the street vendors, who were regarded as one of the most deplorable legacies of the 
military government.”  
                                                
115 Poll data are limited for this period, but ecological correlations suggest a positive, although 
possibly neutral, class gradient.  Cameron (1991: 295-299) finds that the share of manual, employer, 
and white-collar workers in a district does not clearly predict the 1980 AP municipal vote, although 
by 1983 occupational class is a robust predictor across class groups (with manual and informal sector 
workers much less likely to support AP).  However, the share of informal sector workers in a district 
does predict less support for AP even in the 1980 elections, leading to the conclusion that Orrego 
received weaker support among the urban poor. 
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Capacity constraints limited the scope of enforcement actions.  The city acquired 400 
employees to manage urban planning tasks, but the devolution of administrative responsibilities at 
the transition brought no additional budget (Pease Garcia 1989: 51).  Resource constraints led 
Orrego to concentrate his “clean up” efforts on a tiny area of the city center, Lima Cuadrada. He 
ordered the eviction of street vendors to create a pedestrian passage. While a limited objective that 
ignored important concentrations of vendors, it broke with the military government’s neglect of the 
issue.  I classify Orrego as pursuing an enforcement policy because he ordered the eviction of 
vendors and control operations to preserve the cleared zone.  It was a baby step. 
Enforcement sparked a backlash from street vendors and their political representatives.  The 
eviction order resulted in a protest by the largest street vending association in the city, the 
Federation of Lima Street Vendors (Federación Departamental de Vendedores Ambulantes de Lima, 
FEDEVAL).  The mobilizations highlighted the growing political power of street vendors.  The 
number of street vendors climbed from roughly 60,000 at the transition to 85,000 at the end of 
Orrego’s term.116 The IU defended street vending as a means of survival and a necessary response by 
the poor to economic crisis. 117  Orrego pushed ahead with the removal, although conceding to rent 
the city’s fairground to vendors.118 
While surveys are unavailable, it seems likely that the poor sympathized with vendors’ claims 
due to the weak economy.  The Peruvian economy shrank more than 12 percent under President 
Belaúnde, and wages lost 40 percent of purchasing power (Panfichi 1997: 219).  The informal sector 
                                                
116 In 1976, the National Statistical Institute counted 58,284 street vendors in Lima.  In 1985, the 
ILD counted 84,327 street vendors and an additional 38,897 vendors in informal markets.  Head 
count methodologies, like those used by ILD, tend to undercount street vendors, making this a 
conservative estimate of their expansion.  
117 Some IU legislators and city councilors joined the protests, such as Rolando Breña and Hugo 
Blanco.  “Vendedores ambulantes paralizan el Centro,” El Comercio 24 April 1981. 
118 AP city councilor and later mayor, Luis Castañeda, took charge of projects to move vendors to 
fairgrounds in the city center.   
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expanded from 33 percent to 42 percent of Lima’s labor force (Chávez O’Brien 1993: 92).  The 
economic failures and perceived prioritization of middle class interests by the Orrego administration 
led to popular discontent with the traditional parties of AP and its ally, the PPC.  The urban poor 
deserted AP in large numbers in subsequent elections and turned to the Left (Cameron 1991).   
4.1.2 The Materialist and Populist Left: Forbearance Under Barrantes and Del Castillo (1984-89) 
The Left swept the 1983 metropolitan elections, bringing a shift in enforcement policy.  City 
residents elected Alfonso Barrantes, a popular labor lawyer with Marxist roots, as mayor.  Barrantes 
represented the IU, although he was not affiliated with any particular party within the coalition.  The 
IU selected Barrantes as its candidate because his independence and “common touch” could help 
win over low-income voters without strong partisan affiliations (Roberts 1996: 226).  With AP 
discredited, the mayoral contest boiled down to “opposition” candidates; Barrantes ran against 
Alfredo Barrenechea from the populist APRA party.   
Barrantes drew strong support from the urban poor and working class voters. A yawning 
class gap in preferences emerged.  Surveys show that 52 percent of the lower working class voted for 
IU compared to only 23 percent of upper and middle-class voters.  Meanwhile, the urban poor 
supported APRA in roughly equal proportions to other social groups (Cameron 1991: 297).  The 
strength of IU support also was evident at the district level: fifteen of sixteen poor districts in the 
capital elected local mayors from the IU (Dietz 1998: 196).   
On the campaign trail, Barrantes proposed policies and alliances that emphasized his 
commitment to the urban poor.  Most famously, Barrantes promised a free glass of milk to every 
needy child in Lima,119 but he also promoted a “managed” approach to street vending that would be 
                                                
119 The Glass of Milk (Vaso de Leche) program would become Barrantes’ main policy legacy, as 
subsequent governments kept the program and expanded it nationwide due to its popularity among 
the poor.  Del Castillo briefly tried to end Vaso de Leche because it was associated with the IU, but 
backed down due to popular opposition (Graham 1992: 179). 
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sensitive to their employment needs.  To make his commitment clear, Barrantes offered street 
vending leaders places on his IU ticket.  Most notably, FEDEVAL head Guillermo Nolasco 
campaigned alongside Barrantes and won election as a councilor.  The alliance with FEDEVAL, 
which had vocally opposed evictions under Orrego, positioned Barrantes as a candidate who 
represented the poor’s interests.   
A combination of ideological conviction and strategic calculation led Barrantes to ally with 
street vendors.  Barrantes came from a humble provincial background, worked as a labor lawyer, and 
understood street vendors as part of an oppressed lower class.  Interpreted in a Marxist light, 
Barrantes viewed street vendors as part of a “temporary reserve army of labor” that would be 
absorbed as Peru industrialized.120  Nolasco describes how Barrantes identified street vendors as part 
of a common working-class identity:  
“The consensus was that vendors were a product of economic crisis and migration, and at the 
core workers who needed to generate a subsistence income…Maybe we were wrong in not 
thinking about the harms we imposed on the city, but feeding one’s family was seen as more 
important than beautifying the city to please ‘traditional’ Lima.”121 
 
Nevertheless, the incorporation of street vendors into the IU cannot be taken for granted on 
ideological grounds.  A debate raged on the Left about street vending.  Barrantes’ attempts to court 
the informal sector vote conflicted with radical segments of the IU, which dismissed street vendors 
either as lumpenproletariat or entrepreneurial capitalists who lacked the class identity necessary for 
structural change (Cameron 1991: 301; Taylor 1990: 110).   
Barrantes elevated street vendors’ working identity in part for strategic reasons. Barrantes 
represented an electoral Left that calculated how to take power and understood the strategic 
importance of street vendors.  While FEDEVAL only represented 50,000 street vendors in the mid-
                                                
120 Author interview with Elsie Guerrero, former director of Commercialization (Comercialización), 
Lima Metropolitan Government, Lima, Peru, June 7, 2011.   
121 Author interview with Guillermo Nolasco, IU city councilor (1984-87) and FEDEVAL president, 
Lima, Peru, November 25, 2011. 
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1980s, it was intended to expand the IU’s representation to the city’s half a million informal sector 
workers.  Nolasco continues to explain the electoral calculation:  
“Street vendors were the largest single sector workforce in the city, and the most organized 
through FEDEVAL…we [the leadership] were not looking for electoral exchange, but we talked 
with Barrantes about how the alliance would show the IU’s ability to represent the most common 
type of worker and a broader idea of the working class.”122   
 
With direct representation of street vendors in government, the Barrantes administration 
passed legislation to recognize and improve conditions for street vendors.123  First, the government 
required street vendors to join an association to work in the streets.  These associations would be 
represented on a sectoral commission including government officials, police, and politicians.  
Second, vendors would control their own behavior to reduce the harms imposed on others.  
Because the IU understood vending as an employment option for the poor, the government limited 
street vendors to the sale of merchandise worth less than $2,675 dollars annually.  Third, the 
legislation established provisions for social benefits to be administered by district governments.  
Vendors would be allowed to occupy public space in exchange for the payment of an excise tax 
(sisa).  Half of the revenue generated from the tax would support health, pension, and emergency 
coverage for vendors (Roever 2005: 57-60). The legislation thus did not legalize street vending 
outright, but it provided a legal option to work as a street vendor subject to restrictions.   
Enforcement of the constraints on street vendors was minimal.  The city government ceased 
retentions of merchandise, which prevented effective control operations.  Some district 
governments did use the new legislation to impose restrictions on where vendors could operate and 
how many could work in city streets.   Wealthy districts, such as La Molina and San Isidro, for 
example, issued only a few hundred licenses and enforced the restrictions.  In contrast, poor districts 
                                                
122 Author interview with Guillermo Nolasco, November 25, 2011. 
123 The street vending regulations were passed as Metropolitan Ordinance 002, published in the 
official gazette, El Peruano, on April 17, 1985.  Metropolitan ordinances apply to all districts of the 
city.   
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attracted thousands of vendors (De Soto 1989: 68-69), and their mayors, who came almost 
exclusively from the IU, defended street vending as a form of informal employment provision.  As 
one IU mayor relates: 
“I couldn’t touch street vendors because of Izquierda Unida and the relationship that we had 
with the poor.  In those days, vendors were seen as poor and this was a way to assist them, while we 
had little else to offer the popular sectors.  We were with the poor so there was no way that I could 
remove or even control vendors and ever be reelected in the district” (emphasis added).124   
 
Weak distributive capacity made forbearance the government’s preferred policy.  However, it 
was a second best policy for the IU for two reasons.  First, Barrantes understood that his 
administration was a test of whether the IU could govern the city effectively (Schönwälder 2002: 
119).  The growing number of street vendors compromised the IU’s reputation for efficient 
management.  Barrantes hoped to prod street vendors to control their own behavior and 
experimented with a variety of policy options to decongest the city center.  Still, enforcement was 
off the table due to the IU’s commitment to the poor.  As the government head of street vending 
issues Elsie Guerrero puts it, “The priority was social assistance and attention, not removal, so we 
did not invest police resources in control.”125   
Second, the government viewed street vending as a temporary employment solution.  Its 
preferred approach—to move vendors into industrial employment—required control of national 
policy and economic transformations.  Short of taking national power, options to employ the poor 
were minimal.126  The city budget in 1985, for example, dropped by almost half to a mere $42 
                                                
124 Author interview with Washington Ipenza, mayor (1984-87, 1999-2006), District of Villa María 
del Triunfo, Lima, Peru, June 18, 2011. 
125 Barrantes tried to reduce negative externalities by moving vendors to fairgrounds, closing off 
certain segments of streets to create rotating markets, and licenses to reduce entry.  Author interview 
with Elsie Guerrero, Lima, Peru, June 7, 2011.  
126 Notably, revolutionary factions of the IU questioned the logic of investing in city and local 
government at all, given that it deflected the demands of popular sectors away from the central 
government and the capitalist system. Chirinos (1980) most clearly captures this debate. 
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million, or roughly $8.36 per capita (Dietz 1998: 70).  Barrantes recognized that forbearance toward 
street vending was an important way that it could offer labor alternatives to the poor at the level of 
city government, while awaiting the chance to make more fundamental macroeconomic changes.  
The IU party platform (1986: 65-66) for city offices made this logic explicit:  
 “The city cannot resolve the tough problems of employment that, given their character and 
magnitude, correspond to other entities…Here we can develop special initiatives at the scale of what a 
local government can do.  These initiatives include the sector to which we have given preferential 
attention: street vending.  Not to eradicate street vending, as some sectors still hope…but to 
recognize and put value in self-employment as a mechanism for low-income groups to improve their 
socioeconomic situation” (emphasis added). 
 
Thus, the Barrantes administration pushed as far as possible toward the incorporation of 
street vending as an informal employment policy.  The government attempted to work with street 
vendors and impose conditions on the use of street vending for employment generation, but it 
refused to use coercive measures.  Ideological commitments guided Barrantes to represent street 
vendors, but his alliance also represented a pragmatic electoral calculation.   
The weak explanatory power of ideology can be seen in the fact that APRA also pursued 
forbearance, although it lacked the IU’s ideological convictions.  President Alan García 
masterminded APRA’s transition from a centrist party to a populist movement that appealed to 
informal workers.  As part of this strategy, García idolized street vendors, calling them the “symbolic 
expression of Peru’s impoverishment.”127  APRA’s mayoral candidate, Jorge Del Castillo, rode on 
García’s coattails to win election against Barrantes.  Polls show that the urban poor preferred 
Barrantes by a narrow margin (46.8 to 42.7 percent).  This split reflects APRA’s offers of tangible 
material benefits through its links with the national government (Dietz 1998: 213), and the tension 
between poor voters with ideological and instrumental orientations toward politics (Stokes 1991).  
                                                
127 “Fujimori se perfila como vencedor en las elecciones peruanas, según los sondeos,” El País, 6 Apr 
1995.    
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Del Castillo proposed to “manage” street vending through many of the same tactics 
proposed by Barrantes.  But he also offered substitutive social policies through temporary job 
creation programs.128  Ties to a spendthrift national government made the promise credible.  
Enrollment in temporary employment programs run by the national government surged just prior to 
city elections (Graham 1991: 104).  
Nonetheless, APRA’s plan to crowd out street vending through social policy substitutes was 
short-lived.  Temporary employment and social assistance programs folded in 1986, as resources 
dried up and García’s heterodox reforms resulted in economic tumult (Dietz 1998: 56).  
Underemployment shot up from 35 percent in 1985 to 81 percent in 1990 (Crabtree 1992; Glewwe 
and Gillette 1992).  Social expenditures stood at 21 percent of their 1980 values, or just $12 per 
capita (Graham 1994: 92).  The government had no response to the poor’s distributive demands.   
In the absence of other social policy options, enforcement would have devastated APRA’s 
claims to represent marginalized groups.  City officials describe allowing the poor to work as street 
vendors during the economic crisis as a “moral imperative.”129 The number of street vendors 
swelled.  According to city officials, the number of vendors tripled to reach 300,000 in 1990 
(Guerrero 1992: 3).   
These sketches illustrate how elected mayors used forbearance to seek the electoral support 
of informal sector poor voters.  Due to high levels of social affinity with street vendors, mayors 
                                                
128 García implemented a temporary jobs program that hired the urban poor to collect trash and 
build public works on three-month contracts, the Temporary Employment Assistance Program 
(Programa de Apoyo de Ingreso Temporal, PAIT).  Another measure to create jobs temporarily lifted labor 
law restrictions to allow firms to hire workers on temporary contracts.  For those who considered 
street vending as their primary occupation, García promoted credit access through a new lending 
authority, the Institute for Informal Sector Development (Instituto de Desarrollo para el Sector Informal, 
Indesi).  The PAIT program, in particular, was manipulated to build political support.  The poor 
(rightly) came to believe that the allocation of PAIT jobs depended on political loyalty (Graham 
1991).   APRA’s patronage tactics seemed to succeed in building professed loyalty: party 
identification with APRA peaked at 53 percent in 1986 (Seawright 2012: 93). 
129 Author interview with former sub-director of Commercialization (1986-87), May 23, 2011. 
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would have lost votes among poor core constituents and undermined the electoral projects that they 
represented. While ideology in part shaped Barrantes’ enforcement decisions, it also was the strategy 
of a vote-seeking mayor.  Continued forbearance under a populist government shows how an 
electoral logic provides greater analytic leverage to understand enforcement than ideology alone.  
The next section reinforces the point by illustrating how forbearance has been used to build support 
among the poor by the neoliberal Right.   
4.2 Political Outsiders and Weak Enforcement 
This section first traces how the rise of neoliberal proposals for the informal sector—rooted 
in slashing state bureaucracy—led to new linkage strategies for politicians to court street vendors in 
the 1990s.  By neoliberal, broadly speaking, I mean an approach that rejects rent-seeking behavior 
and advocates subjecting economic agents to the competitive logic of the marketplace.  More 
specifically, the neoliberal proposal for street vending was to reduce barriers to small business 
registration, such that vendors would voluntarily shift out of city streets.  No enforcement would be 
required.  The second part shows how forbearance, rooted in neoliberal ideas, helped mobilize street 
vendors in the campaigns of political outsiders like Ricardo Belmont and Alberto Fujimori.  Third, I 
suggest that the growing negative externalities from street vending along with an emphasis their 
hidden wealth reduced social sympathy for street vendors. 
4.2.1 The Rise of the Neoliberal Right 
The neoliberal Right played a central role in recasting street vending as a regulatory issue in 
Peru. Hernando De Soto and Enrique Ghersi’s book on informality, The Other Path, was taken as a 
manifesto for the Peruvian neoliberal Right.130 The specific analysis of street vending is that it results 
                                                
130 For example, see Javier Iguñiz, “El manifesto neoconservador peruano,” Quehacer, Dec 1986-Jan 
1987, No. 44: 42-48; Alberto Flórez Galindo, “Los caballos de los conquistadores, otra vez,” Tiempo 
de Plagas. El Caballo Rojo, 1988; Agustín Cueva, “El ‘sendero’ de la nueva derecha: un modelo para 
desarmar,” Las democracias restringidas de América Latina (Quinto, Planeta, 1988).   
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from cumbersome laws passed by a “mercantilist” business class.  Enforcement is futile.  It also is 
counterproductive because it stymies economic activity; street vendors are capitalists creatively 
responding to their business environment.  The book concludes, “If, instead of overregulating the 
street vendors, the authorities had removed the obstacles to their activities and made it easier for 
them to form business organizations and obtain formal credit so that they could build more markets, 
by 1993 all of today’s street vendors would be off the streets” (De Soto and Ghersi 1989: 240).  Less 
state intervention, which could be achieved by booting out an “oligarchic” political class, thus would 
lead vendors to abandon city streets organically to open businesses.   
More broadly, the Peruvian brand of neoliberalism recast class conflict as the informal sector 
poor aimed against all groups that specialize in extracting resources or beneficial regulations from 
the state.131   In electoral terms, it proposed exactly what the radical Left had feared: it positioned 
informal sector workers as part of a broadly defined capitalist class.132  The neoliberal Right thus 
offered a proscription for a popular Right party that could follow the “other path” of appealing to 
the informal sector workers who made up the majority of Peru’s workforce, rather than the type of 
crony capitalism represented by García’s alliance with business elites. 
However, while neoliberalism offered a proscription for a popular Right party, it also railed 
against the traditional elites who would be its ideological allies.  The neoliberal Right attempted to 
build a political party spearheaded by the novelist Mario Vargas Llosa.  But it aligned with Peru’s 
traditional Right to form a coalition, the Democratic Front (Frente Democrático, Fredemo) in 1989.  
The choice resulted in “brand dilution” to use Lupu's (2013) term for inconsistent or shifting 
                                                
131 As De Soto wrote in the introduction, “The principal dividing line is a vertical frontier, on one 
side of which are politicians, bureaucrats, and businessmen who profit and live off the government’s 
favor and on the other side of which are legal and extralegal producers who are excluded from 
favor” (De Soto and Ghersi 1989: xix).   
132 IU leader Rolando Breña, for instance, explained that neoliberalism constituted an ideological 
defeat of the Peruvian Left because “from the small business owner to the street vendor, all of them 
were made businessmen” (Adrianzén 2012: 269). 
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positions that serve to undermine voter attachments.133  Neoliberals lost their claim to represent the 
urban informal poor when they allied with the same traditional politicians that De Soto and Ghersi 
decried as at the heart of Peru’s problems. The party building project failed.  Instead, several political 
outsiders cherry-picked from the neoliberal Right’s project to attract the informal sector poor’s vote.  
4.2.2 Political Outsiders: Forbearance Under Belmont and Fujimori (1990-95) 
 
Politicians converged on the neoliberal Right’s platform in the 1989 city election.  Fredemo 
ran its own candidate who came from the provinces and was thought to appeal to recent migrants, 
Juan Incáustegui.  The Fredemo platform offered to reduce barriers to help informal workers start 
businesses and access credit.  The victory of Ricardo Belmont, a popular television personality with 
no political experience, was a harbinger for Peru’s collapsing party system.  Belmont admitted that 
he shared many ideas with Fredemo, such as support for free enterprise and streamlined bureaucracy 
for informal sector workers.  He only opposed “the parties that are all burned out” that had allied 
with Fredemo (Vargas Llosa 2011: 73-74).  Belmont created his own “independent movement” 
called Obras (Works) with a simple platform: to build infrastructure in the city.  Neither candidate 
discussed enforcement against street vendors. 
The main difference between the mayoral candidates came in the sociological ways that they 
related to informal sector voters.  Incáustegui was a former AP minister and easily pegged as part of 
the political establishment.  Belmont staked his campaign on a rejection of elites, spoke in popular 
slang, and, in spite of his television presence, made extensive personal visits to street vendors and 
                                                
133 Another interpretation is that Vargas Llosa erred in making an alliance with the neoliberal Right, 
rather than forming a centrist party of business elites under a new banner.  Business sectors had 
hitched their fate to APRA in the 1980s.  When García nationalized Peru’s banks in 1987, private 
business breaks with the government and sees the need to enter politics directly to represent their 
interests.  Business elites viewed the Right’s future as a center or center right party rooted in 
competent management and antistatist economic policies (Durand 1990).  It is possible that this 
moderate formula would have succeeded.  Seawright (2012: 116), for example, argues that 
Fredemo’s main error was its spatial placement on the far right, which left many center and center 
right voters unrepresented.  
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informal settlements (Vargas Llosa 2011: 73-74). Consistent with these differences in style, Fredemo 
maintained relatively narrow support among upper-class voters who identified as conservatives 
(Cameron 1991a: 85).  Belmont fared well among the poor.  He drew stronger support from lower-
class voters (55 percent) than among the middle-income groups (28 percent), and secured the same 
anti-party vote that would take Fujimori to power the following year.134  
In the case of Belmont, how to classify his enforcement policy depends on the answer to the 
counterfactual: what would have happened if resources were available?  Belmont had limited 
administrative capacity to enforce against street vendors. An estimated 1700 new vendors took to 
the Lima streets each month in the early 1990s.  Only 11 percent of the population had adequate 
employment (Webb and Fernández Baca 1999).  The country’s economic situation aside, the Lima 
city government was bankrupt.  In 1993, Fujimori passed a decree that emasculated municipal 
governments in order to reduce the power of the mayor of Lima (Delgado Silva 1994).135  By some 
calculations, the decree starved Lima of 80 percent of its tax income (Tanaka 2002: 13).  The cuts 
decimated Belmont’s ability to execute public works, pay city employees, and provide basic services.  
Only three hundred city police controlled all of Lima’s downtown.136  
Nonetheless, three observations suggest that it was unlikely that Belmont wanted to enforce 
against street vendors.  First, if resources were the major constraint, we would expect a discontinuity 
with the 1993 budget cuts.  Yet, the government made little enforcement effort pre- or post-decree.  
Second, reports suggest that Belmont actively obstructed even “essential” actions to control street 
vendors.  The National Civil Defense Institute (Instituto Nacional de Defensa Civil, Indeci), which 
                                                
134 Ecological correlations at the district level suggest that the overlap in votes for Belmont and 
Fujimori was very high at 0.72 (Seawright 2012: 138-139). 
135 Belmont was viewed as one of Fujimori’s major competitors for the presidency in 1995.  By the 
end of 1994, Belmont was floundering politically due to the austerity measures, and Belmont would 
only win 2.7 percent of the presidential vote.     
136 “Se necesitan más polícias ediles para controlar a tricicleros,” El Comercio 17 March 1994. 
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assesses public risks, ordered the government to control street vending in select areas that had 
become so congested that they generated fire and emergency hazards. But the Belmont 
administration provided no police support when Indeci attempted to undertake operations.  The 
Indeci director lamented that, “the mayor of Lima does not care about genuinely solving the 
problem” and proposed an independent commission to circumvent the political obstacles to 
enforcement. 137  Third, officials in the Belmont administration understood street vending as a 
structural problem and worried that enforcement would alienate poor constituents.  The 
employment situation meant that it would have been “social and political suicide to take any 
stronger actions,” according to one city councilor.138  Belmont preferred to reduce the costs to the 
public through relocation projects.139  As the head of street vending affairs summed up the 
government’s position, “We are solving the consequences of the problem of street vending through 
reordering and relocation [of street vendors] in campgrounds; but this does not attack the cause which is 
the inexistence of industrial policy to increase employment” (emphasis added).140 These facts smack of political 
choices to withhold what little enforcement capacity existed in the city. 
The presidential election of Alberto Fujimori in 1990 brought even clearer promises of 
forbearance toward street vendors.  Fujimori made distinct promises to vendors rooted in 
                                                
137 See, “Urge el reordenamiento de ambulantes en Mercado Castilla,” El Comercio 26 Sept 1995; “La 
Parada afronta descontrolado aumento de vendedores informales,” El Comercio 19 Aug 1994; “Estéril 
result esfuerzo por reordenar informales en el ex Mercado Central,” El Comercio 22 Sept 1994; “Por 
falta de apoyo fracasó el reordenamiento del Mercado Central,” El Comercio 26 Oct 1994.     
138 “Municipio de Lima iniciará recuperación de ‘Las Malvinas’,” El Comercio, 19 Mar 1994.  Also see, 
“Reordenarán a los ambulantes que están en alrededores de sede de la Fiscalía,” El Comercio, 5 April 
1994.   
139 The government announced a large-scale effort to relocate 40,000 vendors and provide credit, but 
relocation projects affected less than 2,000 vendors.  “Reordenarán a 40 mil ambulantes del centro,” 
El Comercio, 22 July 1994; “En 90 días se iniciará estudios para traslado de informales del Centro,” El 
Comercio 20 Aug 1994. “Municipio de Lima iniciará recuperación de ‘Las Malvinas’,” El Comercio,19 
March 1994.  
140 “En el centro hay unos 60 mil ambulantes,” El Comercio 17 Jun 1994.   
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forbearance, and even legalization, going beyond neoliberal promises of cuts to state bureaucracy.  
Street vending leaders organically offered their support to Fujimori due to his promise of 
forbearance and social support, as Nolasco describes: 
“Around fifty vending association leaders went to Fujimori’s house during the campaign.  He 
didn’t pay the leaders or even offer personal benefits like jobs like [Fredemo].  Instead, he made 
an offer to the group.  Fujimori offered to develop a bank for low-interest loans, medical 
insurance, and to let us work in the street…All along the agreement was that he would let us work in the 
street but also expand the benefits that the state offered us” (emphasis added).141 
 
Fujimori won by a large margin with a lower-class support gradient based on his rejection of 
economic austerity, antiparty rhetoric, and elevation of informal sector interests.  He took more than 
75 percent of the vote in Lima’s poorest districts in the second round (Panfichi 1997: 228).  Anti-
elite rhetoric gave rise to an electorally successful form of “neopopulism” (Roberts 1995; Weyland 
1996), but what is less recognized is that Fujimori mobilized his support among informal sector 
workers through direct promises of forbearance and ground campaigning in informal markets.  
Vargas Llosa, despite promises to support the informal sector, became associated with upper-class 
interests.  In a post-election poll, 46 percent of poor respondents opposed Vargas Llosa because he 
“represented the interests of the rich,” while only 17 percent attributed their opposition to his 
“right-wing ideas” (Apoyo June 1990).  
Fujimori moved to support vendors’ interests in office in his early years.. He passed a decree 
that recognized street vendors as “autonomous workers,”142 reaffirmed a constitutional right to 
work, and described street vending as a “social reality generated by the economic crisis that the 
                                                
141 Author interview with Guillermo Nolasco, FEDEVAL head and former city councilor, 
Municipality of Lima, Lima, Peru, November 25, 2011. 
142 Supreme Decree 005-91-TR, published in El Peruano 26 Jan 1991.  Fujimori also convened the 
first national conference of street vendors (Primer Congreso de Vendedores Ambulantes). 
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country had suffered for several years.”143  Perhaps most critically, the decree prohibited 
decommissions of merchandise and therefore removed tools to control vending from city 
authorities.144  The catch was that it suspended decommissions based on a corresponding law that 
would establish alternative regulations.  The accompanying law never passed.  Whether city officials 
could enforce thus was left open.  While Fujimori dropped the vending project, his defense of street 
vendors would resurge when politically expedient, as I show below. 
4.2.3 Shifting Mass Preferences 
 
More than a decade of forbearance produced changes in the nature of street vending that 
expanded the constituency in favor of enforcement.  First, vendors in central city areas became 
wealthier in absolute and comparative terms in the 1990s.  The absolute lack of state control under 
Belmont and Del Castillo—combined with economic liberalization that allowed street vendors to 
market tax-free goods—helped some street vendors to flourish.  Officials love to use the maxim, “In 
a choppy river, the fisherman benefits,” to describe how vendors leveraged the state’s absence for 
profit.  No systematic studies exist, but surveys of central marketplaces showed that street vendors 
earned several times the minimum wage.145  Newspapers honed in on vendors’ wealth, claiming that 
some vendors kept street stores as large as houses or owned storefronts as well as stands.146  Rather 
than a paradigm of the free market, reports emphasized informal barriers to entry that prevented 
vending from assisting the “deserving” poor.  Exploitative intermediaries (“mafias”) allegedly 
                                                
143 For examples of the decree’s use by vendors, see “Ambulantes consideran que pago de ‘sisa’ les 
da derecho a trabajar en la vía pública,” El Comercio 5 March 1995; “Comerciantes se defienden,” La 
República 24 June 1995.   
144 Municipal law expert Alberto Velarde Yánez notes that the decree undermined the Lima city 
government’s ability to control street vendors: “Municipalities could sanction street vendors with 
145 Vendors on the urban periphery likely earned less, but were not the targets of the city 
government’s enforcement campaign.   
146 “Hay que contener a los ambulantes,” El Comercio 7 Jun 1995; “El 60% de los desalojados posee 
tiendas,” El Comercio 19 Feb 1999.   
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charged vendors $35 in monthly rent.147 Even street vending associations admit that the profile of a 
street vendor changed and turned the public against forbearance: 
“The social consensus in the 1980s was that street vendors were a product of the economic crisis 
and internal migration, and that they were people who sought to work before becoming 
criminals…Attitudes toward street vendors change in the 1990s because of street vendors’ own 
development and accumulation due to the stability and permissiveness of the authorities.”148    
 
Beyond changes in street vendors’ material conditions, the negative externalities of their 
activities grew.  In particular, street vendors extended from sidewalks into the main downtown 
streets.  The congestion became the subject of intense complaint, as can be seen systematically with 
the uptick in unsympathetic articles about vendors in Figure 4.3.  The proliferation of vendors was 
declared an “invasion,” “avalanche,” “asphyxiation,” and “street vendor-itis.”149 Street vendors were 
judged a threat to the state’s broader ability to impose authority. Headlines, for example, asked, 
“Who governs this city?” and pointed to state absence, “Where authority is the only one who 
doesn’t have a place,” and “No man’s land.”150  
The point that I want to underscore is that middle-class opposition to street vending 
intensified.  It became a subject of immense frustration and limited social solidarity.  These shifts 
changed politicians’ electoral incentives to propose enforcement by expanding the constituency 
that could be mobilized in favor of police actions. 
                                                
147 In La Parada, the price was reported as 150 soles each month for a 1 to 6 meter square stand; in 
Garmarra the price was 120 soles. “Alto! La Parada no va más…sus días están contados,” El 
Comercio 21 April 1999; “Desalojados benden pistas y veredas de Jr. América,” El Comercio 23 Mar 
1999.     
148 Author interview with Guillermo Nolasco, November 25, 2011. 
149 “Ambulantes invaden la Plaza Grau,” El Comercio 20 Aug 1994; “Más de 500 ambulantes invaden 
pistas, veredas y áreas verdes en Chosica,” El Comercio 26 Sept 1994;“La Parada afronta 
descontrolado aumento de vendedores informales,” El Comercio 19 Aug 1994; “Estéril result esfuerzo 
por reordenar informales en el ex Mercado Central,” El Comercio 22 Sept 1994; “Comerciantes 
informales están ‘asfixiando’ Lima,” El Comercio 12 Sept 1989; “Lima enferma de ‘ambulantitis,’ El 
Comercio 5 Dec 1994. 
150 “¿Quién manda en esta ciudad?” El Comercio 22 Aug 1994; “Puestos callejeros bloquean avenidas 
Caquetá y Zarumilla,” El Comercio 5 Nov 1995.   
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4.3 Upper Class Core Constituencies and Enforcement 
 
Enforcement occurred at an unlikely political moment in Lima, according to conventional 
theories.  Institutions were depleted.  And the national government opposed enforcement and 
withheld police resources.  Nonetheless, Mayor Alberto Andrade managed to unite a core 
constituency of middle and lower-middle class voters in favor of enforcement.  Nonpoor voters had 
come to resent street vendors’ wealth and their associated disorder, and Andrade managed to build 
support among some lower-class groups by differentiating street vendors from the common poor.  
That enforcement did not bring with it accusations of Andrade’s anti-poor politics—while similar 
policies unleashed powerful class polarization in Bogotá under Peñalosa—is consistent with my 
thesis that electoral decentralization reduced the electoral costs of enforcement. This section first 
describes Andrade’s enforcement policy, and then Fujimori’s attempts to undercut it.        
4.3.1 The Conservative Right: Enforcement Under Andrade (1996-2002) 
In 1995, voters elected Andrade, a three-time mayor of the affluent Miraflores district, as city 
mayor.  He had earned a reputation for modern management principles and control of street 
vending.  In Miraflores, Andrade had created a local police force to remove street vendors.  
Conditions to extend an enforcement policy and win citywide elections were not favorable, however.  
While the official unemployment rate was only 7.1 percent, underemployment was estimated at 47 
percent.  More than half the city was poor (INEI 1997).  Miraflores did not reflect the demographic 
composition of the Lima electorate. Moreover, as a white businessman and a longtime member of 
the PPC, Andrade easily could be pinned as part of Lima’s traditional elite that voters had rejected in 
past election cycles.  
Andrade’s campaign recognized the need to expand his political appeal.  The challenge 
would be to capture the lower-middle class vote.  Class groups in Lima, as in many other places, are 
ranked alphabetically, where “A” is the highest class and “E” is the lowest class.  Campaign 
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strategists calculated that Andrade would need to capture part of class “C,” or the lower-middle class 
to win.  Andrade planned to appeal to lower-middle class voters who suffered some of the negative 
externalities of vending and preferred orderly management of the city.  As one of his advisors put it, 
“In Miraflores, the public clearly wanted to remove vendors who took over their streets and did not 
live in the district.  But in metropolitan Lima, the public was divided: about half wanted an end to 
the disorder, and another half lived off the chaos…we needed to make sure that Class C voted for 
their frustration and not for social sympathy with vendors.”151      
While public opinion had begun to shift in favor of enforcement, Andrade deliberately tried 
to coax voters to favor enforcement.  Much like Peñalosa, Andrade used popular appeals rooted in 
urban subnationalism, law and order, and state authority.  First, Andrade cultivated support based 
on appeals to urban pride.  Although a longtime member of the PPC, Andrade detected the 
antiparty mood and created an independent political movement, Somos Lima (We are Lima).  The 
name was intended to emphasize that Andrade represented a collective interest in restoring order 
against a minority that benefitted from the city’s deterioration.  Andrade spoke of the recovery and 
“rebirth” of Lima’s historic center as a symbol of Peru’s greatness (Ronda 2000: 91).  A Somos Lima 
district mayor, Blanca Beltrán, for instance, called enforcement against street vendors, “a battle for 
superior interests, those of Lima as the face to the world.”152  Street vendors damaged Lima’s image, 
and thus had to be removed.  
Second, to expand his electoral appeal, Andrade separated the “common” poor from street 
vendors who violated property laws.  As Andrade’s advisor put it, “The first political question we 
asked ourselves was how do you convince the public that street vending is a problem of “property,” 
rather than social injustice?  The argument that vending helped the poor was very strong in the city, 
                                                
151 Author interview with Oswaldo Carpio Villegas, June 1, 2011.   
152 Statement by Blanca Beltrán Salazar, Mayor of Pueblo Libre. Reprinted in “La opinión de los 
alcaldes,” El Comercio, 23 Jul 1996. 
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so we tried to show that vending didn’t really help the poor.  It was exploitation.”153  Andrade 
distinguished between what he labeled “true” street vendors, or those who walk through the city to 
earn subsistence income, and “speculating” street vendors that “only harm the city and have to 
go.”154  In some ways, this distinction drew on the same neoliberal arguments that vendors were 
capitalists, or as Andrade described in a speech: “One has to remember that these vendors for more 
than 15 years have occupied a public space, that belongs to all citizens, and after these 15 years, they 
no longer are little poor street vendors that walk with their little box selling gum and chocolate.  
These are people with capital that can easily incorporate themselves into the formal sector.”155  
However, Andrade did not subscribe to the neoliberal Right’s policy prescription that the state 
should extricate itself from commercial regulation to reduce street vending.  Neoliberals promised to 
simplify the law and justified the poor’s past legal violations as a creative response to bureaucracy.  
Andrade believed that vendors violated legitimate city regulations.156  Hence, he favored 
enforcement, not regulatory dilution.  His platform was simple: “To clean up the city and make it 
orderly we need an authority that makes people follow the law.”157   
The final related piece of Andrade’s campaign was a focus on the reconstruction of state 
authority.  Beyond a threat to property, Andrade viewed street vending as a visible manifestation of 
the state’s loss of power.  As Andrade made clear in the mayoral debate, he proposed to impose 
order after past forbearance: “There is a generalized crisis and authority has been supremely 
deteriorated for more than 20 years; here everyone does what they want, and that is not governing.  
                                                
153 Author interview with Oswaldo Carpio Villegas, June 1, 2011.   
154 “Comercio informal solo perjudicia a la ciudad,” El Comercio 6 Mar 1996.   
155 “Habían sido notificados y no cumplieron, explicó Andrade,” El Comercio 27 Nov 1996.   
156 For example, Andrade explained that, “There will be no reordering or relocation possible because 
[street vendors] work on public streets violating all municipal laws.” “Comercio informal solo 
perjudicia a la ciudad,” El Comercio 6 Mar 1996.   
157 “Entrevista de Alberto Andrade,” Caretas 4 May 1995, p.14. 
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Without leadership and conviction, it is impossible to impose order.”158  Vendors’ wealth and 
criminality justified a hard line, and Andrade proposed an authoritative approach. Unlike past 
mayors who advocated the “reordering” (reordenamiento) of street vendors, Andrade used strong 
terms to describe his enforcement actions.  He proposed “eradications,” “liberations,” and “clean-
ups.”  The need to exert authority trumped all social claims of poverty and employment demands 
because it lay at the heart of statehood, and welfare needs were the responsibility of the national 
government. For example, as the Somos Lima mayor of the district of San Isidro put it:  
“It is necessary to use state presence to save the city.  If [recovery operations] do not give results, 
we will see a city in chaos, because the principle of authority will disappear, and who will fail?  It will be 
the image of the country, because this is Lima.  Informal workers need to be oriented and trained, given 
the skills so they can compete.  But this is the role of the Peruvian state.”159 
 
Andrade thus made classic conservative appeals to preserve authority, and downplayed the 
social consequences.  He ran against the government-backed candidate, Jaime Yoshiyama, who was 
widely considered Fujimori’s first choice as his successor. Yoshiyama’s campaign tried to portray 
Andrade as “the mayor of the rich,” who viewed vendors as criminals and planned to increase 
unemployment.160   Instead, Yoshiyama proposed that, “the solution is to work hand in hand with 
[street vendors], to come to agreements.  It is not necessary to have a paternalistic attitude.”161  
Vending associations tended to back Yoshiyama due to his promises of support, but with little 
                                                
158 “Dos propuestas para un problema: Lima,” El Comercio 22 Oct 1995.   
159 Statement by Ramón Gastón Barúa Lecaros, Mayor of San Isidro. “La opinión de los alcaldes,” 
El Comercio, 23 July 1996. 
160 There was some truth in their claims of Andrade’s paternalistic view of vendors. Andrade often 
spoke of vendors in a condescending fashion where he insisted that reordering would be for their 
own good.  For example, he would say that operations against street vendors are “not something 
that one does, sadly, with love, shooing them: ‘move away from here, child.’ This has to be done 
with a little push, because if not, [street vendors] will never leave.” “Habían sido notificados y no 
cumplieron, explicó Andrade,” El Comercio 27 Nov 1996.   
161 “Dos propuestas para un problema: Lima,” El Comercio 22 Oct 1995.   
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enthusiasm.  The economic shock, labor code reforms, and emphasis on small businesses led many 
street vending associations to doubt Fujimoristas’ commitment to the sector.162  
The electorate divided along class lines.  While Yoshiyama fared well among the urban poor, 
Andrade captured the middle-class vote and sufficient support among lower-middle class voters to 
win.  Local mayoral results confirm the class divisions: Somos Lima mayors won in all but one 
middle-class district, while Fujimori’s party (Cambio 90-Nueva Mayoría, NM) took all but one poor 
district.163 
In line with the preferences of nonpoor core constituents, Andrade pursued a clear 
enforcement policy that included major operations and continuous control actions.  The city carried 
out more than twenty large-scale operations in the historic center of Lima between 1996 and 1999, 
each involving between 90 to 1200 police officers (Egusquiza 2000).  By 1997, the government 
claimed that it had removed 20,000 street vendors just from the historic center; it assisted in the 
relocation of 8,000 vendors to nearby projects, although it did not pay for the relocation.164  To 
maintain control, Andrade reinterpreted national laws to permit decommission of merchandise from 
vendors who do not comply with city regulations.165  The government also expanded the 
                                                
162 Author interviews with Guillermo Nolasco, November 25, 2011; Manuel Sulca, FEDEVAL, June 
8, 2011; Gloria Norma Solorzano, Red de las Mujeres, May 16, 2011. 
163 The exceptions were one upper income district (San Borja) that elected an independent, Luisa 
María Cuculiza Torre, and one lower-income district (Villa El Salvador) that elected a long-time 
community leader, Michel Azcueta, who represented Somos Lima. 
164 Although designed ex-post, the Andrade administration did work to relocate vendors. In 1997, 
Andrade announced tax incentives, government coordination, and financial intermediary services for 
vendors.  The motivations were twofold. First, the sustainability of vending evictions was perceived 
to depend on moving vendors into other storefronts.  Second, the combination of economic crisis 
and the wealth of vendors in the city center created auspicious conditions to formalize them.  
Businesses that went bankrupt left behind empty warehouses that were ideal and cheap for 
commercial relocation projects.  Nonetheless, the government insisted that enforcement would 
proceed whether or not vendors managed to find relocate spots. Major projects to repave sidewalks, 
add trees, and clean surrounding building facades also helped guarantee that street vendors did not 
retake recovered areas and stayed in their new commercial projects.   
165 “Comuna limeña sí puede decomisar,” El Comercio 23 Feb 1996.   
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metropolitan police force from two hundred to a thousand agents.  The city police known as the 
“Blue Helmets” (Cascos Azules) took charge of preventing street vending through decommission of 
merchandise and patrols.166  Police presence and decommissions made enforcement a continued 
policy of the administration. 
Civil society offered a weak defense of street vendors, particularly compared to Colombia. 
Labor unions, which had been decimated during the economic crisis and focused on formal sector 
workers, offered minimal support.167 Evicted vendors appealed to the courts to protect their right to 
work, but their claims were declared unfounded (Aliaga Linares 2012: 39).  The National 
Confederation of Vending Organizations (Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores Ambulantes del Perú, 
Conatap) presented an alternative legislative project to legalize vending and create processes to 
formalize vendors, such as expropriation of land and state-funded construction of commercial 
centers. 168  It went nowhere. No coherent political party on the Left existed to offer a defense of 
street vendors.169  As I return to below, the main defender of street vendors proved to be 
Fujimorismo.   
Andrade won reelection in 1998, again drawing more heavily on the support of lower and 
lower-middle class voters.  Andrade’s party—renamed Somos Perú (We are Peru) in anticipation of his 
                                                
166 “Polícias ediles sólo son preparados para la defensa,” El Comercio 26 Mar 1997. 
167 Peru’s largest labor confederation during the period, the Peruvian Workers’ Confederation 
(Confederación de Trabajadores Peruanos, CTP) was notably absent from street vending issues.  CTP 
historically was affiliated with APRA and focused on formal sector workers. Peru’s other labor 
confederation, the Unitary Confederation of Workers, (Confederación Unitaria de Trabajadores del Perú, 
CUT) circulated fliers that denounced Andrade “for trying to resolve a social problem in an 
irrational and inhumane manner, with clubs, arms, etc.” (Roever 2005: 125).   
168 “Ambulantes piden ley para regularizar comercio callejero,” El Comercio 11 Mar 1997.   
169 The remnants of the Left also divided about how to react to street vendors.  A faction of the 
former IU, led by Nolasco, continued to argue that the government should allow street vendors to 
work, and manage the harms they imposed.  But another faction shared the views of the post-
materialist Left and came to believe that a policy of forbearance was misguided if the goal was social 
equality.  For example, one of Barrantes’ close allies, Elsie Guerrero, entered the Andrade 
government as the head of street vending affairs.  
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presidential bid—again won almost every upper income district in the city and only a handful of 
poor districts.170  Much of the public gave Andrade high marks for restoring order to the city center, 
but opinions about enforcement divided on class lines. Roughly a third of low-income voters said 
that they did not support Andrade’s reelection because he “has been abusive with street vendors” 
and “does not care about the poor.”  Only 5 percent of upper-class voters shared these beliefs.171   
Class divisions also were reflected in the adoption of enforcement policies by district 
governments.  Mayors in middle-income districts removed street vendors in tandem with Andrade.  
Of 22 middle and mixed-income districts in the city, 20 undertook major enforcement actions.  
Most of these mayors represented Somos Peru and viewed enforcement as a central dimension of 
the party’s program.  In these districts, mayors believed that they had a popular mandate to evict 
vendors.  In the middle-class district of Jesús María, for example, Mayor Francisca Izquierdo said 
she enforced to reflect her constituents’ preferences: “I have been chosen to put order and recover 
the city, not to make the street vendors happy or those who infringe the law, which is what voters 
consider to be correct.”172  In middle-income districts, enforcement had low electoral costs because 
residents demanded vendors’ exit and vendors voted in other districts.   
In contrast, poor districts in the city pursued less consistent enforcement policies.  Of 
fourteen majority poor districts, I could establish that only two undertook enforcement 
                                                
170 Ironically, the only exception among upper class districts was Miraflores where Andrade’s 
brother, Fernando, lost to Luis Bedoya of the PCC.  Poor districts that supported Andrade included 
Ate, Comas, Villa El Salvador, and Villa María del Triunfo.   
171 APOYO, “Porqué razones no votaría por Alberto Andrade?” Nov 2002.  For all class groups, 
and particularly the wealthy, the main opposition to Andrade came from the fact that he had been in 
power for too long. When asked why they did not support Andrade’s reelection in 2002, 70 percent 
of upper class voters emphasized that “the city needed a change” or that Andrade “spent too much 
time” as mayor.  Around 40 percent of lower class voters agreed. 
172 “Reordenarán a ambulantes en Jesús María,” El Comercio 24 Apr 1996. 
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operations.173  Even mayors who attempted enforcement voiced frustration that their electorates did 
not support continued efforts.  For instance, the previous chapter mentioned the case of a respected 
community leader, Michel Azcueta, who was elected mayor in Villa El Salvador.  Azcueta joined 
Somos Lima in 1995, and promoted a vision of urban planning that distinguished Villa El Salvador 
from other popular districts in Lima.  He attempted to remove street vendors and enforce 
regulations, but the effort (much like his position toward squatters) ended in electoral defeat: 
“I tried to relocate vendors from central areas, but they just went to other streets and that was the 
end of the effort because the police weren’t going to keep repressing everywhere.  The thing is 
that public opinion in Villa El Salvador does not pressure for any change.  I tried to control street 
vending but that doesn’t win votes…there’s a lack of effort to address the issue because 
completely irresponsible mayors [who tolerate vendors] gain a lot of popular support”174       
 
Azcueta was an exception: most poor districts did not elect Somos Peru mayors and favored 
forbearance.  District demographics tended to be more important than party in determining 
enforcement policy.  Where Cambio 90-NM mayors governed middle-class districts, they also 
enforced.  The most notable example is the mayor of the district San Martín de Porres, Javier 
Kanashiro, who undertook several major enforcement actions, despite his ties to Fujimori.175  Most 
Somos Peru mayors in poor districts pursued forbearance in line with their electorate’s preferences.  
For example, Mayor Paulo Hinostroza justifies his policy of forbearance in a poor district, even 
though he represented Somos Peru, by his district’s demographic composition: 
                                                
173 These districts include Ate and Villa El Salvador.  Comas also seems to have done some smaller 
actions in response to neighbors’ complaints, but I could not determine the policy of the local 
mayor.  Both Ate and Villa El Salvador had elected mayors with long trajectories within the districts, 
who then joined Somos Lima and convinced poor voters that the long-term development of the 
community required greater enforcement. Some poor districts did try to rearrange street vendors 
while leaving them in the street, thus a more mild form of “reordering” (reordenamiento). 
174 Author interview with Michel Azcueta, Mayor of Villa El Salvador, June 6, 2011.   
175 Unlike other mayors, Kanashiro did allow vendors to remain in city streets until they completed 
the purchase of a project, which went through several delays.  See, “Rebuciación de informales de 
Caquetá y Zarumilla sufrió un nuevo retraso,” El Comercio 18 Aug 1996; “No se reubicó a informales 
que ocupan avenida Zarumilla,” El Comercio 2 Jul 1996; “Comerciantes de Caquetá compraron 
terreno en la Panamericana Norte,” El Comercio, 8 Mar 1996.       
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“I didn’t receive any advice from Andrade about what to do with street vendors, although 
obviously I knew what he had done in the Lima center.  I didn’t want to fight vendors because 
this is a poor district and street vending is an honorable profession, and good jobs are hard to 
come by in this country… if you try too much to impose order, vendors threaten with marches 
and spread bad rumors, and they have a lot of force because they are a huge group.  Both 
disorder and order have support in this district and you can’t make both groups happy.”176   
 
In sum, there are several noteworthy features about the Andrade period.  First, the mere 
election of Andrade was remarkable, and is best explained by shifts in electoral preferences.  
Andrade was a white, conservative, uncharismatic politician elected at a time when the public clearly 
had rejected traditional elites.  But he rightly calculated that he could extend his appeal among lower-
middle class voters by reframing his enforcement platform around the promotion of authority, 
property rights, and urban identity, not an attack on the poor. Second, the main legacy of Andrade’s 
administration was a generalized perception that street vending could be controlled at least in the city 
center.  Urban political decentralization, however, allowed local districts to continue to pursue 
forbearance and absorb displaced vendors. Much of the debate over social obligations to vendors 
thus shifted to poor districts where vendors lived and voted.  Poor districts continued to forbear and 
defend a structural view of street vending.  The final key point, which I turn to next, is that 
Andrade’s enforcement efforts occurred under active opposition from the national government.  
4.3.2 Presidential Intervention Under Fujimori (1996-1999) 
 
Although Andrade was far from a consistent opponent of the Fujimori regime, he emerged 
as one of Fujimori’s few political challengers.177  Andrade’s popularity ratings exceeded those of 
                                                
176 Author interview with Paulo Hinostroza, Mayor (2003-2006), District of San Juan de Miraflores, 
Lima, Peru, June 24, 2011.   
177 During Andrade’s first term as mayor, he avoided taking positions on national issues, particularly 
related to the protection of Peru’s democracy (Levitsky and Cameron 2003: 11).     
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Fujimori throughout the mid-1990s and made him an electoral threat.178  The defeat of Yoshiyama 
also created a tense relationship between Andrade and the national government.  
Fujimori used his control over police, fiscal, and legislative resources to create obstacles to 
enforcement and undercut the Andrade administration. First, the national government withheld 
police support for operations against street vendors.  The city government had a limited number of 
its own police officers, and they were unarmed and required police protection to conduct operations 
that could result in violence.  Accordingly, the large-scale operations against street vendors that 
Andrade planned required the cooperation of the National Police, which is under the direction of 
the executive branch.  Support was minimal.  For example, Andrade organized the first major 
operation to remove 2000 street vendors from the entrance of Lima’s historic center in March 1996. 
Andrade had coordinated with the National Police for them to protect the city’s police force. While 
the regional command of the National Police in Lima included 35,000 agents, the commander sent 
just 24 police officers to assist Andrade.179  
Frustration with the perceived opposition from the national government led Andrade to rally 
district mayors and city councilors behind him.  The political split in the city was apparent, however, 
as only mayors from Somos Lima attended the meeting to demand national cooperation.180  Mayors 
aligned with Cambio 90-NM defended the vendors’ right to work.  Somos Lima mayors issued a 
                                                
178 Fujimori’s popularity dipped to a third of the Lima electorate in 1995, its lowest level since his 
election (Apoyo May 1995).  Just a year out from the 2000 presidential election, 64 percent approved 
of Andrade’s work as mayor, and 31 percent would vote for him in a presidential election (Apoyo 
March 1999).   
179 Of course, it is not clear that Fujimori himself was responsible for the lack of police cooperation.  
The police told the press that the regional commander had orders to provide “full support” to 
Andrade, but had faced conflicting security requirements on the day of the operation.  See, “Alto 
mando de PNP dispusó el apoyo requerido por Andrade,” El Comercio 29 Mar 1996. 
180 Mayors in attendance represented Barranco, Breña, Cieneguilla, Jesús María, La Victoria, Lince, 
Magdalena del Mar, Miraflores, Pueblo Libre, Rimac, San Borja, San Isidro, San Miguel, Santiago de 
Surco, Surquillo, and Villa El Salvador.  Only Villa El Salvador and Cieneguilla are low-income 
districts, although Cieneguilla is rural district with little stake in street vending control.   
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number of statements in support of Andrade’s legitimate mandate to conduct enforcement 
operations, regardless of the employment situation.  As one mayor summed up the message: “The 
decision to impose order on vendors has been taken by an authority supported by the people and we have 
to respect it” (emphasis added).181   
Although police assistance improved, national-metropolitan conflicts over evictions heated 
up when elections drew near.  One of the most dramatic confrontations occurred just prior to the 
launch of Andrade’s reelection campaign in May 1997.  Andrade had organized an operation to 
remove street vendors from the central market, which would be the last major operation before the 
city election.  The city’s police were to receive protection in the removal of vendors’ equipment from 
the National Police.  But, allegedly, the National Police received an order to abandon the operation 
at the last minute because “the conditions weren’t right.”182 An angry Andrade charged ahead with 
the operation.  Instead of assisting the mayor, the group of national police officers present 
blockaded the city police from proceeding and joined forces with street vendors.  Together, the 
national agents and street vendors used tear gas, threw dust and water, and hurled metal barricades 
against the city’s police agents. When Andrade finally ordered his officers to retreat, the street 
vendors chanted “Fujimori, Fujimori!”  Andrade said that the operation failed due to “a political 
hand that harms the capital, that harms the city of Lima” and accused Fujimori of supporting the 
vendors.183   
National officials alluded to social circumstances that prevented the police from offering 
their support to Andrade.  After the 1997 conflict, the director of the National Police, Fernando 
                                                
181 Statement by Michel Azcueta Gorostiza, Mayor of Villa El Salvador.  Reprinted in “La opinión de 
los alcaldes,” El Comercio, 23 Jul 1996.!
182 “Aplazan desalojo de ambulantes del Mercado Central,” El Comercio 1 May 1997.   
183 “Batalle campal entre polícias y comerciantes,” ATV, May 14, 1997, available at, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rkn_1hcTbzk. 
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Dianderas, explained that, “The National Police has a preventive function…to avoid a social cost 
that afterwards we would come to regret.”184  Similar defenses emerged as the 2000 presidential 
elections neared.  The Minister of the Interior, for example, refused police support for operations in 
the city’s garment district in 1999.  The Minister wrote to the district mayor that operations 
threatened to create a “social crisis” if vendors were denied a form of employment.185   
Andrade buttressed the city’s own police force and requested assistance from district mayors 
to steamroll through national obstructions.  As he told the press, “We have told [street vendors] that 
they will leave without a doubt.  How we are going to do it is our issue.  With or without the support 
the [national] police, we have to enforce municipal regulations.”186  The obstacles strengthened 
Andrade’s claim that enforcement against street vendors symbolized a larger struggle to reclaim 
authority.     
The second obstacle presented by the national government was financial.  Fujimori had 
decimated city finances under Belmont. The city budget was estimated at $128 million, or $19 per 
capita, in 1996.187  For comparison’s sake, the Bogotá city budget during the same period was $284 
million, or $45 per capita for a similar population and most police funding came from the national 
government.  In order to finance the removal of street vendors and renovate the city center, 
therefore, Andrade drew up plans to apply for a $20 million loan from the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB).188  By law, the city needed national approval to borrow.189   
                                                
184 “Batalle campal entre polícias y comerciantes,” ATV, May 14, 1997, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8nrg4Ncg4iw.   
185 “Ministro del Interior aboga por comerciantes informales de Gamarra,” La República 9 March 
1999. 
186 “Aplazan desalojo de ambulantes del Mercado Central,” El Comercio 1 May 1997.   
187 The proposed budget was for $400 million soles, or roughly $128 million.  “Casi listo presupuesto 
1996,” El Comercio 23 Feb 1996.   
188 “Proyectos de Lima presentados al BID,” El Comercio 18 Aug 1996.   
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The national government blocked the loan request.  Many suspected that Fujimori was trying 
to starve the city of funds to prevent operations.190  Minister of Economy and Finance Jorge Camet 
opposed the proposal for IBD funds as “useless expenses” that exacerbated poverty.  He 
disqualified the project because it was not an investment, and therefore ineligible for international 
lending.  Andrade defended the venture and openly accused Fujimori of manipulating the loan 
approval:  
“This is an investment because it creates new jobs in hotels, restaurants, tourism agencies, 
bringing tour groups.  I believe that the city of Lima should be put as we all want and we will be 
proud to be able to share it.  If the Minister of the Economy does not like it, what a shame.  I am the 
mayor… You know that the decision is not the Minister’s, but rather from above.”191   
 
In response, Camet claimed that the guarantee request for the loan followed its normal (slow) 
course.  
Sapped of international support, Andrade overcame the fiscal shortage by asking private 
banks to collaborate.192  Andrade managed to bring in over $59 million in private funds to develop 
commercial centers to relocate vendors and improve public spaces. Rather than fund relocation 
projects, the city also focused on organizing vendors to purchase their own commercial centers and 
then working with newspapers to offer free advertising.  Enforcement occurred on the cheap. The 
city’s slogan—“Lima comes to life because its people make it happen” (Lima renace porque su gente lo 
hace)—underscored the city’s autonomous efforts to improve.   
The third way that the national government complicated enforcement was through its 
support for resistance by street vendors.  Fujimori’s allies allegedly assisted street vendors in 
                                                                                                                                                       
189 The Ministry of the Presidency and the Ministry of Economics and Finance are charged with the 
review of subnational loan requests. 
190 Economist Intelligence Unit, Peru Country Report, Nov 1997. 
191 “Municipio no detendrá gestiones para recuperar Centro Histórico,” El Comercio 6 Nov 1996;   
“Andrade confía en que algún día podrá dialogar con Fujimori,” El Comercio 16 Oct 1996.     
192 “Alcalde de Lima pide al gobierno apoyo para acceder a préstamos internacionales,” El Comercio, 
14 Apr 1996; “Construyen puestos para 1.800 ambulantes,” El Comercio 4 Jan 1997.     
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organizing violent confrontations to undermine the city government’s legitimacy.193  Another subtle 
tactic to encourage defiance was the national provision of state land to some politically favored 
street vendors.  Andrade had insisted that the city government would not finance the relocation of 
vendors and would help vendors to purchase commercial spaces through collective initiatives.  The 
city could not afford enforcement otherwise.  This approach raised the issue of what to do for street 
vendors who could not afford to purchase shops.  De facto, some of these vendors moved to work 
in districts outside the downtown where forbearance continued.194   But, in 1997, the Fujimori 
administration transferred state land in the city center intended to “favor of the poorest informal 
workers,” who could not buy into commercial projects. This justification was pretext: the national 
government did not ask the city for a list of the poorest vendors, even though the city had surveyed 
and identified vendors who could not afford relocation.  Andrade saw the transfer as a way to 
undercut the city’s plans: “Vendors are going to have many doubts now, because they will say: if the 
government is going to gift a place to me, why would I buy one?”195  The move positioned Andrade 
as an enemy of poor vendors, while the national government appeared as their defender. 
Why did Fujimori go through such lengths to block enforcement?  On the one hand, 
Fujimori sought to discredit Andrade as a challenger to presidential power. This interpretation is 
                                                
193 It is unclear that Fujimori’s allies incited violence.  What is clear is that street vendors convened 
marches to protest the evictions ordered by Andrade and often ended their protests at the offices of 
Cambio 90 congress members, such as Rigoberto Ezquerra Cácares, María Jesús Espinoza Matos, 
and the former Congress president Martha Chávez Cossío.  City Councilor Pedro León (Cambio 90-
NM) also urged vendors not to leave the city center and to wait for offers of land or legalization.  
See, “Andrade denuncia a regidor de alentar el caos entre ambulantes,” El Comercio 8 Jul 1997. 
194 Complaints had surfaced from vendors who could not purchase land that they were forced to 
move to vend in other districts.  See, “Estamos de acuerdo con el desarrollo de la ciudad, pero no 
tenemos dinero,” El Comercio 29 Sept 1998; “Informales más necesitados fueron relegados del 
proyecto Cantagallo,” El Comercio 8 Jun 1997.    
195 “Andrade lamenta que gobierno entregue terreno de Cantagallo,” El Comercio 9 Jun 1997;  
Andrade repeated these declarations on several occasions saying that the national government “has 
interfered in the municipal work and has created disunity among the street vendors.”, “Después de 
Polvos Azuels sigue la avenida Grau.” El Comercio 11 July 1997.  
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consistent with Fujimori’s broader competitive authoritarian tactics to discredit his political 
challengers, such as the decision to cut Belmont’s budget and intimidation tactics against Somos 
Peru mayors that led twenty-three local mayors to abandon Andrade in 1999 (Planas 2000: 390-94).  
Undermining Andrade’s central initiative would have been a major blow to his political career.  On 
the other hand, Fujimori and his supporters used opposition to enforcement as a tactic to rebuild 
popularity among low-income voters.  Fujimori hit a nadir in popular support after economic 
liberalization.  He then began to boost social spending and target poor communities for 
expenditures to restore his support base (Schady 2000). Andrade’s advisor interpreted his 
intervention in city affairs as a tactic to build electoral support through forbearance because Fujimori 
believed that “people vote for you because they feel like the state permits them to do what they 
want.”196  Hence, Fujimori intervened to complicate enforcement in search of another electoral 
victory.   
In sum, Andrade managed to enforce despite severe capacity constraints.  By the mid-1990s, 
the Peruvian economy had begun a remarkable recovery, but the city government lacked funds, 
police, and national support.  The fact that Andrade mustered the capacity to enforce with limited 
financial or police assistance provides disconfirming evidence of arguments that focus on state 
capacity.  Instead, the events support the interpretation that changing conditions allowed a mayor to 
gain election with a nonpoor core constituency and to follow their preferences for enforcement. 
Andrade’s campaign strategists realized that there was little to fear in electoral terms from 
advocating an enforcement policy as long as it made clear that street vendors violated the law and 
were not poor.  Moreover, Lima’s political decentralization reduced the costs of enforcement by 
allowing local district mayors to continue forbearance policies.  Many lower-class voters ultimately 
                                                
196 Author interview with Oswaldo Carpio Villegas, June 1, 2011.   
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accepted enforcement in the city center, given that wealthy street vendors purchased spots to work 
and local districts allowed the least well-off vendors a place to work.      
4.4 Neutral Core Constituencies and Segmented Enforcement  
 
Notwithstanding the moderating effects of political decentralization, electoral incentives 
continued to play a role in enforcement decisions for city mayors in the 2000s.  However, mayors 
won with broad class coalitions, leading to less straightforward predictions about enforcement 
policy. The centrist administration of Luis Castañeda, in particular, oscillated: enforcement followed 
the electoral cycle.  Like Mockus, Susana Villarán represents the post-materialist Left, which 
prioritizes quality of life issues over immediate material needs and attracts substantial middle-class 
support. Villarán has followed her ideological convictions to enforce and has lost support among 
poor voters, consistent with my electoral theory.   
4.4.1 The Developmentalist Center: Enforcement Cycles Under Castañeda (2003-10) 
Andrade lost a tight race to Castañeda in 2002. Castañeda, a former head of the Social 
Security Institute, ran for a center-right party called National Unity Alliance (Alianza Unidad Nacional, 
later to become Solidaridad Nacional).  His platform echoed the developmentalist approach of 
Belmont in that he proposed major transportation and infrastructure projects.  Castañeda tried to 
portray Andrade as a mayor of the rich, but the accusations did not stick and enforcement policies 
did not divide the candidates.197  Both mayors agreed on the need for order.  Castañeda had a long 
trajectory of enforcement, since he helped Orrego enforce and relocate street vendors.198 Castañeda 
                                                
197 Castañeda challenged Andrade to a debate—which he accepted—in an informal settlement.  In 
the debate, Castañeda claimed that Andrade never visited the informal settlements in Lima.  
Andrade took off his boots and showed them to the crowd, saying that the mud on them proved 
that they had marched to poor neighborhoods and back, and not just prior to the elections. 
“Castañeda y Andrade protagonizaron acalorado debate,” AgenciaPeru 10 Nov 2002; “Andrade reta a 
Castañeda a un nuevo debate,” AgenciaPeru 7 Nov 2002.  By the end of his term, Andrade received 
roughly equal support across class groups (IMA 12 Oct 2002). 
198 Castañeda helped to create the Amazonas and Polvos Azules markets in central Lima. 
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drew similar levels of support across class groups, and eked out a victory based on voters’ 
exhaustion with the Andrade administration.199  
Castañeda straddled class preferences on street vending.  Particularly in his first term, 
Castañeda recognized that the majority of voters preferred order in downtown Lima, and he took a 
zero tolerance approach to infractions like street vending.200  But he also recognized Andrade’s error 
of ignoring employment issues in his enforcement policy. Castañeda describes his support for 
substitutive social policies as follows: 
“In contrast to Andrade, I knew that we couldn’t tolerate such extreme inequality and expulse the 
poor in an improvised fashion…But if you say, ‘oh poor thing’ and only recognize the poor’s 
need to work, that’s a perspective of weakness and resignation that most people no longer 
support.  I was firm with what needed to happen, that first, street vendors had to leave the city 
center but, second, they would not leave without work.”201 
 
Castañeda created several programs to generate employment alternatives.  The most 
innovative one was a program called Capitalizing (Capitalizando) in which street vendors receive 
temporary work permits, stands marked with the city’s logo, and assistance opening savings 
accounts.  The idea is that vendors accrue savings through their work in profitable locations, and 
then transition to formal stores.  In theory, priority goes to disabled or impoverished applicants.  
But, as with most licensing schemes, Capitalizing offered a very limited number of slots.  Complaints 
                                                
199 Vote intention surveys showed Castañeda with stronger support among upper class groups (31.7 
percent among A/B) compared to lower class groups (24.1 percent in C, 23.3 percent in D/E) prior 
to the election.  Poor voters supported a third candidate with a long tradition in informal 
settlements, Michel Azcueta (IMA Sept 2002).  However, as the election approached, the poor 
shifted to Castañeda with roughly 30 percent support across strata (IMA 20 Oct 2002; IMA 30 Oct 
2002).  Voters across the income spectrum cited the “need for change” as the reason for supporting 
Castañeda (Ipsos Oct 2002).  
200 As Castañeda put it in an interview, “people do whatever they feel like here…and when I call 
attention to it, they say that I am authoritarian.  If that is authoritarian, then I am.”  “Luis Castañeda, 
un político reservado,” Terra 26 June 2013. 
201 Author interview with Luis Castañeda, July 12, 2011. 
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emerged that licenses were provided to vending associations allied with the government, while many 
others were denied access.202   
Castañeda also undertook operations against street vendors, but tried to minimize mayoral 
responsibility for enforcement actions.  For example, Castañeda recounts how he avoided any 
personal association with an enforcement operation in Las Malvinas and stressed the substitutive 
social policies offered: “I went home at night and left the bureaucrats with one instruction: if there 
were any questions about the operation from the press, they were to say just one thing, ‘This is not 
an eviction, this is not an eradication, this is a relocation in which vendors will now work 
elsewhere’.”203  The apolitical approach neither won nor lost him support among voters, and 
Castañeda maintained even support across class groups in his reelection in 2006.   
Castañeda proved less consistent in his enforcement policies as he geared up for a 
presidential run.  In part, forbearance became possible because public opinion softened toward 
street vendors after a decade of enforcement had reduced the negative externalities of the activity.  
There are three important reasons why Castañeda’s second term qualifies as a period of forbearance.  
First, Castañeda reduced the government’s coercive capacity.  He transferred control of street 
vending from the city police to an inspections office.204  Just 45 inspectors covered all economic 
infractions in central Lima, compared to more than 1000 police mobilized under Andrade.205  While 
the Peruvian economy did dip with the global financial crisis, there is no evidence that budget cuts 
motivated these drawdowns.  The government also largely stopped the decommissions of 
                                                
202 “CUT Perú demanda solución inmediata pra los trabajadores autoempleados del comercio urbano 
de Lima,” CUT Press Release, 15 Jan 2010.   
203 Author interview with Luis Castañeda, July 12, 2011. 
204 Under Andrade, the Citizen Security Office (Gerencia de Seguridad Ciudadana) coordinated 
enforcement operations, while Castañeda put the much weaker Insepction’s Office (Gerencia de 
Fiscalización) in charge. 
205 Author interview with Álvaro Anicama González, Head of Inspections (Gerente de Fiscalizacion y 
Control) under Villarán, Municipalidad de Lima, November 30, 2011. 
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merchandise, even by the agents that remained.  Evidence suggests that the government decided to 
ease enforcement to reward Castañeda’s supporters.  The associate director of the office in charge of 
street vending management describes: 
“It was a political theme: sometimes [the Inspections Department] wanted to take a hard line in 
certain areas, but then suddenly we’d receive calls from congressmen, councilors, or advisors to 
the mayor to “not abuse” the vendors, and then the mayor’s office would tell us to take a softer 
approach…Andrade had a lot of support for the control of vending, but by the time Castañeda 
took office, there was more sympathy for the vendors.  Retentions were again seen badly, as an 
abuse of power, so there were few ways to control vending and more politicians wanted to get 
involved.”206   
 
Second, Castañeda expanded the number of short-term licensed vendors and tolerated many 
more for political purposes.207   Castañeda began with 300 authorized vendors in the city center, and 
ended with more than 10,000 vendors.208  Castañeda may have allowed vendors to expand as a 
political favor prior to his presidential campaign and then decided not to deal with their eviction 
before leaving office.209  Alternatively, some suspect that Castañeda wanted to force the incoming 
leftist government into an awkward position in which it would be forced to define its distributive 
commitments.  Villarán either would choose to evict vendors, which would go against the immediate 
interests of the poor that she claimed to defend, or allow vendors to stay, which would inflame fears 
among middle-class voters of the Left’s laxness and possibly provide fodder for a recall referendum.  
Third, there is evidence that Castañeda did not conduct scheduled enforcement operations.  
In particular, the city had plans to move Lima’s wholesale market from La Parada to a special site in 
Santa Anita.  More than 3000 street vendors surrounded La Parada, and well-organized associations 
opposed the move that would dislodge vendors from their posts.  Although market construction 
                                                
206 Sub-director of Inspections (Fiscalización), MML (2003-2009), December 2, 2011. 
207 Castañeda reportedly authorized or tolerated an additional 5000 street vendors, “Unos 5.000 
vendedores saldrán del Cercado,” El Comercio 4 Feb 2011.   
208 “Eduardo Zegarra: “Hubo una bolsa de dinero para la revocatoria”,” La República 20 May 2012. 
209 Author interview with Luis Valer, City Councilor (2011-13), November 28, 2011. 
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finished under Castañeda, the government delayed the move. 210  Many involved in the project saw 
electoral considerations behind the deferral.  The mayor of La Victoria, where La Parada is located, 
notes that the removal effort lost steam once Castañeda launched his presidential campaign: “With 
elections, there is a lot of fear of using coercive force to accomplish something.  The basic policy is 
‘don’t touch anyone in the name of politics’… so a lot of problems like La Parada persist because no 
one wants to take the political cost to stop them.”211 The move risked losing vendors’ votes and 
making Castañeda appear antipoor in confronting vendors.  Castañeda shelved the project. 
The picture that emerges from the Castañeda period is one in which enforcement varied 
with electoral exigencies.  Public opinion began to soften and divide on street vending enforcement.  
Castañeda returned to forbearance to expand his appeal among the poor before a presidential bid 
and to let his successor bear the political costs. 
4.4.2 The Post-Materialist Left: Enforcement Under Villarán (2011--) 
In 2010, citizens elected Susana Villarán, a human-rights activist who represented a new left-
wing party, Fuerza Social (Social Force), as mayor.  It was the first time that the Left won the capital 
since 1983.  But the Left’s return brought back a very different ideology and orientation toward 
street vending.  Drawing inspiration from Mockus, Villarán represents the post-materialist Left. 
Surveys suggest that Villarán attracted a broad base of support, despite her leftist credentials.  
The election gave Villarán a narrow victory over Lourdes Flores, a conservative from the PPC who 
twice ran for president. Two months before the election, more than half of upper class voters said 
                                                
210 Construction of the new wholesale market had begun under Belmont, but it was abandoned due 
to the economic crisis.  The project proceeded in fits and starts throughout the 1990s.  Opposition 
periodically erupted to the project whenever the government claimed that it would move the 
wholesale sellers. The project was further complicated when a group of land invaders backed by 
politicians affiliated with Cambio 90 invaded the empty site and began to build housing on the site in 
2002.  It took a long legal battle to evict the squatters.  Castañeda claims that delays in the 
construction prevented him from moving vendors. 
211 Author interview with Alberto Sánchez Aizcorbe, Mayor of La Victoria, June 15, 2011.   
 314 
that they would support Flores compared to 26 percent of lower-class voters (IOP Sept 2010).  But 
support for Flores slipped after it was revealed that she advised a suspected drug trafficker.  Villarán 
surged.  Her rapid and unexpected rise means that many voters turned to Villarán with little sense of 
her platform. Just prior to the election, there were minimal differences in vote intention by socio-
economic group (IOP Oct 2010).212   
Given that Villarán was an unknown candidate identified with the Left, many expected that 
she would promote forbearance like the IU.  Street vendors hoped for a permissive approach and 
mobilized as part of her campaign.  As the leader of one vending association put it, “We supported 
her campaign and marched with her because she promised us dialogue and solutions, but it’s very 
deceiving because she has evicted vendors.”213 Business and middle-class groups feared that Villarán 
would permit street vendors to return.  Media attention to street vending perked up when she took 
office.  Complaints that vendors were “retaking” city streets, and exhortations that the government 
should not permit a “backslide” into the pre-Andrade period, dominated coverage.214 Castañeda may 
have stoked popular fears that the Left would tolerate street vending by expanding the number of 
licensed vendors before the transfer of power.  Those close to Castañeda believe that Villarán 
fostered connections with street vendors during the campaign to signal her commitments to the 
poor against Flores’ association with the rich, and that street vendors retook the streets on the 
                                                
212 Ecological correlations suggest that Fuerza Social attracted a larger vote share in poor districts 
(Sulmont and Gordillo 2011: 61), but individual-level polls do not confirm these results. I thus label 
Villarán as winning a neutral class constituency. 
213 Author interview with Gloria Solorzano, Red de Mujeres, Lima, Peru, May 16, 2011. 
214 For example, one op-ed spoke warned of an impending return to the early 1990s.  “In 1996 it 
seemed more realistic that street vendors would acquire streets through adverse possession than that 
some mayor would manage to move them…This victory had been so difficult to achieve that it 
would have to be jealously guarded by previous municipal administrations.  Incredibly, nonetheless, 
things have not been this way and a good portion of the gained land has been lost again.”  
“Deambulando,” El Comercio 18 Dec 2013.   
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expectation of forbearance.215 Point being, the association between the Left and forbearance was 
strong in the public’s mind. 
Villarán surprised many by pursuing an enforcement policy.  The government ordered 
vendor clearances surrounding a major commercial center in Mesa Redonda.  She pushed ahead with 
the postponed relocation of the wholesale market to Santa Anita, although it required substantial 
coercive force and left four people dead. In addition, Villarán improved the government’s routine 
enforcement capacity.  The number of inspectors dedicated to commercial violations and city police 
doubled. She also cancelled temporary authorizations and revived decommissions of merchandise.216   
Why has a government that claims to represent the poor enforced against street vendors? 
First, political decentralization lowers the political costs of enforcement in central Lima.  After the 
evictions by Andrade, street vendors removed permanent stands and became mobile, scattering to 
poor districts in the city.  Enforcement in the city center, as pursued by Villarán, does not infringe 
upon vendors’ right to work because vendors can relocate to local districts where they live.  
Arguments that the government represses vendors and attacks the poor lose strength, particularly 
compared to a centralized city like Bogotá, when vendors have other employment options in the 
urban periphery.  The government has been explicit in its promotion of a segmented approach.  
Fuerza Social City Councilor Luis Valer explains: 
“We took out 5000-6000 street vendors from the city center.  There was little protest by the 
vendors or outcry that vendors were ‘poor things’ because they went back to the districts where 
they live, and mayors in poor districts aren’t confronting the vendors…The idea is to 
progressively eliminate vendors and let each district do it at its own pace because there is a lack of 
work and business opportunities…But Andrade made clear that historic Lima is special.”217    
                                                
215 Author interview with Marco Tulio Gutiérrez, Instituto Peruano de Administración Municipal, 
May 20, 2011. 
216 Author interview with Álvaro Anicama González, Head of Inspections (Gerente de Fiscalizacion y 
Control) under Villarán, Municipalidad de Lima, November 30, 2011. 
217 Interview with Luis Valer, City Councilor and President of Commercialization Commission, 
Lima, November 28, 2011.  
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Second, much like Mockus, Villarán held the view that enforcement promoted civic equality 
and the poor’s long-run welfare.  Villarán encouraged drawing public attention to enforcement to 
encourage changes in social norms.  For instance, she initiated a publicity campaign in the center of 
the city in which inspectors wear vests with the slogan: “If you change, Lima changes, follow the 
law.”218  Villarán also emphasized that enforcement serves the poor’s long-term interests by 
promoting economic investment, even though it removes tangible benefits in the short-term, or 
what some observers dubbed “progress through force” (progreso a palos).   
The post-materialist Left tends to be unpopular with the poor, and Villarán has proved no 
exception.  Only 15 percent of poor voters approve of her administration, compared to 34 percent 
of nonpoor voters. While inaction and rising crime are the top criticisms of her government, among 
the other complaints are the use of fines and sanctions by city inspectors and the relocation of street 
vendors (CPI 2013).219  Perhaps in an attempt to rebuild the poor’s support, Villarán has softened 
her rhetoric and approach to street vending of late.220  The government has proposed street vending 
regulations that update Barrantes’ approach of a managed licensing policy with caps on the amount 
                                                
218 Author interview with Álvaro Anicama González, Head of Inspections (Gerente de Fiscalizacion y 
Control) under Villarán, Municipalidad de Lima, November 30, 2011. 
219 One public opinion asked for the principal error of Villarán’s administration (“Cúal diría Usted 
que ha sido el principal error o lo que más criticaría a la Sra. Susana Villarán de su gestión como 
Alcaldesa de Lima?”).  Roughly 17 percent of respondents named inaction and crime as the principal 
error of the Villarán government; another 9 percent name “abuse” and fines by municipal inspectors 
(“el abuso de los inspectores municipales/multas/papeltas”) and another 9 percent name the 
relocation of La Parada.   
220 Vice mayor Hernán Núñez, for example, made statements that emphasize the social origins of 
vendors:  “One has to understand street vending as a social necessity.  That is, it is a sector in a 
difficult economic condition and that is dedicated exclusively to this commerce.” “Una necesidad 
social,” El Comercio 12 Dec 2013.  The head of inspections Álvaro Anicama similarly notes, “From 
the point of view of control and sanctions, we can contain the advance [of vendors] and even reduce 
it.  But to eradicate this unauthorized work becomes a social issue.” “Unos 3.000 ambulantes 
obstruyen las rutas de evacuación de Mesa Redonda,” El Comercio, 30 Nov 2013.   
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of merchandise vendors can sell.221  What is clear is that—even with urban decentralization—
enforcement has done little to bolster Villarán’s electoral support among the poor. 
4.5 Summary  
 
The main purpose of the Lima case is to showcase the electoral dynamics of enforcement in 
a context of weak institutions. I have demonstrated how enforcement varies with the core 
constituency of a mayor and serves as a form of informal welfare provision.  Politicians who courted 
poor voters, such as Barrantes and Del Castillo, preferred forbearance to demonstrate their 
commitments to the poor and to provide informal employment.  Other mayors like Castañeda 
attracted mixed-class support and used forbearance when expedient.  Finally, mayors who won with 
middle-class support, like Orrego and Andrade, promoted enforcement consistent with nonpoor 
interests.  Andrade realized the political risk of enforcement in a city that is majority poor, however, 
and made deliberate efforts to minimize the political costs.  Villarán, while motivated by a 
commitment to the poor’s long-run interests, underscored that enforcement costs votes among the 
poor.  Beyond a simple correlation between class constituencies and enforcement policies, the 
qualitative evidence underscores that mayors understand enforcement as a distributive policy choice 
with consequences for how they are perceived and supported at the ballot box.   
I should be careful not to overstate politicians’ scope for choice in Lima.  Institutional and 
fiscal capacity certainly limited the extent of enforcement, particularly under Del Castillo and 
Belmont.  In broad term, enforcement increased as state capacity improved in the city.  My 
interviews and secondary sources suggest, however, that coercive and fiscal capacity played only a 
minor role in how politicians set enforcement policy.  Furthermore, a focus on institutional capacity 
provides limited leverage to understand rapid shifts in enforcement over time. Andrade and Belmont 
                                                
221 The project is Street Vending in Public Spaces (Comercio ambulatorio en los espacios públicos). 
 318 
inherited similar institutional resources.  Yet Andrade insisted on enforcement despite limited 
coercive and fiscal capacity because he had an electoral mandate in favor of enforcement.  Castañeda 
scaled back on enforcement when Peru’s commodity boom was in full swing.  The evidence is more 
consistent with the claim that the weak distributive capacity of the state to generate jobs and 
electoral incentives made politicians hesitant to enforce and lose support among the urban poor.   
5 Street Vending and Business Association Power as Alternative Explanations  
 
This chapter has emphasized how my electoral theory differs from a dominant explanation 
rooted in bureaucratic capacity.  In particular, it demonstrated that enforcement plummeted as 
bureaucratic capacity increased in Bogotá, and that enforcement occurred even as capacity remained 
low in Lima.  Before concluding, it is worth emphasizing the distinct empirical observations that 
support my electoral explanation compared to other alternatives rooted in the power of street 
vending and business associations.  
A competing account of street vending enforcement focuses on principal-agent problems in 
which officials are bribed to forgo enforcement.  The basic expectation is that street vending 
associations collect payments from their members and then pressure bureaucrats and politicians to 
forgo enforcement. A number of studies point to differences in the associational power of street 
vending organizations to explain enforcement variation (Aliaga Linares 2012; Bayat 1998; Cross 
1998; Donovan 2002; Hays-Mitchell 1993; Tripp 1997).  The empirical prediction, then, is that 
enforcement operations should follow declines in informal associational strength and concentrate on 
areas where associations are weak.   
At first blush, it is plausible that the labor power of street vending associations drive 
enforcement outcomes.   Street vending associations declined in membership and unity in the mid-
1990s when enforcement peaked in Lima and Bogotá.  In Lima, the main vending association 
FEDEVAL suffered as the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) insurgency targeted popular sector 
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leaders with violence and disagreements over Fujimori’s economic policies divided the sector 
(Roever 2005).  Bogotá experienced a similar fragmentation.  Leaders from the radical vending 
association, Sinucrom, were victims of political violence in the 1980s due to their support of the 
political arm of the guerrilla, Patriotic Union (Unión Patriótica).  Changes in the labor law that made it 
easier for associations to form also ironically led to a proliferation of vending groups that decimated 
their organizational power (Donovan 2008).  Some further evidence in favor of the idea that vending 
associations bribed politicians to secure forbearance comes from a scandal that broke in Bogotá. 
City councilors demanded a bribe of $215,000 from vending association leaders to vote against 
changes in the police code in 2003, which would make it easier to fine street vendors.  The vending 
association refused to pay the exorbitant fee and denounced the city councilors to the press.222  
Perhaps a more powerful vending organization would have paid the bribe and prevented the legal 
changes.  Thus, in broad strokes, a decline in vending association power does coincide with 
enforcement operations. 
Nonetheless, a focus on associational power struggles to explain the geographical targeting 
of enforcement.  In both Lima and Bogotá, declines in organizational power were most dramatic on 
the urban periphery.  Central city organizations remained well organized to distribute profitable 
spaces.  They could aggregate votes and financial resources throughout the period.  Yet, these 
powerful organizations were precisely those singled out for enforcement. Andrade, Peñalosa, and 
Mockus all enforced against the best-organized street vending associations. Street vending 
associations in historic Lima, for example, pooled more than a million dollars in resources to move 
to formal commercial centers in the mid-1990s; they petitioned Congress and wrote to Fujimori to 
                                                
222 City councilors were caught on tape trying to extort money from a street vending association with 
12,000 members, the Corporación para el Desarrollo Social de Buhoneros de Colombia.  The incident broke 
when the association leader denounced the city councilors to the police.  Courts found the vice-
president of the City Council, Judy Consuelo Pinzón Pinzón, guilty and barred her from public 
office for twenty years. 
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prevent their removal. If organizational power prevents enforcement, then we should have observed 
forbearance in the city center, and enforcement on the urban periphery.  The opposite occurred.   
I suggest that associational strength has a Janus-faced impact on enforcement politics.  On 
the one hand, I agree that strong vending associations can help promote forbearance, although I 
emphasize that associations help to mobilize their members to vote, rather than exclusively to bribe 
officials. Street vending associations’ role as a voting bloc becomes critical when enforcement 
decisions are made at a very local level where few votes are required to win office.  On the other 
hand, my view is that strong associations undermine forbearance because they reduce social sympathy 
for vendors.  Street vending associations impose order on street markets by allocating slots and 
imposing restrictions on who can work as street vendors.  This function makes it easy for politicians 
to pin associations as “mafias,” “street landlords,” and “exploitative intermediaries.” Peñalosa and 
Andrade targeted street vendors in the city center because their organizational power turned voters 
against them.  Particularly in city elections where appeals to a broad electorate matter most, mass 
opinion and voter mobilization drive enforcement choices.  Thus, because popular perceptions of 
street vendors shape electoral incentives, associational strength promotes forbearance.  The decision 
to enforce against the most powerful vending associations is more consistent with an electoral 
explanation than a theory rooted in corruption or organizational power. 
Rather than focus on street vending associations, another strand of arguments focus on how 
business functions as a potential lobby to promote enforcement.  Business chambers and 
commercial organizations tend to oppose street vending as a drag on investment and unfair 
competition.  One possible prediction is that stronger business chambers should be more effective 
in advancing their interests through lobbying the government or helping inspectors to enforce.223  If 
anything, business chambers have been better organized and more involved in street vending issues 
                                                
223 For an example of such cooperative enforcement in a different context, see Amengual (2013). 
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in Bogotá compared to Lima.224 Nonetheless, enforcement has lagged in Bogotá and proved more 
consistent in Lima.  
Admittedly, the existence of a business chamber does not predict the strength or consistency 
of its opposition to street vending.  A more nuanced theory breaks down business interests by time 
and sector.  Business opposition, measured through complaints and statements to the press, peaked 
in the early-1990s in both cities.  Business complaints about street vendors “invading” public spaces 
occurred on a biweekly basis in the newspaper in the early-1990s.  The occupation of downtown 
areas was viewed as a threat to the image of a sound regulatory environment at a time when both 
Peru and Colombia had liberalized their economies and tried to compete for foreign direct 
investment.  As street vendors have moved out of the city center, concerns about their control have 
become more diffuse.  Business chambers have framed their complaints in terms of copyright 
violations, unfair competition, and tax evasion. There also is substantial heterogeneity of business 
interests.  Certain business sectors do support street vending, namely candy, soft drink, newspaper, 
and cell phone companies.225 Others sectors and small-business owners that compete with street 
vendors have a more negative view.  If business interests drive enforcement, then operations should 
concentrate on vendors that compete with businesses, such as durable goods, and exempt those 
types of vendors that powerful business sectors sponsor.   
While business preferences coincide with the rise of enforcement in the mid-1990s, several 
pieces of evidence are inconsistent with this explanation.  The first is that business opposition 
                                                
224 The Bogotá Chamber of Commerce and Fenalco monitor street vending, conduct research, and 
offer their material support for enforcement.  The Lima Chamber of Commerce has no group or 
research arm dedicated to street vending issues.   
225 For example, the Colombian candy conglomerate Quala maintained 1200 street vendors in 
Bogotá.  Newspapers like El Tiempo fiercely defended street vendors who sell newspapers as 
“traditional” and “honorable,” and argued for their separation from all other vendors. “Respeto al 
trabajo,” El Tiempo 30 Dec 1996; “Voceadores perseguidos,” El Tiempo 23 Sept 1997; “Voceadores 
sin espacio,” El Tiempo 30 March 1998; “Voceadores están en aprietos,” El Tiempo 5 July 1998. 
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peaked years before mayors actually moved to enforce; mayors like Del Castillo, Belmont, Caicedo, 
and Castro all ignored intense pressure from business organizations.  For instance, major hotels and 
banks threatened to leave central Lima if Belmont did not act against street vendors.  Belmont still 
did almost nothing.  If business interests are so central to the design of policy, it is unclear why 
mayoral action lagged.   
Second, even when enforcement occurred, it did not take place in ways that necessarily 
aligned with business interests.  For example, after past administrations’ shortcomings, business 
groups lobbied for enforcement when Mockus came to power in 1995. Fenalco, in particular, tried 
to strong-arm the government into enforcement.  It threatened a business strike in protest of the 
number of street vendors.  Fenalco President Dionisio Araújo proposed moving the poor to the 
countryside and insisted that street vending “is not a social problem and that the government is 
obligated to resolve this scourge for businesspeople who pay taxes.”226  The strike was suspended 
when Mockus began operations, although the government insisted that it was not responding to 
business pressure.227  Mockus also imposed harsh fines on companies that sponsored street vendors, 
which is hardly consistent with the prioritization of business preferences. Other city mayors took 
even stronger positions against business lobbies in favor of the poor.  For example, when threatened 
with a commercial strike by Fenalco, the mayor of Bucaramanga emphasized his commitment to 
poor voters over business groups: “I will not initiate a war [against street vendors]…I was chosen by 
                                                
226 The association took a radically anti-poor stance during this period. Araújo, for example, 
proposed the creation of agricultural colonies because “it is the only way to end the scourge of 
insecurity in the city caused by the indigent and street vendors.” “Qué hacer con los indigentes,” El 
Tiempo 21 March 1995; “Comerciantes aplazan paro,” El Tiempo 29 April 1995. 
227 Beyond threats, Fenalco also provided resources to the government to boost enforcement.  For 
example, it offered to provide a warehouse for the police to store decommissioned merchandise, 
trucks, and resources to print flyers. “Comerciantes aplazan paro,” El Tiempo 29 April 1995; 
“Ultimatum,” El Tiempo 22 March 1995; “Fenalco pide recuperar Carrera 13,” El Tiempo 28 Feb 
1995. 
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the marginal sectors of the population and the middle class.  I do not have a commitment to the 
large industries and I have never been supported by them.”228  
Nonetheless, a theory rooted in business interests can be reframed as a complement to my 
electoral explanation of enforcement.  Rather than emphasize how the poor are incorporated into a 
political coalition, the theory can be reframed around how business—as an expression of the 
interests of the nonpoor—is represented in politics.  I find this formulation less persuasive for two 
reasons.  First, most city mayors to a certain extent are “pro-business” in their pursuit of economic 
growth.  Even mayors like Garzón and Barrantes, who came from strong leftist backgrounds, 
worked with business groups to design policies to relocate street vendors and to promote 
investment in a variety of ways apart from vending policy.  As one of Mockus’ close associates and 
interim mayor, Paul Bromberg, observed, “You have to meet with Fenalco and the Chamber as 
mayor, and they always have hated street vendors, but they aren’t the ones who will bring you 
votes.”229  Second, as an empirical matter, it is hard to know how to distinguish the strength of a 
mayor’s business ties, other than through their core constituency or perhaps their backgrounds.  But 
even mayors with identifiable ties to the business community do not necessarily act in their favor. 
For instance, Caicedo was the former president of Fenalco and faced intense business pressure to 
control street vending.  He deferred to the city council and voters’ interests in forbearance instead.   
In short, while street vending and business associations shape the politics surrounding street 
vending, an electoral theory provides greater purchase to explain variation across time and case.  
6 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has explored how a mayor’s core constituency accounts for when enforcement 
occurs at the city level.  The following chapter extends the argument to consider how electoral rules 
                                                
228 “Alcalde no desalojará a vendedores ambulantes de Bucaramanga,” El Tiempo 9 Apr 1997. 
229 Author interview with Paul Bromberg, interim mayor of Bogotá, January 31, 2014. 
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predict where enforcement occurs across city space.  It adds the least likely case of Santiago to show 
how limited employment options and electoral pressures, even in an institutionally strong case, can 
explain forbearance.  Before turning to the spatial dynamics, it is worth emphasizing the unique 
theoretical insights from this chapter’s case comparisons.   
The comparative analysis of enforcement in Lima and Bogotá has yielded multiple empirical 
observations that are inconsistent with rival explanations rooted in state capacity.  Bogotá mayors 
enforced during the city’s worse downturn in decades when capacity presumably hit a nadir.  More 
puzzling from capacity-based perspectives, mayors tolerated street vendors, and quite openly, as the 
economy rebounded.  Lima, which suffered a profound economic crisis, moved to enforce during a 
period of high underemployment, paltry budgets, and central government opposition.  An 
explanation rooted in electoral dynamics resolved these anomalies.  
The chapter demonstrated the plausibility of the central argument of the study—that 
electoral incentives lead politicians to choose not to enforce the law.  Basic correlations confirmed 
that mayors with poor core constituents enforced less than those with upper class constituents. 
Mayors, state officials, and street vendors understood forbearance as a policy choice with welfare 
and electoral repercussions.  Politicians traded the costs of enforcement in the form of lost support 
among the poor against the benefits in support from the nonpoor. A combination of ideological and 
strategic incentives encouraged mayors with poor core supporters to forgo enforcement to employ 
the poor through informal means.   
The historical analysis showed that forbearance sometimes is rooted in ideological debates, 
but that these divisions challenge simple Left-Right dichotomies.  The neoliberal Right favored 
forbearance to protect street vendors’ economic freedom; the material Left concurred to support the 
income and employment options of the poor. However, the conservative Right pushed enforcement 
to guarantee respect for property rights and state authority.  The post-materialist Left—oddly united 
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with the old Communist Left—also enforced to promote a broader conception of social equality 
and formal welfare policies.  While I viewed Left-Right ideology as a poor explanation for 
enforcement policy, I showed that enforcement positions are driven by philosophical views about 
how to help the poor.  What rights to work and subsistence entail in contexts where welfare states 
cannot guarantee these social rights remains a topic of political and legal debate.  The role for 
enforcement ideologies goes against a model of pure office-seeking politicians who select 
enforcement levels to maximize votes.  But, observations that politicians who enforce lose support 
among poor voters—regardless of their broader social policy positions—underscores the 
importance of enforcement in signaling a politician’s class representation.   
Through this longitudinal approach, I also considered a model in which enforcement 
preferences evolved with past policy choices.  Unlike the case of squatting, where forbearance 
generated incentives for its continuation through demands for reactive housing policies, street 
vending was an unstable equilibrium.  Because the negative externalities and wealth of street vendors 
are visible, past forbearance galvanizes the nonpoor and even some poor voters against street 
vending in the following period.  Hence, forbearance toward street vending can take on a cyclical 
character in city elections as mayors mobilize different winning coalitions around enforcement. 
Since much of the argument was derived through a comparative investigation of these two 
cities, the paired analysis in this chapter cannot be considered strictly speaking a test of the 
argument.  Beyond the city story, we can expand the empirical implications of the theory by 
analyzing within-city variation.  This chapter deliberately focused on cities that elect central city 
mayors, while bracketing the case of Santiago, which only elects mayors at the district level. In the 
next chapter, I test the model by showing how differences in a city’s electoral structure, and thus 
enforcement incentives, lead to divergent observations of where enforcement occurs in a city.    
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Chapter 5 
The Electoral Geography of Enforcement 
 
 
“We realize that this is arbitrary legal discrimination, but to win elections in 
this district, you have to appear like you care about the poor…Things 
would be different if you wanted to be mayor in a rich district, or if you 
were Pinochet, then you could enforce the law just as they give it to you.” 
—Head of Inspections, District of Conchalí, Santiago, Chile  
 
 
 Do electoral incentives shape enforcement?  The qualitative evidence presented in Chapters 
3 and 4 suggest that politicians have used forbearance to provide informal welfare benefits and 
signal their representation of poor voters.  This chapter provides an additional test of my electoral 
argument against conventional alternatives by exploiting differences in the electoral structure of 
cities.  The intuition is simple: if electoral incentives shape enforcement, then cities with different 
electoral structures should have different enforcement patterns, all else equal.  It also adds the case 
of Santiago as a “hard” test of the theory: high levels of institutional capacity and police 
centralization make it unlikely to observe weak enforcement under conventional theories.  Yet urban 
political decentralization—combined with spatial segregation of class groups—creates strong 
incentives for some mayors to prefer forbearance under my theory. 
 More concretely, this chapter argues that the extent of political decentralization in a city 
produces differences in electoral geography. The boundaries of electoral districts make the votes of the 
urban poor more or less useful for office-seeking politicians.  Due to residential segregation, some 
districts overwhelmingly concentrate poor voters.  Others cluster together nonpoor voters, while 
some—as we saw in the citywide electoral districts in Chapter 4—mix different classes.  I assume 
that a politician sets enforcement policy for her electoral districts and, as in classic distributive 
models, disregards any negative externalities imposed on other districts.  The salience of political 
costs from enforcement varies with the share of poor voters in an electoral district, as well as the 
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extent of political competition.  In districts with high concentrations of poor residents, politicians 
are more likely to forbear and attract more offenders due to their lax enforcement policies.  In 
districts with few poor voters, the most viable strategy is to enforce, following the median voter’s 
preference and displacing offenses to poor districts.   
Of course, poor districts differ in a host of other ways from nonpoor districts: they may 
collect fewer taxes, receive worse police attention, and employ poorly trained and remunerated 
bureaucrats.  The distinguishing empirical observations of my theory are twofold: first, I expect 
enforcement to vary with district poverty only in cities that hold local elections, and not to respond to 
demographics in cities that centrally determine enforcement policy.  Second, I expect district 
demographics to predict enforcement only for offenses where class preferences over enforcement differ, and not 
more broadly for offenses like violent crime that all citizens prefer to control.   
As outlined in Chapter 1, I selected these cities in part due to the variation in their electoral 
structure:  Santiago is a politically decentralized city, meaning that residents elect a local mayor for 
their district, while Bogotá is a politically centralized city, meaning that residents elect a city mayor 
who appoints administrators for their district.  Lima is a hybrid that elects both types of mayors, but 
allows local mayors to determine enforcement policy. Empirically, then, I expect enforcement to 
vary with district poverty in the cities that hold local elections, Lima and Santiago.  District 
demographics should not predict enforcement in cities that centrally determine enforcement policy, 
as in Bogotá.   
I find that, holding fixed the district budget per capita, the number of street vendors, and 
other key covariates, a poor district does 71 and 78 percent fewer enforcement operations than a 
nonpoor one in Lima and Santiago, respectively. Demographics have no effect on enforcement 
across districts when elections do not occur at the local level, as in Bogotá.  I then compare street 
vending to other criminal offenses.  I show that enforcement does not vary by district demographics 
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when all citizens prefer to control crime.  Additional confirmation of my theory comes from 
measures of the mediator: I show that the perceived electoral costs of enforcement vary with district 
poverty in Lima and Santiago, but not in Bogotá.  Hence, the results support the claim that 
forbearance occurs when politicians need to pursue poor voters to win elections. 
 This chapter concentrates on street vending because offenses occur across urban space and 
thus electoral rules predict distinct spatial patterns.  But, a focus on electoral geography also helps to 
explain the negative case of squatting.  The electoral costs of enforcement are high in districts where 
squatting occurs (in the absence of housing policy).  The co-occurrence of district poverty and 
squatting thus helps make sense of why forbearance is a stable, uniform outcome in the case of 
squatting, as documented in Chapter 3.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows.  I begin by discussing my empirical strategy 
and measures of key variables: enforcement, street vending, and state capacity.  Second, I present the 
empirical analysis, showing both simple bivariate plots and fitting statistical models.  Third, I 
develop the mechanism that connects district demographics and enforcement through qualitative 
data from the unlikely case of Santiago.  Fourth, I show systematically that perceived political costs 
of enforcement increase with district poverty in politically decentralized cities, and that high electoral 
costs helps make sense of the differences in enforcement toward squatting and street vending 
presented in the preceding chapters.  I conclude that an intuitive distributive logic provides greater 
leverage to understand enforcement (and its absence) than alternative approaches. 
1 Identifying Forbearance  
Studies of enforcement face a measurement and an identification challenge.  A count of 
enforcement alone cannot distinguish between perfect control of a small number of offenses and 
limited control of numerous offenses. What I want to measure is enforcement effort, where 
forbearance implies limited effort given the magnitude of the problem.  In Chapter 3, I relied on 
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process tracing to separate the portion of enforcement explained by political choice versus 
administrative constraints.  In Chapter 4, I used a threshold definition of whether governments 
exerted any effort, but this dichotomous operationalization ignored variation in how much effort a 
government exerts and, as with any categorical definition, could be criticized as an arbitrary 
standard.  More systematic comparisons, however, run into a problem because data on both 
enforcement and the universe of offenses (the “denominator problem”) are rarely available across 
time and cases.  Most empirical studies rely on strong assumptions that either the underlying 
distribution of offenses is constant across observations or that the probability of enforcement is 
constant.  The empirical test of the theory developed here instead relies on my original survey of 
district governments to develop comparable measures of both offenses and enforcement.  This 
feature allows me to expand the number of predictions that I should observe if my theory holds.  
1.1 Empirical Strategy 
How to compare enforcement across different offense levels presents obstacles due to 
reverse causality.  We expect enforcement to respond to the number of offenses, and we also expect 
the number of offenses to respond to enforcement. It is therefore natural to think of enforcement as 
an equilibrium outcome determined by supply (enforcement as a function of offenses) and demand 
(offenses as a function of enforcement), as in Figure 5.1.1   
In this equilibrium framework, forbearance represents an outward shift in the enforcement 
supply curve.  The left panel of Figure 5.1 makes clear that a supply shift decreases enforcement and 
thus increases the number of vendors.  Critically, this approach distinguishes alternative means 
through which a reduction in enforcement can be observed.  The right panel shows that a demand 
                                                
1 These relationships are depicted as linear for simplicity’s sake, but the functional form is unknown 
(and likely non-linear because the marginal costs of enforcement increase with the number of 
offenses).  “Prices” in this model can be thought of as the cost to the offender of violating the law.    
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shifter, such a drop in the profitability of street vending, decreases the number of street vendors and 
thus enforcement.  
 
FIGURE 5.1. Supply (Left) and Demand (Right) Shifts in the Enforcement-Offense 
Equilibrium 
I examine whether electoral politics leads politicians to shift the supply of enforcement by 
selecting cities that differ in their electoral structure.  Political decentralization changes the 
distribution of class groups within electoral districts and the level at which enforcement policy is 
determined.  I draw on classic accounts of local public goods provision to predict how forbearance 
is distributed under decentralized and centralized political systems (Besley and Coate 2003; Oates 
1972).   
The intuitive idea is that political decentralization produces uneven enforcement across 
districts, as politicians tailor enforcement to the poverty level in their electoral district and disregard 
spillover effects.  If the main source of variation across districts comes from differences in how 
politicians choose to supply enforcement, then districts should trace out a downward sloping curve 
in the cross-sectional data, as in the left of Figure 5.1.  Poor electoral districts should conduct fewer 
enforcement actions and attract more vendors.   
Politically centralized cities constitute a single electoral district with a mayor who sets 
enforcement policy for the city.  I predict that policy varies over time with the mayor’s core 
more offenses 
fewer 
operations 
Offenses 
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Figure : Supply (Left) and Demand (Right) Shifts in the Enforcement-O ense Equilibrium
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constituency.  In theory, a politician charged with enforcement for the entire city also could 
differentiate enforcement levels according to heterogeneous tastes in each local district.  But a mayor 
who represents an entire city internalizes both the benefits and costs imposed on others.  She 
allocates resources to achieve the maximum reduction in negative externalities at the minimum cost 
to the people committing the offense, which likely requires enforcement in areas with the highest 
rates of the offense.  As such, most variation in enforcement across districts comes from differences 
in the number of violations.  I expect a positive relationship between offenses and enforcement 
under centralization like on the right of Figure 5.1.  
While bivariate correlations provide an initial test of my theory, I further examine the 
relationship between district poverty and enforcement using a Poisson regression and controlling for 
other important district characteristics. The Poisson distribution is appropriate given that 
enforcement is a count variable with a range restricted to positive integers.  My baseline estimating 
equation is ln !!! = !! + !! !"#$%! + !! !"#$%&'! + !!!! + ! 
where yi is the count of enforcement operations and Xi are the control variables in district i.   
My first hypothesis is that enforcement operations drop off with the fraction of poor 
residents in an electoral district.  So, district poverty should be a negative and significant predictor of 
enforcement, but only in politically decentralized cities.  Poverty should have no relationship with 
enforcement in politically centralized cities once controlling for the number of vendors.  
I include the number of vendors as a covariate for the limited purpose of observing the 
difference depending on whether enforcement policy is locally or centrally determined. In politically 
centralized cities, I expect that enforcement is a function of the number of vendors.  The coefficient 
is positive.  But this relationship should be much attenuated or reversed in politically decentralized 
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cities.  There is no clean prediction because my theory implies reverse causality: districts have more 
vendors because they enforce less.  
My second hypothesis is that competition shapes officials’ responsiveness to enforcement 
preferences.  In addition to differences across cities due to political decentralization, I look at a 
mayor’s margin of victory.  Mayors who win by larger margins enjoy greater office security and will 
be less sensitive to political costs.  
I test my third hypothesis that a politician’s core constituency shapes enforcement in two 
ways.  I use partisan affiliation to operationalize partisan support; politicians from the Right should 
favor more enforcement.  In the time series data, I expect less enforcement by mayors who receive 
higher vote shares from poor voters. Politicians supported by the poor may have an ideological 
commitment to their interests, or they may attempt to retain and mobilize the poor’s backing to win 
reelection.  
I distinguish my theory from capacity-based alternatives in several ways.  First, if state 
authorities are generally less capable or less attentive in poor districts, then demographics should 
shape enforcement irrespective of electoral rules.  Under my theory, in contrast, district poverty 
predicts enforcement only when elections occur at the local level.  The contrast of appointed and 
elected officials also differentiates my argument from optimal enforcement approaches. While I 
expect that officials in centralized cities respond to the number of offenses, elected politicians 
manipulate enforcement so that it bears no relationship to offense levels. 
I also compare enforcement across cities with different institutional arrangements. While 
capacity constraints play a larger role in administratively decentralized cities, I still expect political 
pressures to be a substantively more important explanation for enforcement. The “critical” case for 
theory testing, however, is a politically decentralized city with a single police force.  Capacity-based 
theories suggest minimal variation when a single institution manages enforcement.  My theory 
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instead posits that politicians choose how to deploy common police resources in response to 
electoral pressure, such that demographics still predict enforcement variation when local elections 
occur.  
Of course, the same formal institutions do not necessarily translate into the same informal 
access to policing.  To rule out that difference in the responsiveness of police to poor communities 
accounts for the observed patterns, I compare enforcement against violent crime to street vending.  
Violent crime is a classic valence issue; the poor and nonpoor reward politicians for improved 
control.  Less criminal law enforcement in poor districts would suggest that institutional debilities or 
neglectful policing accounts for class-based variation in enforcement.  A “Placebo” test of my theory 
is that poverty should explain enforcement against street vending, but it should not more broadly 
explain enforcement against crime without distributive implications.  
1.2 Measurement 
This chapter draws on my structured survey to the director or sub-director of the district 
office in charge of street commerce and inspections in all urban districts in Lima, Santiago, and 
Bogotá for a total of 89 districts.2  Summary statistics and alternative measures and specifications are 
included in Appendix D. 
The dependent variable is the average number of enforcement operations conducted per 
month by a district (Operations).  A challenge is to determine a consistent definition of an 
enforcement operation.  I use the involvement of the national police as a standard in Bogotá and 
Santiago.  Because only the national police can require vendors to identify themselves, which allows 
authorities to impose fines and decommission goods, police assistance implies an operation of a 
certain scale.  The measure of an operation must be adjusted in Lima.  The last chapter emphasized 
that local police control public space, and national police only supplement district forces to protect 
                                                
2 I dropped rural districts, which means that the sample includes 92 percent of all city districts. 
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them in large-scale action.  As such, in Lima, I use the retention of merchandise or equipment from 
a group of vendors as the threshold for an operation because it indicates willingness to impose costs 
on vendors.  As one director explains, “If I apply the law as written and take away [vendors’] 
merchandise, I take away their work, so I don’t do it.”3  I therefore ask officials how many 
operations the district has requested with the national police, or have involved decommission, in 
each of the last three months.  I average the monthly reports and verify the director’s report with 
district records and police logs whenever possible.  The measurement difference (operations in Lima 
are on a smaller scale) requires caution in drawing level comparisons across cities.  All results are 
expressed in percent terms.   
I also measure the number of unlicensed street vendors in thousands (Vendors).  I ask each 
director for the district’s estimates and records on unlicensed vendors.  In about half of cases, these 
records come from local vending censuses, and in the other half, they come from inspection team 
estimates.     
The main explanatory variable of theoretical interest is the district’s class composition.  I 
code the portion of lower class residents (Lower).  This government measure classifies households by 
reported income, education levels, durable goods, employment status, and social benefits.  While I 
check an alternative measure of poverty based on unsatisfied basic needs, class stratifications better 
capture both a household’s economic level and its precariousness.   
Given that the dominant alternative explanation focuses on resource constraints, I include 
the district budget per capita as a control variable (Budget).  Budgets are an imperfect proxy for 
                                                
3 Author interview with Director of Citizen Security and Inspections, District of Puente Piedra, 
Lima, Peru, June 20, 2011. Officials in Santiago and Bogotá repeat these sentiments with respect to 
police assistance.  For example, one director in a poor district in Santiago puts it, “To call in the 
Carabineros would create a huge social problem because the police can take out everything…they 
bring the law in too strong of a form when they decommission merchandise.”  Author interview 
with director of inspections, District of Quilicura, Santiago, Chile, June 25, 2012. 
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capacity so I check alternatives, including the number and salary of bureaucrats, police infrastructure, 
and local tax collection.  Population likely affects the amount of enforcement, as well as the number 
of street vendors, and therefore is included as a control (Population).  I also recalculate all variables in 
per capita terms.  
To operationalize competitive threats, I calculate the mayor’s margin of victory (Margin) as 
the percentage of votes for the winning candidate less the percentage won by the second-place 
candidate.  A wide margin suggests greater office security. 
Of the cases, only Chile boasts an identifiable political spectrum to test the role of partisan 
constituencies in the cross-sectional data.  There are three parties that form a block on the Left, the 
Concentration (Concentración) and two parties that form a coalition on the Right, the Alliance 
(Alianza).  I therefore include an indicator variable (Right) that takes on the value of “1” if the district 
mayor is a member of an Alliance party, which is the case for half the districts.   
To examine enforcement patterns in the absence of distributive incentives, I use arrests for 
hard crimes as a dependent variable (Arrests).  Arrests indicate that the police have taken action in a 
case beyond arriving at the scene of a crime.  I measure the underlying level of violations using 
citizen crime reports (Reports).  I conduct this Placebo test in Santiago, given that it is a politically 
decentralized city with a national police force.  Table 5.1 maps my theoretical hypotheses into 
empirical predictions.  
2 Spatial Patterns of Street Vending and Enforcement 
This section examines the empirical results across cities. To begin, I explore the bivariate 
relationship between enforcement and street vending in the raw data.  Figure 5.2 reveals a negative 
relationship in the politically decentralized cities, Lima and Santiago, as predicted if some mayors do 
fewer enforcement operations and attract more street vendors.  The opposite relationship emerges 
in the politically centralized case, Bogotá.  Districts do more operations when they face more street 
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vendors.  Similarly, enforcement against hard crimes increases roughly in proportion with the 
number of offenses in Santiago. The observed positive correlation between offenses and 
enforcement suggests that political supply-side distortions are likely at work to generate a negative 
relationship in the case of street vendors in politically decentralized cities.  
 
To examine the role of district demographics, I shade poor districts, defined as those with 
more than half lower-class households.  Again, the cities follow distinct patterns based on their 
electoral structures.  In Bogotá, poor and nonpoor districts alike enforce in proportion to the 
problem.  In Lima and Santiago, poor districts have more vendors and conduct fewer police 
operations. Valence crime occurs in all types of districts in Santiago, and enforcement is 
proportional to the extent of violations.  These patterns are consistent with my theory that the 
combination of elections and district poverty drives enforcement toward street vending. 
Hypothesis Empirical Prediction
Hypothesis 1: Enforcement decreases with the poverty —lower < 0,—vendors|lower ¥ 0 in Lima and Santiago
of an electoral district due to the political costs. —vendors > 0 in Bogotá
Hypothesis 2: District demographics are less —lower|vendors ¥ 0
relevant under limited political competition. —marginúlower > 0 in Lima and Santiago
Hypothesis 3: Politicians enforce less when —right > 0 in Santiago
their core constituents are poor.
Alternative 1: Enforcement decreases with the poverty —lower < 0 in all cities
of a district due to capacity constraints. R2budget > R2lower
Alternative 2: Enforcement decreases with the poverty —lower < 0 in all cities
of a district because the police are less responsive. —arrestslower < 0 in Santiago
Alternative 3: Politicians enforce in proportion —vendor > 0 in all cities
to the number of o enses.
TABLE 5.1.  Theoretical Hypotheses and Empirical Predictions 
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FIGURE 5.2.  Relationship between Offenses, Enforcement, and District Poverty 
I next use a Poisson regression to probe the relationships of interest.  I report the Poisson 
regression results using the Sandwich linearized estimator of variance to relax the assumption of 
equal mean and variance.4  Given the small dataset, the asymptotic standard errors are large and may 
be overstated if the Poisson assumptions are in fact satisfied.  I therefore note where results are 
significant under the Poisson assumptions but lose significance with robust standard errors.  To 
make the results readily interpretable, Table 5.2 reports the standardized coefficients, or the average 
                                                
4 The Poisson fits reasonably (the goodness-of-fit chi-squared test is not statistically significant), but 
the assumption is frequently violated by over-dispersion and/or excess zeros.  
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percent change in enforcement for a standard deviation change in the covariate.5  The size of a 
standard deviation differs by city so I describe the results for uniform covariate changes in the text.6 
TABLE 5.2.  Cross-Sectional Analysis of Enforcement: Standardized Poisson Coefficients 
 
Model 1 tests and confirms the core argument.  Moving from a typical district that is 10 
percent lower class to one that is 50 percent lower class (roughly two standard deviations) reduces 
enforcement by 71 and 78 percent in Lima and Santiago, respectively. District demographics have 
no significant impact on enforcement in Bogotá, as expected given a centrally determined 
enforcement policy.  
                                                
5 I standardize the coefficient and then use the Stata command nlcom to calculate the exponentiated 
coefficients and standard errors using the Delta method.   
6 The Poisson regression has an exponential structure so, for an x unit change in a covariate, the 
percent change in the response variable is !(!∗!) − 1.  Due to the nonlinearity, the standardized 
coefficients cannot simply be multiplied to calculate the predicted changes.    
Bogotá Lima Santiago
(1) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lower -0.052 -0.500* -0.473* -0.623* -0.507* -0.490* -0.535* -0.361 0.048
(0.074) (0.069) (0.070) (0.089) (0.237) (0.221) (0.243) (0.259) (0.111)
Vendors 0.770* -0.166 -0.150 -0.086 -0.410 -0.495 -0.529 -0.391
(0.091) (0.113) (0.100) (0.131) (0.306) (0.333) (0.324) (0.202)
Budget 0.039 0.062 0.127* 0.090 -0.138 0.100 0.148 -0.163 -0.628
(0.051) (0.037) (0.049) (0.060) (0.297) (0.353) (0.371) (0.240) (0.124)
Population 0.230* 0.597* 0.595* 0.445* 0.312 0.797 0.886 0.500 0.101*
(0.076) (0.200) (0.170) (0.172) (0.355) (0.634) (0.695) (0.528) (0.029)
Margin 0.180 -0.172 -0.493* -0.580*
(0.099) (0.171) (0.192) (0.227)
Margin*Lower 0.530 0.339
(0.325) (0.777)
Right 7.028 0.096
(4.670) (0.093)
Reports 0.492*
(0.070)
N 19 36 36 36 34 34 34 34 34
R2 0.467 0.413 0.441 0.473 0.213 0.294 0.295 0.354 0.388
Notes: úp < 0.05; Poisson robust standard errors in parentheses; two-tailed tests. The indicator variable for “Right”
is not standardized for ease of interpretation. Model 5 uses Arrests as the dependent variable.
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In contrast, the coefficient on the number of street vendors is positive and significant in 
Bogotá.  For a typical district, an increase of 3000 street vendors (a standard deviation) is associated 
with 75 percent more enforcement.  The number of street vendors has no relationship with 
enforcement in Lima and Santiago.  These findings are consistent with the theory that politically 
centralized cities determine enforcement policy primarily based on the magnitude of violations.   
Among the other variables of interest, an increase of $800 in the budget per capita (two 
standard deviations) is associated with 13 percent more enforcement in Lima.  This finding likely 
reflects the fact that Lima relies on local police so resources play a larger role in enforcement.  
Nonetheless, even in Lima, the budget falls just shy of statistical significance and district poverty 
remains a substantively more important predictor of enforcement.  Resources explain just 0.6 
percent of the variation in enforcement in Lima, while district poverty accounts for 26 percent.  The 
results are robust to other measures of local fiscal and administrative capacity. 
Models 2 and 3 analyze the second hypothesis on the role of political competition. The 
margin of victory on its own has an inconsistent relationship with enforcement, but the interaction 
with district poverty points in the predicted direction although failing to reach statistical significance 
using the Sandwich correction.  In a typical nonpoor district, a mayor who wins by 30 percentage 
points does 42 and 38 percent less enforcement in Lima and Santiago, compared to one who wins 
by a hair.  Meanwhile, a mayor in a poor uncompetitive district does 35 and 11 percent more 
enforcement in Lima and Santiago, respectively.  A natural confounder may explain the fragility of 
these results: a mayor who dominates politics may gain freedom and enforce, but a mayor also may 
win by wide margins by catering to his constituents’ interests.  
Model 4 shows that a mayor’s core constituency—measured loosely by party affiliation—has 
a substantial relationship with enforcement.  Mayors from right-leaning parties do seven times more 
enforcement than left-leaning mayors.  However, the result is only significant at the 10 percent level.  
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Finally, Model 5 compares enforcement against valence crime.  When crime data are used, 
the number of offenses is strongly predictive of enforcement as expected.  Reassuringly, consistent 
with my theory, poverty and partisan affiliation do not more broadly predict enforcement against 
non-redistributive crime.  
 
FIGURE 5.3.  Predicted Enforcement Operations Relative to City Average by District Poverty 
(Left) and Vendors (Right) 
The regression results confirm that poor districts pursue less enforcement and, contrary to 
competing theories, this relationship only holds for cities that elect district mayors and distributive 
offenses.  The differences depending on the electoral structure of a city become even clearer when 
illustrated with a graph. Figure 5.3 plots the predicted number of operations relative to the 
corresponding city average and the 95% confidence intervals. The left panel shows the predicted 
relative operations as the share of lower class residents in a district changes.  As the figure makes 
clear, when the share of lower class residents is low in Lima and Santiago, districts do more than 
double the usual operations.  When the share is high, districts execute less than half the average.  
The flat line at the city mean reinforces that the irrelevance of district demographics in centralized 
cities like Bogotá.  Instead, the enforcement logic in Bogotá becomes clear in the right panel, which 
illustrates the predicted enforcement operations as the quantity of street vendors changes.  More 
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vendors are strongly associated with more operations in Bogotá, but not in the politically 
decentralized cities.7  
The regression results thus demonstrate that poor districts are less likely to enforce, but 
contrary to capacity-based alternatives, this relationship only holds in cities that elect local mayors 
and in enforcement against distributive crime.   
3 The Electoral Costs of Enforcement 
The cross-sectional results suggest that when voters run for office in poor districts, they are 
less likely to enforce against street vendors.  But do voters actually choose to enforce less to build 
their electoral support and reputation, as my theory suggests, or does some other mechanism link 
these two phenomena?  To evaluate the mechanism—varied political costs—through which district 
type affects enforcement, I measure bureaucrats’ perceptions of the electoral repercussions from 
enforcement.  “Street-level” actors often have intimate knowledge of enforcement politics; these 
attitudinal measures lend greater plausibility to the findings.  Here, I offer evidence of the 
mechanism at work across different electoral structures: I expect the electoral costs of enforcement 
to vary with district type only in politically decentralized cities.  Additionally, the electoral costs 
should be uniformly high for geographically concentrated offenses like squatting that occur in poor 
districts.     
To test my theory that variation in enforcement comes from differences in the electoral 
repercussions across district types, I again use the question examined in Chapter 3 that asked each 
district director to rank his perception of whether the mayor loses (coded as a “1”) or gains (coded 
as a “10”) electoral support if the government enforces the law against street vendors or squatters.  
Admittedly, it might be the case that bureaucrats and politicians have different perceptions of the 
                                                
7 The large 95% confidence intervals are suppressed for Lima and Santiago on the right panel of 
Figure 5.3 to highlight the Bogotá result.  
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electoral consequences than politicians, or that bureaucrats do not accurately report their 
perceptions on a survey where the stakes are low.  But there are compelling reasons to be interested 
in the patterns that subjective perceptions reveal. Local politicians rarely have poll information.  It is 
not uncommon for them to consult bureaucrats on how the community will respond to 
enforcement.  This measure, while noisy, thus helps understand how district poverty connects to less 
enforcement.   
 
FIGURE 5.4.  Political Costs of Enforcement by District Poverty, Decentralized Cities 
Politically decentralized cities should have a strong negative relationship between district 
poverty and electoral costs of enforcement.  As indicated on the left side of Figure 5.4, I find a clear 
connection in the case of street vending.  While mayors in nonpoor districts are perceived to gain 
electoral support from enforcement, mayors in poor districts are expected to lose support.  
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Consistent with my theory, higher anticipated electoral costs are strongly correlated with district 
poverty in Lima and Santiago (!=-0.54 and -0.73, respectively).  Mayors take greater electoral risks 
when they enforce in poor districts; it is plausible that this motivates them to refrain from action.   
The right-column of Figure 5.4 repeats the exercise for squatting.  The first thing to note is 
that there is a clear selection effect: only poor districts contend with squatters.  Other than in 
hypothetical scenarios, it is impossible to measure the electoral costs in nonpoor districts.  Focusing 
on poor districts where squatting actually occurs, the comparison of cities supports my argument 
that the political costs of enforcement are high where social policy substitutes are absent, as in Peru, 
but that they fall where the state develops alternative solutions, as in Chile.  
In contrast, my expectation is that electoral costs vary little across urban space in politically 
centralized cities because any support gained locally must be weighed against the broader urban 
effects.  Figure 5.5 repeats the same plot for the politically centralized city of Bogotá.  The 
relationship between perceived electoral costs of enforcement against unlicensed street vendors and 
district poverty is much weaker (!=-0.25).  Again, this helps us make sense of why district poverty 
did not predict enforcement in the statistical models for Bogotá.  The squatting results actually do 
show a slight correlation between political costs and district type, but this relationship is too noisy to 
be meaningful.  As expected given truncated housing programs and low visibility of squatting, most 
bureaucrats believed that the city mayor would lose political support if he enforced against squatters. 
In sum, to provide a more systematic assessment that political pressures, rather than 
resource differences linked district demographics and enforcement, I compared perceived electoral 
costs across cities for street vending and squatting.  I showed that bureaucrats in politically 
decentralized cities believed that mayors would lose votes if they enforced against squatters in poor 
districts, and gain votes in nonpoor districts.  Consistent with the statistical findings, electoral costs 
do not vary by district type in a politically centralized city.  The contrast between squatting and street 
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vending also hammers home why enforcement against squatters was minimal.  Enforcement lags 
because the electoral costs of enforcement are uniformly high in the areas of the city where they 
occur. 
 
FIGURE 5.5.  Political Costs of Enforcement by District Poverty, Centralized Cities 
4 Illustrating the Mechanism in a Least Likely Case: Santiago 
The number of street vendors is particularly surprising in Santiago, given that Chile boasts 
one of the region’s strongest economies and substantial poverty reduction programs.  I now draw on 
qualitative interviews from Santiago to flesh out the electoral logic that motivated mayors to forbear, 
even in the context of a capable police force and bureaucracy.  While Chile has the administrative 
capacity to control street vending, it lacks unemployment insurance for unskilled workers, and job 
intermediation programs struggle to crowd out demand for short-term employment.8  The Achilles’ 
heel of past administrations has been employment, and street vending provides an important way to 
substitute for employment demands in poor districts and signal sympathy for the poor’s needs.   
This section uses unstructured interviews with politicians to show that the need to provide 
employment opportunities and project a sympathetic image to poor constituents motivates 
                                                
8 Chilean districts place unemployed workers in jobs through the municipal labor intermediation 
service (OMIL), but their ability to place job seekers varies greatly across time and space (Pribble 
2013b). 
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politicians to forbear in poor districts.  In contrast, officials in nonpoor districts believe that their 
job is not to solve employment problems for the poor, and that enforcement demonstrates their 
commitment to cleanliness and efficient management.  Here, I try to give a sense for variation across 
district types in Santiago; similar themes emerged in Lima where mayors also are elected at the local 
level.  To show that differences in district composition, rather than political ideology, explain the 
enforcement logic even in a country with programmatic parties at the national level, I compare the 
behavior of the same mayor who switched electoral districts in Santiago.   
4.1 Informal Welfare Provision  
Elected officials varied in their beliefs that forbearance toward street vending was a 
necessary form of informal employment provision.  In poor districts, politicians emphasized that 
forbearance offers distributive benefits to the poor, and that they were unwilling to enforce absent 
other alternatives to meet their constituents’ social needs.  Even in a comparatively strong economy 
like Chile’s, officials lamented that jobs were unstable and low-quality—leading to temporary periods 
when the poor needed to work as street vendors to smooth or supplement their incomes—and that 
specific groups like older workers, single mothers, the disabled, and unskilled workers struggled to 
find work—leading to structural unemployment that street vending addressed.9  Politicians’ 
observations that street vending is a “palliative for macro problems”10 and a visible “reflection of 
labor market flexibility and declining industrialization” were typical of the links made between 
                                                
9 Author interviews with director of inspections, District of Quinta Normal, Santiago, Chile January 
10, 2012; director of normalization and inspections, District of La Pintana, Santiago, Chile, June 15, 
2012. 
10 Author interview with Tamara Homel Navarro, Councilor, District of Pudahuel, Santiago, Chile, 
January 17, 2012. 
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forbearance and unemployment problems.11  Some mayors voiced indignation about economic and 
spatial inequality in Santiago that forced poor districts to rely on forbearance.  They stressed that 
unemployment rates are much higher in poor districts, and that districts in the periphery have 
smaller budgets and fewer connections with private business to meet the poor’s needs through labor 
intermediation programs.12  While all local governments in Santiago have an office for labor 
intermediation, officials in poor districts emphasized that employment positions were inadequate to 
meet demand, particularly in poor districts.  A councilor in a poor district captured how this 
inadequacy led her to support forbearance:  
“The municipality has its office of labor intermediation, but it can’t deal with the number of 
people who need jobs in this district and so this is a way to help poor people from the sector.  
We can’t have more police or resources to clean up the markets until this district solves the 
unemployment issue, so at this time, I think that the disorder is necessary for people to work.”13 
 
Politicians in poor districts were quite explicit that forbearance toward street vending was 
one option that they had to assist constituents.  Claudia Lange, a local councilor from the popular 
conservative party, UDI, provides a typical example of this perspective.  She described how people 
came to her office asking for help with a job, food or money to help them get through a period of 
unemployment.  While she works with a congressman in her district on local initiatives, so far she 
has been unsuccessful in finding jobs for her constituents.  Instead, Lange helps the unemployed set 
up as street vendors by buying them raw materials like ingredients to make Chilean snacks (sopapillas) 
or having friends donate used clothes to start selling in rotating street fairs without a license.  She 
said that the mayor knew not to call the police against the unemployed who began to work as street 
vendors.  When asked if encouraging vendors to work without permits fomented illegality, Lange 
                                                
11 Author interview with anonymous councilor, District of Quinta Normal, Santiago Chile, January 
10, 2012. 
12 Author interview with Pedro Isla, Mayor, District of San Ramón, Santiago, Chile, June 21, 2012. 
13 Author interview with Councilor, District of Puente Alto, Santiago, Chile, June 20, 2012.   
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replies, “What are the other possibilities?  The poor want things immediately that day, but I help 
them to get the tools they need to generate income in the longer term.  It isn’t clientelism because 
I’m not just giving them things, this is a way to help them get started and people are always grateful 
for the opportunity to work.”14  Other politicians were less direct in the assistance that they provided 
to street vendors, or as another councilor put it, “We never tell people to go to work as street 
vendors, but they’ll ask the mayor what to do when out of work and whether they can join the 
unlicensed vendors at the end of the market [la cola].  And [the mayor] will say that no one will stop 
you.”15   
Politicians in poor districts like the one that Lange represents who view forbearance as a 
necessary way to work responded to questions about why they avoided enforcement in two ways.  
First, they tended to emphasize that the median voter in their district did not demand enforcement.  
Bureaucrats said that residents tolerated unlicensed street vendors as long as the negative 
externalities of their activities, such as noise, garbage, or direct competition with local businesses 
were contained.  They “took the point of view of the poor” given that “many people have suffered 
poverty.”16  One bureaucrat made a direct comparison with nonpoor districts,  
“If this were a rich district, then you’d have to protect the sidewalk of rich people because they 
don’t like seeing poor people in the streets.  But in this district, everyone has a modest economic 
level and if some people with a little bit less are working in the streets, the other residents don’t 
get annoyed…they put themselves in the position of the vendors and understand their needs.”17   
 
There also was a second type of response that pointed to what would happen if the 
government enforced the law against street vendors.  Officials and politicians commonly discussed 
                                                
14 Author interview with Claudia Lange, Councilor, District of San Ramón, Santiago, Chile, June 19, 
2012. 
15 Author interview with local councilor, District of San Bernardo, Santiago, Chile, June 23, 2013. 
16 Author interview with head of inspections, District of La Pintana, Santiago, Chile, June 15, 2012.  
Bureaucrats in other districts, such as Conchali, told stories that bureaucrats got fired when they 
decommissioned merchandise from vendors. 
17 Author interview with head of judicial affairs, District of Renca, Santiago, Chile, June 27, 2012. 
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the “social cost” of enforcement by which they mean the dislocations caused by denying the poor 
the basic goods achieved through forbearance.  Bureaucrats in poor districts also said that the mayor 
would not use enforcement because the police could not discriminate between vendors who needed 
to be in the streets out of necessity and those with other income sources.  Descriptions of police 
operations as a “blunt instrument”18 and “bringing the law in too harsh a form” 19 are indicative of 
these concerns.  
Mayors in nonpoor districts, in contrast, rejected forbearance as a way to solve employment 
issues and stressed that their constituents demanded enforcement.  Officials tended to emphasize 
that social agencies were assigned to address employment issues, not the police.  The director of 
operations in Las Condes, a wealthy district, for example, spoke about a separation of 
responsibilities, “Our job is not to solve the country’s social problems, there are all types of program 
for that…If lawmakers want to change the law so that some can stay, then I’ll change how to do my 
job.”20  Other officials stressed that the mayor received a mandate from constituents to enforce.  As 
one official bothered by the social costs of enforcement put it, “We don’t want to be a punishment 
entity, but here, all the neighbors want to live in a clean neighborhood and the mayor made a clear 
promise to control vending.”21 
The qualitative evidence thus suggests that the weight put on informal welfare concerns 
differs depending on the type of constituency that politicians represent. Officials in poor districts 
thought that the public would react poorly if they enforced, and that as long as the externalities were 
contained, people showed solidarity with vendors.  In nonpoor districts, officials stressed that 
                                                
18 Author interview with head of rents, District of San Bernardo, Santiago, Chile, June 23, 2012. 
19 Author interview with head of rents and inspections, District of Quilicura, Santiago, Chile, June 
25, 2012.   
20 Author interview with director of inspections, District of Las Condes, Santiago, Chile, June 29, 
2012.   
21 Author interview with director of inspections, District of Vitacura, Santiago, Chile, July 4, 2012. 
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unemployment and poverty were not their concerns, and residents supported enforcement. 
4.2 Signaling 
The second major concern of politicians was the signal conveyed by enforcement.  In the 
absence of welfare substitutes, politicians can use forbearance or enforcement to signal their 
distributive commitments, namely whether they are with the poor or with the nonpoor. 
Bureaucrats in charge of enforcement described their jobs as “political work”22 and called 
operations “the face of the mayor” because enforcement is publicly observable.  Given this 
visibility, bureaucrats in poor districts described that mayors risked their reputation for 
understanding the poor if they enforced against street vending: 
“If you bring the police, you are worse than Pinochet…The mayor tries to be part of the 
community, always trying to help the community, so he can’t go against them in this public way.  
The day we try to force an unemployed man to stop selling things in the streets, the cameras will 
come out to the district and poor people will denounce the mayor as a traitor.”23  
 
Mayors in nonpoor or mixed-income districts, by comparison, emphasized that 
enforcement showed a “modern” district and “efficiency.”24  Even though the public was not 
uniformly supportive of enforcement, there were gains from appearing to respect the rule of law.  
As one politician commented on the signaling calculation in a nonpoor district:  
“From a human perspective, these are people who support families and it is viewed as an abuse 
to repress their activity and there are always people who take up the common cause.  But at some 
point, the mayor realized that more people in this district applauded control…and that it made 
him seem decisive, like he respected the residents’ desire for cleanliness and clear streets.”25     
 
                                                
22 Author interview with director of rent and inspections, District of Quilicura, Santiago Chile, June 
25, 2012. 
23 Author interview with director of inspections, District of Pedro Aguirre Cerda, Santiago, Chile, 
June 26, 2012.   
24 Author interview with director of citizen security, District of Las Condes, Santiago, Chile, July 4, 
2012. 
25 Author interview with councilor, District of Providencia, Santiago, Chile, January 6, 2012. 
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Explanations in this signaling category thus highlight how voters view politicians when they 
choose to enforce.  Notably, the signal of enforcement in Santiago had more to do with 
administrative efficiency.  In Lima, where levels of government corruption are higher, as we will see 
below, mayors of nonpoor districts were more likely to enforce to show that they did not accept 
bribes or manipulate the law as a political favor.  
This signaling explanation for forbearance is not mutually exclusive with the first category of 
observations about the informal welfare effects. Both types of responses are predicated on a view of 
forbearance as a tool to tailor welfare policy to citizens’ demands depending on the district where 
politicians are elected. Whether or not politicians genuinely care about the poor’s welfare, or 
whether they want to appear that they care, the electoral incentives not to enforce in poor districts 
are strong.  
4.3 Mayors Who Move Districts  
A logical question in the case of Chile, given a coherent Left-Right party spectrum, is 
whether political ideology instead drives enforcement.  My claim is that concerns about the welfare 
costs and signals conveyed by enforcement transcend ideological divisions.  An example of a mayor 
who ran for office in different electoral districts exemplifies this point.  Again, my theory is that 
politicians should shift their enforcement behavior depending on a district’s demographic 
composition.  An alternative theory is that political ideology undergirds variation in enforcement, 
and thus enforcement remains constant regardless of constituency.  
A notable illustration of the weak impact of partisan ideology comes from the career of a 
mayor of Santiago, Pablo Zalaquett (2008-11).  Zalaquett represents the conservative party, the UDI.  
Zalaquett began his career in politics as the mayor of a poor district, La Florida.  La Florida 
conducts minimal enforcement operations against street vendors because forbearance elicits public 
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sympathy and votes.  Prior to recent elections, for example, the mayor appointed a special advisor to 
manage street vending.  The head of inspections explains that the appointment was a way to boost 
forbearance:  “The mayor has appointed someone who thinks that a person’s income changes the 
legality of what he is doing…This is a poor district so the mayor thinks that it shows that he 
understands the people.”26  Licensed vendors protested that unlicensed street vending should not be a 
way to resolve unemployment problems.27  Photos released to the press show that Zalaquett similarly 
allowed street vendors to work unchecked in La Florida.28  This finding confirms past studies that 
show the UDI takes a “segmented approach” in which it unites an upper class core constituency on 
ideological grounds with targeted distributive appeals to poor voters (Luna 2006, 2010).   
In 2008, Zalaquett ran for mayor of Santiago, a middle-income district and business center.  
Still representing the UDI, Zalaquett promised frequent control operations against street vendors 
and emphasized order in his “I Want a Clean Santiago” campaign.  Zalaquett’s opponents tried to 
shame him for his inability to control street vending in La Florida. Nonetheless, fulfilling his 
promise, Zalaquett has conducted frequent street vending control operations in Santiago center.  
The change in behavior—the same politician with the same party has pursued radically different 
enforcement operations as he moved districts—is one example of how constituency interests 
overwhelm partisan ideology.  
Beyond partisan ideology, the impact of political legacies of the dictatorship cannot explain 
variation in enforcement across districts or sectors.  Many officials and politicians, primarily from 
the political Left, contrasted forbearance against street vending to Pinochet’s repression and 
                                                
26 Author interview with José Luis Fouticelle, Head of Inspections, Municipality of La Florida, 
Santiago, Chile, June 20, 2012. 
27 “Comerciantes de las ferias libres de La Florida agudizan su lucha contra los coleros,” 15 Nov 
2010, El Paradiario 14. 
28 “Ravinet acusa a Zalaquett de fomenter el comercio ambulante en La Florida,” El Mercurio 14 Oct 
2008.   
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disregard for the poor.  If concerns about being perceived as continuing the military government’s 
tactics drove enforcement, then it would only amplify the impact of partisan affiliation.  The 
structure of Chile’s party system was deeply influenced by the legacies of the dictatorship (for 
example, see Torcal and Mainwaring 2003). Mayors on the Left would avoid enforcement, regardless 
of the type of district where they stood for office.  Instead, the effect of partisan affiliation is weak.  
Moreover, concerns about replicating authoritarian tactics did not lead to forbearance against 
squatting, as detailed in Chapter 3.  When social policy substitutes are available, mayors enforce, 
even though Pinochet used a very heavy hand to repress squatting.  References to the dictatorship 
provided a way for mayors to discuss their reputational concerns of being perceived as “anti-poor,” 
but they cannot explain enforcement variation across district or sector. 
5 Alternative Explanations  
Much of the existing literature treats limited enforcement as an undesirable consequence of 
weak state capacity. It is possible that district poverty captures understaffed and underfunded 
bureaucracies that cannot enforce state regulations, rather than differences in political choices to 
enforce.  To summarize my findings on the relative importance of resources and politics across cases 
and sectors, I return to the question discussed in Chapter 3 in which I asked bureaucrats what they 
consider to be the main limitation—political intervention or resource constraints—on their ability to 
enforce.  Table 5.3 shows that bureaucrats divide in what they consider the primary constraint, and 
many do discuss resource constraints including the availability of cars, staff, storage space (for 
decommissioned merchandise), and legal aid.  But in every case, political interference is at least as 
important as resources, if not more so.  In some instances, such as squatting in Bogotá, bureaucrats 
overwhelmingly view political intervention to avoid social and political costs as what stops 
enforcement.  The more common case is that bureaucrats see both resources and politics as 
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conspiring against effective control.  
Another explanation centers on the corruption of “street-level” bureaucrats.  These theories 
expect a gap between the way that politicians and senior officials want to enforce laws and how 
bureaucrats implement their directives. The way that I evaluate the importance of corruption is by 
asking local government officials whether they believe that informal associations bribe police 
officials to prevent enforcement. Table 5.4 reports bureaucrats’ perceptions across cities and sectors.  
Consistent with my expectations, bribery is perceived to play a role in the case of Lima.  However, 
bribery is considered to be uncommon in Bogotá and Santiago.  Not a single bureaucrat reported 
that it was common for street vendors or squatters to bribe the police in Santiago.  While 
underreporting may explain the lack of reported corruption, leaders of street vending associations 
corroborated them.  None of the two-dozen street vending leaders that I interviewed in Bogotá and 
Santiago reported paying bribes to the police.  Around half of street vending leaders do pay the 
police in Lima.  We can thus conclude that corruption is not a necessary condition for forbearance.  
Forbearance occurs even in Santiago where there is overwhelming evidence that the police are clean 
and bribes are rare.  
TABLE 5.3.  Perceived Primary Constraint on Enforcement by City and Sector 
 
 
Theories focused on “street-level bureaucracy” assume that local level officials take 
autonomous decisions about how to enforce that go against the orders of local politicians; my 
survey results suggest that politicians are deliberate in their positions not to enforce the law.  Instead, 
Bogotá Lima Santiago
squatting vending squatting vending squatting vending
Intervention 0.67 0.63 0.46 0.43 0.80 0.50
Resources 0.27 0.21 0.42 0.32 0.20 0.42
Both 0.07 0.16 0.13 0.24 0.00 0.08
1
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it is often bureaucrats who express frustration at political intervention in enforcement.  Qualitative 
evidence confirms this point.  Santiago maintains a well-trained and professional bureaucracy even at 
the local level.  On average, bureaucrats in charge of street vending enforcement have worked in the 
district for 13 years, have college degrees, and enjoy stable labor contracts (in Lima and Bogotá, 
average tenure length was under one year and most employees worked on short-term contracts).  
Yet, even in poor districts where institutional resources are more limited, officials in Santiago 
characterized enforcement as an option.  Politicians could call in the police, but they were unwilling 
to take such decisions.  In many cases, bureaucrats stressed that politicians interfered to prevent 
them from doing their jobs and ordering police operations.  A local inspector in Santiago captures a 
common dynamic where some mayors blocked bureaucrats’ attempts to enforce: 
“Under the past mayors, I would propose control operations and the mayor or councilors would 
block enforcement on the grounds that the people affected were poor or out of work, or that 
decommissions would be something that only the Right would do.  This mayor is more respectful 
of my decisions…but nothing generates more political thought or discussion than enforcement 
because no one likes to look like they don’t care about the poor.”29  
TABLE 5.4.  Perceived Corruption in Enforcement by City and Sector 
 
 
Another common fear was that enforcement operations would lead bureaucrats to get 
moved into less prestigious roles.  A bureaucrat in a poor district exemplified this censorship 
saying that, “The mayor and councilors respect my decisions, not every district has this 
support…but I know not to go too far and not to decommission merchandise or I might get 
                                                
29 Author interview with head of inspections, District of Cerro Navia, Santiago, Chile, January 18, 
2012.   
Table 1: Perceived Primar Constraint on Enforcemen by City and Sector
Bogotá Lima Santiago
squatti g vending squatting ven ing squatting vending
Intervention 0.67 0.63 0.46 0.43 0.80 0.50
Resources 0.27 0.21 0.42 0.32 0.20 0.42
Both 0.07 0.16 0.13 0.24 0.00 0.08
Bogotá Lima Santiago
squatting vending squatting vending squatting vending
Common 0.17 0.04 0.45 0.42 0.00 0.00
Uncommon 0.75 0.85 0.45 0.54 1.00 0.97
Unsure 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.03 0.00 0.03
1
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shifted to another office.  I know that politicians need to let people do things that resolve their 
problems to get votes so we can’t create problems for them.”30 Even with a high-quality civil 
service, bureaucrats feared demotions or transfers if they opposed the mayor.  
In sum, this chapter found a variety of forms of evidence against state capacity-based 
theories.  The regression results controlled for resources at the sub-city level.  I showed that district 
demographics remain a significant predictor of enforcement even after accounting for resource 
disparities.  I also showed that enforcement against other forms of crime that all citizens prefer to 
control do not vary by district demographics.  It is not the case that the Chilean police more broadly 
ignore poor districts.  This section reinforced the statistical findings by showing that bureaucrats 
find political intervention to be a more important constraint on their actions than resources or 
corruption in the police.  Even in a case like Santiago that is known for effective police and courts, 
bureaucrats complained about politicians controlling enforcement to suit their electoral aims.  Of 
course, state capacity is not irrelevant.  In particular, greater administrative and fiscal decentralization 
resulted in more reports of problems within the bureaucracy.  Where bureaucracies are funded by 
local taxes, as in Lima, spatial inequalities translate into major differences in the training and 
resources of bureaucrats.  Nonetheless, politics is named as at least as important of a determinant of 
enforcement in Lima. These observations are more consistent with an explanation in which political 
calculations drive enforcement, rather than coercive or administrative capacity alone. 
6 Conclusions 
This chapter asks why some politicians opt not to enforce the law against the poor.  To 
answer this question, I shift the analysis away from the traditional focus on fiscal and institutional 
constraints and consider enforcement’s distributive effects.  Forbearance toward offenses primarily 
                                                
30 Author interview with head of inspections, District of La Pintana, June 15, 2012.  Bureaucrats in 
other districts, such as Conchali, told stories that bureaucrats got fired when they decommissioned 
merchandise from vendors. 
  356 
committed by the poor can help a politician gain votes among the poor, but it may cost a politician 
support from the middle class.  Under political competition, politicians forbear when they require 
the poor’s support to win office.  The statistical results are consistent with the claim that 
enforcement follows an electoral logic in which politicians choose enforcement levels to serve their 
constituents.  Poverty decreases enforcement when elections occur at the local level, while having 
little effect on enforcement in less competitive settings or against hard crime that angers all class 
groups.  These relationships hold even in a context of institutional strength like Santiago.  A focus 
on electoral geography also helps make sense of comparatively limited enforcement against squatting.  
The overlap between district poverty and informal land takings means that mayors rarely have 
incentives to enforce, while they have variable incentives depending on the type of district where 
they run for office in the case of street vending.    Taken together, these multiple tests of my 
theoretical expectations –within and across cities and sectors – provide robust and wide-ranging 
support for my theory of forbearance as a form of redistribution. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions 
 
Historically, social expenditures have done little to aid the informal sector poor in Latin 
America.  Spending in many countries and policy areas remains reserved for those with steady 
formal sector employment.  While some countries have expanded social benefits in recent years, 
many others have done far less to include those outside the formal sector and redirect spending in 
their favor.  The uneven pace of contemporary reforms raises a wider puzzle about how it is 
possible that social expenditures barely improve the income distribution in some of the most 
unequal societies in the world.  Why have the informal sector poor been unable to redirect social 
expenditures more decisively in their favor under democracy?   
This question pushed me to investigate what the urban poor get out of Latin American 
welfare regimes.  As I noted in the introduction, this project questioned the premise that the poor 
want more welfare expenditures and fail in their efforts.  The informal sector poor often are 
skeptical that they will benefit from the welfare state for good historical reasons.  Instead, the main 
theoretical contribution of this study is to show how informal welfare policy hugely shapes the lives of 
the informal sector poor and reconfigures welfare politics.   
The benefits at stake from forbearance surpassed state expenditures in many arenas.  Just 
reflect on a few simple descriptive statistics presented: after decades of informal housing 
construction more than two-thirds of the urban poor in Lima now are homeowners.  A third of the 
urban poor in Bogotá once have depended on income from street vending.  By contrast, housing 
and employment programs have reached comparatively few poor households.  A basic lesson of this 
study is that the ways that laws are enforced should not be treated as trivial choices.  Forbearance 
has been a consequential way in which many Latin American states provide for the urban poor, and 
a means through which the poor engage the state. 
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The tolerance of legal violations also has been a deliberate choice.  To underscore the 
intentional nature of enforcement decisions, this study developed the concept of forbearance and 
then honed in on its electoral logic.  To recap the central argument, two main factors shape how 
politicians decide to enforce laws that the poor violate.  First, the social welfare context affects the 
electoral incentives to enforce by shaping the nature of the demands that the poor make on 
politicians and the signals that politicians, in turn, send to voters.  On the one hand, paltry or 
truncated social policies leave the poor’s distributive needs unmet, displace their demands to local 
politicians, and lead voters to associate enforcement with anti-poor politicians.  This process reduces 
incentives for local politicians to enforce.  Substitutive social policy, which entails targeted in-kind 
expenditures on the poor, on the other hand, funnels distributive demands to state authorities and 
attenuates the distributive cues sent by enforcement.  Hence, social policy substitutes make 
enforcement more likely.   
Second, where social policies fail to meet the poor’s basic needs, the electoral geography 
influences when and where politicians will enforce. Politicians gain greater latitude to enforce when 
they can win elections with the support of nonpoor core constituencies, as seen in citywide elections 
or in nonpoor sub-city districts.  Districts that concentrate poor voters lead politicians to attend to 
their constituency’s distributive needs and forgo enforcement to boost welfare informally and signal 
their support for the poor.  The overlap of offenses and district poverty, when elections are held at 
the local level, makes enforcement unlikely.   
These claims underscore the strategic—and deeply democratic—nature of enforcement 
against laws with progressive effects.  “Weak” enforcement in urban Latin America does not 
necessarily imply a weak state that cannot regulate the behavior of its citizens.  To the contrary, 
forbearance can indicate healthy electoral democracy in which politicians tailor policies to local 
preferences and search for more equitable outcomes given the constraints posed by truncated or 
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inadequate welfare states. 
I looked for a range of empirical implications that distinguish my theory from dominant 
alternatives moored in state weakness.  These included observations that the poor support 
forbearance and candidates who advocate it (Chapter 2), that politicians block enforcement on 
welfare and electoral grounds even after bureaucrats perform their roles (Chapter 3), that 
enforcement choices vary with politicians’ core constituencies irrespective of available resources 
(Chapter 4), and that electoral rules and district demographics predict enforcement patterns even in 
“strong” states (Chapter 5).  The accumulation of anomalies in state capacity-based theories is 
simply too great to dismiss as an issue of measurement error.  Moreover, each of these basic tests 
was supported by rich and varied qualitative data, including interviews, newspaper archives, 
campaign materials, administrative records, and secondary sources.  These data reinforced that 
citizens, state officials, and politicians think of forbearance as a form of redistribution on the cheap. 
Methodologically, this study makes a contribution in showing how we can operationalize 
forbearance.  The twin challenges of comparing enforcement effort given unknown offense levels, 
and separating situations when governments cannot enforce the law from those when they will not 
enforce it, mean that forbearance has not been documented empirically.  A focus on the city and 
subcity level allowed me to collect measures of both enforcement and offenses, and to use 
differences in social policy structure, core constituencies, and electoral rules to generate distinct 
empirical predictions. The basic methodology employed here could be replicated elsewhere, in this 
way building an even more comprehensive theory of forbearance across offenses and countries from 
the subnational level upwards.  
This concluding chapter addresses the implications of the use of forbearance as an informal 
welfare policy.  I first situate the findings in the context of debates on the electoral behavior of the 
urban poor, state capacity, enforcement, and welfare regimes.  Woven in this discussion, I consider 
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the generalizability of my findings and future directions for research. I also revisit the normative 
tension inherent in forbearance: it offers much-needed and substantial support, particularly for 
groups outside the egis of the formal welfare state, yet it also can perpetuate truncated welfare states, 
exclusionary citizenship regimes, and stratified economies.  The poor settle with a revocable system 
of welfare provision that they must bend laws to access. I close by speculating on the future role of 
informal redistribution.    
1 Political Representation and Accountability  
When I began this project, many voiced skepticism that politicians would admit that they did 
not enforce certain laws and regulations.  A study of forbearance, like work on corruption, would be 
hindered due to its hidden nature.  In the course of my fieldwork, however, it became quite clear 
that politicians did not shy from discussing their enforcement positions.  Quite the opposite, I found 
evidence that enforcement and forbearance were discussed openly in political campaigns and 
government meetings.  Politicians defended forbearance as an issue of distributive justice and a 
necessity in the context of weak welfare states.  This section uses this basic point–that forbearance 
can be a policy rooted in philosophical principles and extended as a policy to all members of a 
group–to show how incorporating forbearance advances the discussion on how politicians establish 
linkages to the urban poor.  To begin, I briefly review current debates over the electoral behavior of 
the urban informal sector to show that they paint a pessimistic and incomplete picture of the poor’s 
political representation.  
Debates over the voting behavior of the informal sector poor begin with the idea of a 
“representation gap.”  The gold standard is that politicians establish programmatic linkages to voters 
through political parties.  Political parties offer packages of policies that they promise to pursue if 
elected.  Voters use party labels to assess which politicians are most likely to represent their interests 
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across a range of issues.  Such a model of party-based representation does a lousy job explaining the 
electoral behavior of the urban informal sector poor.  At a general level, party identification is low 
and party systems are volatile in many Latin American countries.  As Roberts and Wibbels (1999) 
capture, the weak institutionalization of party systems in Latin America has given rise to “a pervasive 
sense that political representation has become de-structured or unhinged.”  Some scholars blame the 
growth of the informal sector for this destabilization.  Studying Peru’s collapsed parties, Cameron 
(1994: 10) diagnoses that “[t]he flight from the formal economy and the breakdown of the 
traditional party system were two sides of the same coin.”  Roberts (2002) likewise argues the 
fragmented nature of informal work gives rise to a “disarticulated classless inequality” that 
complicates the construction and durability of class-based programmatic parties.1  Even in countries 
with coherent national party systems like Chile, parties lose meaning at the local level and the urban 
poor do not necessarily ally with their “natural” representatives on the political Left (Luna 2010). 
Latin America’s Left turn depended primarily on the support of middle-class voters (Handlin 2007; 
Kaufman 2009).  The informal sector poor thus largely are seen as apathetic and even potentially 
destructive of programmatic electoral politics.   
The volatile nature of the urban informal sector’s vote has led many scholars to emphasize 
the importance of clientelism for the poor’s vote choice.2  Because of their shorter time horizons 
and greater marginal utility from small material payouts, poor voters are the targets of vote buying.  
As measures of vote buying improve, however, it becomes increasingly clear that much electoral 
                                                
1 Seawright (2012) finds little evidence that there were few differences between formal and informal 
sector workers in the likelihood to vote against traditional parties, as hypothesized in these theories.    
2 A new wave of literature has shed light on what types of voters are targeted (Gans-Morse, 
Mazzuca, and Nichter 2010; Nichter 2008; Stokes 2005; Stokes et al. 2013), why politicians and 
voters follow clientelistic exchanges (Auyero 2000; Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes 2004; Finan and 
Schechter 2012; Lawson and Greene 2013), and the conditions under which clientelism loses favor 
with politicians and voters (Stokes et al. 2013; Weitz-Shapiro 2012).  
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behavior remains unexplained.  Even in countries with high rates of vote buying, such as Argentina, 
only a fifth of the electorate reports being approached to sell their vote.3  Moreover, vote buying 
relies on a belief that a voter’s behavior will be monitored and that her voting decision may result in 
material gains or losses.  Contingent electoral exchange poorly explains electoral behavior in 
collapsed party systems, such as Peru and Colombia, where it is dubious that the necessary party 
actors exist to monitor voters’ behavior.  While candidates still may offer goods in these contexts, 
these exchanges are “unenforceable bargains.”  The urban poor can accept the generosity of all the 
parties and vote for their favorite candidate.  Then, the question becomes, what else leads the urban 
poor to turn away from a clientelist exchange in favor of other candidates?   
The other major alternative presented to explain the informal sector poor’s vote is populism.  
While the concept has been stretched and disputed, a minimalist definition is the appeal to mass 
constituencies by personalistic leaders who challenge established elites and institutions (Roberts 
2006: 127). The programmatic agenda of populists ranges from the political Right, as with neoliberal 
or security populists, to the political Left.  The crux is that the urban poor vote based on charismatic 
or anti-establishment appeals.  So, under all three of these perspectives, the view of the electoral 
behavior of the informal sector poor is rather dim.  Informal sector voters have amorphous interests 
that lead them to swing erratically among parties, sell their votes, or support politicians based on 
personality traits.  This study pushes back against these portrayals of the political behavior and 
representation of informal sector poor voters in three ways. 
First, a major contribution of this study is to identify a coherent material interest of the 
informal sector poor, forbearance, and suggest how it can structure their preferences, mobilization, 
and allegiances. Chapter 2 showed that forbearance garnered strong support among poor voters, 
                                                
3 Reports may be higher using list experiments (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2011), but 
AmericasBarometer asks whether individuals were approached with an offer, rather than accepting 
the offer, which reduces concerns of social desirability bias.  
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motivated their vote choice, and served as a heuristic to identify politicians who served their 
interests in the absence of strong party labels.  Chapters 3 and 4 uncovered the centrality of 
forbearance toward squatters and street vendors in urban electoral campaigns.  From these empirical 
observations, we can see the need to take a wider view of what the informal sector poor want and 
hold their politicians accountable for in elections.  The informal sector poor have logical interests 
like their ability to work unchecked or to gain security over their houses that are materially rooted.  
Perversely, then, evaluating politicians on how many bills they sponsor or roads they pave may miss 
central issues at stake, particularly in urban elections.   
A natural counterpoint is that scholars measure what the poor say they want.  Surveys 
suggest that the urban poor desire broadly similar things across societies and independent of labor 
contract type: public security, high-quality jobs, education, basic services, and the like.  Forbearance, 
while perhaps better than nothing, is a second-best option.  As I have shown, forbearance occurs 
precisely because the state fails in its positive duties of welfare provision.  So, why would citizens 
hold politicians accountable for forbearance, rather than the welfare outcomes that they desire?  
To restate my claims, forbearance motivates electoral behavior because it is a credible welfare 
policy, not because it is necessarily the preferred one.  Chapter 2 explicitly compared platforms on 
social policy promises with those based on forbearance, and showed that only the forbearance 
platforms led the poor to believe that hypothetical candidates would serve their interests.  Talk of 
social inclusion and welfare state programs is cheap.  In this sense, this study confirms what others 
have described as a vicious cycle of “low performance and low expectations for broad development 
outcomes” (Khemani 2007: 59; also see, Soifer 2013). Forbearance provides distributive benefits, 
but even more importantly, it offers credible ones in contexts where welfare policy promises often 
fail to come to fruition.  
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Additionally, the assignment of political responsibility may be easier in the case of 
forbearance compared to other social policies.  A background theme in this study was the visibility of 
enforcement outcomes.  Politicians calculate their choices about enforcement actions against 
squatters and street vendors because they can be observed directly and carry broader reputational 
signals.  In this sense, this study builds on work that shows that electoral accountability is improved 
when voters have better information about policy.  Recent work relies on experimental designs to 
investigate how improving citizens’ information about social policy expenditures affects vote choice 
and government responsiveness (Banerjee et al. 2011; Besley and Burgess 2002; Chong et al. 2011; 
Ferraz and Finan 2008; Humphreys and Weinstein 2012).  Less thought has gone into the types of 
issues the urban poor naturally learn more or less about in their everyday lives.  What emerges from 
this project is that voters may select their politicians and hold them accountable for some forms of 
enforcement because they can attribute those choices more clearly to politicians. 
The second implication of this study is that forbearance can form an axis of substantive 
policy competition.  Minimalist definitions of programmatic policy center on the idea that 
disbursements are 1) made based on transparent criteria, and 2) that the criteria of distribution are 
codified.  These criteria led me to theorize the idea of informal welfare policy in which forbearance is 
extended to the poor as a class (fitting the first definitional component) but is not codified in law 
(failing on the second component).  While falling short on standard definitions of programmatic 
policy, informal welfare policies provide a similar structure to political competition because they can 
be openly defended and grounded in beliefs about how to help the poor.  Think back on the 
examples of mayors like Barrantes or Garzón: both articulated a commitment to forbearance as 
necessary to improve the short-term employment options for the poor until the state could 
guarantee their welfare.  Politicians like Peñalosa, Andrade, and Villarán countered with a view that 
enforcement served the poor’s long-term interests by boosting growth and investment in the city.  
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None of these proposals involved changes to the formal legal structure.  But these were substantive 
philosophies about core social policy issues.  To be clear, forbearance also can be distributed in a 
clientelistic fashion contingent on political loyalty.  But, by neglecting forbearance as a potentially 
programmatic dimension of political competition, scholars miss out on a central issue that can 
differentiate candidates. 
Third, this study emphasized that forbearance can structure electoral behavior because it is a 
heuristic that poor voters use to identify politicians that favor their interests.  In volatile party 
systems that are recomposed from one election to the next, the need for informational shortcuts 
becomes all the greater.  Subnational elections pose a similar challenge given that ideological 
cleavages find few analogues at the local level.  While Left and Right have lost salience for many 
voters, and the poor in particular, the idea of politicians who “help the poor” or represent “people 
like me” still holds weight.  Chapter 2 showed that almost every poor respondent could respond to 
the question of whether a politician would help the poor, but only about half were able to position 
the candidate on a Left-Right political spectrum.  Class-based voting emerged in Lima and Bogotá, 
despite incoherent party systems and an absence of traditional Left-Right cleavages.   
The use of progressive forbearance to signal affinity for the poor raises questions about its 
relationship to populism.  On the one hand, forbearance is an appealing distributive tactic for 
populists.  Core to the definition of forbearance is the idea that it is an informal form of 
redistribution that circumvents established institutions.  It can form part of an anti-state position in 
which political outsiders offer immediate benefits to the poor without reliance on state institutions.  
Forbearance also plays into an anti-elite discourse, and thus has been a common distributive and 
symbolic tactic for populists from the political Right and Left like Fujimori and Hugo Chávez. 
Politicians can promise to defend the poor regardless of what some law written by out-of-touch 
 366 
legislators might say, and attack those who enforce as “enemies of the informal economy” to use a 
Chavista phrase.4  
In fact, recognizing the importance of forbearance helps make sense of the programmatic 
content that unites a range of populist figures that have appealed to the informal sector poor.  
Consider the case of Fujimori.  The classic interpretation is that Fujimori captured the informal 
sector poor through his anti-party, anti-elite appeals, and he did little to serve the poor’s interests 
(after stabilizing the economy).  He slashed welfare programs, replacing them gradually with small-
scale funds managed in a clientelistic fashion by the president.  If we measure the formal welfare 
benefits that the urban poor received, their enduring loyalty (now transposed to Fujimori’s daughter 
Keiko) seems inconsistent with any model of voting based on material interests.  But Fujimori 
complemented cuts to the state with a host of informal benefits.  Fujimori defended Lima’s more 
than 300,000 street vendors.  He provided property titles to more than a million Peruvians, which 
allowed for public service investments in squatter settlements that no previous president had cared 
to touch.  Keiko Fujimori has promised to initiate another wave of property titling to legalize land 
invasions while the current president Ollanta Humala has refused.  These facts are not meant to 
defend Fujimori’s regime in any way.  But they should give us pause when we dismiss the urban 
informal sector poor’s loyalty to Fujimori as a vote for charisma or a rejection of elites alone.  
Informal welfare policies can generate enduring loyalties just like formal ones, and can be an equally 
“rational” basis for vote choice. 
While populists often embrace forbearance, it is incorrect to view forbearance as a form of 
populism in all but the loosest sense, such as a direct appeal to the urban poor or a tactic to provide 
immediate benefits by neglecting long-term costs.  Such a thin definition provides little analytic 
                                                
4 For example, see “Jorge Rodríguez se convirtió en el enemigo de la economía informal” Noticias 24 
8 Nov 2012. 
 367 
leverage to understand the range of politicians and circumstances that favor forbearance.  It also 
ignores the fact that forbearance can co-exist with and stabilize institutionalized welfare policies.  
Chapter 3 gave examples of both of these processes.  Forbearance toward squatting substituted 
entirely for Peru’s housing policy, which Fujimori dismantled on the grounds that it was captured by 
the middle class.  However, it supplemented Colombia’s truncated housing policy and made possible 
the expansion of subsidies, tax cuts, and debt relief for middle-class groups.  Forbearance thus is an 
attractive tool for populists given its anti-state nature and immediate provision, but its pro-poor 
benefits appeal to a broader variety of politicians confronted with welfare state weakness. 
Future studies of electoral politics could fruitfully look at the associative signals that voters 
use in the absence of party labels or more generally in light of the declining salience of Left-Right 
ideological cleavages.  Understanding what policies communicate group representation, how they 
differ across political systems and levels of politics, and when they are invoked rather than valence 
issues could help make sense of how claims of political representation are made without parties.  
Associative signals fall short of the programmatic ideological content provided by stable parties but 
that they do convey group representation and tangible material benefits in ways that scholarship on 
clientelism or populism overlook.  While I argued that forbearance is a powerful associative signal, I 
see it as a starting point for future theorizing about a broader set of cues that can communicate 
political representation.   
The insight that variation in enforcement has distributive consequences that can motivate 
electoral behavior could be extended to other laws and contexts in future comparative work. To give 
another example, one of the most frequent topics that I encountered in local election campaigns and 
that motivated citizens to go to mayors’ offices in Lima was tax amnesty.  Politicians did not 
promise to change the tax rate; they offered to forgive past nonpayment.  Voters’ expectations of 
what a politician who ran on a platform to ease tax collection will do in office likely vary dramatically 
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from those of someone who supports a candidate who promises more local public goods.  
Particularly in contexts of institutional weakness, enforcement should be treated as a potential policy 
choice with electoral and distributive repercussions.  Another potential extension includes 
enforcement against service theft, such as electricity and water.  One implication of my electoral 
theory is that enforcement should be more uniform in contexts that have privatized their basic 
service provision; the removal of informal benefits through forbearance could result in different 
politics surrounding formal subsidies on service provision for the poor.  
The core idea that enforcement needs to be treated as a political choice variable can travel to 
contexts where laws have ambiguous or regressive distributive consequences.  Already, a number of 
studies have found evidence of political cycles of enforcement in cases when legal violations by the 
rich are at stake: electricity theft to irrigate the fields of wealthy Indian farmers peaks in election 
years (Golden and Min 2013); arson to clear land for purchase by the wealthy spikes prior to Greek 
elections (Skouras and Christodoulakis 2011); labor regulations go unenforced in election years in 
Argentina (Ronconi 2010); and environmental regulations to control pollution are enforced less 
strictly in election years and in cases where the mayor and governor are from the same party in 
Brazil (Ferraz 2007).  The fact that enforcement follows political cycles in a variety of “weak” 
institutional contexts suggests scope for choice in how laws are enforced.   
However, despite a shared electoral impulse, I should stress that progressive forms of 
forbearance hold out a relatively unique potential to structure electoral representation.  Chapter 2 
suggested that legal violations by the rich tended to generate almost uniform condemnation.  Even 
the wealthy seemed to concur that offenses like electricity theft and tax evasion were unambiguously 
“bad.”  Social desirability bias may underestimate private levels of support, but the fact that few 
people are willing to admit their support confirms my central point: it seems implausible that an 
incumbent would try to signal distributive commitments to the rich using a policy that is broadly 
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censured.   
Contrasting progressive and regressive forms of forbearance leads to different implications 
for the types of reforms likely to promote enforcement.  Legal violations by the wealthy differ in 
their visibility compared to those studied here.  The electoral effects of tolerating white-collar crime 
often are unobservable to voters until after the election has passed, if at all.  Forbearance toward 
many laws that the wealthy violate offers immediate distributive benefits to special interest groups, 
who may well sway their electoral support or offer campaign contributions in exchange.  However, 
the majority of voters who bear the costs of regressive forbearance only observe the consequences 
long after the fact.  Because regressive forms of forbearance tend to be motivated by politicians’ 
need for campaign contributions, not votes, favors can be offered in private and without fanfare.  
The implication is that interventions that provide real-time information to voters about regressive 
forms of forbearance may help voters to hold politicians accountable and increase enforcement.  In 
contrast, in the context of progressive forms of forbearance, information about enforcement 
activities may simply polarize the electorate.  As I return to below, information about social policy 
alternatives is far more likely to generate support for uniform sanctions when citizens have 
distributive reasons to support forbearance. 
In summary, this study has provided a new perspective on the informal sector poor’s 
electoral behavior.  It uncovered a material interest that unites many informal sector voters, showed 
how positions on forbearance can involve philosophical differences about how to assist the poor, 
and emphasized the way that enforcement positions convey broader distributive commitments to 
voters.  Future work may productively extend these insights into other forms of enforcement, and 
work to modify the theory to account for differences in the progressivity and visibility of offenses.  
2 State Capacity  
 
Careful attention to how politicians choose to enforce the law is important because it 
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reorients scholars and policymakers to the type of state weakness that matters, particularly in middle-
income countries.  As stressed throughout this project, most previous theoretical approaches to 
explain weak enforcement focus on underfunded, understaffed, poorly trained or designed 
institutions that limit state actors’ ability to detect and sanction legal violations.  This view has 
infused public policy.  International institutions like the World Bank and the Inter-American 
Development Bank have promoted bureaucratic reform and capacity building to improve property 
law enforcement. More specifically, policy reformers have focused on De Soto’s diagnosis that 
inefficient and byzantine bureaucracies explain the prevalence of property law violations in the 
developing world.  But after two decades of institutional reforms, property law violations have not 
disappeared.  
Strengthening administrative institutions is a valuable undertaking, but this study’s focus on 
the distributive stakes of enforcement clarifies why it is not a panacea.  Efficient small business or 
property registration procedures cannot provide the poor with jobs or houses.  If politicians and 
some citizens prefer legal violations to persist until welfare programs can provide these goods, as I 
suggest, then more efficient bureaucracy will result in limited gains.  Improvements in administrative 
procedures may even incentivize property law violations if not accompanied by prospective welfare 
solutions, as shown in the case of property titles for squatters in Chapter 3.    
This study showed how weak distributive capacity instead drives enforcement patterns. Even in 
“strong” institutional contexts like Chile, forbearance offers important informal welfare benefits to 
patch over social policy deficits.  This study used a simple tripartite distinction between the coercive, 
administrative, and distributive aspects of state strength.  From a theoretical perspective, this study 
thus reinforces work that attempts to disaggregate the dimensions of state capacity (e.g. Cammett 
and MacLean 2011; Soifer and vom Hau 2008; Ziblatt 2008).  In contrast to conventional 
explanations rooted in the first two components, I emphasized the importance of distributive 
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capacity for enforcement outcomes. Additionally, the cases suggested the need to think through the 
sequence in which countries tend to develop different components of state strength.  My sense is 
that the uneven pattern of state development highlighted is relatively common—a functional police 
force and bureaucracy likely develop prior to the architecture of a modern welfare state.5  Peñalosa, 
Bogotá’s former mayor, perhaps best captures the odd paradox of states of intermediate strength 
where coercive capacity develops more thoroughly than the ability to provide for the poor’s 
wellbeing: “The problem is that as the city becomes more sophisticated and richer, there are more 
controls and this is very bad because we are controlling informal construction but we are not 
offering any [housing] alternative.”6  This sequence can create a disjuncture between the capacity to 
enforce laws against the urban poor and the capacity to address their welfare needs.  Politicians back 
off the use of state power.     
Having reviewed the empirical evidence, it is worth questioning the extent to which we want 
to think of skeletal or truncated welfare policies as evidence of a distributive capacity problem.  To 
clarify, my view is that local politicians’ enforcement choices are bound by limited distributive 
capacity because national actors make welfare policy choices.  The levers under local control to 
create houses and jobs can only have a marginal impact.  However, economic growth, a 
commodities boom, and reliance on value-added taxes mean that the national governments studied 
could do much more to prioritize the poor’s interests.  Historically, budget constraints were far more 
persuasive explanations of the scope and structure of Latin American social policy.  The essential 
point of this project is that legacies of weak welfare states have perpetuated a combination of 
forbearance and complementary formal welfare policies.  These legacies have been hard to reverse, 
                                                
5 Admittedly, laws that the poor tend to violate tend to be relatively simple to enforce, and the poor 
do not have legal resources to hide their evasions.  States still may lack the administrative capacity to 
control complex regulations or white-collar crimes where the rich can use their wealth, power, and 
lawyers to subvert the law. 
6 Author interview with Enrique Peñalosa, Bogotá, Colombia, September 7, 2011.   
 372 
even as states acquire the funds, staff, and expertise to do much more to aid the poor.  
To demonstrate the centrality of distributive capacity to enforcement outcomes, and that it is 
not an exclusively Latin American phenomenon, I examine the statistical relationships between the 
welfare state size and the extent of legal violations by the poor, operationalized by urban squatter 
populations, in 82 developing countries.  If, as I have argued, forbearance is the product of 
distributive capacity, then we should be able to observe a negative relationship between progressive welfare 
state development and squatter settlements, all else equal.  The predictive power of measures of 
administrative capacity, such as bureaucratic quality and time to register property, should be weak.  
Additionally, if I am correct that more politically decentralized countries will be less able to control 
local politicians and invest in substitutive social policy, then we should observe a positive relationship 
between political decentralization and squatter settlements.  Appendix E describes the data and results in 
detail.  Despite the limitations of this cross-national statistical analysis, I find support for the central 
argument advanced: progressive social spending—measured through taxation on the wealthy and 
safety nets for the poor—foretells smaller squatter populations, although targeted safety net 
expenditures fall short of statistical significance.  Political centralization also is associated with 
smaller squatter settlement populations.  Encouragingly, alternative state capacity measures, such as 
bureaucratic effectiveness, GDP per capita, and the time to register property, do not predict squatter 
settlement populations.  Like my qualitative findings, then, administrative capacity seems to matter 
less than distributive capacity for enforcement outcomes.    
The implication of this study, which a preliminary cross-national statistical analysis suggests 
may travel outside the region, is that improvements in the scale and targeting of social programs can 
be an alternative route to strengthen property law enforcement.  In-kind welfare expenditures matter 
because they resolve basic demands and change cognitive beliefs about the fairness of enforcement.  
In building popular support for enforcement, they make it easier for politicians to mobilize 
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resources to make laws effective.  I showed that citizens with better assessments of the welfare state 
were less tolerant of squatting across Latin America (Chapter 2).  And, citizens were willing to assist 
in the enforcement process in the context of targeted welfare policies, as in Chile, in ways that they 
refused to do in weak welfare contexts, as in Peru and Colombia (Chapter 3).  Hence, reinforcing the 
welfare state can align politicians’ incentives with parchment law and improve enforcement.  These 
reforms will be essential complements to existing efforts to streamline and strengthen state 
bureaucracies. 
3 Variation in Enforcement and Electoral Geography  
 
My theory of enforcement politics also highlights important sources of variation in 
enforcement.  As Levitsky and Murillo (2009) emphasize, different levels of enforcement have 
important implications for our theories about institutional design, effects, and change.  But we still 
know little about the sources and variability of enforcement outcomes.  This section relates this 
study’s findings to existing theories of weak enforcement (apart from sheer bureaucratic incapacity) 
and differentiates this study’s focus on electoral incentives for enforcement. More specifically, a 
contribution of this study is to show that electoral geography can make sense of both spatial and 
temporal variation in enforcement.  These insights may provide leverage to understand enforcement 
outcomes across a range of institutional contexts.    
The idea of intentional non-enforcement is not new.  Past scholars have thought about 
entire categories of laws that their crafters never intended to enforce.  International law makes this 
point clearest.  Countries sign international laws to join a community of nations, and laws often 
carry no enforcement mechanisms.  The inclusion of social and economic rights in constitutions 
similarly is understood as an aspiration, simply signaling to domestic and international constituencies 
a symbolic commitment to certain principles.  Moral prohibitions, such as bans on sodomy, divorce, 
drugs or prostitution, similarly may be put on the books to shape social norms, not enforcement 
 374 
action.  While I do not doubt the existence of a class of symbolic laws, it provides little purchase to 
understand variation in enforcement.  Some symbolic laws can gain “teeth.”  Courts, politicians, and 
citizens have made attempts at the enforcement of social rights (Brinks and Gauri 2012; Landau 
2012).  Conversely, some “hard” laws can be reinterpreted as mere (or misguided) aspirations.  
Legislators wrote regulations to prevent street vending in Colombia.  But mayors have reinterpreted 
these laws as aspirational until the country can offer employment alternatives.  Viewing certain laws 
as purely symbolic brushes aside much of the political debate over when and how enforcement is 
appropriate.  
A second perspective on weak enforcement is that laws remain on the books because there 
are political costs to remove them.  Enforcement can be a de facto mode of institutional change 
when actors’ preferences diverge from written law.  Legal change occurs when the costs are low and 
passage is possible; enforcement change occurs when channels of formal legal change are foreclosed.  
Htun (2003), for example, emphasizes that removing abortion statutes would unleash the ire of the 
Catholic Church in many Latin American countries.  Choosing to allow abortions to persist de facto 
achieved similar objectives without the political costs.  Similarly, the introduction cited the example 
of American immigration laws.  Once President Obama failed to pass the Dream Act through the 
legislature, he ordered the use of prosecutorial discretion to achieve parallel ends through 
enforcement.  This study largely concurs with this view: if the political costs are higher to change law 
than its enforcement, then substantial change can occur at the enforcement stage.   
However, political preferences for weak enforcement can be conditional on social or 
economic circumstances.  A contribution of this study is to suggest that forbearance may be 
preferable—even when it is feasible to change the law—precisely because enforcement can be 
adjusted outside the legislative process.  Revocability can have several advantages.  Returning to the 
point on symbolic law, manipulation of enforcement rather than institutional change can be 
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attractive in circumstances where politicians and citizens agree with institutional aims, but disagree 
with enforcement given domestic conditions. Revocability also may allow for nuanced adjustments 
in the effects of laws to make them more appropriate to local conditions or special circumstances.  
For instance, Kleine (2013) argues that the European Union allows member states to depart from 
rules that impose adjustment costs on one another in order to accommodate governments under 
strong domestic pressure.  Allina-Pisano (2012) makes a similar argument about state officials in 
Ukraine, who rejected liberalizing land reforms when the social costs were expected to be high at the 
local level.  The purpose of forbearance in theses cases is to allow for changes in the timing and 
distribution of legal costs, and to makes the rules more responsive to those groups that they affect 
most.  
Revocability also has a less benign interpretation, which has tended to dominate the 
literature on developing countries.  The ability to manipulate enforcement allows politicians to 
establish power over those who violate the law.  Recent work on property rights in Africa, such as 
Boone (2009) and Onoma (2010), emphasizes that political actors may prefer weakly enforced 
property rights regimes because they can be used to exploit and extract resources from vulnerable 
groups.  Weak property rights make expropriations easier in the case of political disloyalty or 
ownership by unpopular minority groups.  Historic work on squatter settlements in Latin American 
cities has much the same flavor: politicians tolerate squatter settlements because they can then be 
evicted when land values rise or political circumstances change (Collier 1976; Fischer 2008).  While 
there certainly are cases where the revocable nature of forbearance leads politicians to exploit and 
punish the poor, it is worth reiterating how rare these cases are in contemporary Latin American 
politics.  Particularly in the case of illegal land occupations in Chapter 3, what stood out was the 
dwindling turnaround time to secure property title.  Land invasions chased by legalization make no 
sense for politicians who want to exploit the continued legal vulnerability of the poor.  Thus, while 
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the revocable nature of forbearance can be used to extract rents or create political dependencies, it 
also can be a convenient way to tailor legal rules to promote acceptable societal goals.  
A related third perspective is that laws go unenforced because the bodies in charge of 
lawmaking and enforcement diverge.  Mahoney and Thelen (2010) view enforcement as a locus for 
gradual institutional change because actors other than those who designed the rules make 
enforcement choices.  However, they primarily conceptualize the agents responsible for 
enforcement decisions as bureaucrats.  This study stresses the role of local politicians.  Rather than 
principal-agent problems in which administrative agencies overstep or ignore political mandates, 
there can be principled-agents, or politicians who intervene in enforcement processes to advance their 
ideological or electoral ambitions. In focusing on the role of politicians, this study helps make sense 
of why bureaucrats might be motivated to expand or contract a rule’s implementation in the first 
place.   
Political interventions in enforcement may be more common in young democracies, but it is 
not exclusive to weak institutional environments.  Even in countries like Chile, where bureaucrats 
enjoy labor stability, politicians jumped in to make enforcement suit their distributive goals.  Past 
scholarship has viewed such interventions by politicians as a type of state weakness because states 
lack the autonomy to impose their preferences on local actors.  Migdal (1988, 2001) emphasizes that 
many states in the developing world are weak “states in society” because diverse organizations vie to 
make the de facto rules about how citizens behave.  Authorities with informal “tutelary” power, 
such as religious, military or traditional leaders, may control enforcement and thus challenge state 
authority to make the effective rules of the game.7  Shadow powers certainly make political 
interventions at the enforcement stage more likely. However, my view is that limiting forbearance to 
                                                
7 Recent work on subnational authoritarianism (Gibson 2005, 2013; Giraudy 2009) also shares this 
impulse that liberal norms can be jettisoned by elected local politicians who create enclaves with 
alternative rules.   
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cases of weak states glosses over issues common to multilevel democracies; informal power 
challenges can come from other levels of elected government. 
A global wave of political decentralization has created a new set of subnational actors who 
do not necessarily share the preferences of national legislatures.  Subnational politicians often have 
incentives to change the substantive meaning of law and policy, even when they have no formal legal 
powers to do so.  Take the recent example of the health exchanges set up under the Affordable Care 
Act in the United States.  A number of states have refused to create health exchanges despite 
national guidelines.  Whether or not the President decides to force state governors to form the 
health exchanges or steps in to impose federally constructed ones is hardly an issue of state capacity.  
It is a choice about which level of elected government in practice determines the health care options 
of citizens.  The major issue is that there are divergent preferences that happen to be spatially 
concentrated in some subnational electoral units. Much in the same way, this study has emphasized 
that national governments have the formal powers to determine welfare policies.  But local 
governments still are responsible for promoting the welfare of their citizens.  Choices of forbearance 
toward squatting and street vending can reflect attempts to improve the poor’s welfare informally in 
contexts where social welfare powers have not been devolved to local authorities.  The point is that 
political decentralization creates a common class of problems that deserve greater study across a 
range of political systems, and their consequences for the quality of democracy will vary.   
Viewing enforcement as the result of the divergent preferences of elected politicians across 
levels or units of government provides a tractable framework to understand variation in 
enforcement.  First, it can help predict when enforcement deviations occur and stabilize.  
Forbearance by subnational actors can be a consistent political choice, at which point it can produce 
informal institutions or give way to formal reforms.  But it also can be volatile, revocable decision.  
The chapters in this study exposed the role that electoral geography plays in producing informal 
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institutions in some contexts as opposed to others. The contrast between the stable equilibrium 
outcome of forbearance toward squatting and the cyclical outcome in the case of street vending is 
highly suggestive.  The gist of Chapter 3 was that forbearance toward squatting has been unwavering 
in Peru and Colombia because it occurs precisely in poor districts in which mayors consistently 
support deviations from the parchment law.  There is an informal institution in which the poor take 
state land for housing purposes.  In contrast, Chapter 4 showed that the high visibility of street 
vending due to its occurrence across city space created cyclical enforcement patterns in politically 
centralized cities.  Forbearance is more stable over time in homogeneous sub-city units under urban 
political decentralization, but is highly uneven across urban space because class groups are 
segregated into electoral districts.  The intuition that forbearance is more likely to converge to a 
stable alternative equilibrium that contradicts formal law, or a competing informal institution, in 
electorally decentralized contexts seems to be an important one.  In this sense, politically 
decentralized cities do have “brown spots,” to use O’Donnell’s term, in that some types of law 
enforcement may be functionally absent.  But politically centralized cities have “brown periods” in 
which laws are selectively jettisoned.  These periods of legal volatility are perhaps even more relevant 
to the structure of electoral competition because politicians can swing between enforcement 
extremes.  They would be missed if looking for stable institutional outcomes, whether formal or 
informal, alone.   
Further work on enforcement politics may fruitfully look at the distribution of legal 
preferences and their geographic occurrence—which citizens support enforcement?  How variable 
are these preferences within electoral districts?  How does the structure of electoral institutions or the 
party system encourage politicians to cater to local enforcement preferences?  The spatial 
distribution of preferences across electoral units can help us understand both when forbearance 
arises and how it stabilizes across a variety of political contexts.   
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In focusing on mass preferences and enforcement incentives, future research could work to 
bring parallel literatures on compliance and enforcement more directly in dialogue.  This study made 
small steps to explore these connections. In particular, I proposed individual-level measures of 
attitudes toward both compliance and enforcement (Chapter 2), and an equilibrium model that took 
seriously the endogeneity between enforcement and offenses (Chapter 5).  Nonetheless, there is a 
need for much more theorizing about how enforcement affects citizens’ willingness to comply with 
the law, and how expectations of compliance alter politicians’ enforcement calculus.  Survey work, in 
particular, could extend the attempt here to measure both compliance and enforcement attitudes and 
thus help generate ways to explore both attitudes and their variation across space.    
4 Informal Welfare Regimes 
Although the substantive focus of this study was enforcement politics, it was motivated by 
broad questions about Latin American welfare states.  By arguing that enforcement preferences and 
outcomes are intimately related to the social policy context, this study establishes a dialogue between 
two literatures that rarely speak to each other. To date, research on the comparative political 
economy of welfare states has generally overlooked the extensive linkages between welfare state 
structure and property law violations, and thus missed a central means through which states shape 
the incomes and risks faced by citizens. Similarly, as noted above, work on property rights has 
focused largely on issues of institutional weakness and design while minimizing the distributive 
consequences of enforcement. Highlighting these linkages can anchor future work on both social 
policy and enforcement within a broader framework, and suggests modifications to how we assess 
welfare regimes in low and middle-income countries. 
Informal welfare policies may change our view of the size and incidence of welfare regimes.  
Comparative welfare state scholars tend to study a handful of formal policies to assess how states aid 
the poor and use these policy areas to draw conclusions about who benefits from redistributive 
 380 
politics writ large.  Incorporating forbearance is necessary to understand what the informal sector 
poor get out of the system, and also how formal policies are designed. Political favoritism in one 
area does not necessarily predict the same—and may even be counterbalanced by the opposite—
pattern of redistribution in another.  In housing policy, I showed a rather grim picture of the 
political capture of subsidies by middle-class groups in Colombia and Peru.  These policies, 
however, have been explicitly complemented by extensive forbearance that makes the poor even 
more likely to be homeowners than the rich.  Informal welfare policies differ in many ways from 
their formal counterparts but we miss much about how the welfare state works and how formal 
policies are designed in ignoring the existence of informal welfare substitutes.  
Forbearance complicates our basic accounting because the effects can be so substantial.  To 
bring in another example on the revenue side, consider that value-added taxes are regressive on 
paper in Peru.  Since the mid-1990s, indirect taxes constitute the bulk of revenue compared to 
nominally progressive income taxes in most Latin American countries.  Mahon Jr. (2013) argues that 
the decreased tax progressivity has offset many of the improvements in social policy in the region.  
However, most rural and urban poor escape indirect taxes through purchases in the informal sector 
that the Peruvian government lets pass.  The rich have a harder time skirting value-added taxes 
because they prefer to shop in registered stores.  The choice to move away from a formally 
progressive income tax system in which the wealthy evaded taxes to a formally regressive indirect tax 
system in which the poor are allowed to purchase outside the system thus ironically represents a 
move toward a more equal income distribution.  Today, Peru does more to redistribute income to 
the poor through forbearance in its tax system than all social spending combined (Lustig, Pessino, 
and Scott 2013: 18).  Latin American states may do more for the poor, albeit in somewhat 
problematic ways, than commonly recognized when we look at formal policies without taking into 
account how variation in enforcement alters their distributive incidence. 
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Much work remains to be done on the politics and dynamics of forbearance as a social 
policy substitute.  Continuing with the Peruvian tax example, legislators could craft exemptions to 
the value-added tax for goods that the poor tend to buy like clothing, food, and medicine, as in 
many advanced industrial economies, and then enforce tax laws.  Why not just change the law to 
achieve the same effects?  More broadly, when do governments favor forbearance over tax and 
transfer-based systems of redistribution?  And, how do experiences of often-hidden forms of 
redistribution shape preferences regarding formal expenditures?  
These effects are not limited to Latin American welfare regimes.  For example, Turkey also 
has a legacy of truncated welfare policies.  Economists calculate that transfers that come from saved 
rent payments from living in illegal squatter settlements constitute 1.2 percent of annual income for 
poor household’s in urban Turkey.  In comparison, benefits from all social assistance programs 
amount to 0.4 percent of household income (Başlevent and Dayıoğlu 2005: 37).  The tolerance of 
squatter settlements has been called the primary “subsidy” used to win the votes of Istanbul’s poor 
through the 1990s (Keyder 1999).  Future comparative research may think about how politicians 
trade-off between informal and formal modes of redistribution in ethnically heterogeneous societies, 
such as Turkey.  New generations of squatters in urban Turkey tend to be Kurdish.  Ethnic 
heterogeneity is associated with smaller formal welfare states (Alesina and Glaeser 2004).  But does 
ethnic heterogeneity lead to more or less informal redistribution?  It could be the case that 
politicians prefer forbearance toward ethnic minorities to establish power over them, or to maintain 
stability without having to expand the formal welfare state.  Alternatively, authorities may use 
enforcement to suppress ethnic groups and further exacerbate the limited distributive benefits 
provided by formal welfare states.  
A similar range of questions arises in authoritarian regimes.  While not motivated by electoral 
concerns, authoritarian regimes are diverse, and still have motives to redistribute resources (for a 
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review, see Mares and Carnes 2009).  Authoritarian leaders may embrace the positive distributive 
benefits and revocable nature of forbearance.  Dorman (2007), for instance, argues that Egyptian 
authorities began to tolerate squatter settlements in the 1960s because neglect resolved housing 
demands and sustained a patrimonial indirect system of rule.  Iran has let street vendors proliferate 
(Bayat 1998).  On the other hand, authoritarian regimes can disregard the poor’s well-being. 
Pinochet strongly repressed squatter settlement formation in Chile.  The thuggish Chinese urban 
administrative police (chengguan) engage in routinized brutality against street vendors (HRW 2012), 
When do authoritarian leaders prefer to build welfare states and when do they achieve parallel 
distributive effects informally?  And when do they choose enforcement with no redistribution?  This 
study only began to scratch the surface of such questions about the political economy of different 
modes of redistribution.  Taking informal welfare policies seriously, and as something more than an 
inevitable consequence of weak institutions, is the first step to improving out understanding of who 
gets what and how out of distributive politics.   
This broader conceptualization of welfare regimes also has implications for our theories that 
relate changes in economic conditions or inequality to redistribution within democracies.  Consider 
the dynamics of economic recessions.  Classic political economy models predict that economic 
downturns lead to more demands for redistribution, specifically from those hardest hit or made 
vulnerable, to help smooth consumption and spread risk.  Governments respond to increased 
demands by boosting social expenditures, leading to countercyclical spending patterns under 
democracy.  Yet, Wibbels (2006) shows that social expenditures in developing countries tend to be 
procyclical.  International borrowing constraints partially explain the phenomenon, although Latin 
American governments also manage to maintain social security and middle-class programs even as 
economies sour.  How is it that the poor do not react when elected governments slash social 
programs during crises?  Wibbels (2006: 440) draws a pessimistic conclusion about the quality of 
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democracy from this pattern: “In contrast to many wealthy nations, where the constituency for 
social spending of various kinds is quite strong, poor constituencies across much of the developing 
world are weak.”  
Adding informal redistribution to the mix of policy tools available to governments gives us a 
slightly different perspective on the politics of welfare states in times of austerity.  Informal welfare 
policies stabilize welfare states in the developing world.  Chapter 4 showed that street vending is 
strongly countercyclical, and that governments shape the flow of informal employment through 
their enforcement choices.  More broadly, most of the labor market movement during economic 
recessions is not from employment to unemployment, but from formal to informal employment.  
Politicians may well cut targeted social expenditures on the expectation that they can use informal 
mechanisms to compensate the “losers.” A key demand of the poor may be the ability to stop 
paying electricity bills and local taxes, rather than positive state provision to make it through 
downturns.  Of course, the implications for human welfare and democratic quality are not entirely 
positive.  Levels of poverty and indigence escalated dramatically during Latin America’s debt crises.  
The poor may turn to forbearance because they have generations of experience with meager state 
response to economic crisis.  They expect adjustments to occur at the enforcement margin.  Thus, 
the strongly countercyclical nature of informal redistribution helps make sense of why procyclical 
expenditure patterns endure.  
The emphasis on informal welfare provision opens a range of questions about how citizens 
relate to welfare state change.  Decades of informal welfare provision have altered the expectations that 
the informal sector poor have about social expenditures and the heuristics that they use to select their 
representatives.  In theory, politicians can promise and manage to implement policies to include the 
informal sector poor.  They can save to provide for the most vulnerable during economic downturns.  
Nonetheless, in practice, this project joins others in suggesting that beliefs about the working of the 
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welfare state are deeply rooted.  Chapter 2 found that beliefs about the welfare state’s functioning are 
tricky to change.  Substantial and prolonged social policy improvements may be required to 
overcome historical legacies of limited program coverage and efficacy.  Future survey work could 
probe citizens’ expectations about social policy provision and also how these attitudes can (or already 
have begun to) change with the creation of more inclusionary social programs.  One potential question 
for future research is how insulated attitudes are by policy area—in other words, have cash transfer 
programs begun to change expectations about housing?  Or does income support reduce expectations 
that the government can manage to provide high-quality goods like jobs?    
What does forbearance mean for the future of Latin American welfare states?  The 
relationship between informal welfare policies and formal welfare states is likely to remain important 
in the coming years, but decreasingly so in Latin American capital cities.  In particular, my prediction 
is that social policy sectors in which the poor can secure benefits informally, such as housing and 
employment, will see more limited reforms to extend universal benefits than other areas of the 
welfare state like health care where informal substitutes are less readily available.  The exceptions 
may come from countries that have maintained or regained stable party systems, such as Mexico, 
Brazil or even El Salvador.  Strong party systems make it easier for Latin American executives to 
implement “big ticket” social policies that deliver political gains over the medium-term.  These 
initiatives are far less likely in volatile party systems where executives have incentives to turn to 
policies that provide immediate gains to all eligible recipients. Advances in welfare state inclusion 
will continue but through programs that require minimal bureaucracy and provide short-term and 
broad electoral rewards.  These expansions will be real, but they may leave social sectors that require 
a heavier state hand untouched. 
At the same time, informal welfare policies may begin to wither in Latin American capital 
cities due to the growth of a burgeoning lower-middle class that may no longer be satisfied with 
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informal welfare benefits.  Expectations about some areas of social policy provision, like cash 
transfers or noncontributory pensions, could well bleed into demands for other social policies.  
Even if housing or employment policy progresses at a glacial pace, the idea that the state can and 
should mediate social claims seems to be on the march in much of the region.  These advances can 
spark fresh cross-sector conversations about what governments should do (and have not done) in 
the social welfare domain.  Rising demands thus could destabilize the informal welfare state 
equilibrium that persisted for generations.  Particularly with respect to housing, another destabilizing 
factor comes from the fact that many Latin American capital cities are now hitting geographic 
constraints that make informal housing provision tricky.  The lack of available land may lead future 
generations to demand formal housing alternatives.  Bounds on informal redistribution mean that 
citizens may demand more from state options.    
In the future, issues of informal welfare policy may become even more relevant in secondary 
Latin American cities and less developed democracies.  What is most interesting is that an uptick in 
intra-Latin American immigration means that some of the main claimants of informal benefits may 
be immigrants excluded from formal welfare systems on citizenship, rather than labor contract, 
grounds.  Debates over informal redistribution thus may take on new questions of nationalism 
compared to past waves of rural migration.  More generally, cities across the global south are 
growing rapidly.  Cities with democratic elections and constrained distributive capacities—and 
relatively functional institutions—provide ripe conditions for informal welfare provision.  To 
provide one recent example outside the region, the 2011 Zambian election brought the opposition 
Patriotic Front (PF) to power in part because its candidate, Michael Sata, managed to draw together 
overwhelming support from urban voters.  Sata filed injunctions to reverse evictions of squatters, 
visited street markets, and promised to defend street vendors against enforcement by the ruling 
party (Resnick 2012: 1360-63).  In office, Sata has fired two ministers who tried to enforce laws 
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against street vendors as part of internationally funded regulatory projects.8  Even more explicitly, 
Sata sent an open directive to his government explaining the electoral logic of forbearance:  
“Local government is a very fast growing organization which you need to reorganize [rather] than 
concentrating on harassing innocent vendors and car washers which will lead to our party being more 
unpopular… Those are the people we promised to give employment of which we have not done 
so” (emphasis added).9  
 
Hence, informal welfare policies may surge outside Latin America as politicians try to link to a 
growing class of urban poor voters in countries where targeted social policies still remain pipe 
dreams.  While administrative weakness poses a much stronger constraint in low-income settings, 
political scientists miss a central social policy debate and electoral cleavage in ignoring the politics 
of forbearance. 
 To conclude, it is worth lingering on the normative implications of forbearance.  On the 
one hand, the provision of distributive benefits through forbearance raises the issue of why 
politicians do not change the law or offer tax-based benefits that serve the same purpose.  
Forbearance is an inefficient way to provide basic goods. Its revocable nature means that it is an 
unstable policy that can be manipulated to defend the poor, but also to construct relationships of 
political dependency. The poor may prefer forbearance to enforcement, but their first-best option is 
likely legal recognition of their activity or a formal version of the same good. To the extent that 
forbearance falls short of the poor’s distributive demands, or has retarded the construction of more 
inclusive, modern welfare states, its usage may have done real damage. Forbearance cannot replace 
or substitute for a welfare state that guarantees the poor basic goods and protection against risks as a 
condition of social citizenship.  Its persistence thus leads to a rather pessimistic evaluation of the 
                                                
8 See, “PF Declare Street Vending Legal as Petty Crime Rises in Lusaka,” Zambia Reports 30 July 
2012.; “Zambia's move to covered markets proves hard sell to street vendors,” The Guardian, 17 May 
2012. 
9 “Sata defends street vendors,” Post of Zambia 16 Dec 2011. 
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quality of democracy and the ability to incorporate the informal sector poor into a programmatic 
party system.  
On the other hand, forbearance fills a gap in welfare states that still lag far beyond the ideal 
for unequal societies.  In the absence of forbearance, it is not clear that the political system would 
rise to the occasion.  Moreover, this study emphasizes that forbearance gives rise to a new set of 
demands on local politicians that show real engagement in the political system by the urban poor.   
These demands may not fit within traditional programmatic welfare frames.  But they show real 
political power and engagement of the part of urban poor to secure substantive distributive benefits 
and elect leaders who provide tangible goods.  In this light, elections may have aligned politicians’ 
behavior with the poor’s preferences for concrete benefits that reach them.  The key question, then, 
is not how to make politicians more accountable or socialize the informal sector poor to understand 
their class interests.  Rather, it is how to strengthen social welfare provision so that the poor get 
more—and expect as much—from expansions in formal policy programs.   
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Appendix A:  Public Opinion Data on Enforcement and Social Policy 
 
I designed and implemented a face-to-face public opinion survey of 900 voters in Bogotá, 
Colombia.  The survey was administered by the Bogotá-based polling firm Cifras y Conceptos 
between August 5 and 29, 2013.  On average, the survey interview lasted 25 minutes.   
A clustered random sample was generated within the city. Thirty-six polling stations were 
selected as the primary sampling units (PSUs), with 25 cases conducted in each PSU.  To ensure 
sufficient power for the survey experiment, 12 polling stations were selected from lower class groups 
(Strata 1 and 2), 12 polling stations from lower-middle class groups (Strata 3), and 12 polling stations 
from middle and upper class groups (Strata 4, 5, and 6).  Survey weights must be used to adjust for 
the oversampling of upper class groups to make population-representative statements. Interviewers 
began from a randomly selected corner in the PSU and proceeded in a clockwise direction. 
Interviewers used the twelve different questionnaires in sequential order and rotated between asking 
for a male and female respondent in the household.   
Interviewers were part of the survey firm’s trained professionals and were mostly single-
mothers. Training was conducted for interviewers on the logistics of the survey instrument and 
issues of respondent protection such as anonymity and privacy. On a separate sheet from the 
questionnaire, interviewers recorded the first name only and phone number of each respondent for 
the purposes of later supervision. Post-sampling verification was conducted on a randomly-selected 
30 percent of the sample by telephone, after which this information was destroyed.  
The response rate for the survey was 15.6 percent; the cooperation rate was 23.7 percent, the 
refusal rate 23.3 percent, and the contact rate was 36.4 percent. 
Table A.1 presents the summary statistics for the variables discussed in the text.  Table A.2 
includes the balance tests for pretreatment covariates.  The full translated questionnaire follows.   
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TABLE A.1.  Summary Statistics, Survey of Perceptions of Informality and Social Policy in 
Bogotá 
 
 
TABLE A.2.  Balance Tests on Pretreatment Covariates 
 
 
 
 
  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
forbearance 0 1 -2.462 2.194 878
social policy 0 1 -1.896 1.599 884
class 3.166 1.537 1 6 900
education 3.548 1.217 1 5 900
female 0.492 0.5 0 1 891
age 3.691 1.571 1 6 900
vendor past 0.228 0.42 0 1 896
squatter past 0.112 0.315 0 1 895
informal 0.529 0.499 0 1 892
housing need 0.746 0.316 0 1 887
benefits 0.39 0.327 0 1 888
street vending 0.513 0.382 0 1 896
squatting 0.251 0.332 0 1 895
decomission 0.197 0.308 0 1 898
eviction 0.419 0.381 0 1 889
evictionab 0.523 0.362 0 1 896
transfers 0.497 0.398 0 1 899
tax 0.701 0.361 0 1 896
inequality 0.822 0.291 0 1 895
pension 0.597 0.387 0 1 896
housing 0.467 0.404 0 1 896
employment 0.44 0.405 0 1 899
electricity 0.106 0.218 0 1 896
tax loopholes 0.075 0.181 0 1 896
Concept Indicators
Support for Law Breaking How much do you disapprove or approve that people...
Street vending Sell goods without a license in the public space.
Squatting Occupy land informally to build housing.
Support for Law Enforcement How much do you disagree or agree that the government...
Street vending Decommissions the merchandise and removes an unlicensed street
vendor from the public space.
Squatting Evicts a family that occupies vacant land and begins to build
where they do not have title to the land.
Candidate 1 Candidate 2 Balance Tests
Redistribution Business Forbearance Enforcement Di erence of Means p-value
(A) (B) (C) (D) (A-B) (C-D) (A-B) (C-D)
Class 0.433 0.433 0.434 0.433 0.000 0.000 1.00 0.965
Education 0.635 0.639 0.632 0.642 -0.003 -0.010 0.869 0.622
Age 0.548 0.528 0.535 0.541 0.019 -0.006 0.362 0.783
The p-values in the final column give the probability of observing a t-statistic as large in absolute value as the
observed value, if the groups are drawn from the same distribution. N = 900 respondents total.
Table 3: Redistributive Attitudes
Inequality Tax Transfers Employment Housing
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Class 0.033 -0.024 -0.236* -0.220* -0.190* -0.168* -0.063 -0.056 -0.093 -0.082
(0.042) (0.045) (0.051) (0.055) (0.056) (0.060) (0.058) (0.062) (0.058) (0.062)
Education -0.047 -0.061 -0.013 -0.025 -0.073 -0.096 0.088 0.120 -0.093 -0.114
(0.044) (0.048) (0.053) (0.058) (0.059) (0.064) (0.061) (0.065) (0.061) (0.065)
Female 0.008 -0.006 -0.025 -0.044 0.022 0.015 0.033 0.039 -0.051 -0.049
(0.020) (0.022) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026) (0.029) (0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (0.029)
Age -0.027 -0.043 -0.013 -0.019 -0.029 -0.024 -0.117 -0.132 -0.051 -0.075
(0.033) (0.036) (0.040) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.049) (0.049) (0.045) (0.045)
Right -0.085* -0.078 -0.005 -0.048 0.045
(0.036) (0.044) (0.056) (0.049) (0.057)
N 886 750 887 749 890 754 889 752 887 754
R2 0.007 0.020 0.044 0.047 0.036 0.034 0.018 0.025 0.019 0.023
Notes: úp < 0.05; robust standard errors in parentheses; two-tailed tests.
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TABLE A.3. Summary Statistics, AmericasBarometer, Pooled 2008, 2010, and 2012 Waves 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
property seizure 0 1 -4.41 5.443 80664
inequality 0.796 0.259 0 1 85375
income 0.427 0.321 0 1 75904
education 0.43 0.282 0 1 75415
female 0.515 0.5 0 1 88206
age 0.358 0.262 0 1 88206
urban 0.697 0.459 0 1 88206
right 0.512 0.278 0 1 70674
informal 0.403 0.49 0 1 37955
e ort 0.479 0.312 0 1 58806
deficit 0.333 0.471 0 1 58206
 416 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 14 15 16 17 18 19 22 23 24
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 14 15 16 17 18 19 22 23 24
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 14 15 16 17 18 19 22 23 24
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 14 15 16 17 18 19 22 23 24
1 Yes 1 No 2
2 5
3A 6
3B 7
4 8
9
A1 98 99
A2 98 99
A3 98 99
A4 98 99
A5 98 99
A6 98 99
4
Between4104and4204blocks 2 In4another4city 5
4
4
4
4
In.the.last.5.years,.have.you.voted.for.the.mayor,.governor,.congress.or.president?
If42,4end4the4survey4and4mark4the4
incidence4table4
Locality4Number: Supervisor:4
Locality4Name: Enumerator:4
I...IDENTIFICACION.
City:
Polling4station:
How4many4blocks4away4is4your4house4from4the4polling4station4where4you4voted4in4the4last4election?4
Less4than4104blocks 1 More4than4504blocks
Segment:
Between4214and4504blocks 3
Of4companies4that4pay4less4than4their4electricity4use.44
Of4people4occupying4land4informally4to4access4housing.
Of4marginal4neighborhoods4connecting4to4other4people’s4electricity4lines.44
Of4companies4that4use4loopholes4to4lower4their4taxes.
1 2
2 3
NS NR
Of4people4selling4merchandise4or4products4in4the4streets.
Strongly.
Disapprove
Strongly.
Approve2 3
Of4people4who4refuse4to4pay4taxes4if4they4do4not4receive4services4in4their4
neighborhood.4
3
1 2 3
1
Starting4time Ending4time Consecutive 1
SURVEY.ON.PERCEPTIONS.OF.INFORMALITY.AND.SOCIAL.POLICY.
Strata4of4the4zone4(socioeconomic4level):
2013
INCIDENCE.TABLE
Date.of.survey:
DD MM YY
S:.For.each.one.of.the.following.cases.mark.the.number.of.houses.that:.
Did.not.answer
Rejected
Abandoned
Has.not.voted
Part.A...INFORMALITY
PART.A,.Section.1...[ENC:.Give.the.interviewee.the.card.].
To.begin,.I.am.going.to.read.a.list.of.some.actions.that.individuals.and.businesses.can.use.to.achieve.their.objectives...I.would.like.you.to.tell.me.how.strongly.you.
approve.or.disapprove.that.people.do.the.subsequent.actions...We.are.going.to.use.Card.“A”.where.“1”.indicates.that.you.strongly.disapprove.and.“4”.indicates.that.you.
strongly.approve.
[ENC:.Write.number.1a4,.98.for.don’t.know.(NS).and.99.for.no.response.(NR).].
4
43
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2
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B1 98 99
B2 98 99
B3 98 99
B4 98 99
B5 98 99
C1
C1a
C1b
C1c
C2
C2a
C2b
C2c
C3
C3a
C3b
C3c
The&control&of&street&vending&(choose&the&3&most&responsible)
The&control&of&traffic&violations
The&control&of&informal&land&occupations
Who&is&the&third&most&responsible?
Who&is&the&most&responsible?
Who&is&the&third&most&responsible?
Who&is&the&most&responsible?
Who&is&the&second&most&responsible?
Who&is&the&third&most&responsible?
Who&is&the&second&most&responsible?
A&&family&with&few&resources&occupies&an&unoccupied&piece&of&land&and&builds&a&small&
home&despite&not&having&title&to&the&land.&The&government&orders&them&evicted&from&
the&lot.&&How&much&do&you&approve&or&disapprove&of&the&eviction?&&
1 2 3
A&family&builds&a&thirdDfloor&addition&to&their&house,&even&though&the&building&code&
does&not&permit&addition&in&their&neighbourhood.&&How&much&do&you&approve&or&
disapprove&of&the&government’s&decision&to&order&the&demolition?&&&&
1 2 3
4
4
A&man&lost&his&job&in&a&factory&and&begins&to&sell&arepas&in&the&streets.&How&much&do&
you&approve&or&disapprove&that&the&government&decommissions&his&equipment&and&
orders&his&eviction?&&
1 2 3
A&developer&builds&upper&class&housing&in&a&zone&where&the&norms&do&not&permit&it.&&
How&much&do&you&approve&or&disapprove&of&the&government’s&decision&to&order&the&
demolition?&&&&
1 2 3
4
4
A&man&decides&to&open&a&bar&in&the&first&floor&of&his&house,&even&though&he&lives&in&a&
residential&zone.&How&much&do&you&approve&or&disapprove&of&the&government’s&
decision&to&close&the&bar?&&&&
1 2 3 4
Who&is&the&second&most&responsible?
President3of3
the3Republic
PART3A,3Section33.33From3your3perspective,3which3of3the3following3entities3are3the3most3responsible3for3the3following3actions?33[ENC:3Read3options,3mark3each3of3the3three3
most3responsible3entities3with3an3X].33
City3Bureaucrats Bogotá3Mayor
Who&is&the&most&responsible?
Police Local3Mayor
PART3A,3Section32.33The3following3questions3ask3your3opinion3about3the3reactions3of3the3government3to3some3common3activities.3We3are3going3to3use3Card3“B”3where3“1”3
indicates3that3you3strongly3disagree3with3the3DECISION3OF3THE3GOVERNMENT3and3“4”3indicates3that3you3strongly3agree3with3what3the3government3has3decided.
[ENC:3Write3number31[4,3983for3NS3and3993for3NR.]3
Strongly3Disgree 2 3 Strongly3Agree NS NR
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D1 98 99
D2 98 99
D3 98 99
D4 98 99
D5 98 99
D6 98 99
D7 98 99
D8 98 99
2 3 Strongly2Agree
3
4
4
Cash)transfer)programs)like)Familias)en)Acción)or)the)Programa)de)Vivienda)Gratis)
teach)beneficiaries)to)live)depending)on)the)government.)) 1 2 3 4
From2your2perspective,2which2group2benefits2most2from2state2social2policies?2[ENC:2
Read2options.]
People)who)need)the)assistance)who)primarily)have)informal)
jobs.
NS/NR
Part2B,2Section21.22Changing2issues,2I2am2going2to2read2you2some2statements2about2the2social2policies2of2the2Colombian2state.22We2are2going2to2use2Card2“B”2again.
[ENC:2Write2number21S4,2982for2NS2and2992for2NR.]2
Part2B.22SOCIAL2POLICY2
Strongly2Disgree NS NR
The)Colombian)government)should)implement)strong)policies)to)reduce)income)
inequality)between)the)rich)and)the)poor.))To)what)extent)do)you)agree)or)disagree)
with)this)statement?
1 2 3
State)social)policies)help)people)like)you. 1 2
El)gobierno)se)excede)en)proteger)los)derechos)de)las)personas)con)pocos)recursos,)y)
no)les)enseñan)sus)deberes)y)obligaciones)como)ciudadanos. 1 2 3 4
D9
1
People)from)the)middle)class)who)primarily)have)formal)
jobs. 2
Unsure 98
No)response 99
D10 2Please2tell2me2in2which2of2the2following2three2areas2should2the2Bogotá2government2spend2more2money?
Education
Infrastructure
The)government)should)increase)taxes)to)spend)more)on)programs)to)promote)
employment)and)training. 1 2 3
The)government)should)increase)taxes)to)spend)more)on)programs)that)provide)
monthly)assistance)to)poor)families. 1 2 3
4
4
Public)security
Environment
Poverty)relief
Health
Employment
Public)space
99
Housing
The)state)should)collect)more)taxes)from)the)rich)to)redistribute)to)the)poor. 1 2 3 4
The)government)should)increase)taxes)to)increase)spending)on)pensions)for)the)
elderly. 1 2 3 4
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E1 98 99
E2 98 99
E3 98 99
E4 98 99
E5 98 99
E6 98 99
E7 98 99
F1 98 99
F2 98 99
F3 98 99
L1 5 98 99
4
Center0Left RightLeft
Now0we0are0going0to0use0Card0“E”0that0has0a0scale0from010to050in0which0the0number010means0“left”0and050means0“right.”0[ENC:0Write0number01G5,0980for0NS0and0990for0NR.]
NS NRCenter Center0Right
How(likely(is(it(that(this(candidate(promotes(policies(that(benefit(people(like(you?( 1 2 3 4
The(government(should(raise(taxes(to(increase(housing(spending.(To(what(extent(do(
you(agree(or(disagree(with(this(statement?(( 1
Now(thinking(of(this(candidate,(how(likely(would(you(be(to(vote(for(him(for(mayor(of(
Bogotá? 1 2
Thinking(of(this(candidate,(how(likely(do(you(think(he(is(to(favor(the(poor?
Option01:0As0a0City0Councilor,0the0candidate0criticized0the0abuses0of0previous0mayors0against0unlicensed0street0vendors.00If0he0were0mayor,0he0would0respect0the0rights0of0
workers0in0the0informal0economy0until0the0government0provides0other0job0alternatives.
Option02:0As0a0City0Councilor,0the0candidate0criticized0the0permissive0attitude0of0previous0mayors0against0unlicensed0street0vendors.00If0he0were0mayor,0he0would0work0for0
greater0order0in0the0streets0and0clear0out0unlicensed0vendors.000
Part0D,0Section01.00Now,0to0change0themes,0I0am0going0to0read0a0description0of0a0candidate0thinking0of0running0for0Mayor0of0Bogotá.00I0will0ask0for0your0impressions0of0the0
candidate,0we0will0use0Card0“D”0where010is0“very0unlikely”0and040is0“very0likely.”0[ENC:0Write0number01G4,0980for0NS0and0990for0NR.00Each%respondent%heard%one%of%the%two%
following%candidates .]
Part0D.00CANDIDATES
1 2 3
3 4
3 42According(to(the(meaning(that(the(words(“left”(and(“right”(have(for(you,(where(would(you(put(this(candidate(on(the(scale?(( 1
Option01:0The0city0and0national0government0assigns0subsidies0of0120million0pesos0on0average0per0family,0and0the0majority0of0families0that0apply0receive0a0
subsidy0within0a0few0years.000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
Option02:0The0city0and0national0government0assigns0subsidies0of0120million0pesos0on0average0per0family,0and0the0majority0of0families0that0apply0receive0a0
subsidy0within0a0few0years.00Of0all0subsidies0provided0in02012,090out0of0100subsidies0went0to0lowGincome0households.0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
Option03:0The0city0and0national0government0assigns0subsidies0of0120million0pesos0on0average0per0family,0and0the0majority0of0families0that0apply0receive0a0
subsidy0within0a0few0years.00The0subsidies0provided0in020120were0intended0for0lowGincome0households.00However,090out0of0100social0interest0houses0went0to0
middle0class0households,0due0to0the0lack0of0bank0credits,0the0high0price0of0houses,0and0irregularities0in0contracting0housing.
Strongly0Disgree 2 3 Strongly0Agree NS NR
Parte0C.00HOUSING
Now0I0am0going0to0read0some0statements0about0housing0policy0in0Colombia0and0then0I0will0ask0about0your0opinions0about0the0housing0situation0in0the0city.00
We0are0going0to0use0Card0“B”0again,0where010is0“strongly0agree”0and040“strongly0disagree.”00[ENC:0Write0number01G4,0980for0NS0and0990for0NR.0%Each%
respondent%heard%one%of%the%three%following%options.]0
2 3
The(poor(sometimes(need(to(occupy(land(informally(or(buy(from(pirate(landlords(to(
access(housing.( 1 2 3
4
4
The(government(should(evict(people(who(occupy(land(informally. 1 2 3
The(right(to(dignified(housing(is(a(reality(for(the(poor. 1 2 3 4
The(government(should(decrease(housing(subsidies(for(the(middle(class(to(increase(
spending(on(housing(programs(for(the(poor. 1 2 3
4
4
The(government(should(raise(taxes(to(increase(spending(on(road(infrastructure(in(the(
city. 1 2 3 4
The(government(should(give(property(titles(to(people(who(live(in(informal,(pirate(or(
invasion(neighborhoods.( 1 2 3 4
Very0Unlikely Unlikely Likely Very0Likely NS NR
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F4 98 99
F5 98 99
F6 98 99
L2 5 98 99
L3 5 98 99
Thinking*of*this*candidate,*how*likely*do*you*think*he*is*to*favor*the*poor? 1 2 3 4
Option.3:.As.a.City.Councilor,.the.candidate.criticized.the.lack.of.projects.to.generate.private.sector.investment...If.he.were.mayor,.he.would.promote.economic.
development,.and.specifically,.cut.government.bureaucracy.to.help.businesses.grow.and.generate.jobs.
Option.4:.As.a.City.Councilor,.the.candidate.criticized.the.lack.of.projects.for.vulnerable.sectors.of.the.population...If.he.were.mayor,.he.would.promote.social.inclusion,.
and.specifically,.invest.in.government.employment.programs.to.help.unskilled.workers.find.jobs.
In.which.strata.is.your.household?
University
3
Unsure 98
No*response 99
4
David*Luna
Other*candidate 6
NR*(99)
5
3
2
Secondary*(6J11)
Part.E...DEMOGRAPHICS
1
2
3
4
7Did*not*vote
Blank*ballot 8
Technical 4
EST
In.the.last.elections.for.Mayor.of.Bogotá,.which.candidate.did.you.vote.for?.
[S:.READ.OPTIONS,.mark.1W8,.98.for.unsure,.99.for.no.response).
Gustavo*Petro 1
Carlos*Fernando*Galán
VOT
Primary*(1J5)
ED
5
NS NR
How*likely*is*it*that*this*candidate*promotes*policies*that*benefit*people*like*you?* 1 2 3
Very.Unlikely Unlikely Likely Very.Likely
PART.D,.Section.2..Now,.I.will.read.a.description.of.another.candidate.for.the.Mayor.of.Bogotá.and.after.we.will.use.the.Cards."D".and."E".again...[[Read.one.of.the.two.
options.Each%respondent%heard%one%of%the%two%following%candidates..]].
1 2 3
5
Enrique*Peñalosa
Left Center.Left Right
According*to*the*meaning*that*the*words*“left”*and*“right”*have*
for*you,*where*would*you*put*this*candidate*on*the*scale?** 1 2 3 4
Now,*where*would*you*put*your*own*views*on*this*scale? 1 3 42
2
NR
How*likely*would*you*be*to*vote*for*this*candidate*for*mayor*of*Bogotá?
Gina*Parody
What.was.the.highest.level.of.schooling.that.you.completed?..
None 1
6
NS*(98)
Center Center.Right NS
4
4
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R1 X
R2 X
R3
R4
R5
R6 X
99
Yes
No(
Unsure
No(response
Yes
No(
Yes
No(
Unsure
No(response
98
99
3
1
2
98
99
Do*you*personally*know*someone*who*has*worked*as*a*street*vendor?
VIV1 At*some*moment,*have*you*or*someone*in*your*household*requested*or*received*any*assistance*from*the*government*to*help*pay*for*rent,*housing*or*housing*improvements?
Yes 1
No( 2
Unsure 98
No(response 99
VIV2 Have*you*or*someone*in*your*household*lived*in*an*informal,*pirate*or*invasion*neighborhood?**
Yes
99
No(response
1
No( 2
Unsure 98
No(responseHow(many?
99
99
99
99
1
No( 2
Unsure 98
No(response 99
VIV3 Do*you*know*someone*who*has*lived*in*an*informal,*pirate*or*invasion*neighborhood?
Yes
AMB2
SAL
What*type*of*health*insurance*do*you*have?*
(S:*Read*all*the*options.)
Contributory
CCT
1
2During*the*last*12*months,*did*you*or*someone*in*your*household*receive*monthly*assistance*in*the*form*of*money*or*
products*from*the*government,*such*as*Familias*en*Acción?
Subsidised((for(example(SISBEN) 2
None 4
No(response 99
Unsure 98
1
Special((Armed(forces,(Ecopetrol,(Public(universities,(
Teachers)( 3
99
Computer,(how(many? 1 2
Yes No
Freezer 1 2
Washing(machine 1 2
Television,(how(many?([S:*If*they*do*not*say*how*many,*mark*“1”.] 1 2
Could*you*tell*me*if*this*house*has:*[ENC:*Mark*one,*read*all*the*options.]
Do*you*contribute*to*a*pension*fund?
Car,(how(many? 1 2 99
Unsure
No(response
Already(pensioned
Internet(service 1 2
AMB1 Have*you*ever*worked*as*a*street*vendor?
Yes 1
No( 2
Unsure 98
No(response 99
PEN
1
2
98
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HOG.
OCUP
Thank&the&respondent.
Email:
1
Between&90,000&and&180,000 2
Between&180,000&and&270,000 3
Between&270,000&and&360,000 4
Between&360,000&and&450,000 5
Between&450,000&and&540,000 6
Between&540,000&and&630,000
1
2
No&response 99
Age&in&years:
Name:
Address:
Telephone:
18E25
26E35
36E45
46E55
56E65
65+
As*part*of*the*quality*control*for*this*survey,*it*is*probable*that*we*will*need*to*contact*you*again*to*confirm*some*information.**For*this*purpose,*we*would*like*to*
request*the*following*information:
IN
Using*Card*“F,”*in*which*of*the*following*monthly*income*ranges*is*this*household,*
including*income*from*all*adults*and*children*who*are*working?*[ENC:*Do*not*read*
the*options,*show*Card*F.**If*they*do*not*understand,*ask:*How*much*money*comes*
into*this*household*each*month?]
No&income
GE Gender*(S:*Note*gender,*do*not*ask.)
8
Female
Male
7
No&response 99
EDAD How*old*are*you?
How*many*people*live*in*this*household*at*the*moment?*[S:*Note*number,*98*don't*know**and*99*no*response]
What*do*you*primarily*do?*(S:*Read*all*options.)
Working 1 Housework 5
Looking&for&work 2 Permanently&disabled 6
Studying 3 Retired 7
Not&working&and&not&looking&for&work& 4
88
Business&owner&in&public&space 8
No&contract 3
Autonomous&or&independent 4
Autonomous&or&independent&professional 5
Owner&or&partner&in&a&business 6
Temporary&or&timeElimited&contract 2
99
Between&2,100,000&and&3,200,000
Between&3,200,000&and&4,300,000
14
15
More&than&4,300,000 16
9
Between&800,000&and&940,000 10
Between&940,000&and&1,100,000 11
Between&1,100,000&and&1,600,000 12
Between&1,600,000&and&2,100,000 13
Between&710,000&and&800,000
No&response
Between&630,000&and&710,000
Age&Range
1
2
3
4
5
6
Formal&contract 1
CONT What*type*of*labor*contract*do*you*have?**[ENC:*If*not*working,*mark*“Doesn’t*apply”*88,*read*all*the*options].
Does&not&apply
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Appendix B.  The Formal-Informal Redistribution Game 
 
The model informally described in Chapter 3 is based on a simple game in which national 
governments develop housing policy depending on how they think local governments will enforce.  
This dependence can be thought of as an extensive form game in which there are two players.  The 
basic structure of the game, as depicted in Figure B.1, is that the national government, N, is a 
Stackelberg leader, meaning that it acts first and makes its choice of housing policy in anticipation of 
how local governments, L, will react.  
The utility that local governments receive from forbearance is determined by how the 
national government sets housing policy.  Local politicians receive a benefit of !! in the case of 
substitutive housing policy, and !! in the case of complementary housing policy.  I argued that local 
politicians receive greater political rewards from forbearance when the national government does 
not invest in housing than when it does, so !! > !!.   
 
FIGURE B.1. The Formal-Informal Redistribution Game  
When the national government provides housing to the poor, it receives net benefits !.  If 
local politicians choose forbearance, then the national government also pays a cost !.  These costs 
accumulate over time so they depend on the national government’s discount factor !. When local 
politicians enforce, the national government does not pay these costs.   
N 
L     L 
s              c 
(— ≠ “”, ◊s) (—, 0)
(≠“”, ◊c) (0, 0)
(— ≠ “”, ◊s) (—, 0)
(≠“”, ◊c) (0, 0)
f         e    f        e 
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I solve by backwards induction.  I first consider the case in which the national government 
invests in substitutive social policy.  Local governments receive a net payoff from forbearance of !! 
and therefore will choose forbearance as long as !! > 0.!!Alternatively, if the national government 
invests in complementary housing policy, local governments receive a net payoff from forbearance 
of !! .  They will prefer forbearance when !! > 0.   
Chapter 3 argued that local politicians find it in their electoral interest to forbear when the 
government provides complementary housing policies, but they will enforce when substitutive 
housing policies are available.  In other words, the case considered is that !! > 0 > !!.!!However, 
there also exist ranges in which local governments always choose forbearance !! > !! > 0, like 
when they are too weak to act otherwise or national housing expenditures are so minimal that 
mayors still receive political benefits from forbearance.  Or, local governments may enforce 
regardless of social policy availability 0 > !! > !!, as in the case of a dictatorship that forces its 
subordinates to follow the law. 
If local governments will enforce only if substitutive housing policy is available, then the 
national government decides whether to provide housing in which case it receives net benefit !, or 
whether to forgo housing provision and pay !".  It will invest in housing policy when ! > −!".!! 
Proposition 1.  If local governments enforce exactly when there is substitutive housing policy !! > 0 > !!,!then 
national governments invest in substitutive housing policy if and only if the net benefits are greater than the discounted 
costs so that ! > −!". 
 
This proposition underpinned my argument that national governments are more likely to 
invest in substitutive housing policy where past politicians have enforced the law, as was the case in 
Chile following the dictatorship, because the net benefits were high.  There are least likely to enforce 
when the discount factor is high, as in the case of Peru’s weak party system.   
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While I focused on the case where substitutive social policy can change the behavior of local 
politicians, it is worth comparing cases where local politicians cannot or will not enforce the law 
irrespective of social expenditures (!! > !! > 0).  In this case, the national government always pays 
the costs of forbearance and invests in housing when ! > 0, which means that the government will 
be less likely to provide substitutive housing policies (recall that previously, it invested when ! > −!").  Similarly, if the national government perfectly controls the behavior of local 
governments 0 > !! > !!, as in a dictatorship, then it will always escape the costs of forbearance 
and invest in housing policy when ! > 0.!!  
Proposition 2.  If local government capacity is weak, housing investments are small, or the national government 
perfectly controls local government behavior, then the national government invests in substitutive housing policy only if ! >0.  Therefore, substitutive housing policy is less likely to be implemented.   
 
State weakness thus makes housing policy investments less likely in two ways.  If local 
politicians cannot enforce or sufficient resources cannot be mobilized, then national governments 
will have weaker incentives to invest in substitutive housing policy.  Dictatorship also makes 
substitutive housing policy less likely if we assume that politicians can perfectly control the behavior 
of their agents and force enforcement regardless of housing expenditures.  A future model could 
more explicitly model the factors that structure the net benefits of housing provision and costs of 
forbearance, such as the extent of illegal land occupations and popular demands.  For now, this 
game set up is simply meant to clarify the basic propositions stated informally in Chapter 3.   
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Appendix C: Coding Rules for Newspaper Database 
 
 The newspaper database was drawn from two national newspapers, El Comercio in Peru and 
El Tiempo in Colombia.  These papers were selected as the most comparable, continuously 
published, centrist papers.  Both papers lean to the right compared to their main rival papers.  The 
main rival paper in Colombia, El Espectador, went to weekly publication between 2001 and 2008. The 
main rival paper in Peru, La República, has a slightly lower circulation.  El Tiempo has the highest 
circulation in Colombia with 1.1 million readers; El Comercio has roughly half a million readers.  I 
selected center-right leaning papers in part so that the Peruvian and Colombian papers also could be 
compared with the main newspaper in Chile, El Mercurio, which I relief on primarily for its coverage 
of squatting.   
I relied on El Tiempo’s online archive to locate articles on street vendors; in contrast, I used 
research assistants to locate articles on street vending from El Comercio’s physical archive (given that 
the online archive only begins in 2002 and does not include full coverage).  I also reviewed the 
physical archives of El Tiempo through the categorized newspaper archive maintained by the Center 
for Research and Popular Education (Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular, CINEP).  This 
difference in methodology may have resulted in some discrepancy in the set of stories located. In 
particular, stories with briefer mention of street vending may have been difficult to locate using 
hand-coding rules.  These methodological differences should not affect the time trends, although 
they may explain the slightly higher article count on average in Bogotá. 
Articles were pulled on street vending from 1990 through 2010.  Only articles that included a 
substantial discussion of street vending were included in the database.  In practice, this meant that 
stories that interviewed street vendors on unrelated content or mentioned that a street had been 
occupied by street vendors without commentary were excluded.  The articles were classified as one 
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of four types: 1) news item, 2) letter to the editor, 3) short note, and 4) platforms, speeches, or 
interviews with politicians.  The content coding rules for the database are as follows: 
Sympathetic Narrative: Human-interest stories focused on street vendors (or poor people who happen 
to work or have worked as street vendors), such as a laid-off factory worker or a single mother who 
tries to put her children through school by working as a street vendor.  For example, “Dora Lila 
Hernández, who lives in the neighborhood Combeima and supports her three children with her 
snack sales says that she is willing to go to battle.  ‘The mayor is toying with how we feed our 
families,’ says Hernández, who is part of a group of around 100 informal vendors in public space 
around the center” (El Tiempo 7 March 2005). 
 
Sympathetic Polemic: Stories that tie street vending to external conditions like unemployment, political 
violence or migration, or that defend street vendors as honorable and innocent when faced with 
enforcement actions, including political speeches that portray vendors in this light.  For instance, 
“To resolve the problem that Bogotá is going through, he said that one needs to take into account 
three realities: the recovery of public space not only with substantial investment but with awareness 
of its value as an element of equality, the problem of employment in the city that creates poverty, 
and recent decisions of the Constitutional Court” (El Tiempo 6 Jan 2004).  
 
Within these two categories, each article was coded according to the specific sympathetic appeal: 
Unemployment: If there is mention of high unemployment rates, lack of jobs, etc. 
Displacement: If there is mention of the civil war, migration, or internal displacement 
Criminalization of poverty: If there is mention of “persecution” of innocent poor. 
 
The second major category coded were unsympathetic items:  
 
Unsympathetic Narrative: Human-interest stories focused on street vendors who do illicit or unseemly 
things (ex. selling live chickens in violation of health standards) or otherwise are portrayed as 
criminal.  For example, a description of a couple who sold animals and other illicit merchandise: “In 
the operation, there also were seized armadillo shells, deer feed, skins, and dead birds, and soon 
enough they noticed other items hidden behind pots, clothing, peaches, cassettes, and there was 
even more merchandise stuffed in the pockets of the street vendors” (El Tiempo 26 August 1993). 
 
Unsympathetic Polemic:  Stories on the negative externalities of street vending, such as item that 
highlights jammed traffic or sidewalks, unfair business competition, tax evasion, clandestine 
electricity connections, and unsanitary or illegal merchandise.  Letters to the editor often fell into 
this category, for instance: “There the vendors are generating heaps of trash in their workplaces.  
The minimum that we ask from them is that they go out and sweep the streets and sidewalks” (El 
Tiempo 2 Jan 2005). 
 
Within the unsympathetic categories, there were several sub-categorizations: 
Public Space: If the article denounces street vendors for monopolizing the public space that 
should be noncommercialized and accessible to all citizens 
 Traffic: If there is mention of blocking traffic or sidewalks, etc. 
Business environment: If there is mention of business being harmed, less private sector 
investment, tax evasion 
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Public safety risks: If there is mention of bad sanitation, unsafe electricity connections, 
blocking emergency exits, etc. 
Crime and disorder: If there is mention of make streets unsafe, sheltering criminals, facades for 
drug traffic organizations, etc. 
 
The category “Other” includes several different types of stories: 
 
Vendor Negotiations:  Articles on street vendors forming informal associations, negotiating as a group 
with the government, holding elections, etc. 
 
Protest: An organized march by a group that involves claims about street vending. 
 
Leniency:  Articles that denounce politicians for their failure to act on the problem of street vendors, 
or otherwise insinuate that the problem could be dealt with if political leaders were to act. 
 
Relocation and Social Policy Substitution: Articles that describes past or future project to relocate street 
vendors to a formal commercial center, kiosks, transition zones, or temporary employment 
alternatives for vendors.  Includes legislation to regulate or legalize street vending. 
 
Sanction:  Articles that describes the removal of vendors from city streets, the imposition of fines, or 
decommission of merchandise; also includes articles that discuss the structure of sanctions, such as 
changes to the police code, and articles that praise politicians for restoring order and removing 
vendors. 
 
Court:  Descriptions of a legal case, filing or decision regarding street vendors. 
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Appendix D: Local Government Enforcement Survey and Additional Statistical Results 
 
The survey of local governments involved an in-person interview with the director or sub-
director of the office in charge of street vending in each district.  The precise office depends on the 
district’s administrative structure.  Rather than seek an office with a specific title, the selection 
criterion is the office that manages operations against street vending.  In most cases, a local 
commerce or inspections office is in charge.  The exceptions are districts that have a special office 
for street commerce, or that group vending in an economic “rents” office.  The author and/or a 
trained research assistant from a local university conducted all interviews. The structured survey 
lasted 30 minutes, although unstructured conversations with officials often continued for up to two 
hours.     
The sample does not include districts that are classified as more than 75 percent rural or 
have populations under 5000.  This means that the sample excludes Sumapaz in Bogotá, and Ancón, 
Pucusana, Punta Hermosa, Punta Negra, San Bartolo, and Santa Rosa in Lima.  In Santiago, I 
include the 34 districts that comprise Greater Santiago (32 comunas in Santiago, plus San Bernardo 
and Puente Alto in the provinces of Maipo and Cordillera, respectively).  Translated versions of the 
survey, summary statistics, and the additional statistical results discussed are included at the end of 
this Appendix.   
To verify the enforcement operations reported, I consulted district and city documents.  
Districts in Lima are supposed to report their control activities through the Municipal Survey 
(Registro Nacional de Municipalidades, RENAMU), and districts in Bogotá report their operations to the 
District Comptroller (Personería) and Government Secretary (Secretaría de Gobierno).  However, not all 
districts keep records of their operations. When information on operations was available for more 
than three months, I averaged the number of monthly enforcement operations over up to a year to 
create a more consistent indicator of a district’s behavior. I omit the month of December, however, 
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because most districts do fewer enforcement operations around the Christmas holiday. For the 
places that I have the full year data, I ran a regression on the full sample using seasonal dummies and 
did not find seasonal effects after accounting for the winter holiday. 
To check the district government estimates of unlicensed street vending, I verified the data 
against government and university censuses (VendorsAlt).  In Bogotá, I checked the district estimates 
against the 2010 database of street vendors that registered with the city’s agency that attempts to 
relocate street vendors, the Institute of the Social Economy (Instituto para la Economía Social, IPES). 
The IPES, a government institute, only registered 42,238 vendors in 2010 (up from 23,829 in 2006) 
in Bogotá, but it likely undercounts vendors by requiring them to register. There is little reason to 
believe that the undercounting varies systematically by district. The correlation in sources is very 
high, and my results are unchanged using the IPES data.  In Lima, the 2011 Encuesta Nacional de 
Hogares (ENAHO), a household survey, estimates the number of street vendors in Lima at 341,237.  
The discrepancy in the estimates likely reflects the fact that this count depends on the weights used 
to inflate the survey data (only 478 street vendors were included in the Lima survey) and ambiguity 
in the question wording (vendors who work in markets may describe themselves as street vendors, 
or ambulantes).  Despite these concerns, the correlation between ENAHO estimates and my survey is 
0.821 and my results are robust to the use of this alternative measure of vendors.  In Santiago, my 
estimate of the number of street vendors is very similar to the 47,595 unlicensed vendors numbers 
counted in a 2010 census by the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile and the Ministry of 
Transportation.  The correlation with district government estimates is 0.838, and my regression 
results are unchanged.  
To construct district estimates of lower class residents (Lower), I use government 
socioeconomic classifications. Chile and Peru rank households from Class A, the highest, to Class E, 
the lowest. Following the government’s classifications, I code the lower class as Classes D and E, 
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which constitute 45 percent of the population in Santiago and 44 percent in Lima. Colombia ranks 
socioeconomic strata on a scale of 1 to 6. The lower class comprises Strata 1 and 2, which represent 
44 percent of Bogotá’s population. Class stratifications by district for 2010 are available from the 
Bogotá Administrative Department for District Planning (DAPD)’s Stratification and Monitoring 
Area, and from the polling companies Adimark in Chile and Apeim in Peru. 
I verify that differences in socioeconomic stratification methodology do not drive the cross-
city results by using a second measure of district poverty.  I measure the proportion of households 
in a district with unsatisfied basic needs, Poor.  In Bogotá, district poverty data come from the 2011 
Multipurpose Survey of Bogotá (Encuesta Multipropósito de Bogotá), available from the District Planning 
Secretary (Secretaría de Planeación Distrital, SPD).  Poverty statistics for Santiago come from the 2011 
National Socioeconomic Characterization Survey (Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional, 
CASEN), compiled at the district level by National System of Municipal Information (Sistema 
Nacional de Información Municipal, SINIM).  In Lima, poverty data come from the National Statistics 
Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estádisticas, INEI) using the 2009 Poverty Map.  Given that individuals 
with an unmet basic need are universally classified as lower class in government stratifications, it is 
unsurprising that the district income measures are highly correlated—!!=0.874 in Bogotá, 0.737 in 
Lima, and 0.881 in Santiago.   
Budgets are available from Bogotá’s District Auditor (Contraloría de Bogotá), Chile’s SINIM, 
and Peru’s Ministry of Economics and Finance (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas, MEF).  For Bogotá, 
polling station level data comes from the Electoral Observation Mission (Misión de Observación 
Electoral, MOE).  For the over-time comparisons, I use the security budget controlled by the city 
mayor (Fondo de Vigilancia y Seguridad ) from the District Finance Secretary (Secretaría de Hacienda 
Distrital, SHD).  
For Santiago and Lima, data on the mayor’s margin of victory and political party come from 
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national electoral authorities. In Peru, I use records from the National Office of Electoral Processes 
(Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales, OMPE).  In Chile, I use data from the Electoral Service (Servicio 
Electoral, Servel) and consider the mayor in power during the 2008-2011 term.  
In Santiago, I use data on crime available from the 2011 National Statistics Institute (Instituto 
Nacional de Estadísticas, INE) Justice Report to examine criminal law enforcement (including crimes 
against order, morality, people, property, family, and misdemeanors).  Chile’s National Police, the 
Carabineros, keep records of calls that they receive for crimes, as well as criminal apprehensions.  
Additional Results and Models 
My baseline estimating equation is 
ln !!! = !! + !! !"#$%! + !! !"#$%&'! + !!!! + ! 
where yi is the count of enforcement operations and Xi are the control variables in district i.   
I examine several alternative specifications to verify the robustness of my results shown in 
Table D.2. Model 1 uses the class composition variable Poor to measure district poverty.  The results 
are unchanged, and the model fit is actually improved in Santiago.  Model 2 fits a negative binomial 
regression with robust standard errors.  A negative binomial is another logical distribution for count 
data that does not have the Poisson’s strong assumption of equal mean and variance.  However, it is 
not recommended for small samples and therefore is used only to check the robustness of the 
results.  The core results from the negative binomial regression are similar to the reported Poisson 
results.  Model 3 recalculates the variables in per capita terms.  I use operations per 10,000 residents 
as a dependent variable and vendors per 10,000 residents (Vendorspc) as a covariate.  This 
specification assumes linearity in the value per population, as opposed to linearity in the absolute 
amount of enforcement controlling for population.  I do not have clear priors on the superior 
specification.  The key point is that the results are robust to both, although the model fit is worse 
overall using the per capita specification.  
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Table D.3 tests several additional measures of capacity.  It is possible that the budget per 
capita is a weak measure of local government capacity, given that budgets are supplemented by 
central or city government transfers and not always spent.  If district poverty merely captures 
differences in local government capacity, then the use of more proxies for capacity should drive the 
coefficient on district poverty to zero.  Capacity measures also should be more significant predictors 
of enforcement outcomes than demographic variables.   
One type of measure of capacity comes from the size of the district police or bureaucracy.  
Districts with larger police forces and bureaucracies are more likely to be able to enforce the law 
effectively.  Unfortunately, data on the size of police forces are not disaggregated to the sub-city 
level.  Cities with national police forces rotate their officers frequently, such that they do not keep 
statistics on the size of the force in a given district, and decentralized cities like Lima have no 
systematic data collection on force size.  Due to data limitations, I measure the number of police 
stations per district (Police) as a proxy for enforcement capacity.  This measure obviously does not 
capture differences in the number of officers at a station or the quality of policing, but it provides a 
crude measure of whether basic institutional infrastructure is distributed evenly across urban space. 
Model 1 shows that, while the coefficients on the number of police stations are positive in Bogotá 
and Santiago, they do not reach statistical significance, and the coefficient actually points in the 
wrong direction in Lima.  Obviously, I cannot rule out that differences in the number of police 
officers or their quality drive the results, but using the best proxy available, this test provides 
suggestive evidence that differences in policing do not account for the enforcement patterns.  
A second measure that captures administrative capacity is the number of district employees 
per 1,000 residents (Employees).  In some respects, the size of the bureaucracy as a whole may be a 
better indicator of capacity than simply the number of police offices.  The number of employees 
assigned to enforcement is an endogenous choice that can itself reflect a mayor’s political or 
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enforcement priorities, while the overall size of the bureaucracy represents the government’s 
potential to enforce its regulations.  The number of bureaucrats varies by almost an order of 
magnitude across districts (these figures include contract, political, and permanent employees, but 
exclude pensioners).  Information comes from SINIM in Santiago, and the MEF in Lima. I could 
not locate this information by district in Bogotá because all personnel are considered city, not 
district, employees due to urban centralization.   
Model 2 reveals that the size of the bureaucracy is associated with more enforcement in 
Lima and Santiago.  However, the result is not statistically significant in Lima, and poverty remains a 
significant negative and substantively important predictor of enforcement in both cases.  The most 
interesting result comes from Santiago where an increase in personnel is associated with more 
enforcement.  The result for Santiago suggests that government capacity may play a role even in a 
city with strong institutions and a capable police force.  Critically, however, district poverty remains 
significant even after accounting for the size of bureaucracy and explains more of the variance in 
enforcement outcomes. 
Third, I consider locally collected taxes as a measure of district government capacity (Tax).  
Local revenue may directly allow for governments to fund more enforcement activities, but as Cleary 
(2007) argues, local revenue also may suggest efforts to develop bureaucratic capacity to collect 
property taxes and local fees.  Local revenue per capita thus may better proxy for administrative 
quality than the total budget, which often includes transfers from the center weighted by district 
poverty to compensate poor districts.  In Bogotá, I consider property tax collection, given that it is 
the only tax collected at the local level (although revenues are then redistributed).  In Lima and 
Santiago, I consider all taxes directly collected at the local level (which excludes central government 
transfers and oil, mineral, and duty tax revenue, but includes property and local taxes, fees, and 
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fines).  Model 3 shows that there is no significant relationship between tax collection and 
enforcement in any city.   
Another ideal measure of capacity would be salary information for the police or inspectors.  
Unfortunately, systematic payroll data are not available for police officers. In Lima and Santiago, I 
use the average annual salary of a district employee (Salary), which I calculate by dividing total 
personnel costs by the reported number of employees in the district.  As stated above, employment 
statistics are not broken down by district in Bogotá, nor are salaries locally determined, so I am 
unable to perform the same calculation.  Tax and salary information comes from the SHD in 
Bogotá, SINIM in Santiago, and MEF in Lima. Model 4 shows that there is no statistically 
significant relationship between salaries and enforcement. 
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SURVEY ON PERCEPTIONS OF STREET VENDING AND PUBLIC SPACE  
A.  Local Government Resources 
1. What position do you hold? 
2. What career did you study? 
3. How long have you been in the position? 
4. What type of employment contract do you have? 
5. Where did you work before you started here? 
6. Now I want to talk about commerce in the district.  How many informal street 
vendors, meaning vendors without licenses, are there in the district?  
a. Informal market vendors? 
b. Vendors on sidewalks? 
 
7. How does the district gather information on the number of informal vendors?  
Where do these statistics come from?  
8. In this municipality, which entity is in charge of the control of public space 
(inspectors, municipal police, etc.)?  How many inspectors or police are dedicated to 
the control of informal commerce?  
9. Do the inspectors have their own car?  If not, how many times a week do they have 
access to a car to do inspections? 
10. Some people think that the district has put a lot of emphasis on the control of Street 
vending; others think that the district is not using much effort.  On a scale of 1 to 10 
where “1” means no effort and “10” means a lot, how much effort do you think that 
this government uses to control unlicensed street vending?   
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
     None      A lot 
 
11. How many operations has the office done this month?  And in the past three 
months?  What does an operation consist of?   
 
12. How many citizen complaints do you receive per month about street vending? 
 
13. How many times a month do politicians call you with respect to the problem of 
vending?  Do politicians want more or fewer operations? 
 
14. How many vending associations are there in the municipality?  Do you know any 
vending association leaders by name?   
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B.  Control Activities 
I am going to read a series of various types of policies to control street vending and ask you 
how frequently the district undertakes each of the following activities.  For each one, can 
you tell me if the district does it every week or almost every week, a few times a month, a 
few times a year, or never?  
 
 Each week or 
almost every 
week 
One or two 
times per 
month 
Only a few 
times each 
year 
Never 
15. Inspections     
16. Evictions     
17. Relocations of 
vendors 
    
18. Warnings or 
fines 
    
19. Retentions or 
decommissions 
of merchandise 
    
20. Technical 
assistance to 
help register 
vendors 
    
21. Collection of 
payments for 
the use of 
public streets 
    
22. Meetings or 
operations 
with other 
districts  
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C.  Perceptions 
People have different ideas about street vending.  I am going to read you some opinions and 
ask you where you would situate your own opinions on this scale where “1” means that you 
agree completely with the first statement, and “10” means that you agree completely with the 
second statement.  The statements are opposites.  If your opinions are somewhere in the 
middle, you can choose any intermediate number.   
 
23.  
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
The poor receive most of the benefits 
from street vending. 
Leaders of vending associations receive 
most of the benefits from street vending. 
24.  
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Occupations of public space are necessary 
so that the poor have a way to work. 
Employment needs do not justify that 
people occupy public spaces to work. 
25.  
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
The eviction of street vendors only results 
in their displacement to other districts.  
The eviction of street vendors efficiently 
reduces the number of street vendors in 
all districts. 
 
26.  
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
The majority of street vendors do not 
have enough income to rent or buy a 
formal shop.   
The majority of street vendors already 
have a formal shop or have sufficient 
resources to buy or rent one.   
27.  
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
The poor choose to live off the hand of 
the government. 
 
 
The poor are victims of social injustice. 
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28.  
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
The lack of resources is the biggest 
obstacle to the control of street vending. 
Political intervention is the biggest 
obstacle to the control of street vending.   
29.  
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Legal requirements restrict government 
action when confronted with occupation 
of public space by vendors. 
Legal requirements allow for government 
action when confronted with occupation 
of public space by vendors. 
30.  
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
The government should relocate street 
vendors in formal spots or grant licenses 
because relocation guarantees a form of 
work for evicted vendors.   
 
The government should not relocate 
vendors in formal spots or grant licenses 
because relocation is a reward for people 
who have violated the law.   
 
31.  
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
It is common that street vendors pay 
bureaucrats or the police to remain in the 
streets. 
It is uncommon that street vendors pay 
bureaucrats or the police to remain in the 
streets. 
32.  
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Politicians on the Right are more willing 
to tolerate street vendors due to their 
aversion to using the state to create jobs.  
Politicians on the Left are more willing to 
tolerate street vendors due to their social 
sympathies.  
33.  
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Politicians lose electoral support when 
they evict street vendors.   
Politicians gain electoral support when 
they evict street vendors.
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34.  
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
It is the responsibility of the government 
to guarantee that everyone has a form of 
employment. 
It is the responsibility of each individual 
to find employment. 
 
35.  
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
The local mayor and councillors stop 
evictions of street vendors.  
The local mayor and councillors support 
evictions of street vendors.  
36.  
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Bureaucrats and the police fear 
disciplinary investigations against them for 
doing operations against street vendors. 
Bureaucrats and the police do not fear 
disciplinary investigations against them for 
doing operations against street vendors. 
 
D.  Demographic Information 
1. Were you born in the city? Were your parents born in the city? 
2. Did you work for any candidate or party in the last municipal elections?  And in the 
presidential elections?   
3. On a scale of 1 to 10 that goes from Left to Right, where “1” signifies Left and “10” 
signifies Right, today, according to the understanding that you have of the terms Left 
and Right, when you think of your political point of view, where would you put 
yourself on that scale?   
4. In the last elections, which mayoral candidate did you support? 
5. What is your level of education? 
 
Internal Information: 
Date: 
Duration: 
Gender: 
Code:  
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SURVEY ON PERCEPTIONS OF ILLEGAL LAND OCCUPATIONS AND HOUSING  
A.  Local Government Resources 
1. What position do you hold? 
2. What career did you study? 
3. How long have you been in the position? 
4. What type of employment contract do you have? 
5. Where did you work before you started here? 
6. Now I want to talk about the district.  Approximately, what fraction of the district is 
included in the land cadaster?  For example, would you say that none, a quarter, half, 
or almost all the district is included?  
 
7. How does the district gather information on the number of informal vendors?  
Where do these statistics come from?  
8. In this municipality, is there an entity that is in charge of the control of illegal land 
occupations (inspectors, municipal police, etc.)?  How many inspectors or police are 
dedicated to the control of illegal land occupations?  
9. How does the district learn about new illegal land occupations in general? 
10. How many inspectors are dedicated to formal construction inspections or licenses? 
11. Do the inspectors have their own car?  If not, how many times a week do they have 
access to a car to do inspections? 
12. In the last six months, how many new illegal land occupations have there been in the 
district?   
13. In the last six months, have there been any evictions? 
14. Some people think that the district has put a lot of emphasis on the control of illegal 
land occupations; others think that the district is not using much effort.  On a scale 
of 1 to 10 where “1” means no effort and “10” means a lot, how much effort do you 
think that this government uses to control illegal land occupations?   
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
     None      A lot 
 
 
15. How many citizen complaints do you receive per month about illegal land 
occupations? 
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16. How many times a month do politicians call you with respect to illegal land 
occupations?  Do politicians want more or fewer operations? 
 
17. How many informal settlement associations are there in the municipality?  Do you 
know any housing association leaders by name?   
 
 
 
B.  Control Activities 
I am going to read a series of various types of policies to control illegal land occupations and 
ask you how frequently the district undertakes each of the following activities.  For each one, 
can you tell me if the district does it every week or almost every week, a few times a month, 
a few times a year, or never?  
 Each week or 
almost every 
week 
One or two 
times per 
month 
Only a few 
times each 
year 
Never 
18. Fines or 
warnings for 
illegal land 
occupations 
    
19. Demolitions     
20. Evictions     
21. Projects to 
occupy empty 
land 
    
22. Talks with 
neighbors so 
they report 
offenses  
    
23. Propaganda to 
warn against 
purchases from 
land traffickers 
    
24. Report illegal 
land 
occupations to 
authorities 
    
25. Relocations       
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C.  Perceptions 
People have different ideas about illegal land occupations.  I am going to read you some 
opinions and ask you where you would situate your own opinions on this scale where “1” 
means that you agree completely with the first statement, and “10” means that you agree 
completely with the second statement.  The statements are opposites.  If your opinions are 
somewhere in the middle, you can choose any intermediate number.   
 
26.  
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
The poor receive most of the benefits 
from illegal land occupations.   
 
Land traffickers receive most of the 
benefits from illegal land occupations.   
 
27.  
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Illegal land occupations are justified so 
that the poor have somewhere to live. 
Housing needs do not justify that people 
occupy land illegally. 
28.  
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
The majority of squatters do not have 
enough income to rent or buy a formal 
house or apartment.   
The majority of squatters have enough 
income to rent or buy a formal house or 
apartment.   
29.  
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
The poor choose to live off the hand of 
the government.  
The poor are victims of social injustice. 
 
30.  
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
The lack of resources is the biggest 
obstacle to the control of squatting.  
Political intervention is the biggest 
obstacle to the control of squatting.   
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31.  
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Legal requirements restrict government 
action when confronted with an illegal 
land occupation. 
Legal requirements allow for government 
action when confronted with an illegal 
land occupation. 
32.  
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
It is the state’s responsibility to guarantee 
that each individual has access to housing. 
It is each individual’s responsibility to find 
their own housing.
 
33.  
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
The government should relocate squatters 
to guarantee that the evicted people have 
a place to live. 
The government should not relocate 
squatters because relocation is a reward 
for people who have violated the law. 
34.  
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
It is common that squatters pay 
bureaucrats or the police to remain in the 
land that they have occupied. 
It is uncommon that squatters pay 
bureaucrats or the police to remain in the 
land that they have occupied. 
35.  
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Politicians on the Right are more willing 
to tolerate illegal land occupations due to 
their aversion to using the state to build 
housing for the poor. 
36.  
Politicians on the Left are more willing to 
tolerate street vendors due to their social 
sympathies.  
.   
 
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
The local mayor and councillors stop 
evictions of squatters.  
The local mayor and councillors support 
evictions of squatters.  
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37.  
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Politicians lose electoral support when 
they evict illegal land occupations.   
Politicians gain electoral support when 
they evict illegal land occupations.
38.  
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
It is expensive for the state to build social 
interest housing; it is cheaper to permit 
illegal land occupations and legalize the 
constructions.  
It costs more in the long run for the state 
to formalize informal housing than to 
build social interest housing at the 
beginning.  
37. 
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Bureaucrats and the police fear 
disciplinary investigations against them for 
doing operations against squatters. 
Bureaucrats and the police do not fear 
disciplinary investigations against them for 
doing operations against squatters. 
 
D.  Demographic Information 
1. Were you born in the city? Were your parents born in the city? 
2. Did you work for any candidate or party in the last municipal elections?  And in the 
presidential elections?   
3. On a scale of 1 to 10 that goes from Left to Right, where “1” signifies Left and “10” 
signifies Right, today, according to the understanding that you have of the terms Left 
and Right, when you think of your political point of view, where would you put 
yourself on that scale?   
4. In the last elections, which mayoral candidate did you support? 
5. What is your level of education? 
Internal Information: 
Date:        Duration: 
Gender: 
Code:
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Table D.2. Cross-Sectional Analysis: Alternative Specifications
Bogotá Lima Santiago
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Poor -0.074 -0.077 -0.035 -0.421* -0.568* -0.516* -0.636* -0.734* -0.661*
(0.076) (0.081) (0.127) (0.069) (0.075) (0.066) (0.129) (0.111) (0.148)
Vendors 0.752* 0.752* -0.339* -0.432* -0.413 -0.415
(0.077) (0.044) (0.113) (0.129) (0.274) (0.199)
Budget 0.021 0.021 0.193 0.276* 0.325* 0.253* -0.172 -0.249 -0.222
(0.051) (0.050) (0.170) (0.083) (0.109) (0.098) (0.221) (0.202) (0.171)
Population 0.212* 0.192* -0.307* 0.852 1.522* -0.299* 0.295 0.527 -0.323*
(0.071) (0.058) (0.120) (0.282) (0.656) (0.125) (0.289) (0.667) (0.134)
Vendorspc 0.752* -0.160 -0.303
(0.105) (0.107) (0.238)
N 19 19 19 36 36 36 34 34 34
R2 0.469 0.290 0.292 0.372 0.431 0.381 0.263 0.273 0.162
Notes: úp < 0.05; Poisson robust standard errors in parentheses; two-tailed tests. Model 2 is a negative binomial;
Model 3 uses operations per capita as the dependent variable.
Table D.3. Cross-Sectional Analysis: Alternative Capacity Measures
Bogotá Lima Santiago
(1) (3) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Poor -0.058 -0.069 -0.410* -0.442* -0.474* -0.421* -0.596* -0.613* -0.633* -0.637*
(0.076) (0.102) (0.072) (0.091) (0.081) (0.067) (0.192) (0.170) (0.128) (0.125)
Vendors 0.670* 0.749* -0.338* -0.329* -0.277* -0.340* -0.331 -0.272 -0.370 -0.411
(0.097) (0.079) (0.114) (0.120) (0.138) (0.115) (0.205) (0.261) (0.233) (0.260)
Budget 0.012 0.022 0.303* 0.338 0.009 0.276* 0.039 -0.078 -0.195 -0.186
(0.039) (0.056) (0.117) (0.180) (0.173) (0.082) (0.313) (0.186) (0.277) (0.258)
Population 0.101 0.211* 0.824* 0.826* 0.728* 0.856* 0.241 0.403 0.231 0.232
(0.092) (0.064) (0.270) (0.295) (0.278) (0.302) (0.293) (0.308) (0.279) (0.488)
Police 0.135 -0.056 0.536
(0.107) (0.162) (0.431)
Employees -0.057 0.403*
(0.168) (0.162)
Tax 0.006 0.316 0.073
(0.088) (0.243) (0.336)
Salary -0.011 0.071
(0.151) (0.589)
N 19 19 36 36 36 36 34 34 34 34
R2 0.473 0.469 0.375 0.374 0.383 0.372 0.311 0.323 0.265 0.263
Notes: úp < 0.05; Poisson robust standard errors in parentheses; two-tailed tests.
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Appendix E.  A Cross-National Statistical Test 
The analysis considers squatter settlement formation in 82 low and middle-income 
countries.1  I measure forbearance toward squatting through the fraction of the urban population 
that lives in squatter settlements in 2005 using UN-Habitat reports. UN-Habitat defines a squatter 
settlement as any urban area that suffers from one or more of the following conditions: non-durable 
structures (e.g. shacks), insufficient living area (i.e. overcrowding), insecure tenure, or deficient 
access to adequate water and sanitation facilities (UN-Habitat 2008).  The main shortcoming of this 
measure is that it does not isolate populations by their land tenure status. 2   
My key independent variable is a state’s distributive capacity, and particularly the 
progressivity of social expenditures.  Unfortunately, housing budgets and their beneficiaries are not 
available.  Absent housing expenditure information, the best way to measure distributive capacity 
consistent with my theory is to look at the extent of pro-poor social spending.  I follow others 
(Morrison 2009; Slater and Smith 2012; Timmons 2005) in using direct income taxation as a fraction 
of GDP as the best available proxy for redistribution from elites (Redistribution).  Income tax revenue 
is calculated as a fraction of GDP to control for the size of the economy and national income.  
Direct taxation of elites, I argue, predicts the ability to prioritize the poor through formal means.  I 
measure pro-poor expenditures more directly by the extent to which social safety nets exist to 
compensate for poverty and other social risks (Targeted), available from the 2010 Bertelsmann 
Transformation Index.  A score of “10” represents comprehensive social safety nets focused on the 
                                                
1 These are defined as countries with average per capita GDP of less than $15,000 between 1995 and 
2010.  Micro-states—defined as countries with a population less than 500,000—are excluded 
because of limited data and distinct urban dynamics.   
2 Although UN-Habitat has produced cross-country estimates of slum populations for other years, 
the 2001 and 2005 series offers the largest country coverage.  The terms “slums” and “squatter 
settlements” are used almost interchangeably, although tenure and ownership institutions can vary in 
both categories.  
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prevention of poverty that cover the entire population; a score of “1” represents the absence of 
social safety nets.  Most Latin American countries receive middling scores (4 to 6) because important 
social safety benefits are limited to a fraction of the population.  Both of these measures should 
predict fewer squatter settlements.   
To help assess my theoretical claim that distributive, rather than administrative, capacity 
underlies forbearance, I attempt to control for overall bureaucratic quality by controlling for the 
effectiveness of the bureaucracy (Effectiveness), as measured by the World Bank’s Government 
Indicators.  The effectiveness indicator captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of government’s commitment to such 
policies.  Following DeSoto, I include a measure for the number of days required to register 
property (Regulation).  More cumbersome bureaucracy to formalize property should be associated 
with large squatter settlements, if administrative capacity-based theories are correct. 
My second key independent variable is the degree of political decentralization.  I look at 
whether a country holds elections at the district and state level (Decentralization).  It runs from 0, if 
there are no subnational elections, to 2, if there are elections at both the local and state level.  While 
the case studies concentrated on unitary political systems, enforcement likely becomes even more 
complicated in federal systems if city, state, and national officials must coordinate enforcement and 
housing efforts.  This variable is based on the Quality of Government Database from the Institute at 
University of Gothenburg.  Under political decentralization, local politicians are more likely to 
respond to demands to permit squatting and national governments can pass off the costs of 
forbearance.  As such, I expect political decentralization to predict larger squatter settlements.    
To check that political centralization does not simply reflect regime type, I also control for 
regime type (using the sum of the autocracy and democracy scores, Polity2).  While the theory 
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developed here focuses on electoral democracies, forbearance also can occur in authoritarian 
regimes.  I expect democracies to have larger squatter populations because elected politicians are 
more sensitive to the political costs of enforcement.  Anecdotally, some authoritarian rulers have 
used far more consistent and intense repression against squatters and street vendors than plausible 
under democracy.  Pinochet strongly repressed squatter settlement formation in Chile.  The thuggish 
Chinese urban administrative police (chengguan) engage in routinized brutality against street vendors 
(HRW 2012).  Nonetheless, authoritarian regimes are diverse, and still have motives to redistribute 
resources (for a review, see Mares and Carnes 2009).  In particular, authoritarian rulers may favor 
forbearance to stabilize the regime without expansions in the welfare state.  Collier's (1976) excellent 
study of authoritarian Peru underscores the attraction of tolerance toward squatter settlements to 
rulers who are unwilling to do more to aid the poor. Dorman (2007) argues that Egyptian authorities 
since the 1960s began to tolerate squatter settlements to resolve housing demands and sustain a 
patrimonial indirect system of rule.   Thus, much like the political Right faces a tension in its 
embrace of forbearance, some authoritarian regimes may value the pro-poor distributive benefits 
that forbearance offers without the use of traditional welfare channels.  My hunch is that, on 
average, authoritarian regimes should be more likely to repress squatter settlements so the 
coefficient should be positive. 
I also include a number of controls.  It is possible that income taxation affects enforcement 
because it represents an increase in the size of the government’s budget to fund enforcement, as well 
as other welfare activities.  To account for this possibility, I control for all taxes collected by the 
government as a fraction of GDP (Taxes). Second, I test the impact of a larger welfare state, 
measured by aggregate social expenditures on health, social security, and education as a share of 
GDP (Welfare).  My expectation is that overall social expenditures do not have a clear impact on 
squatter settlement size because it is unclear if governments invest in substitutive or complementary 
 451 
programs.  Third, some economists have suggested a “modernization theory” of squatter settlements 
(Frankenhoff 1967; Glaeser 2012; Turner 1969).  Squatters are a transitory phenomenon 
characteristic of fast-growing economies, and they give way to formal housing as societies approach 
the later stages of economic development. As a measure of economic development, I include the 
natural log of GDP per capita between 1995 and 2010 in constant 2005 dollars (GDP).  More 
developed societies likely have smaller squatter populations. Fourth, I include Urban Growth as a 
control for the compound annual urban growth rate between 1995 and 2010.  Intuitively, cities that 
grow faster have more demand for housing and thus are likely to have larger informal settlements, 
regardless of government enforcement activities and social investments.  Fifth, I control for the 
population that lives in urban areas (Urbanization).  More urbanized countries likely have less 
available land for additional squatter settlements, and therefore smaller squatter populations. I also 
include dummies for each region. 
Table E.1 presents the results of a series of regression models of the cross-national 
determinants of squatter settlements.  Consistent with my first hypothesis, Model 1 reports that 
redistributive taxation is a highly significant negative predictor of squatter settlement formation. 
Controlling for the other possible confounders, the more that governments manage to tax the 
wealthy, the smaller the squatter population, and substantially so.  A standard deviation in income 
taxes collected (an additional 3 percent of GDP) is associated with 10 percent less of the urban 
population living in squatter settlements.   
These findings support my theory that governments that pursue greater redistribution are 
also better able to reduce squatting.  In other words, formal redistribution substitutes for informal 
redistribution, making squatting less likely. There are clearly inferential problems associated with this 
interpretation.  Specifically, an alternative interpretation is that governments with the administrative 
capacity to extract taxes from the wealthy also can keep the poor from squatting.  
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To separate these explanations, Model 2 includes the same array of variables, but uses social 
safety net provisions to capture expenditures on the poor.  Again, an important line of argument in 
past chapters is that spending must be divided based on its progressivity.  Only forms of 
expenditures that target the poor effectively reduce demand to squat and take resources through 
informal means.  Consistent with this emphasis, social expenditures on the poor are associated with 
smaller squatter settlements, but the effect falls just short of conventional levels of statistical 
significance.  Models 3 and 4 show that the size of the welfare state, even controlling for the 
progressivity of expenditures, does not predict squatter settlement size. 
These results thus support the argument advanced: progressive social spending—measured 
through taxation on the wealthy and safety nets for the poor—does foretell smaller squatter 
populations.  Encouragingly, alternative state capacity measures do a much worse job explaining 
squatter settlement patterns.  The effectiveness of the bureaucracy, and even GDP per capita, are 
not associated with smaller squatter settlements once redistributive spending is taken into account.  
The extent of regulation is a weak and inconsistent predictor of squatter settlement populations. 
Models 5 and 6 examine the impact of political decentralization.  As predicted, local and 
state elections are associated with larger squatter settlement populations.  The coefficient remains 
positive, but loses statistical significance, once we account for regime type.  These results thus 
suggest that decentralized political systems may have more challenges in controlling squatter 
settlement formation either because local politicians use forbearance to satisfy popular demands or 
they struggle to coordinate enforcement and social spending activities, as theorized in Chapter 3.   
Generally speaking, there is no statistically significant relationship between a country’s polity 
score and squatter settlements.  In some ways, this result is surprising given my theory of electorally 
motivated forbearance.  This could be attributed to measurement error given that the coefficient 
does point in the right direction.  Alternatively, it might reflect the diverse reasons that lead some 
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authoritarian regimes to favor forbearance due to its pro-poor, anti-state nature.  Future research 
may probe the workings of forbearance across a range of authoritarian regimes, investigating 
questions such as how the identity of squatters as potential political opponents or the durability of 
the authoritarian regime might affect its enforcement politics.  
TABLE E.1.  Cross-National Determinants of Squatter Settlements 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Redistribution -3.104ú -3.182ú -0.132 -1.057
(1.35) (0.84) (1.99) (1.79)
E ectiveness -0.271 5.760 -1.780 -1.125 6.047 1.742
(5.92) (6.40) (5.53) (6.87) (9.47) (9.19)
Regulation 0.075 0.065 0.050 0.091ú 0.077 0.091ú
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
GDP -1.071 -6.625 -4.936 -0.015 -1.212 4.854
(4.39) (3.45) (2.80) (4.39) (5.47) (5.29)
Urbanization -0.331 -0.340ú -0.203 -0.444ú -0.162 -0.311
(0.18) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.23) (0.23)
Urban Growth 6.201ú 4.614ú 5.427ú 5.990ú 5.200 6.689
(2.58) (1.83) (1.83) (2.45) (3.79) (3.38)
Taxes 0.242 -1.519 -1.254
(0.68) (1.41) (1.22)
Targeted -4.804 -2.013 -2.702 -0.159
(2.57) (2.67) (3.63) (3.35)
Welfare -0.385 1.804 0.773 -1.312
(1.03) (1.07) (1.73) (1.66)
Decentralization 6.095ú 4.494
(3.10) (3.00)
Polity2 0.233
(0.63)
N 67 76 82 76 40 40
R2 0.679 0.678 0.626 0.720 0.822 0.892
Notes: úp < 0.05; Robust standard errors in parentheses; two-tailed tests. Regional dummies not shown.
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